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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Overview 
 
The liability regime of executive and non-executive directors in companies constitutes a necessary 
corollary to control issues within a company. It is based on the determination of specific duties, it 
establishes the limits of management behaviour and it provides stakeholders and third parties dealing 
with the company with legislative protection against management misconduct. In that respect, 
directors' liability is an important and effective compliance and risk-allocation mechanism. 
The European Commission has not, to date, considered directors' liability issues in a comprehensive 
way. It is the purpose of this study to provide the relevant information in a comprehensive manner, in 
order to support to European Commission to consider its future policy in this area. To this end, the 
analysis spans from national laws and case law to corporate practice in respect of companies’ 
directors duties in all 27 EU Member States and Croatia.
1
 The overarching goal is to provide for a 
better understanding of certain important drivers of directors' behaviour. 
This study shows the extent to which the content and extent of duties and the corresponding liabilities, 
as well as the understanding of the persons to whom they are owed, fluctuate over the life of a 
company, i.e. during the "normal" phase of operation, and in the so called "twilight zone", i.e. shortly 
before insolvency. The study is mainly a stocktaking one. However, its comparative analysis also 
identifies similarities and differences between national regimes and identifies relevant cross-border 
implications. 
 
Mapping directors’ duties 
 
Apart from taking stock of the national regimes in 28 detailed country reports (cf. Annex), this study 
provides a comprehensive comparison of those elements of the law that appear relevant to further 
policy decisions to be taken by the European Commission. The comparative-analytical part strives to 
identify similarities, differences and trends in the relevant national laws of Member States, and to 
aggregate that information in an accessible manner. The comparative-analytical part uses maps, 
allowing the user to easily grasp the core information on each of the relevant aspects. Extensive 
tables aggregating statutory and case law allow for quick reference and a critical discussion of the EU-
wide treatment of each of the issues. 
The findings in respect of the relevant issues are set out below, followed by an overall assessment of 
the current legal landscape governing directors’ duties and liabilities in the EU.  
 
Organisation and structure of boards in Europe 
This study first analyses the differences in board structures used and available across the EU. Despite 
recent trends of regulatory convergence regarding board structures, there is still a significant degree 
of variation between the company laws of the EU Member States. The variation exists in the basic 
board structure (especially with regards to the distinction between one-tier and two-tier boards), as 
well as in relation to other aspects of company board make-up, such as election/nomination rights and 
the participation of employees. Differences in board structures can have a significant impact on both 
the extent and content of directors’ duties and liabilities, as well as on the enforcement of these duties. 
                                                     
1
 In the following, the term ‘Member States’, for the present purpose, is understood to refer to the current 27 EU Member States 
and Croatia. 
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First, the structure of a company’s board determines the main elements for the allocation of decision-
making powers – and, consequently, responsibility for the decisions – within a company. Second, to 
the extent that a legal system (also) relies on enforcement of directors’ duties through the company 
organs itself, a formal division of responsibilities between different types of board members may be 
seen as having the effect of creating incentives for holding managers to account. 
Employee participation can play an important role in the effect that rules on directors’ duties and 
liability have in practice. Twelve of the 28 countries examined grant employees some form of influence 
over the composition of the board. In most cases, employee representatives are not directly 
participating in the day-to-day management decisions, but rather in strategic planning and 
management supervision. There is a fair amount of variance among the systems of employee 
participation. The study finds that, throughout the examined countries, employee representatives on 
the board of directors are subject to essentially the same duties as other board members, although the 
practical application of such duties may somewhat differ across Member States. Also, this study finds 
that the participation of employee representatives in the managerial decision-making process strongly 
correlates with a less shareholder-centric understanding of the “interest of the company”. This is of 
significance for the main subject of this Study, since the interests of the company, and the question 
whether or not board members have acted in the company’s interest, plays a pivotal role in 
determining the accountability of board members across all jurisdictions examined by us. 
 
Substantive law in respect of directors’ duties 
The comparison and analysis regarding the substantive law governing directors duties covers a wide 
range of material and procedural aspects, notably: (i) where and how directors’ duties are addressed 
in the law – regulatory approach; (ii) who owes the duties and to whom – addressees of duties; (iii) 
how the interest of the company is defined; (iv) what represents the material content of the directors’ 
duties – duty of care, duty of loyalty; (v) the nature of liability, covering in particular the extent to which 
an individual director is liable for decisions taken by the board; (vi) further, it describes the type of 
liability flowing from breaches of the duties, and limitations to the liability. 
Regulatory approach. Member States’ laws differ both with respect to the general approach to the 
regulation of directors’ duties – based on a system of statutory rules or general principles of law (e.g., 
fiduciary principles or the law of agency) that are elaborated and amplified by the courts – and the 
level of detail with which the duties are laid down. Obviously, the first point relates to the well-known 
distinction between common law and civil law countries, although this distinction has lost much of its 
meaning in the context of directors’ duties. As far as the second point is concerned, some jurisdictions 
provide for a largely exhaustive list of specifically defined duties, others rely on a general clause that 
defines the behavioural expectations of directors in broad terms. However, the two points are not 
parallel. Directors’ duties may be uncodified but nevertheless distinguish between specific duties and 
attempt to regulate all relevant conflicts exhaustively. Or, the duties might be codified, however in the 
form of a very broad general clause. All legal systems draw on principles of general contract law, tort 
law, or fiduciary principles to supplement the company law-specific rules where necessary. Nowadays, 
in almost all countries, directors’ duties are predominantly codified.  
Notwithstanding a country’s general regulatory approach, the analysis suggests that the law in most 
legal systems is elastic enough to allow the courts to derive solutions for novel conflicts that are not 
addressed by the statute. Furthermore, irrespective of the paucity or indeterminacy of the statutory 
sources of directors’ duties, the content of the duties is nuanced and applicable to a variety of 
conflicts, provided that the courts have had the opportunity to build on the codified rules and develop 
the legal principles. As a consequence, the analysis concludes that, first, a fragmentary codification of 
directors’ duties as such does not necessarily lead to an insufficient level of investor protection. 
Second, fragmentation and/or paucity may, however, suggest a higher level of legal uncertainty, at 
least until judicially developed rules are well established, which, in turn, may require time and the 
existence of procedural rules that facilitate access to justice. 
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Addressees of directors’ duties.  In all Member States the main addressees of directors’ duties are 
the validly appointed members of the relevant company bodies, i.e. the de jure directors. However, the 
vast majority of Member States recognise that the duties owed by de jure directors should, under 
certain circumstances, also apply to other persons with a comparable relationship to the company and 
its stakeholders.  
The first category concerns, in general terms, persons who act as if they were de jure directors, 
despite not having been validly appointed as such. This category can be further divided into, first, the 
rather uncontroversial cases of defective appointment: even the jurisdictions that do not formally 
recognise the application of directors’ duties to such de facto directors typically resolve the matter by 
providing that any defects that may have attached to the process of appointment can be “healed” at a 
later point in time. Second, persons might simply behave as if they had been validly appointed, without 
such appointment ever being attempted. Most Member States also extend at least some of the duties 
to this type of director.  
The most problematic category concerns persons who do not act as if they were de jure directors, nor 
purport to be directors. Rather, they exercise a certain degree of influence over the company’s affairs 
that affords them a level of factual control comparable to the power that is typically vested in the 
board. This issue typically arises where a parent company, or its directors, take strategy decisions at 
group level. None of the Member States answers the question of whether the parent can be held liable 
in the same manner as the de jure directors of the legal entities they control with an unqualified “yes”, 
not least because doing so would call into question the very concept of limited liability. Where Member 
States do provide for liability of legal or natural persons wielding significant influence over the 
company, the rules differ significantly in the degree of control and influence that may lead to the 
imposition of director-like duties on the parent company or its management. 
Directors’ duties are owed primarily to the company, i.e. to the legal entity and not to its shareholders. 
This basic principle is universally accepted and undisputed. However, in exceptional circumstances 
duties may be owed directly to shareholders, creditors, or other stakeholders.  
Notably in the common law countries the rule is that directors owe their duties directly to the 
shareholders if a ‘special factual relationship’ exists between the director and the shareholders, for 
example where directors make direct approaches to the shareholders in order to induce them to enter 
into a specific transaction. In any case, this jurisprudence is restricted to the relationship between the 
director and the shareholders. Duties owed to creditors or to other constituencies, such as the 
employees, are not accepted in any of the common law jurisdictions, although the focus of the 
company’s interests may shift from the shareholders to the creditors in the vicinity of insolvency. 
Theoretically, in civil law jurisdictions, a direct legal relationship between directors, shareholders, and 
other constituencies may arise from an application of general principles of law, particularly tort law. 
The general tort law clauses that can be found in a number of jurisdictions may open that possibility as 
they provide for liability for any damage caused by intentional or negligent conduct. However, the 
courts restrict the use of the general clause, and in some of the jurisdictions general principles do not 
seem to play an important role in practice. In jurisdictions where legal tradition is usually characterised 
by narrower provisions these cannot be relied on as complements of the company law duties 
capturing general directorial misconduct, but they afford additional protection to shareholders and 
some other constituencies in particularly severe cases of wrongdoing like criminal offences. A third 
group of civil law jurisdictions distinguish laws between internal liability of the director to the company 
and external liability to shareholders or third parties. External liability usually requires conduct that 
goes beyond mere mismanagement or conflicts of interest and is triggered by a breach of specific 
legal requirements of the companies legislation or the articles of association, conduct that affects 
exclusively the rights of the shareholders, or the drawing up of misleading accounts. 
Duty of care. The duty of care ensures that directors devote sufficient time, care, and diligence to 
managing the company, act only on an informed basis, possess the necessary skills and experience 
to make sound business decisions, and consider the likely outcome of their decisions carefully. 
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However, legal systems differ with regard to the precise behavioural expectations towards directors in 
this respect. At the same time, most jurisdictions recognise that directors may become risk averse if 
the liability risk faced by them is too high, thus forgoing investment opportunities with a positive net 
present value in favour of less risky alternatives. They try to counter this phenomenon with rules 
capable of avoiding hindsight bias, in particular by introducing business judgement rules or similar 
mechanisms. Yet, this response is not uniform. 
As regards the first aspect, the behavioural expectations towards directors with a view to avoiding any 
deficient performance of management functions, the analysis splits into two aspects: the determination 
of the required standard of care and the allocation of the burden of proof for showing that the standard 
was met or, respectively, not met.  
Three approaches are used in defining the required standard of care, the objective/subjective 
standard (strictest), objective standard (intermediate), and reduced standard (less strict). All but four 
EU jurisdictions provides either for the objective/subjective or the objective standard. In addition, the 
differences between the strictest and intermediate standards are small, and even the four jurisdictions 
using the reduced standard may move fully or in part to a stricter standard. Therefore, there is 
significant convergence in respect of this issue throughout the EU. However, this study finds that in 
spite of the theoretical convergence the perception of how the standard of care applies in practice 
differs widely in the Member States. 
Regarding the burden of proof, the analysis focuses on whom it is imposed in relation to the most 
important aspect, notably the care taken by the director in making the business decision. While the 
burden of proof for other elements, for example the requirement that the company has suffered a loss, 
is often on the plaintiff, the level of care employed by the director is a function of processes that relate 
to board proceedings and the director’s state of mind. Accordingly, they cannot easily be reviewed by 
the claimant, especially if the claim is enforced by the shareholders. The allocation of the burden of 
proof consequently assumes particular importance. However, the relevant laws of EU Member States 
differ: about half of them imposes the burden of proof on the director (i.e., that he or she acted with 
due care), whereas the other half imposes it on the plaintiff (i.e., that he or she has failed to do so). 
The Member States show relatively little variation with respect to the questions of whether the 
applicable standard of care differs depending on the role and position of the director and the type of 
company. The statutory definition of the standard of care usually does not distinguish between 
directors depending on the role they perform and the position they occupy in the company. However, it 
is recognised in virtually all jurisdictions that even where the law contains only a general reference to 
the prudent businessman, it seems natural to require more of directors who work full-time and hold an 
important position in the company, such as chief executive or chairman of the audit committee, since 
the understanding of what constitutes ‘prudent’ or ‘diligent’ behaviour depends on the context. Yet, 
while the general approach to taking account of differences in the directors’ professional experience, 
knowledge of, and familiarity with, the company is fairly similar, the study observes nuanced 
differences in the Member States. A topical example is the responsibility of a non-executive director 
who holds a key position in the company, for example chairman of the board or of the audit 
committee.  
Member states’ laws also show relatively little variation as far as monitoring duties of the directors and 
the consequences of a delegation of functions on the standard of care are concerned. Virtually all 
jurisdictions hold, either in the statute, in case law, or in the literature, that the delegation of tasks does 
not lead to an exculpation of the delegating director. The Member States differ, however, in the 
specificity and comprehensiveness with which they regulate the problem. This latter aspect of the duty 
of care has become particularly relevant in financial institutions, where the financial crisis exposed 
significant risk management failures in some institutions. 
A further aspect in respect of the duty of care analysed in detail in this study is whether institutions 
comparable to the business judgment rule (originally adopted from US case law) have been 
implemented in Member States. The rule consists of a presumption that in making a business decision 
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the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that 
the action taken was in the best interests of the company. If this presumption is not rebutted by the 
claimant, the courts will generally respect the directors’ business judgment. If the presumption is 
rebutted by the claimant, the burden of proof shifts to the directors to demonstrate that the transaction 
was ‘entirely fair’ to the corporation. The study first asks whether an express, codified business 
judgment rule exists or the courts accord directors an implied margin of discretion, within which 
business decisions are not subjected to full review. If an express or implied business judgment rule 
can be found, the study examines the threshold requirements, the burden of proof for these 
requirements, and the remaining standard of review if the protections apply.  
The business judgment rule or an equivalent rule as a codified legal institution has spread over the 
last six or seven years to five European jurisdictions. The majority of legal systems in the EU, 
however, do not contain an explicit formulation of a business judgment rule. In that case, the margin of 
discretion accorded to the directors depends on the interpretation of the duty of care’s behavioural 
expectations by the courts. Often, clear definitions and bright-line rules are missing, with the 
consequence that the limits of the implied protection of business judgments are shifting and not easy 
to identify. Still, in most jurisdictions, there is evidence that the courts appreciate that a review of 
decisions taken under conditions of uncertainty has to acknowledge that the decision-maker has to 
rely ex ante on expectations and probabilities, and that a full ex post review may suffer from hindsight 
bias. Nevertheless, differences remain. At the other end of the spectrum are the countries that have 
codified a business judgment rule and thus explicitly provide for an area of managerial decision-
making that will not be reviewed by the courts. However, this does not mean that directors face the 
lowest risk of liability for breaches of the duty of care in these countries. Given that the level of 
protection afforded by a business judgment rule is a function of several factors, the advantage of 
recognising a protected margin of discretion by statute may be offset by rules that shift the burden of 
proof to the directors. This is in fact the case in most of the countries that have codified a business 
judgment rule. 
Duty of loyalty.  The duty of loyalty, broadly understood, addresses conflicts of interest between the 
director and the company. Particularly in common law, it has a long tradition as a distinct and 
comprehensive duty that encompasses a variety of situations where the interests of the director are, 
or may potentially be, in conflict with the interests of the company. In other legal traditions, a fiduciary 
position of directors is less accentuated and the duty to avoid conflicts of interest and not to profit from 
the position on the board of companies is less pronounced. Nevertheless, the social conflicts that the 
common law duty of loyalty is intended to address are identical and are recognised in most 
jurisdictions as in need of regulatory intervention. The most important such conflicts are: (1) related-
party transactions (self-dealing), i.e. transactions between the company and the director, either 
directly or indirectly; and, (2) corporate opportunities, i.e. the exploitation of information that ‘belongs’ 
to the company, in particular information that is of commercial interest to the company. Most other 
aspects associated with the expectation that the director act loyal towards the company (e.g., not to 
compete with the company, not to accept benefits from third parties that are granted because of the 
directorship, or not to abuse the powers vested in the directors for ulterior purposes) can be related to 
these two main applications of the duty of loyalty. 
While the duty of care is pervasive in the Member States and the formulation of the directors’ 
behavioural expectations does not differ widely between jurisdictions, the regulatory techniques 
employed to address conflicts of interest are markedly different. What is called duty of loyalty in the 
common law terminology, is in most jurisdictions a compilation of functionally comparable legal 
instruments. While no one approach is per se superior to another, it seems that the effectiveness of 
the respective rules depends on the flexibility that they allow and that some approaches lend 
themselves more to an application sensitive to the particularities of the individual case than others. 
The study analyses the status quo in relation to the most relevant behavioural expectations, notably 
the treatment of related party transactions as well as of the exploitation of corporate opportunities.  
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In respect of the treatment of related party transactions the study identifies three main approaches: (i) 
jurisdictions applying a broad rule that makes such transactions conditional upon disclosure and a 
decision by a disinterested organ; (ii) jurisdictions using the two-tier board system, allocating decision-
making power for transactions between the company and the director to the supervisory board; and, 
(iii) jurisdictions making such transactions conditional upon disclosure, but the interested director can 
participate in the decision that authorises the interested transaction.  
As regards corporate opportunities the assessment depends on two factors. First, is the exploitation of 
corporate opportunities by the directors for their own account restricted and, if yes, under which 
conditions (disclosure, disinterested approval, etc.) are the directors free to pursue a business 
opportunity that belongs to the corporation? Second, how is it determined when a business 
opportunity ‘belongs’ to the corporation? With respect to both dimensions, the law may adopt a narrow 
approach (i.e., the regulation is applicable to a narrowly defined set of cases) or a broad approach 
(applicable to a wide range of directors’ activities). Accordingly, one group of countries (in particular, 
those belonging to the common law group) impose a fairly broad duty on directors not to exploit any 
information or opportunity of the company, as this would constitute a case of prohibited conflict of 
interest, and a second, larger group relies on the duty not to compete with the company. No country 
establishes an absolute prohibition. All jurisdictions allow directors to exploit corporate opportunities 
after authorisation by the board of directors, supervisory board, or general meeting of shareholders, as 
applicable. 
Furthermore, in most jurisdictions the rules apply both to direct conflict cases (the director him- or 
herself takes advantage of the opportunity) and indirect conflicts (the director is involved in a business 
that engages in activities that are potentially or actually of economic interest to the company). The 
legal systems differ in details, for example with respect to the question of when the interest of the 
director in a competing business is significant enough to trigger the prohibitions of the no-conflict or 
non-compete rule or when the activities of a person affiliated with the director implicate the director 
him- or herself. But all legal systems that regulate these conflicts (which is not the case for all 
jurisdictions analysed) provide for some mechanism that goes beyond the purely formal director-
company relationship and includes affiliates that are economically identical or closely related to the 
director. The Member States differ systematically with regard to the second dimension, i.e. the 
definition of the necessary link between the business opportunity and the company. 
On the basis of the foregoing considerations, the study divides the Member States into the following 
groups. (i) The broad approach is based on what can be called the ‘no-conflict rule’: directors are 
required to avoid any type of conflict of interest with the company, which means in this context that 
they must refrain from exploiting business opportunities. (ii) The narrow approach relies on the duty 
not to compete with the company. The director is generally only required to refrain from pursuing 
economic activity in the company’s line of business. (iii) Finally, the third group comprises jurisdictions 
that do not contain any binding regulation of corporate opportunities, either by way of a statutory no-
conflict or non-compete provision or case law. However, the analysis shows that the jurisdictions in 
the third group do not, per se, exhibit regulatory gaps compared with the legal systems in the other 
two groups, as the law seems elastic enough to be able to address conflicts where regulatory 
intervention is deemed expedient. The main difference with regard to outcomes seems to be the 
increased legal uncertainty due to the lack of clearly specified rules addressing different conflict 
situations.  
An important aspect in this context is the treatment of resigning directors. The resignation may invite 
regulatory intervention if the director resigns for the purpose of establishing a competing business and 
he or she makes use of information, business contacts, or general skills and expertise acquired while 
serving on the board of the company. Often this issue will be addressed in the service contract with 
the director, which will contain a non-compete agreement imposing the obligation on the director not to 
compete with the company for a number of years. Outside the scope of the contractual solution, the 
law in many Member States is not settled. The difficulty is that the codified law in many countries does 
not deal with the problem of resigning directors explicitly and case law is scarce. In that case, the 
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situation is characterised by a great degree of uncertainty and the general rule is that directors’ duties 
no longer apply after the director ceases to hold office. 
Nature of liability. The board of directors is a collegiate body, but liability is in all Member States 
personal; it does not attach to the board as a corporate organ (which does not have legal personality), 
but to the individual director. This gives rise to the question how collegiate decisions that constitute a 
breach of duty translate into liability of the directors who participated in the decision by voting in favour 
or against it, and directors who were absent but were later involved in the implementation of the 
decision or could have prevented its implementation. These questions have not been addressed in all 
Member States. In particular in those jurisdictions where case law on directors’ duties is rare it may 
not always be clear which steps a board member should take in order to exculpate himself. In general, 
however, the principles developed by the legal systems that have dealt with this question show a high 
degree of coherence. This is in particular of relevance for jurisdictions where the burden of proof is 
normally with the plaintiff. 
Limitation of liability. The study identifies five methods to limit or exclude the liability of directors for 
breach of duty commonly used in the Member States: Exclusion of liability in the articles; ex ante 
authorisation of certain types of conduct by the shareholders, i.e. before the conduct that gives rise to 
liability occurs; ex post ratification of breaches of duty or waiver of the company’s claim; 
indemnification of the director against liability incurred not to the company, but to a third party, or 
against the costs of third party lawsuits; and directors and officers liability insurance (D&O insurance). 
 
Enforcement of the duties 
In order to ensure effective investor protection, enforcement of directors’ duties is a necessary 
complement to the substantive rules on directors’ duties and liability. While enforcement of personal 
claims, i.e. actions brought by shareholders or third parties in their own name for the infringement of 
individual rights owed directly to them generally does not pose significant problems, enforcement of 
the company’s claims against its directors faces two major difficulties: the organ authorised to act on 
behalf of the company may be conflicted, in particular, in the one-tier system. Second, enforcement of 
the company’s claims through shareholders by means of a derivative action faces a collective action 
problem: the costs are borne by the shareholders who bring the action, while the passive shareholders 
benefit from the claimant’s efforts. Consequently, the study focuses on, first, who has authority to act 
on behalf of the company in enforcing the company’s claim, and, second, under which conditions 
(minority) shareholders can bring a derivative action if the authorised organ does not act. As far as the 
second issue is concerned, the study quantifies the ease with which shareholders can bring a minority 
action. 
Standing to sue.  As regards the first issues, there is significant variation between the Member 
States. In a number of one-tier board systems the board of directors has the authority to instigate 
proceedings on behalf of the company. A second group of such countries provide that the general 
meeting shall have the power to decide whether or not to enforce the claim. A third group of one-tier 
board model countries accord the right to bring an action to both the board of directors and the 
shareholders in general meeting. In the group of jurisdictions with two-tier board structures, several of 
them stipulate that the supervisory board has the authority to instigate legal proceedings and 
represent the company; in others the supervisory board is required to do so upon the request by the 
general meeting. Alternatively, some jurisdictions allocate the power to decide on an enforcement 
action to the general meeting, the managing director, the board of directors, or either the management 
board or the supervisory board. It is difficult to assess which of these arrangements is the most 
effective in order to address the conflict of interest problem mentioned above and the data indicates 
that enforcement levels are low in all Member States.  
Derivative action.  The study assesses the ease of derivative actions from the point of view of, first, 
standing, second, the conditions for bringing an action, and, third, the cost rules and combines the 
findings into a minority shareholder enforcement index in order to facilitate cross-country comparison 
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and to allow an appreciation of the overall ease with which shareholders can enforce breaches of 
directors’ duties in each Member State if the authorised organ of the company fails to do so. The index 
assumes that the three components are of equal importance. Further, it must be noted that a high or 
low score in the enforcement index should not be equated with a high or low level of minority 
shareholder protection in the respective jurisdiction. The jurisdiction may have developed substitute 
mechanisms that supplement private enforcement and give minority shareholders other avenues to 
complain of an alleged breach of duty, as in particular judicial investigation procedures, disqualification 
of directors as a sanction, as well as other administrative or criminal sanctions.  
 
Directors’ duties and liability in the vicinity of insolvency 
All Member States employ one of two main legal strategies to ensure that creditors’ interests are 
properly taken into account in near-insolvent companies. First, the vast majority of Member States 
provide for a duty on the part of a company’s directors to timely file for insolvency. Typically, this 
strategy is then buttressed by a consequential liability of directors for any depletion of the company’s 
assets resulting from the delayed insolvency filing. In most Member States employing this strategy, 
this liability can only be enforced by the liquidator, and thus results in a proportional satisfaction of all 
creditors’ claims. 
The second main strategy we have identified is very similar in nature. Instead of setting a legal 
requirement for the insolvency filing, some Member States provide for a duty to cease trading at a 
particular point in time where creditors’ interests are at risk. The first regulatory strategy is clearly 
more widely spread. It is triggered by the insolvency of the company, rather than by merely a threat of 
insolvency. The “wrongful trading” strategy, on the other hand, differs in so far as it does allow 
companies, for at least a limited time, to continue trading in a state of (balance sheet) insolvency. At 
the same time, the wrongful trading remedy can – at least in theory – be triggered even before the 
company is formally insolvent. The remedy is based on a realistic assessment of a company’s 
prospects. Thus, directors of a formally insolvent company that has a realistic chance to trade its way 
out of its situation may be justified in continuing the business, while directors in a not-yet insolvent 
company may be obliged to cease its operations where the avoidance of a (future) insolvency seems 
highly unlikely. The two legal strategies seem to have at least similar effects on the behaviour 
expectations towards of directors in pre-insolvency situations. 
Important differences exist, however. In practice, courts mainly tend to enforce the wrongful trading 
prohibition in relation to companies that are already insolvent. This may suggests that, in practice, the 
wrongful trading prohibition tends to be triggered at a later stage than duties to immediately file for 
insolvency once the relevant triggering event has occurred. At the same time, however, empirical 
research suggests that recovery rates in jurisdictions relying on the wrongful trading prohibition – are 
higher than in jurisdictions adopting the “duty to file”-strategy.  
An additional regulatory strategy which at least indirectly affects the duties in the vicinity of insolvency 
is the so-called “re-capitalise or liquidate” rule. Throughout the European Union, public companies are 
obliged to call a general meeting where the (cumulated) losses of a company exceed 50% of the 
subscribed capital. While Art 17 of the Second Directive requires the calling of a general meeting in 
these circumstances, it does not require companies to take any specific action. A majority of the 
Member States have implemented the Second Directive as a mere duty to call a meeting. A third of 
the Member States, however, goes beyond this minimum requirement. These Member States require 
companies to choose, upon loss of half of their subscribed share capital, between either re-capitalising 
the company or winding down its operations and liquidating the company. The effect of the “re-
capitalise or liquidate” rule on near-insolvency trading is twofold. First, it aims at making it less likely 
for companies with significant nominal share capital to trade in a state of capital depletion. Second, 
duty-related enforcement mechanisms are directly linked to this strategy, as failure to ensure that 
appropriate capital measures are taken at this very early stage lead to the liability of board members. 
The findings suggest that enforcement of duties related to the “re-capitalise or liquidate” rule mainly 
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happens once insolvency proceedings have been opened, but the existence of the rule may have a 
significant impact on directors’ incentives as the company approaches insolvency. 
 
Cross-border issues 
The differences in respect of substantive law and enforcement set out above may have cross-
jurisdictional significance. In particular, they may create challenges as a consequence of cross-border 
operation or administration of companies. 
Centros decision.  The Court of Justice, with its decisions in Centros and subsequent cases, has 
significantly increased the availability of foreign company law forms to incorporators across Europe. 
As a result, a growing number of companies headquartered – and sometimes exclusively operating – 
in a particular jurisdiction will be subject to the company laws of another Member State. At its core, the 
jurisprudence of the Court of Justice ensures that companies formed in accordance with the law of 
one Member State (home state) will not be subjected to the substantive company law provisions of 
another Member State (host state) merely because of the location of the company’s headquarters or 
central management. 
The exclusive application of the home Member States’ company law mandated by the Centros line of 
cases also applies, in principle, to the regulation of both duties and liability of board members. This 
primarily means that incorporators, when choosing between the available company laws, also choose 
the legal framework for directors’ duties and liabilities. Host Member States would not be allowed to 
apply to companies incorporated in another Member State their domestic legal rules about directors’ 
liability, as this would potentially subject the directors to claims under multiple substantive laws and, 
as such, be ‘liable to hinder or make less attractive’ the exercise of freedom of establishment. The 
study outlines the main private international law “connectors” used by various jurisdictions. As the 
Court of Justice has held in Cartesio, Member States are effectively free to restrict the availability of 
their company laws to businesses that mainly, or at least exclusively, operate outside their territory. 
Traditionally, the ability of a company to have its centre of operations outside the jurisdiction it is 
incorporated in, depended on the private international law framework adopted by the relevant 
jurisdiction. Countries following the incorporation doctrine generally allowed companies to incorporate 
in their jurisdictions, even though no substantial link existed between the operations of the company 
and this jurisdiction. Countries following the real seat doctrine, on the other hand, traditionally required 
from their own companies that they maintain their central administration within their jurisdiction. 
However, as shown in the study, the relationship between the two approaches (i.e. private 
international law in relation to foreign-incorporated companies and company law requirement to 
maintain the “real seat” of a domestic company within a jurisdiction) can now be seen as relatively 
weak. The consequence of the above is twofold. First, the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice 
effectively requires all Member States, irrespective of their private international law approach, to 
accept foreign incorporated companies to establish their central administration within their territory. 
Second, a large variety of different company laws, including company laws of Member States still 
applying a real seat approach to foreign companies, are available to businesses across Europe. As 
mentioned above, this also includes the legal frameworks dealing with directors’ duties and liabilities. 
Potential conflicts. We identify a number of potential conflicts that can arise between different 
national rules in the area of directors’ duties and liability. 
 
Directors’ duties and general civil liability.  As discussed before, the study finds a significant 
degree of variance among Member States regarding the legal mechanisms for subjecting directors to 
liability. Not all Member States exclusively rely on company law mechanisms in this regard. Thus, 
rules which in a national context merely operate as functional substitutes for company law-based 
liability provisions can have the effect of subjecting directors to multiple and conflicting obligations. 
Where a Member State, for example, contains provisions regarding the liability for harming creditors’ 
interests in its general civil law, such rules may expose the director to liability under both, the 
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applicable company law and the “foreign” general civil law. This problem may potentially affect all 
companies with cross-border operations. 
Duties in the vicinity of insolvency. Particular problems arise as a consequence of differences in 
insolvency law. As described before, Member States rely on different legal mechanisms to dis-
incentivise directors from trying to “gamble” their way out of insolvency. Some of these mechanisms 
are situated outside traditional company law. In the jurisdictions examined, the application of Member 
States’ conflict of law rules differ significantly in relation to such duties. In a large number of Member 
States, no clear consensus exists in legal practice or academia regarding the qualification of duties to 
file for insolvency. Such duties are sometimes qualified as company law rules, leading to the 
application of the company’s home Member State. In other circumstances, such rules are qualified as 
falling within the area of tort law or insolvency law, which leads to the application of the law of the 
Member State where the company has its centre of main interest (COMI). In some Member States, a 
number of different interlocking legal strategies are classified, for private international law purposes, 
as belonging to different areas of law, leading to the application of such rules to foreign-incorporated 
companies. 
A further complication stems from the fact that the COMI will not necessarily coincide with the “real 
seat”. The study highlights the different approaches taken by the Member States analysed. In some 
countries, the exact classification of the rules that are functionally equivalent to insolvency-related 
duties is unclear and/or the classification differs within the class of legal remedies relating to near-
insolvency situations. In addition, other countries rely mainly or exclusively on company law 
mechanisms. This results in the inapplicability of the relevant legal remedies in relation to foreign-
incorporated companies and may thus lead to a significant degree of under-enforcement of the 
relevant duties. 
 
Conclusion of the Study 
 
Lack of enforcement. This study concludes that gaps and deficiencies exist less with regard to the 
substantive rules on directors’ duties, and more in relation to enforcement. In the vast majority of 
Member States, breaches of directors’ duties do not normally lead to judicial enforcement of claims 
against directors as long as the company continues to operate as a going concern. There are several 
factors that contribute to what may be seen as under-enforcement of directors’ duties. We find that the 
most important of these factors cannot easily be addressed by changes to the national law rules 
concerning directors’ duties; rather, the relevant obstacles are of a structural nature.  
First, in most jurisdictions the most important business decisions are taken by, or with the formal or 
informal approval of, the controlling shareholders. Consequently, it may be said that the issue in need 
of regulatory intervention is not so much wrongdoing by the directors that affects the shareholders as 
a class, but rather the minority/majority shareholder conflict.  
Second, the rules on standing do not seem to be working well. If the board of directors in companies 
with a one-tier board structure has authority to instigate proceedings on behalf of the company, the 
conflict of interest is apparent, in particular where incumbents are sued. However, data indicates that 
the problem is not alleviated by allocating the power to enforce the company’s claims to another 
organ, for example the general meeting or, in companies following the two-tier board model, the 
supervisory board.  
Third, the institutional preconditions may not always be conducive to enforcement. Even where the 
law on the books seems to be, in principle, satisfactory, enforcement is perceived in some Member 
States as being lengthy, expensive, and fraught with uncertainties. In addition, the perception of the 
competence and efficacy of the judicial system does not seem to be unreservedly positive in all 
Member States. Shareholders may prefer to remove the incumbent directors and appoint new ones, 
rather than applying to the courts.  
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As a consequence of these factors, enforcement in most jurisdictions is confined to cases of 
fraudulent conduct and particularly grave breaches of directors’ duties. In some cases, claims against 
directors are also brought following a change of control, although such claims are often excluded in 
the relevant agreements leading to the change of control. Enforcement activity also occurs where the 
duty of loyalty is implicated and directors have engaged in self-dealing or misappropriated corporate 
assets. It should be noted, that the findings do not, in itself, call into question the effectiveness of the 
relevant legal rules. The level of compliance with directors’ duties, particularly in larger companies, is 
perceived to be very high in some of the Member States that do not exhibit high levels of litigation 
activity. 
Incentive problems in relation to enforcement by (minority) shareholders.  Derivative actions are 
rare in Europe. An explanation may be that virtually all Member States exhibit deficiencies with 
respect to one or more of the three dimensions along which this study tests the effectiveness of the 
shareholder suit, as the ease of enforcement index shows. A particularly important issue are cost 
rules. A rule that requires the shareholders to advance the costs of the proceedings and imposes the 
litigation risk on them aggravates the collective action problem mentioned above. Therefore, this study 
submits that for an effective regulation of derivative actions all three elements analysed, standing, 
admission conditions and cost rules, should be conducive to minority shareholder enforcement. 
Absent that, private enforcement is unlikely to act as a meaningful deterrent against breaches of 
directors’ duties.  
Incentive problems with enforcement of claims against directors of insolvent companies.  In 
most Member States, judicial enforcement of directors’ duties mainly or almost exclusively takes place 
after the company has filed for insolvency. Nevertheless, the feedback received from both the 
interviewed practitioners and Country Experts suggests that in most Member States only a small 
fraction of claims against an insolvent company’s directors are enforced in practice. 
The study identifies the following three problems in relation to enforcement of directors’ duties after 
the company has entered insolvency proceedings. First, liquidators may often not be properly 
incentivised to bring claims against directors. Secondly, most companies that enter insolvent 
liquidation are small or medium-sized businesses. In most of these companies, the directors are at the 
same time major shareholders of the company. This typically means that a significant part of the 
director’s personal assets will have been tied up in the company, and hence lost in its insolvency. 
Third, practitioners from a number of Member States emphasised the problems relating to the costs 
and duration of court proceedings. In addition, and more relevant to this study, practitioners 
highlighted the legal uncertainties resulting from the scarce case law on directors’ duties in most 
jurisdictions. This situation may well be a self-perpetuating and inefficient equilibrium that may be 
attributed to the public good-nature of litigation of that sort. 
Gaps relating to companies with cross-border operations.  In all Member States directors’ duties 
consist of a mix of traditional company law duties, i.e. in particular the duty of care and the duty of 
loyalty, and additional duties that apply in the vicinity of insolvency, notably the duty to file for the 
opening of insolvency proceedings. As far as the latter are concerned, in most Member States some 
uncertainty exists as to their classification for purposes of private international law. Often there is no 
coherent view in the legal literature and in case law whether to classify an instrument as company law, 
insolvency law, or tort law. It is also possible that functionally related instruments are classified 
differently under private international law and, accordingly, are subject to different connecting factors. 
The consequence is that a coherent set of interconnected rules of substantive national company law 
may be dissected by virtue of the private international law and allocated to different legal systems. If 
foreign law is applicable to some aspects of the case and no substitute legal mechanism is available 
under that country’s substantive company law, parts of the case may be left unregulated. Finally, if 
companies and directors are subject to other regulatory regimes in addition to the state of 
incorporation, which of course determines liability of the directors under the general rules on directors’ 
duties, they may be dissuaded from exercising their free movement rights under the Treaty. 
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The likely disadvantages of the current legal situation in many Member States are as follows: 
(1) The uncertain scope of the private international law rules and the criteria for classification 
of the substantive provisions on directors’ duties in the vicinity of insolvency creates legal 
uncertainty. 
(2) Where two or more legal instruments function as legal complements in a jurisdiction, but 
these instruments are subject to different connecting factors and these connecting factors 
lead to the application of different national laws, the lack of coordination in the conflict of 
law rules may result in regulatory gaps. 
(3) It is unclear whether, and under what conditions, the application of additional duties and 
liability provisions, for example pursuant to the lex loci delicti commissi to directors of 
companies incorporated under a different jurisdiction is compatible with Arts. 49, 54 
TFEU. 
Such gaps may invite regulatory arbitrage. While we have not found any evidence in practice that 
regulatory arbitrage takes place, the theoretical possibility exists and may warrant a modification of the 
applicable rules on private international law so that the weak selection of multiple regimes is avoided. 
Gaps relating to director disqualification. Director disqualification as an administrative law 
substitute for private enforcement of directors’ duties creates similar cross-border frictions due to the 
unaligned nature of the respective private international law rules as those discussed in the previous 
section. Director disqualification requires some connection of the director’s company with the territory 
where the disqualification order is issued. Such rules give rise to two concerns. First, in case of foreign 
companies they may lead to strong selection as outlined above, since they apply in addition to any 
sanctions that may be applicable under the law of the company’s home Member State. In general, 
they are foreign elements that may disturb the balance of the domestic system of sanctions and 
liability. Second, and maybe more importantly, disqualification orders do not apply on an EU wide 
basis, but only capture companies that have the necessary connection to the territory where the 
disqualification order is issued. Even where a member State extends the applicability of its 
disqualification statute, this extension will not prevent the valid appointment of a director in another 
jurisdiction. Partly due to the case law of the European Court of Justice, Member States may find it 
difficult to enforce their national law rules against disqualified directors who are then appointed by 
foreign-incorporated companies, even where the relevant foreign-incorporated company operates 
within its territory. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The European Commission DG Internal Market and Services has commissioned the three authors of 
The London School of Economics and Political Science to undertake a study on directors’ duties and 
liability across the EU. Work on the study commenced mid-January 2012 and ended 15 December 
2012. The work basically consists of two strands, notably the relevant research in 28 jurisdictions (EU-
27 plus Croatia
2
) on the one hand, and the comparative analytical work on the other hand.  
In performing the task of local research in the 28 jurisdictions, in a first phase of the work, the three 
authors drew on a Europe-wide network of more than 60 local research assistants and renowned 
company law experts.
3
  
During the second phase of the work, the comparative-analytical part was developed in-house at LSE 
with additional input by a steering group of eminent experts and supplementary fact finding in the 
Member States where needed.  
The process of producing the 28 ‘country reports’ and the comparative analytical part is described in 
greater detail in the section on methodology below. 
 
Overview 
 
The structure of the finalised study is as follows. 
In this introductory part, the purpose of the study, history of the Commission’s work on directors’ 
duties, the scope of the study and the main methodological elements employed in preparing the study 
are presented. Further, it sets out a number of difficulties we encountered in preparing it. 
The comparative-analytical part is the core of this study, as it summarises as well as analyses the 
information gathered by us in the first phase of the project. Seven topics are covered:  
 The organisation and structure of boards, covering the choice between one tier and two tier 
structures, the roles of employee representatives and the appointment and dismissal process. 
 The substantive provisions on directors’ duties. This is the main part of the analysis, 
comprising the issues of who owes the duties and to whom; which are the interests of the 
company; and the content of the duty of care and the duty of loyalty. Further, it describes the 
type of liability flowing from breaches of the duties, and limitations to the liability. 
 Questions of enforcement, i.e. who has the standing to sue and whether a derivative action is 
possible. 
 Duties in the vicinity of insolvency, in particular to file for insolvency and the prohibition to 
engage in wrongful trading. Further, whether there are other changes to directors’ duties in 
the vicinity of insolvency, and whether there is a duty to recapitalise or a mere duty to call a 
meeting. 
 Cross-border issues, notably the influence of the real seat or the incorporation theories on the 
law applicable to directors’ duties. 
For each of these topics, we first identify the main legal strategies used throughout the Member States 
to address the common practical problems in the respective sphere. We then “map” the regulatory 
approaches in the areas we identified as most relevant, in order to provide an overview of the legal 
landscape throughout Europe. In the subsequent analysis we take a functional approach, comparing 
                                                     
2
 For ease of reference hereinafter simply referred to as ‘Member States’ or ’28 jurisdictions’. 
3
 The list of all contributors is set out on pp. v et seq. 
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different legal strategies based on their intended purposes and their function within a given 
jurisdiction, rather than focussing on similar legal techniques. We then discuss the comparability of the 
strategies we identified and highlight potential problems where appropriate.  
The findings of the comparative-analytical part are supported by information extracted from our local 
experts’ answers to a number of hypothetical scenarios. The use of this tool allowed us to uncover 
hidden uncertainties, differences and practices which would not have been easy to spot based purely 
on a description of the law, however elaborate.  
Lastly, the second part will draw conclusions from the legal landscape and will try to identify the 
relevant legal issues and gaps in the legal framework. 
The Annex contains 28 country reports setting out the law of the Member States underlying directors’ 
duties and liability. All country reports follow, to the extent possible, the following template in order to 
facilitate orientation and comparison. 
 Overview of the regulatory regime and ownership structure of local companies. 
 Who is considered director under the local law (eligibility, de facto/shadow directors). 
 Content of directors’ duties under local law (duties of care, loyalty, etc). 
 Which are directors’ duties in the vicinity of insolvency (file for insolvency, wrongful trading). 
 Which types of liabilities directors incur and in relation to whom (company, third parties) 
 How claims based on breach of liability are enforced, by the company, by shareholders or by 
creditors. 
 Relevant conflict of laws rules, depending on the type of claim (company law rule, tort law, 
contract law, or insolvency law) 
The country reports strive to depict the local law currently in force comprehensively, adding necessary 
information on its historical and dogmatic background. They are entirely descriptive and refrain from 
assessing the legal framework in terms of completeness or efficiency.   
 
Purpose of this study  
 
This study is designed to assist the European Commission in assessing the EU approach to and 
policy on corporate law. It focuses on the issues of company directors’ duties and liability. It strives to 
enable policy makers to obtain a clearer picture of Member States’ statutory law, case law and 
supervisory and corporate practices in respect of directors’ duties and liability. Further, it identifies 
gaps and incompatibilities of the legal frameworks of Member States that may materialise in cross-
jurisdictional situations. 
 
History of the Commission’s work on directors’ duties and liability 
 
The High Level Group of Company Law Experts, which was set up by the Commission with a view to 
making recommendations on company law modernisation has recommended, in its 2002 report, 
amongst other things, the strengthening of the accountability of directors when the company is 
threatened by insolvency by introducing a rule on "wrongful trading" at EU level.
4
 Such a rule should 
hold company directors (including shadow directors) accountable for letting the company continue to 
do business when it can be foreseen that the company will not be able to pay its debts as they fall 
                                                     
4
 Report of the high level group of company law experts on a modern regulatory framework for company law in Europe, 
Brussels (2002), available at: http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/modern/report_en.pdf. 
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due. The group emphasised the usefulness of such a rule while adding that there was no need to 
harmonise the whole body of directors' liability rules in all Member States. 
 
The Commission included this idea in its 2003 Communication on Modernising Company Law. It 
stated however that concrete proposals would need further analysis before they are made. The 
proposal to introduce focussed harmonising legislation was then tested by the Commission in the 
context of its 2006 public consultation on future priorities for the 2003 Action Plan on Company law 
and Corporate Governance. The majority of respondents opposed any EU initiative in this regard. 
Amongst other things, it was argued that there were no current substantial cross-border problems 
requiring a common EU solution. Nonetheless, there was much support for preparing a study focusing 
on the different systems of directors’ responsibilities and liability. The study should establish the 
existence of a basis for common EU standards on some major principles and issues. 
 
In its 2010 Green Paper on Corporate Governance for Financial Institutions, the Commission raised 
the wider question of whether civil and/or criminal liability of directors needs to be strengthened. The 
invitation for comments was mainly designed as an information gathering exercise; there were no 
developed arguments in support or against the proposition, while it was expressly stated that 
additional in-depth work would be necessary.  
 
Just recently, in its December 2012 Action Plan on European Company Law and Corporate 
Governance, the European Commission announced to take up a number of initiatives intended to 
modernise company law and corporate governance in the EU. Amongst the measure envisaged is the 
strengthening of shareholder oversight over related party transactions of company directors. This 
study, in the context of analysing the duty of loyalty, already provides an analysis of the current state 
of play in Member States.  
 
Scope 
 
This study covers both duties and the consequential liability of directors. Directors’ liability is the 
corollary of a number of diverse duties imposed on them, either individually or as a group. For this 
reason, the application of laws addressing directors’ duties and liability is closely related to and 
interacts with other legal rules and statutory provisions on corporate governance.  
 
However, the legal framework regarding directors’ duties and corresponding liability is not well 
explored at the EU level. This is also due to the level of complexity of the matter, as different 
jurisdictions may have differing rules on  
 the character and variety of duties; 
 the changes of duties when a company comes close to or enters insolvency; 
 the exact circle of persons bound by these duties; 
 the exact circle of persons to whom these duties are owed; 
 the kind of liability entailed; 
 the procedures for enforcing duties and liability related claims; and, 
 the treatment of cross-jurisdictional situations. 
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Unsurprisingly, the rules governing the above and other related issues are widely spread over the 
different areas of law, such as company law, civil law, insolvency law, tort law and criminal law.  
 
Further, the sources vary considerably, from statutory law to case law but also including other 
regulatory instruments like stock exchange rules and rules promulgated by self-regulatory 
organisations. Any assessment of duties and corresponding liability of directors requires an 
aggregation of these sources. 
 
Therefore, in its fact-finding part, this study is a mapping exercise. The country reports contained in 
the Annex set out a comprehensive local picture regarding content, sources and practice in respect of 
directors’ duties and liability for each of the 28 jurisdictions. The comparative part aggregates this 
information so as to produce an overarching, bigger image in relation to the EU as a whole, identifying 
similarities, gaps, and difficulties between the various domestic regimes. 
 
There are, however, two restrictions to the scope.  
 First, the study is generally limited to pre-insolvency situations. In other words, it will not cover 
duties and corresponding liability arising on insolvency. Yet, it covers duties and 
corresponding liability in the vicinity of insolvency, i.e., the "twilight zone" period. This 
restriction to the scope is slightly blurred in certain cases as the borderline between pre-
insolvency and insolvency situations differs between the laws of Member States. 
 Second, though generally all companies are covered, regardless of their business (in 
particular: financial and non-financial ones), the study is primarily focussed on public 
companies, i.e. those subject to the Second Company Law Directive,
5
 such as the ‘plc’, ‘AG’ 
or ‘SA’. 
 
Main methodological elements  
 
Multi-tier scrutiny of research 
This study organised the relevant research activity in several layers in order to guarantee 
accurateness and completeness.  
 Country reports were drafted by local researchers. A template and prototype report were used 
as basis so as to guarantee the same level of awareness of the relevant problems of all 
researchers involved in the drafting.  
 Each country report was scrutinised by an eminent local company law expert who provided 
additional input and gave a second view on the substance. At the same time, the authors of 
this study were closely involved in the revision of the country reports, ensuring completeness 
and comparability.  
 The authors of the study aggregated the findings of all country reports and prepared the 
relevant conclusions from the comparative analysis.  
 At an early stage, preliminary conclusions were submitted to a high-level steering committee 
made up of leading legal scholars for review and additional input. The comparative-analytical 
part was refined on that basis and again submitted to the steering committee for comments.  
 Throughout the process of drafting the comparative-analytical part, the authors conducted 
additional fact finding, notably by way of interviewing eminent local experts that had not been 
                                                     
5
  See now Directive 77/91/EEC of 13 December 19762012/30/EU, OJ 2012 L 315/74. 
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involved in the drafting process so far. In particular in respect of practical enforcement of 
directors’ duties the authors sought this input from leading local practitioners.  
 
Functionality 
It is important to obtain pristine and unaltered information on each jurisdiction’s legal framework 
regarding directors’ duties and liability. However, there is a general risk of obtaining biased or 
incomplete information as local authors tend to view legal problems through the lens of the relevant 
national legal discourse. To tackle problems relating to this phenomenon, the comparative-analytical 
part of the study has been prepared with a strictly functional approach in mind.  
 
That is, practical problems are described and concrete questions are asked without reference to any 
specific legal rules and without employing terminology ‘borrowed’ from one of the jurisdictions. Only 
this method allows aggregating sensibly information gathered in the country reports. General and 
specific legal concepts in Member States are not necessarily the same and an attempt to work along 
legal classification would bear the risk of comparing what is not necessarily comparable. 
 
In order to assess not only the law on the books, but also the law in practice, we conducted a number 
of interviews with practitioners from leading law firms in all Member States. We asked questions 
regarding the practical role that directors’ duties play in the respective jurisdiction, the risk of liability 
that directors face, the likelihood of enforcement before insolvency and in insolvency, the relevance of 
the derivative action, and generally potential obstacles to an efficient enforcement. The answers to 
these questions allowed us to draw tentative conclusions regarding perceptions of the effectiveness of 
the regulatory regime. In the comparative part, we refer to these answers where appropriate. It should 
be noted that our conclusions are not based on a representative survey. In addition, they relate to the 
perceived effectiveness of the regulation of directors’ duties, rather than quantifiable indicators of 
enforcement output. We are grateful to all practitioners who have contributed to the study and made 
time available to answer our questions. 
 
Hypothetical scenarios 
Experience shows that any comparative legal study that exclusively focuses on abstract questions and 
generic description and comparison of the local laws is not only hardly vivid but first and foremost 
prone to be incorrect or incomplete. This is because only a concrete testing of the abstract and 
generic findings against concrete cases regularly reveals the full range of intricacies and 
interdependencies. Further, local laws (and local jurists) tend to see the law in purely national 
categories, generally neglecting the potentially distorting effect flowing from the involvement of cross-
jurisdictional elements.  
 
Consequently, we have included in respect of most countries the likely solutions to hypothetical 
scenarios, drafted by local experts, which cover a broad range of pertinent problems connected to 
directors’ duties and liability. The concrete answers given under the relevant local law were factored 
into our comparative analysis in order to support its accurateness and functionality. 
 
Cross-jurisdictional aspects 
National legislators tend to consider legislation from a purely domestic angle, often neglecting any 
potential distortion stemming from cross-jurisdictional incompatibilities. Consequently, national law 
often contains no or little guidance as to the comprehensive solution of such situations. Therefore, this 
study pays particular attention to the issue of cross-jurisdictional incompatibilities.  
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Difficulties 
 
The most significant difficulties in preparing this Study consisted in the following. 
 Member states’ legal frameworks in respect of a specific question, here directors’ duties and 
liability, often differ considerably, in terms of concepts, content, sources, etc. However, in 
order to keep this study manageable, country reports should follow the same structure and 
deal with exactly the same questions. Researchers and country experts have found it difficult 
to transpose their thinking into the standard structure of thought we asked them to follow. We 
have consequently invested a great deal of work with a view make findings comparable and 
manageable so as to guarantee a consistently structured and easily accessible final product. 
 The degree of sophistication of the legal literature and the case law in respect of the relevant 
questions varies enormously. This is not a surprise given that a number of Member States 
have smaller markets and some have also re-entered the market economy only about 20 
years ago. Obviously, one cannot expect the same degree of guidance from courts and 
academic writing across Europe, and our experience so far shows that legal problems 
discussed in detail for several decades in some jurisdictions have hardly been addressed in 
others. As a consequence of these differences, authors and reviewers from a number of 
countries are unable to provide us with authoritative and specific answers to some of our more 
detailed questions. Therefore, as a consequence, our discussion and analysis of some of the 
more complicated legal concepts tends to rely more on a subset of European jurisdictions. 
 Equally a typical phenomenon in comparative studies of the present kind, the cross-
jurisdictional aspect is not prominently addressed in most Member States. In other words, it is 
extremely difficult extracting the relevant information, also because guidance from courts and 
literature is scarce. This issue is further addressed in the comparative-analytical part, below.  
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COMPARATIVE-ANALYTICAL PART 
 
Introduction – Mapping Directors’ Duties 
 
The following part of the report contains the summary findings of the study. We This part has been 
designed drawing on the results of our stocktaking exercise, relying in particular on the country reports 
and the additional input received from our Country Experts and Country Researchers,
1
 as well as the 
input received by the Steering Committee, the discussions during our Steering Committee Conference 
and our discussions with the Commission. 
Our primary goal is to highlight common features as well as the difference between the approaches 
taken by EU Member States in regulating directors’ duties. Given the substantial differences in legal 
traditions and regulatory techniques between Member States on the one hand, and the similarities of 
the legal and economic problems this central part of company law tries to address on the other, we 
adopt a functional approach in our analysis.
2
 
In light of the aims of this study and having regard to its usefulness for assessing the necessity for, 
and the viability of, any potential future harmonisation in this area of law, we take the view that it is 
essential to identify functional equivalents across jurisdictions, and analyse their real-life effect on the 
operation of national company law.  
This part thus goes beyond describing different regulatory approaches relating to the accountability of 
directors; the aim is to compare both the legal techniques used, and their outcomes. The value of this 
approach is underlined by the fact that we find both – close similarities in outcomes despite 
fundamental differences in regulatory techniques, as well as significant differences in the effect of 
seemingly similar rules. 
 
This part is organised as follows. Part 1 sets the scene 
by providing an overview of the board structures used 
across the EU, including the role of employee 
representatives on corporate boards.  
Part 2 describes the substantive provisions on 
directors’ duties, including the different regulatory 
approaches relating to directors’ duties and the 
addressees of the duties. This part also provides 
information of how different Member States define the 
“interests of the company”, a concept that often serves 
as the central reference point for defining the 
behavioural expectations towards company directors. 
Furthermore it describes in detail how Member States 
define and enforce the duty of care and the duty of 
loyalty for company directors, and to what extent 
director liability can be excluded or limited.  
Part 3 contains a summary of the relevant enforcement mechanisms, and attempts to identify relevant 
legal factors for what is widely perceived as under-enforcement of directors’ duties. To complement 
our stocktaking exercise, which mainly focussed on obtaining information on the legal rules in place 
                                                     
1
 See the lists of contributors in Part I. of this report. 
2
 For a discussion of the merits of, and the problems connected with, the “functional method”, see e.g. R Michaels, “The 
Functional Method of Comparative Law” in: Law M Reimann and R Zimmermann (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative 
Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2006) 339-382.  
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across Europe, we conducted a number of interviews with corporate law practitioners from a number 
of Member States. The additional information obtained through these interviews is also described in 
Part 3. 
Part 4 deals with directors’ duties once the company approaches insolvency. The main findings of this 
part of the study, however, have been used in Part 5, which highlights the main problems arising from 
the establishment and operation of companies across frontiers. 
Each of the following sections starts by summarising the findings from our stocktaking exercise by 
categorising the legal approaches according to their main regulatory aims and their likely effect. The 
results are then visualised – necessarily in simplified form – by literally “mapping” the most significant 
regulatory groups. After that, we provide a short interpretation and analysis of our findings. 
To complement our presentation of the data collected in our stocktaking exercise, we circulated a 
number of hypothetical cases among our country experts, and where relevant reference is made to 
the answers we received to these hypotheticals.  
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1. The Organisation and Structure of Boards 
 
1.1 Relevance of board structure 
As part of our stocktaking exercise, we looked at the differences in board structures available and in 
use across the EU. These structures can have an important impact on the functioning and 
performance of a board,
3
 including a board’s attitude towards risk.
4
 The structure and composition of 
boards has also been shown to be related to a number of firm characteristics.
5
 Despite recent trends 
of regulatory convergence regarding board structures,
6
 we still find a significant degree of variation 
between the company laws of the EU Member States. The variation exists in the basic board structure 
(especially with regards to the distinction between one-tier and two-tier boards), as well as in relation 
to other aspects of company board makeup, such as election/nomination rights and the participation of 
employees.  
Differences in board structures can have a significant impact on both the extent and content of 
directors’ duties and liabilities, as well as on the enforcement of these duties.
7
 First, the structure of a 
company’s board determines the main elements for the allocation of decision-making powers – and, 
consequently, responsibility for the decisions – within a company. Second, to the extent that a legal 
system also relies on enforcement of directors’ duties through the company organs itself, a formal 
division of responsibilities between different types of board members may be seen as having the effect 
of creating incentives for holding managers to account.
8
 
The same is true for corporate ownership structure,
9
 which – for listed companies – also differs 
significantly across Europe.
10
 Indeed, the vast majority of corporate law practitioners we interviewed 
as part of our fact-finding mission stressed the fact that concentrated shareholder structures are an 
important factor explaining perceived low levels of enforcement of directors’ duties.
11
 In particular, the 
direct or indirect involvement in the managerial decision-making process by controlling shareholders 
of both listed and non-listed firms seems to act as a powerful disincentive for the enforcement of 
directors’ duties outside insolvency. 
                                                     
3
 See e.g. KJ Hopt, ‘Modern Company and Capital Market Problems: Improving European Corporate Governance after Enron’ 
in: J Armour and JA McCahery (eds.), After Enron: Improving Corporate Law and Modernising Securities Regulation in Europe 
and The U.S. (Hart: Oxford 2006) 445, 453; PL Davies “Board Structure in the UK and Germany: Convergence or Continuing 
Divergence?” (2001) 2 International and Comparative Corporate Law Journal 435; C Jungmann, ‘The Effectiveness of 
Corporate Governance in One-Tier and Two-Tier Board Systems: Evidence from the UK and Germany’ (2006) 4 European 
Company and Financial Law Review 426; RB Adams and D Ferreira, ‘A Theory of Friendly Boards’  (2007) 62 Journal of 
Finance 217. 
4
 See e.g. AB Gillette, TH Noe and MJ Rebello, “Board Structures Around the World: an Experimental Investigation” (2008) 12 
Review of Finance 93-140. 
5
 See e.g. A Boone, L Field, J Karpoff, and C Raheja, ‘The Determinants of Corporate Board Size and Composition: An 
Empirical Analysis’ (2007) 85 Journal of Financial Economics 66.  
6
 See e.g. PL Davies “Board Structure in the UK and Germany: Convergence or Continuing Divergence?” (2001) 2 International 
and Comparative Corporate Law Journal 435; KJ Hopt and PC Leyens, “Board Models in Europe – Recent Developments of 
Internal Corporate Governance Structures in Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy” (2004) 1 European Company 
and Financial Law Review 135. 
7
 See e.g. KJ Hopt and PC Leyens, ibid.  
8
 But see KJ Hopt and PC Leyens, ibid 142, pointing towards the reluctance of supervisory board members in a two-tier system 
to bring actions against management board members, as this would often entail admittance of a breach of the supervisory 
boards’ duty to exercise control over the management. See also Adams and Ferreira, n 3 above. 
9
 See e.g. S Thomsen, ‘Conflicts of Interest or Aligned Incentives? Blockholder Ownership, Dividends and Firm Value in the US 
and the EU’ (2005) 6 European Business Organization Law Review 201; CG Holderness, ‘A survey of blockholders and 
corporate control’ (2003) FRBNY Economic Policy Review 51. 
10
 See e.g. M Faccio and LHP Lang, ‘The ultimate ownership of Western European corporations’ (2002) 65 Journal of Financial 
Economics 365; F Barca and M Becht (eds.), The control of corporate Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2001); T 
Kirchmaier and J Grant, ‘Corporate ownership structure and performance in Europe’  (2005) 2 European Management Review, 
231.  
11
 “Closely-held companies”“ are private or public limited companies with a small number of shareholders and, consequently, 
relatively high ownership concentration. 
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1.2 Mapping board structures I: The choice between one-tier and two-tier 
boards 
Summary of the country reports in tabulated form 
Table 1.2.a: board structures in Europe 
Country 
one-tier or two-tier board 
structure 
(public companies) 
Austria 
mandatory two-tier board 
structure 
Belgium 
one-tier board  
or mixed structure
12
 
Bulgaria 
choice between one-tier and 
two-tier board structure 
Croatia 
choice between one-tier and 
two-tier board structure 
Cyprus one-tier board structure
13
 
Czech Republic  
mandatory two-tier board 
structure 
Denmark 
choice between “Nordic 
model”
14
 and German-type 
two-tier board structure 
Estonia 
mandatory two-tier board 
structure 
Finland 
choice between “Nordic 
model” and German-type 
two-tier board structure 
France 
choice between one-tier and 
two-tier board structure 
in addition, in the one-tier 
structure the company may 
choose between the PDG 
model
15
 
Germany 
mandatory two-tier board 
structure 
Greece one-tier board structure 
Hungary 
choice between one-tier and 
two-tier board structure 
Ireland one-tier board structure
16
 
Italy 
choice between three 
different board structures
17
 
                                                     
12
 Under Belgian law, the board of directors may transfer some of its power to a “direction committee”, which consists of both 
directors and non-directors.  
13
 Cypriot company law is based on the UK Companies Act 1948. As under the law of the United Kingdom, the argument can be 
made that a degree of choice exists in relation to board structures. See also n. 25 below. 
14
 See the description of the “Nordic Model” below. 
15
 The PDG or “président-directeur general”-model combines the offices of the CEO and the chairman of the board, which in 
turn has consequences on removal rights; see below Section 1.5. 
16
 Irish company law is similar to the law of the United Kingdom; hence, a degree of choice may exist in relation to board 
structures. As a matter of fact, Irish companies do, however, invariably adopt a one-tier board structure; see also n. 25 below. 
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Country 
one-tier or two-tier board 
structure 
(public companies) 
Latvia 
mandatory two-tier board 
structure 
Lithuania 
choice: supervisory board 
and/or board of directors are 
optional under Lithuanian 
law 
Luxembourg 
choice between one-tier and 
two-tier board structure 
Malta one-tier board structure 
Netherlands 
choice between one-tier and 
two-tier board structure
18
 
Poland 
mandatory two-tier board 
structure 
Portugal 
choice between three 
different board structures
19
 
Romania 
choice between one-tier and 
two-tier board structure 
Slovakia 
mandatory two-tier board 
structure 
Slovenia 
choice between one-tier and 
two-tier board structure 
Spain one-tier board structure 
Sweden “Nordic model”
20
 
United Kingdom one-tier board structure
21
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                                     
17
 Italian company law allows companies to choose between the “traditional” model with a board of directors and a board of 
statutory auditors, as well as a typical two-tier and a typical one-tier system. The prevalent choice, i.e. the traditional system, 
can probably best be described as a special form of a one-tier board structure. See the Italian report, Annex, Section 1.3, for 
details on the three board structures. 
18
 While companies may generally adopt either structure, after exceeding certain size-related thresholds, companies are obliged 
to adopt a two-tier board. 
19
 Portuguese company law allows companies to choose between the a structure with a board of directors and an audit board, 
as well as a typical two-tier and a typical one-tier system. The prevalent choice is best described as a special form of a one-tier 
board structure, in our view. See the Portuguese report, Annex, Section 1.3, for details regarding the available board structures. 
20
 See the description of the “Nordic Model” below. 
21
 UK company law does not contain mandatory rules as to a company’s board structure, arguably allowing shareholders to 
adopt a structure that resembles a typical two-tier board; see PL Davies and S Worthington, Gower and Davies’ Principles of 
Modern Company Law (9
th 
ed., London: Sweet & Maxwell 2012) 14-65; PL Davies “Board Structure in the UK and Germany: 
Convergence or Continuing Divergence?” (2001) 2 International and Comparative Corporate Law Journal 435.  
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Discussion 
Map 1.2.a: Board structures in Europe 
 
Legend Countries 
Mandatory two-tier board AT, CZ, EE, DE, LV, PL, SK 
One-tier board CY, EL, IE, MT, ES, SE, UK 
Choice 
BE, BG, HR, DK, FI, FR, HU, IT, LT, 
LU, NL, PT, RO, SI 
 
Board structures are usually classified into one-tier and two-tier structures, and it is this divide that has 
received most of the attention in comparative corporate governance debate. We find that a significant 
number of Member States provide national companies with a choice between the two systems. This 
“choice” approach has increased in its importance since the introduction of the Societas Europea  
(“SE”),
22
 which effectively enables incorporators across the EU to choose between one- or two-tier 
boards.
23
 Research relating to SE incorporations suggests that the added flexibility of governance 
(board) systems offered by the SE has been an important driver for the creations of SEs across 
                                                     
22
 Council Regulation (EC) No 2157/2001 on the Statute for a European Company (Societas Europaea – SE). 
23
 See Art 38(b) of the SE Regulation. J Rickford, ‘Current Developments in European Law on the Restructuring of Companies: 
An Introduction’ (2004) 15 European Business Law Review 1225, 1240. 
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Europe.
24
 It seems plausible that the recent trends of making available a choice of board structures for 
all public companies is related to these findings. 
As of 2012, thirteen Member States permit companies to choose between one- and two-tier boards. 
These are Bulgaria, Croatia, Denmark, Finland, France, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Portugal, Romania, Slovenia and, with some limitations, the Netherlands.  
Only seven Member States (Austria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Germany, Latvia, Poland, and 
Slovakia) require a two-tiered board, while eight Member States (Belgium, Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, 
Malta, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom
25
) provide for one-tiered board structures. 
There exists one important caveat in relation to our findings as reported above. While it is tempting to 
assume that the only significant divide between the board structures in different Member States’ is 
reflected in their choice between one-tier or two tier boards, a closer examination shows a more 
complex set of board structures in Europe. Under the typical “dualistic” model, a company has two 
distinct boards, one with purely supervisory functions and a management board responsible for the 
day-to-day management. Under the “monistic” model, on the other hand, the two functions are 
exercised by a unified board, such as typically the case under UK law. 
However, the board structures in a number of Member States cannot easily be classified according to 
the “monistic” / “dualistic” divide. For example, Swedish company law prescribes a structure that we 
classify, in our description above, as being closer to a “one-tier structure”.
26
 However, the executive 
team (including the CEO) of Swedish companies are, in effect, not typically elected by the 
shareholders, but rather by the shareholder-elected board, which in turn monitors the executive team. 
Although there is no formally distinct “management board”, the Swedish structure can probably best 
be described as a hybrid form, incorporating elements of both the one-tier and the two tier system,
27
 
although it still seems closer to the “monistic” model, given that the board has functions that go 
beyond purely supervisory tasks.
28
 This is reflected in the table above by classifying the Swedish 
board system as “Nordic Model”. Denmark and Finland also apply this “Nordic Model”, but in both 
jurisdictions public companies can choose to adopt a German-type two-tier structure instead. 
Similarly, Italian law offers not two but, three separate forms of organisation for corporate boards. For 
companies adopting the “traditional model”,
29
 the board of directors is accompanied by a “board of 
auditors”, which has only parts of the responsibilities that are typically associated with a supervisory 
board. Apart from the “traditional model”, Italian law also allows for the adoption of “typical” one- and 
two-tier board structures. Portugal adopts a very similar approach, also offering the choice between 
these three forms.
30
  
 
1.3 Mapping board structures II: Prevalent choices 
It should be noted, however, that in most of the Member States allowing for choice between different 
board structures, and particularly in the Member States that introduced such choice relatively recently, 
only few companies make use of the flexibility the law offers. The table below summarises the 
prevalent choices made by public companies in Member States classified as “choice”-countries above. 
                                                     
24
 See e.g. H Eidenmüller, A Engert, and L Hornuf, ‘Incorporating under European Law: The Societas Europaea as a Vehicle for 
Legal Arbitrage’ (2009) 10 European Business Organization Law Review (EBOR) 1-33. 
25
 In relation to the UK the argument can be (and has been) made that nothing in its national company law prohibits the 
adoption of a board structure that comes very close to the traditional two-tier board; see PL Davies “Board Structure in the UK 
and Germany: Convergence or Continuing Divergence?” (2001) 2 International and Comparative Corporate Law Journal 435. 
See also n 21 above. A similar argument can be made in relation to Cyprus and Ireland. 
26
 See also D Johanson and K Østergren, ‘The Movement Toward Independent Directors on Boards: A Comparative Analysis of 
Sweden and the UK’  (2010) 18 Corporate Governance: An International Review 527, 530. 
27
 See the Swedish report in the Annex; see also B Kristiansson, “Directors’ Remuneration in Listed Companies – Sweden” 
(2008), (available at www.ecgi.org/remuneration/questionnaire/sweden_update_2008.pdf) 2. 
28
 Rolf Dotevall, Bolagsledningens skadeståndsansvar (Norstedts Juridik 2008) p. 31. 
29
 See the Italian report in Annex I. See also F Ghezzi and C Malberti, “The Two-Tier Model and the One-Tier Model of 
Corporate Governance in the Italian Reform of Corporate Law” (2008) 5 European Company and Financial Law Review 
(ECFR) 1, 11. 
30
 See Portuguese Report in Annex I, p 7-8. 
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Based on our analysis of the real-life divisions between the different company organs, we decided to 
classify the system predominantly adopted by Italian and Portuguese companies as “one-tier”, 
although it is clearly possible to arrive at the opposite conclusion. 
 
Map 1.3.b: Choices between one-tier and two-tier boards  
in countries providing a choice of different board structures 
 
Legend Countries 
 Predominant structure:  
one-tier  
BG, DK, FI, FR, IT, LT, LU, PT 
 Predominant structure:  
two-tier 
HR, HU, NL, RO, SI 
 
 
1.4 Mapping board structures III: The roles of employee representatives 
The table below summarises our findings regarding the roles of employee representatives on the 
board of (large) public limited companies throughout the European Union.  
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Table 2.3.a: Employee participation in Europe 
Country 
employee participation  
(if mandatory, board-
level and independent 
of current/former state 
ownership) Details 
Austria Yes 
employees appoint one third of the members of the 
supervisory board 
Belgium No Only applies in certain state-controlled companies 
Bulgaria No - 
Croatia Yes One member of the supervisory board 
Cyprus No - 
Czech Republic Yes 
In companies with at least 50 employees, employees 
appoint one third of the members of the supervisory 
board 
Denmark Yes 
Two members of the board when adopting the 
“Nordic Model” of corporate governance 
Up to a third of the members of the supervisory board 
in companies adopting the two-tier model 
Estonia No - 
Finland Yes 
Employee participation subject to negotiation 
between company and employees 
France No 
Only in state-owned or certain privatised companies 
For all other companies, employee participation is 
voluntary and depends on agreement with employees 
Germany Yes 
Between one third and half of the supervisory board 
seats are allocated to employees (one third for 
companies with more than 500 and up to 2,000 
employees; one half for companies with more than 
2,000 employees) 
In companies with more than 2,000 employees, trade 
unions may also nominate representatives to the 
board 
Greece No Only in state-owned companies 
Hungary Yes 
one third of members of supervisory board, provided 
that company has more than 200 employees 
Ireland No - 
Italy No - 
Latvia No - 
Lithuania No - 
Luxembourg Yes 
In companies with more than 1000 employees, one 
third of the board members are employee 
representatives 
Malta No - 
Netherlands Nomination only 
Works council has nomination rights for up to a third 
of the board seats, but may not nominate employees 
of the company. The board members nominated by 
the employees still have to be elected by the 
shareholders. 
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Country 
employee participation  
(if mandatory, board-
level and independent 
of current/former state 
ownership) Details 
Poland No Only for (formerly) state-owned companies 
Portugal No - 
Romania No - 
Slovakia Yes 
One third of supervisory board members in 
companies with more than 50 employees 
Slovenia Yes 
One third of supervisory board members (two-tier 
structure) 
One to three members, depending on board size 
(one-tier structure) 
Spain No Only in state-owned companies 
Sweden Yes Two to three members of the board 
United Kingdom No - 
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Discussion 
Map 1.4.c: Board-level employee participation in Europe 
 
Legend
31
 Country 
 No mandatory board-level 
employee participation 
BE, BG, CY, EE, EL, ES, FR, IE, IT, LT, MT, 
PL, PT, RO, UK, LV 
Mandatory board-level employee 
participation AT, CZ, DE, DK, FI, LU, HR, HU, SE, SI, SK 
Nomination/opposition rights only NL 
 
                                                     
31
 Henceforth, we use the official two-letter country code to identify the Member States (and Croatia). These codes are as 
follows:  
Belgium  (BE)  Lithuania  (LT) 
Bulgaria  (BG)  Hungary  (HU) 
Czech Republic  (CZ)  Malta  (MT) 
Denmark  (DK)  Netherlands  (NL)  
Germany  (DE)  Austria  (AT) 
Estonia  (EE)  Poland  (PL) 
Ireland  (IE)  Portugal  (PT) 
Greece  (EL)  Romania  (RO) 
Spain  (ES)  Slovenia  (SI) 
France  (FR)  Slovakia  (SK) 
Italy  (IT)   Finland  (FI) 
Cyprus  (CY)  Sweden  (SE) 
Latvia  (LV)  United Kingdom  (UK) 
Luxembourg  (LU)  Croatia  (HR) 
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Our classification above is based on mandatory rules applicable to public companies with large 
domestic business operations. We do not report here special rules applicable only to companies 
operating in special industry sectors and/or to companies that are, or formerly were, (part-)owned by 
the state or another public body. 
Employee participation can play an important role in the practical effect rules on directors’ duties and 
liability have in practice. Twelve of the 28 countries examined by us grant employees some form of 
influence over the composition of the board. These countries are Austria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, 
Germany, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Luxembourg, the Netherland, Slovenia, Sweden, and Slovakia. 
Of these countries, only Sweden has been classified as providing for a one-tier board,
32
 while all other 
countries either mandate, or at least allow the adoption of a two-tiered board structure. There exists a 
fair amount of variance among the systems of employee participation; the spectrum ranges from the 
German system, where employee representatives
33
 populate 50% of the supervisory board in large
34
 
companies, to the Dutch system of nomination and opposition rights, where employees are in effect 
restricted to make recommendations for the appointment of particular candidates, but shareholders 
can in turn oppose such nominations.
35
 In addition, the employee representatives must not 
themselves be employees of the company.
36
 
We find that, throughout the examined countries, employee representatives on the board of directors 
are subject to essentially the same duties as other board members, although the practical application 
of such duties may somewhat differ across Member States.  
The decision to mandate board-level employee participation also relates to the focus and scope of 
directors’ duties more generally. We find that the participation of employee representatives in the 
managerial decision-making process strongly correlates with a less shareholder-centric understanding 
of the “interest of the company”. This is of significance for the main subject of this Report, since the 
interests of the company, and the question whether or not board members acted in the company’s 
interest plays a pivotal role in determining the accountability of board members across all jurisdictions 
examined by us. 
 
1.5 Appointment and dismissal of directors 
Summary of the country reports in tabulated form 
Table 2.3.a: Shareholder appointment and removal rights  
Country 
Rights of 
shareholders to 
appoint directors 
Rights of shareholders 
to remove directors
37
 
Comments 
Austria 
Shareholders may 
appoint members 
of supervisory 
board 
Management 
board members 
are appointed by 
Shareholders may 
remove members of 
supervisory board, but 
need supermajority to do 
so without cause 
(subject to articles, 
which can provide for 
Two-tier board structure 
mandatory 
                                                     
32
 But see the qualification as regards this classification above (text to n 27). 
33
 In Germany, some of the employee representatives are nominated by the relevant trade union, rather than the employees of 
the company; see s.7 of the German Co-Determination Law (“Mitbestimmungsgesetz”); see in more detail the German Report 
in Annex I. 
34
 i.e. companies with more than 2,000 employees. See s.7 of the German Co-Determination Law and, in more detail, the 
German Report in Annex I. 
35
 See e.g. G Jackson, “Employee Representation in the Board Compared: A Fuzzy Sets Analysis of Corporate Governance, 
Unionism and Political Institutions” (2005) 12 (3) Industrielle Beziehungen 1, as well as the Dutch Report in Annex I. 
36
 See the Dutch Report in Annex I for more detail. 
37
 The data presented here only refers to without cause removal rights, i.e. the right to remove a director without proving a 
breach of duties on the part of the director. 
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Country 
Rights of 
shareholders to 
appoint directors 
Rights of shareholders 
to remove directors
37
 
Comments 
supervisory board  simple majority). 
Management board 
members can only be 
removed by supervisory 
board and only for good 
cause. A vote of no 
confidence by the 
shareholders may 
constitute a good cause 
unless passed for 
unjustified reasons. 
Belgium 
All directors are 
appointed by the 
general meeting of 
shareholders 
All directors may be 
removed by the general 
meeting of shareholders 
without cause at any 
time 
One-tier structure; simple 
majority suffices for removal 
of directors 
Bulgaria 
One-tier system: 
Shareholders 
appoint all 
members of the 
board of directors 
Two-tier system: 
Shareholders 
appoint members 
of the supervisory 
board; supervisory 
board appoints 
members of the 
management 
board 
One-tier system: 
Shareholders may 
remove members of the 
board of directors at any 
time without cause  
Two-tier system: 
Shareholders may 
remove members of the 
supervisory board 
without cause 
management board 
members may be 
removed by the 
supervisory board 
without cause 
- Choice of board structures 
- simple majority suffices for 
removal of directors 
Croatia 
One-tier system: 
Shareholders 
appoint all 
members of the 
board of directors 
Two-tier system: 
Shareholders 
appoint members 
of the supervisory 
board; supervisory 
board appoints 
members of the 
management 
board 
One-tier system: 
Shareholders may 
remove members of the 
board of directors at any 
time without cause  
Two-tier system: 
Shareholders may 
remove members of the 
supervisory board 
without cause 
management board 
members may be 
removed by the 
supervisory board only 
for good cause 
- Choice of board structures 
- in the more common two-
tier system, the management 
board enjoys a higher degree 
of “insulation” as its members 
cannot be removed without 
cause (even by the 
supervisory board) 
Cyprus 
All directors are 
appointed by 
general meeting of 
shareholders 
Mandatory removal right 
in relation to all board 
members 
Mandatory removal right of 
shareholders (simple 
majority) 
Shareholders may vest 
power to appoint directors in 
board, but removal rights still 
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Country 
Rights of 
shareholders to 
appoint directors 
Rights of shareholders 
to remove directors
37
 
Comments 
apply mandatorily 
Czech 
Republic  
One-tier system: 
Shareholders 
appoint all 
members of the 
board of directors 
Two-tier system: 
Shareholders 
appoint members 
of the supervisory 
board; supervisory 
board appoints 
members of the 
management 
board 
One-tier system: 
Shareholders may 
remove members of the 
board of directors at any 
time without cause  
Two-tier system: 
Shareholders may 
remove members of the 
supervisory board 
without cause 
Shareholders’ removal 
rights in relation to 
management board 
members is subject to 
provision in articles 
Removal rights can be 
exercised by simple majority 
of the votes (where 
available), but articles may 
provide for higher threshold 
or additional requirements 
Denmark 
“Nordic Model”: 
Shareholders 
appoint all 
members of the 
board of directors  
Executives are 
appointed by 
board of directors 
Two-tier system: 
Shareholders 
appoint members 
of the supervisory 
board; supervisory 
board appoints 
members of the 
management 
(executive) board 
“Nordic Model”: 
Shareholders may 
remove members of the 
board of directors at any 
time without cause  
Executives can be 
removed by board of 
directors without cause 
Two-tier system: 
Shareholders may 
remove members of the 
supervisory board 
without cause 
Only supervisory board 
members can remove 
management (executive) 
board members; 
removal without cause 
- Nordic Model still by far the 
prevalent choice 
- Although the two-tier 
structure was modelled on 
German law, the supervisory 
board members can remove 
the management board 
members at their discretion 
Estonia 
Shareholders 
appoint members 
of supervisory 
board 
Management 
board members 
are appointed by 
supervisory board  
Shareholders may 
remove members of 
supervisory board 
without cause 
Management board 
members can only be 
removed by supervisory 
board and only for good 
cause.  
Two-tier board structure 
mandatory 
Finland 
“Nordic Model”: 
Shareholders 
appoint all 
members of the 
board of directors  
Executives are 
appointed by 
board of directors 
“Nordic Model”: 
Shareholders may 
remove members of the 
board of directors at any 
time without cause  
Executives can be 
removed by board of 
directors without cause 
- Nordic Model is the 
prevalent choice; few 
companies with supervisory 
boards 
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Country 
Rights of 
shareholders to 
appoint directors 
Rights of shareholders 
to remove directors
37
 
Comments 
Two-tier system: 
Shareholders 
appoint members 
of the supervisory 
board; supervisory 
board appoints 
members of the 
management 
(executive) board 
Two-tier system: 
Shareholders may 
remove members of the 
supervisory board 
without cause 
Only supervisory board 
members can remove 
management (executive) 
board members; 
removal without cause 
France 
One-tier system: 
Shareholders 
appoint all 
members of the 
board of directors 
Two-tier system: 
Shareholders 
appoint members 
of the supervisory 
board; supervisory 
board appoints 
members of the 
management 
board 
One-tier system with 
PDG:
38
  
Shareholders may 
remove all members of 
the board of directors 
without cause 
One-tier system without 
PDG:  
Shareholders may 
remove all members of 
the board of directors 
without cause, but need 
good cause to remove 
the general 
manager/CEO 
Two-tier system:  
Only  supervisory board 
may remove members 
of the management 
board 
One-tier model by far the 
most popular choice 
Germany 
Shareholders may 
appoint members 
of supervisory 
board 
Management 
board members 
are appointed by 
supervisory board  
Shareholders may 
remove members of 
supervisory board, but 
need supermajority to do 
so without cause 
(subject to articles, 
which can provide for 
simple majority). 
Management board 
members can only be 
removed by supervisory 
board and only for good 
cause. A vote of no 
confidence by the 
shareholders may 
constitute a good cause 
unless passed for 
unjustified reasons. 
Two-tier board structure 
mandatory 
Greece 
Shareholders 
appoint all 
Shareholders may 
remove any member of 
one-tier board structure is 
mandatory in Greece 
                                                     
38
 The PDG or “président-directeur general” model combines the offices of the CEO and the chairman of the board. 
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Country 
Rights of 
shareholders to 
appoint directors 
Rights of shareholders 
to remove directors
37
 
Comments 
members of the 
board of directors 
the board of directors at 
any time without cause 
Hungary 
One-tier system: 
Shareholders 
appoint all 
members of the 
board of directors 
Two-tier system: 
Shareholders 
appoint members 
of the supervisory 
board; supervisory 
board appoints 
members of the 
management 
board 
One-tier system: 
Shareholders may 
remove members of the 
board of directors at any 
time without cause  
Two-tier system: 
Shareholders may 
remove members of the 
supervisory board 
without cause 
Management board 
members may be 
removed by supervisory 
board only (subject to 
articles) 
 
Ireland 
All directors 
elected by 
shareholders 
Any director may be 
removed without cause 
by shareholder meeting 
with simple majority of 
votes cast 
Mandatory removal right of 
shareholders (simple 
majority) 
Shareholders may vest 
power to appoint directors in 
board, but removal rights still 
apply mandatorily 
Italy 
Traditional system: 
Shareholders 
appoint all 
members of the 
board of directors 
and the board of 
statutory auditors 
One-tier system: 
Shareholders 
appoint all 
members of the 
board of directors 
Two-tier system: 
Shareholders 
appoint members 
of the supervisory 
board; supervisory 
board appoints 
members of the 
management 
board 
Traditional system: 
Shareholders may 
remove members of the 
board of directors at any 
time without cause 
Members of the board of 
statutory auditors can 
only be removed with 
cause and following 
court approval 
One-tier system: 
Shareholders may 
remove any member of 
the board of directors at 
any time without cause 
Two-tier system: 
Shareholders may 
remove members of the 
supervisory board 
without cause 
Only supervisory board 
may remove members 
of the management 
board without cause 
Traditional system still by far 
the most popular choice 
External auditors may only be 
removed without cause 
irrespective of the board 
structure 
Latvia 
Shareholders 
appoint members 
of the supervisory 
Shareholders may 
remove members of the 
supervisory board 
Mandatory two-tier structure 
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Country 
Rights of 
shareholders to 
appoint directors 
Rights of shareholders 
to remove directors
37
 
Comments 
board; supervisory 
board appoints 
members of the 
management 
board 
without cause 
Only supervisory board 
may remove members 
of the management 
board, and only with 
cause 
Lithuania 
Where supervisory 
board is 
established: 
General meeting 
appoints 
supervisory board 
supervisory board 
appoints board of 
directors 
Where no 
supervisory board 
is established: 
General meeting 
appoints  members 
of the board of 
directors 
Where supervisory 
board is established: 
General meeting may 
remove supervisory 
board members without 
cause 
supervisory board may 
remove members of the 
board of directors and 
the company manager 
without cause 
Where no supervisory 
board is established: 
General meeting may 
remove supervisory 
board members and 
company manager 
without cause 
 
Both, board of directors and 
supervisory board are 
optional in Lithuania 
Luxembourg 
One-tier system: 
Shareholders 
appoint all 
members of the 
board of directors 
Two-tier system: 
Shareholders 
appoint members 
of the supervisory 
board; supervisory 
board appoints 
members of the 
management 
board 
One-tier system: 
Shareholders may 
remove members of the 
board of directors at any 
time without cause  
Two-tier system: 
Shareholders may only 
remove members of the 
supervisory board 
without cause 
management board 
members may be 
removed by the 
supervisory board 
without cause 
Where the articles 
provide so, management 
board members may 
also be removed by the 
general meeting 
- Removal rights are 
exercised with simple 
majority, unless otherwise 
stated in the articles of 
association 
- Articles of association can 
be changed by shareholders 
to gain right to remove 
management board members 
without cause 
Malta 
Shareholders 
appoint all 
members of the 
board of directors 
Shareholders may 
remove any member of 
the board of directors 
without cause  
One-tier structure 
Simple majority suffices for 
removal of directors 
Netherlands 
One-tier system: 
Shareholders 
One-tier system: 
Shareholders may 
Employees have the right to 
nominate, and under certain 
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Country 
Rights of 
shareholders to 
appoint directors 
Rights of shareholders 
to remove directors
37
 
Comments 
appoint all 
members of the 
board of directors 
Two-tier system: 
Shareholders 
appoint members 
of the supervisory 
board; supervisory 
board appoints 
members of the 
management 
board 
remove members of the 
board of directors at any 
time without cause  
Two-tier system: 
Shareholders may 
remove members of the 
supervisory board 
without cause 
supervisory board may 
remove management 
board members without 
cause, but an obligation 
to consult the general 
meeting applies 
 
 
circumstances oppose, the 
appointment of supervisory 
board members 
Poland 
Shareholders may 
appoint members 
of supervisory 
board 
Management 
board members 
are appointed by 
supervisory board  
Shareholders may 
remove members of 
supervisory board 
without cause 
Management board 
members can only be 
removed by supervisory 
board and only for good 
cause. 
Two-tier board structure 
mandatory 
Portugal 
“Latin board 
structure”: 
Shareholders 
appoint members 
of the board of 
directors and the 
audit board 
One-tier board 
structure: 
Shareholders 
appoint members 
of the board of 
directors  
Two-tier board 
structure: 
Shareholders 
appoint members 
of the supervisory 
board  
Supervisory board  
appoints 
management 
board members 
Shareholders may 
remove board members 
at any time without 
cause 
 
The removal rights are 
subject to the limitations in 
the articles of association  
Romania 
One-tier system: 
Shareholders 
appoint all 
members of the 
One-tier system: 
Shareholders may 
remove members of the 
board of directors at any 
- Removal rights are 
exercised with simple 
majority, unless otherwise 
stated in the articles of 
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Country 
Rights of 
shareholders to 
appoint directors 
Rights of shareholders 
to remove directors
37
 
Comments 
board of directors 
Two-tier system: 
Shareholders 
appoint members 
of the supervisory 
board; supervisory 
board appoints 
members of the 
management 
board 
time without cause  
Two-tier system: 
Shareholders may 
remove members of the 
supervisory board 
without cause 
Management board 
members may be 
removed by the 
supervisory board 
without cause 
Where the articles 
provide so, management 
board members may 
also be removed by the 
general meeting 
association 
- Articles of association can 
be changed by shareholders 
to gain right to remove 
management board members 
without cause 
Slovakia 
One-tier system: 
Shareholders 
appoint all 
members of the 
board of directors 
Two-tier system: 
Shareholders 
appoint members 
of the supervisory 
board; supervisory 
board appoints 
members of the 
management 
board (subject to 
articles of 
association) 
One-tier system: 
Shareholders may 
remove members of the 
board of directors at any 
time without cause  
Two-tier system: 
Shareholders may 
remove members of the 
supervisory board 
without cause 
Management board 
members may be 
removed by the 
supervisory board 
without cause (subject to 
articles of association) 
Co-optation right (i.e. board 
appointing additional 
directors) can be provided for 
by articles, but appointment 
only valid until following 
general meeting and subject 
to limitations 
Slovenia 
Shareholders may 
appoint members 
of supervisory 
board 
Management 
board members 
are appointed by 
supervisory board  
Shareholders may 
remove members of 
supervisory board, but 
need supermajority to do 
so without cause 
(subject to articles, 
which can provide for 
simple majority). 
Management board 
members can only be 
removed by supervisory 
board and only for good 
cause. A vote of no 
confidence by the 
shareholders may 
constitute a good cause 
unless passed for 
unjustified reasons. 
Two-tier board structure 
mandatory 
Spain 
All directors 
elected by 
Any director may be 
removed without cause 
In case a director breaches 
his or her duties, any 
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Country 
Rights of 
shareholders to 
appoint directors 
Rights of shareholders 
to remove directors
37
 
Comments 
shareholders by shareholder meeting 
with simple majority of 
votes cast 
shareholder can demand 
immediate removal of such 
director 
Sweden 
All directors 
elected by 
shareholders, but 
managing director 
is not typically 
member of the 
board 
Any directors can be 
removed at any time 
without cause 
Nordic Model 
The chief executive officer is 
typically not a member of the 
board of directors 
United 
Kingdom 
All directors 
elected by 
shareholders 
Any director may be 
removed without cause 
by shareholder meeting 
with simple majority of 
votes cast 
Mandatory removal right of 
shareholders (simple 
majority) 
Shareholders may vest 
power to appoint directors in 
board, but removal rights still 
apply mandatorily 
 
 
To enable us to assess the real-life effect of the legally defined duties of directors more fully, we have 
analysed the effective distribution of powers within the corporate entity. In this context, we first focus 
on the appointment and dismissal rights of shareholders in relation to board members. Significant 
differences exist across different Member States in relation to shareholders’ rights to remove directors 
without cause, i.e. without any proof of improper conduct on the part of the director.  
One must tread carefully in interpreting this data, however. Where ownership is concentrated, the 
legal allocation of appointment and removal rights does not typically have a significant effect on the 
accountability of directors or the influence shareholders have over a company’s affairs. High 
ownership concentration is still the norm in most Member States, including, to a certain extent for 
listed companies. 
The data summarised above is thus of particular importance for listed companies with a relevant level 
of share ownership dispersion.  
Although the company laws of all European jurisdictions enable a well-coordinated shareholder body 
to ultimately decide on the composition of the board of directors, the degree to which law “insulates” 
managers from immediate shareholder influence can have an important impact on directors’ 
behaviour. Even where a jurisdiction mandates the management of the company in the interest of all 
stakeholders, a credible threat of being removed by one of the constituencies (i.e. the shareholders) 
should be expected to influence the relative weight a director will assign to the different stakeholders’ 
interests when making business decisions. The effects of such decision rights can, for instance, play 
an important role in a board’s reaction to a hostile takeover offer. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
21 Directors’ Duties and Liability in the EU  
 
1.6 Shareholder power 
 
1.6.1 Managerial insulation 
Based on the data collected in relation to the factors mentioned above, one can group the jurisdictions 
covered by this report according to the influence shareholders have with regard to the composition of 
a company’s board of directors.  
The influence over the composition of a company’s board can have an important influence on how the 
company’s business will be managed in practice. The ability to change the board composition “ad hoc” 
also has important implications for the exposure of boards – and, hence, companies – to outside 
pressures,
39
 including pressures by activist shareholders with a short-term investment horizon. 
Likewise, these rights also affect the accountability of managers to shareholders.
40
 
In categorising the company laws of the Member States, we focus in particular on factors such as the 
rights of shareholders to dismiss directors without cause, the majority requirements for dismissal, and 
the presence of employee representatives on the board. Where a two-tier board structure also 
requires management board members to be appointed and dismissed by supervisory board 
members,
41
 the resulting mediatisation of shareholder power is also taken into account. Likewise, we 
also take into account how the “interests of the company” are defined under national company law. 
We would expect that where the interests of the company are defined in a way that includes multiple 
constituencies, this multi-interest model will result, at the margin, in a higher degree of managerial 
discretion.
42
 Overall, our categorisation can best be interpreted as focussing on “managerial 
insulation” – i.e. the degree to which managers can, at least in the short- and medium-term, withstand 
pressure from shareholders as to the corporate and business strategy pursued by the company. 
The relevance of our categorisation does, of course, also depend on a number of structural factors 
that cannot be regarded as direct consequences of the legal rules examined. Most importantly, a 
highly concentrated ownership structure may well render limitations of shareholder rights 
meaningless.
43
 Thus, the three categories may be most relevant in situations where share ownership 
is dispersed or at least no single shareholder, and no (coordinated) group of shareholders, has de 
facto control over the company. 
 
                                                     
39
 See the discussion Ferreira et al as to the possible impact of ad hoc removal rights on corporate risk taking (D Ferreira, D 
Kershaw, T Kirchmaier, EP Schuster, ‘Shareholder Empowerment and Bank Bailouts’ (2012) ECGI - Finance Working Paper 
No. 345/2013, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2170392). 
40
 The impact of managerial “entrenchment” has received particular attention in US legal and economic research; see e.g. LA 
Bebchuk and A Cohen, ‘The cost of entrenched boards’, 78 Journal of Financial Economics 409; PA Gompers, JL Ishii, and A 
Metrick, ‘Corporate governance and equity prices’ (2003) 118 Quarterly Journal of Economics 107. 
41
 Which is not the case in all jurisdictions, as can be seen above, Section 1.5. 
42
 See e.g. the discussion in M Gelter, ‘Taming or Protecting the Modern Corporation - Shareholder-Stakeholder Debates in a 
Comparative Light’ (2011) 7 NYU Journal of Law & Business 641. See also the “Varieties of Capitalism” approach (PA Hall and 
D Soskice (eds.) Varieties of Capitalism [Oxford: Oxford University Press 2001]); see also MC Jensen, ‘Value Maximization, 
Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function’ (2001) 14 Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 8, for a very critical 
view of multi-dimensional approaches to defining the objectives managers should pursue. 
43
 See above, text to n 9. 
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1.6.2 Classification of national company laws on the basis of “managerial insulation” 
Map 1.6.2.a: Classification of national  
company laws on the basis of “managerial insulation”  
 
Legend Country 
Group I AT, DE, EE, HR, LV, PL, SI 
Group II 
BG, CZ, DK, FI, FR, HU, LT, LU, NL, RO, SK, 
SE 
Group III BE, HR, CY, EL, IE, IT, MT, PT, ES, UK 
 
Rather than attaching an “index value” to each examined jurisdiction, we form three groups of 
countries, with each group assigning, in our view, a similar set of rights to shareholders of national 
companies. The reason we do not attach exact numerical index values to national company laws is 
that we want to avoid the wrong impression of precision. The effectiveness of shareholder rights is the 
result of a plethora of factors, only few of which are within the scope of this report. The possible 
interactions between the legal rules assessed and the diverse social, cultural, institutional and 
economic factors render a precise “ranking” of company law unfeasible, in our view. Also, the 
differences between the described legal systems should not be exaggerated, as – even in the 
absence of controlling shareholders – a number of other factors may lead to convergence in firm 
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behaviour.
44
 For example, economic pressures stemming from executive compensation or from the 
product markets certainly play an important role not reflected in our description below. Nevertheless, 
we believe that the grouping of jurisdictions may make it easier to compare the different legal systems 
covered by our study.  
We form three distinct groups of company laws, based on the factors mentioned above. As mentioned 
above, the rights we focus on will typically only be relevant in companies with at least modestly 
dispersed ownership structures. We thus restrict the analysis on rules applicable to public limited 
companies. Where shareholders may choose between several board structures, we focus on the 
prevalent choice made in the relevant jurisdiction to avoid focussing on governance structures that 
have little or no relevance in practice. 
Below is a description of the three groups we formed, as well as an explanation for the assignments 
we have made in relation to each jurisdiction covered. 
 
Description of the three “Groups” 
Group I  
Group I contains the company laws that offer the highest degree of managerial insulation to 
company directors. The Member States assigned to Group I prevent shareholders from directly 
removing the executive directors (managers) of a company before the end of their respective 
terms, except for cause.
45
 
Group III  
Group III contains the jurisdictions whose company laws offer shareholders the highest degree of 
power over management. The Member States assigned to Group III allow shareholders to (almost) 
immediately remove the managers of a company without cause before the end of their respective 
terms. In addition, company laws assigned to this group also lack additional features that may 
dilute the shareholder-centric orientation of the company, such as board level employee 
participation or a clear multi-interest approach in relation to the “interests of the company”. 
Group II  
This group contains the “intermediate cases” – jurisdictions that cannot easily be assigned to either 
of the two aforementioned categories, with managerial insulation between what we find for Groups 
I and III. 
 
Table 1.6.2.a: Classification of national  
company laws on the basis o f “managerial insulation”  
Country 
Classification 
(Group) 
Explanation of assignment to group 
Austria Group I 
Austria’s company law is assigned to Group I because 
the management board members cannot be removed 
without cause by the shareholders.  
In addition, even the supervisory board cannot remove 
members of the management board, except for cause.  
While a vote of no confidence by the shareholders may 
constitute good cause for dismissal by the supervisory 
board, this is not the case where shareholders pass the 
                                                     
44
 See also M Gelter, ‘The Dark Side of Shareholder Influence: Managerial Autonomy and Stakeholder Orientation in 
Comparative Corporate Governance’ (2009) 50 Harvard International Law Journal 129, who describes differences in 
shareholder influence as only “variations in degree”. 
45
 Removal “for cause”, in this context, typically requires proving a breach of directors’ duties. 
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Country 
Classification 
(Group) 
Explanation of assignment to group 
relevant resolution for unjustified reasons. Even where a 
cause for dismissal exists, the supervisory board still has 
discretion as to the exercise of the right (subject to the 
supervisory board members’ duties). 
Additional factors we considered are the “inclusive” 
definition of the interest of the company,
46
 the mandatory 
rules on employee representation, and the inability of 
shareholders to give binding directions to management 
Belgium Group III 
Belgium is classified as Group III-country, since all 
directors, including the executive directors, may be 
removed by the general meeting of shareholders without 
cause at any time. 
An additional factor we considered was the absence of 
mandatory rules on employee representation.
47
 
Bulgaria Group II 
Bulgaria is classified as Group II-country for the following 
reasons: members of the management board may only 
be removed by the supervisory board, but the 
supervisory board may remove members of the 
management board without cause at any time. In effect, 
shareholders cannot exercise removal rights directly in 
the two-tier structure, but since without cause removal 
rights are available to the supervisory board, the 
insulation of management is not as high as in the typical 
company subject to a law we classify as Group III. 
Additional factors we took into account are the absence 
of mandatory rules on employee representation as well 
as a shareholder-focussed definition of the interests of 
the company. 
Croatia Group I 
In the prevalent two-tier system, shareholders do not 
have the right to remove management board members 
directly.  
In addition, even the supervisory board cannot remove 
members of the management board without cause. 
Additional factors we considered are the definition of the 
interest of the company,
48
 the mandatory rules on 
employee representation,
49
 and the inability of 
shareholders as well as the supervisory board to give 
binding directions to management. 
Cyprus Group III 
Cyprus is classified as Group III-country, since all 
directors may be removed by the general meeting of 
shareholders without cause at any time. This right can be 
exercised with a simple majority of the votes cast. 
Additional factors we took into account are the absence 
of mandatory rules on employee representation, the 
shareholder-focussed definition of the interests of the 
company, as well as the right of shareholders to give 
                                                     
46
 See also Section 2.2.2 below. 
47  
The classification is based on the prevalent one-tier structure. See K Geens and M Wyckaert, ‘Het gebruik van het facultatief 
duaal systeem in Belgische beursgenoteerde vennootschappen: enkele facts and figures’ (2010) 7 TRV 527. 
48
 See also Section 2.2.2 below. Croatian law does seem to attach a higher weight to shareholder interests than other 
stakeholder interest, but shareholder interests are not assigned over-riding priority. 
49
 Note that the Croatian system of employee participation mandates only one employee representative on the supervisory 
board. 
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Country 
Classification 
(Group) 
Explanation of assignment to group 
binding directions to shareholders. 
Czech 
Republic  
Group II 
We assigned Czech company law to Group II for the 
following reasons: 
In the prevalent two-tier system, shareholders may 
reserve the right to remove management board members 
without cause in the articles of association. However, the 
default rule is that only the supervisory board may 
remove members of the management board. The articles 
may also make the removal right subject to additional 
conditions. 
Denmark Group II 
Denmark is categorised as Group II company law for the 
following reasons: Under the prevalent “Nordic Model”, 
shareholders may remove members of the board of 
directors at any time without cause, typically with simple 
majority. However, the CEO is not necessarily or typically 
a member of the board. 
In addition, Denmark adopts a mandatory system of 
employee participation. 
Estonia Group I 
Estonia’s company law is assigned to Group I because 
the management board members cannot be removed 
without cause by the shareholders, and even the 
supervisory board can only remove members of the 
management board with cause.  
An additional factor we considered is the “inclusive” 
definition of the interest of the company. Board-level 
employee participation is not, however, mandatory in 
Estonia. 
Finland Group II 
Finland is categorised as Group II company law for the 
following reasons: Under the “Nordic Model”, 
shareholders may remove members of the board of 
directors at any time without cause, typically with simple 
majority. However, the CEO is not necessarily or typically 
a member of the board. 
In addition, Finland adopts a mandatory system of 
employee participation, albeit subject to company level 
negotiations between the company and the employees. 
France Group II 
French company law is categorised as Group II. While 
shareholders may remove members of the board of 
directors without cause, they can only do so with cause in 
relation to the CEO in companies not adopting the PDG-
model.
50
 
In addition, the interests of the company seem to include 
interests other than those of the shareholder body as a 
whole. 
Germany Group I 
German company law is assigned to Group I because the 
management board members cannot be removed without 
cause by the shareholders.  
In addition, even the supervisory board cannot remove 
members of the management board, except for cause.  
                                                     
50
 One may argue that France is a Group III company law, depending on the importance one attaches to employee participation 
(which is absent in France), and depending on the adoption of the PDG system. 
 
 
 
 
26 Directors’ Duties and Liability in the EU  
 
Country 
Classification 
(Group) 
Explanation of assignment to group 
While a vote of no confidence by the shareholders may 
constitute good cause for dismissal by the supervisory 
board, this is not the case where shareholders pass the 
relevant resolution for unjustified reasons. Even where a 
cause for dismissal exists, the supervisory board still has 
discretion as to the exercise of the right (subject to the 
supervisory board members’ duties). 
Additional factors we considered are the “inclusive”, 
stakeholder oriented definition of the interests of the 
company, the mandatory rules on employee 
representation, and the inability of shareholders to give 
binding directions to management 
Greece Group III 
Greek company law is categorised as belonging to Group 
III, since shareholders can remove any member of the 
board of directors at any time without cause, and they 
can do so with simple majority (mandatory law). 
Additional factors we took into account in our 
classification are the rather shareholder centric 
understanding of the interests of the company, the 
absence of mandatory rules on employee representation, 
and the right of shareholders to give binding directions to 
management 
Hungary Group II 
In the prevalent two-tier structure, the supervisory board 
typically appoints the management board members. 
However, shareholders may preserve the right to appoint 
the members of both boards. 
Additional factors we took into account in our 
classification are the mandatory board-level employee 
participation system and the lack of a clear shareholder-
centred definition of the interests of the company. The 
case could, however, be made that Hungary properly 
belongs to Group III, not least because of a right of 
shareholders to give binding directions to management. 
Ireland Group III 
Ireland clearly belongs into Group III. Shareholders can 
remove directors without cause with a simple majority of 
the votes cast (mandatory rule), and they may give 
binding directions (albeit with qualified majority).  
Shareholder interests are clearly given overriding priority 
in case they conflict with the interests of another 
constituency. Moreover, no system of mandatory 
employee participation applies. 
Italy Group III 
We classify Italy as belonging to Group III for the 
following reasons. Under the traditional system, 
shareholders have the right to remove directors at any 
time without cause. A mandatory simple majority 
requirement applies.  
The interests of the companies are defined with a clear 
shareholder focus, and no system of board-level 
employee participation applies in Italy. 
Latvia Group I 
Latvian company law is assigned to Group I because the 
management board members cannot be removed without 
cause by the shareholders, and even the supervisory 
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Country 
Classification 
(Group) 
Explanation of assignment to group 
board can only remove members of the management 
board with cause.  
An additional factor we considered is the lack of a clear 
shareholder-centric definition of the interest of the 
company. Board-level employee participation is not, 
however, mandatory in Latvia. 
Lithuania Group II 
Lithuanian company law is assigned to Group II. 
Although members of the management board cannot be 
removed without cause by the shareholders directly as a 
default position, such right can be provided for in or 
added to the articles of association. In addition, the 
supervisory board can remove members of the 
management board without cause.  
An additional factor we considered is the lack of a 
mandatory board-level employee participation system 
and a shareholder-centric definition of the interests of the 
company. Indeed, Lithuania may also be assigned to 
Group III. 
Luxembourg Group II 
Under the two-tier system, shareholders may not directly 
remove the members of the management board without 
cause, unless the articles provide for this right. The 
supervisory board does not need to show cause to 
remove management board members.  
Where the articles say so, the general meeting may also 
remove management board members directly and 
without cause, providing for a lower level of insulation 
than in companies in Group I. 
Mandatory board-level participation applies to (relatively 
few) large companies. 
Malta Group III 
Malta belongs into Group III, since shareholders can 
remove directors without cause with a simple majority of 
the votes cast (mandatory rule), and they may give 
binding directions to the company’s directors.  
Shareholder interests are given overriding priority in case 
they conflict with the interests of other constituencies. 
Moreover, no system of mandatory employee 
participation applies. 
Netherlands Group II 
Under the prevalent two-tier system, shareholders may 
not directly remove members of the management board 
without cause. The supervisory board can, however, 
exercise a without cause removal right, and its members 
are themselves subject to a without cause removal right 
exercisable by the general meeting. 
This leads to a lower degree of insulation than in our 
Group III company laws. 
However, a multi-interest approach to the interests of the 
company as well, the mediatisation of shareholder rights 
through the prevalent two-tiered structure, and the 
involvement of employees in the nomination of directors 
result in shareholders of Dutch companies having less 
power to effect immediate changes to the company’s 
management than can be observed in company laws we 
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Country 
Classification 
(Group) 
Explanation of assignment to group 
classified as belonging to Group III. 
Poland Group I 
Polish company law is assigned to Group I because the 
management board members cannot be removed without 
cause by the shareholders.  
In addition, even the supervisory board cannot remove 
members of the management board, except for cause.  
Additional factors we considered are the lack of a clearly 
shareholder focussed definition of the interest of the 
company and the inability of shareholders or the 
supervisory board to give binding directions to 
management. Polish law does not, however, mandate 
board-level employee participation. 
Portugal Group III 
We consider Portuguese law to belong to Group III 
because under the prevalent board model, shareholders 
have a mandatory without cause removal right in relation 
to all directors. This right may be exercised by the 
general meeting with a simple majority of the votes cast 
(although this is a default rule). 
Portuguese law does not mandate board-level employee 
participation. The definition of the interests of the 
company seem to give priority to shareholder interests, 
but less clearly so than other members in this group. 
Romania Group II 
Romanian company law is assigned to Group II. Although 
members of the management board cannot be removed 
without cause by the shareholders directly as a default 
position, such right can be provided for in or added to the 
articles of association. In addition, the supervisory board 
can remove members of the management board without 
cause and its members are themselves subject to a 
mandatory without cause removal right.  
An additional factor we considered is the lack of a 
mandatory board-level employee participation system 
and a shareholder-centric definition of the interests of the 
company.  
In the case of Romania, the decision whether the better 
assignment is to Group II or Group III is not entirely clear. 
Slovakia Group II 
Slovak company law is assigned to Group II. Members of 
the management board can be removed without cause 
by the shareholders, but this power is often assigned to 
the supervisory board, leading to a certain degree of 
mediatisation of shareholder power.  
An additional factor we considered is the mandatory 
board-level employee participation system and the lack of 
a clearly shareholder-centric definition of the interests of 
the company. It may also be argued that Slovak company 
law should rather be assigned to Group III. 
Slovenia Group I 
Slovenian company law is assigned to Group I because 
the management board members cannot be removed 
without cause by the shareholders and even the 
supervisory board cannot remove members of the 
management board, except for cause.  
Additional factors we considered are the lack of a clearly 
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Country 
Classification 
(Group) 
Explanation of assignment to group 
shareholder-centric definition of the interest of the 
company, the mandatory rules on employee 
representation irrespective of the adopted governance 
structure, and the inability of shareholders to give binding 
directions to management. 
Spain Group III 
We classify Spain as belonging to Group III for the 
following reasons. Shareholders have the right to remove 
directors at any time without cause (mandatory rule).  
The interests of the companies are defined with a clear 
shareholder focus, and no system of board-level 
employee participation applies in Spain. 
Sweden Group II 
Sweden is categorised as Group II company law for the 
following reasons: Under the “Nordic Model”, 
shareholders may remove members of the board of 
directors at any time without cause, typically with simple 
majority. However, the CEO is not necessarily or typically 
a member of the board. 
In addition, Sweden adopts a mandatory system of 
employee participation, with employee representatives 
appointing members to the (quasi-unitary) board. 
United 
Kingdom 
Group III 
The UK clearly belongs into Group III. Shareholders can 
remove directors without cause with a simple majority of 
the votes cast (mandatory rule), and they may give 
binding directions (albeit with qualified majority).  
Shareholder interests are clearly given overriding priority 
in case they conflict with the interests of another 
constituency. Moreover, no system of mandatory 
employee participation applies. 
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2. Substantive provisions on directors’ duties 
2.1. Regulatory approach to directors’ duties 
Summary of the country reports 
Table 2.1.a: Regulatory approach to directors’ duties  
Country Case law or statutory 
law? 
General clause or 
different types of duty? 
If statutory law: 
exhaustive 
enumeration of duties 
or also common law 
ones? 
Austria Statutory law 1) Company law: 4 duties 
explicitly regulated in the 
AktG: 
a) duty to act in the best 
interests of the company, 
s. 70 
b) duty of non-
competition, s. 79 
c) duty of care, s. 84(1) 
d) duty of confidentiality, 
s. 84(1) last sentence 
2) Tort law and various 
other acts 
Exhaustive enumeration, 
but case law important in 
shaping the exact scope 
of duties 
Belgium Mixture of statutory law 
and case law: 
- Strictly speaking, duties 
are not codified in 
company law, but derived 
from the general duty to 
act in good faith (art. 
1134, 3 Civil Code), as 
well as the sections of 
the Companies Code 
providing for liability of 
directors 
- Substantial clarification 
has been given by case 
law (e.g. conditions of 
liability, co-existence of 
liability, content of civil 
law duty to act in good 
faith) 
1) Liability to the 
company based on 
company law or contract 
law: 
a) Liability for faults 
committed in the exercise 
of the directors’ 
management according 
to general law (i.e. law of 
contract), Art. 527 CC. 
This duty includes cases 
where the director acts 
against the company’s 
interests. Several more 
specific duties flow from 
the company’s interests 
(see right). 
b) Liability for breaches 
of the CC and the 
articles, Art. 528 CC 
c) Liability for non-
compliance with the 
regulation on related-
party transactions (as laid 
down in Art. 523), Art. 
529 CC 
d) Liability in bankruptcy 
if the assets of the 
- Art. 527 CC refers to 
general principles of 
contract law, in particular 
the obligation to act in 
good faith (art. 1134, 3 
Civil Code). This 
provision is interpreted as 
the basis of the duty to 
act in the company’s 
interest. The duty to act 
in the company’s interest 
gives rise to a general 
duty of loyalty from 
which, in turn, a duty not 
to compete, a duty of 
confidentiality, and a duty 
to avoid conflicts of 
interest derive 
- Art. 1382 Civil Code is 
an open-ended liability 
provision 
→ these provisions 
capture all cases that do 
not fall within a specific 
duty 
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company are not 
sufficient to meet all 
debts, Art. 530 CC 
(requires serious fault, 
i.e. ‘inexcusable 
recklessness verging on 
fraud) → comblement de 
passif 
2) Liability to third parties 
based on tort law: 
general liability provision 
for negligent acts causing 
damage, Art. 1382 Civil 
Code 
Bulgaria Statutory law 1) Commercial Act: 
specific duties: 
a) duty of care, s. 237(2) 
b) disclosure of conflicts 
of interest: s. 237(3) 
c) non-competition: s. 
237(4) 
d) confidentiality: s. 
237(5) 
e) regulation of related 
party transactions, s. 
240b 
2) Public Offering of 
Securities Act: s. 116b(1) 
lays down duties for 
directors of listed 
companies 
3) Director’s mandate: s. 
280 Obligations and 
Contracts Act 
The director’s mandate 
under s. 280 Obligations 
and Contracts Act is 
interpreted as giving rise 
to the general duties of 
loyalty and to manage 
the company; s. 237(3)-
(5) are specific 
expressions of the 
general duty of loyalty; 
when interpreting the 
specific duties, the courts 
do so in conjunction with 
the respective principles 
of general private law 
regarding the mandate 
Croatia Statutory law Companies Act specifies 
duties: 
1) Duty of care, s. 252(1) 
2) Confidentiality, s. 
252(1) 
4) Prohibition of 
competition, s. 248 
5) Other duties in ss. 
193, 251, 526 
Duty of loyalty not 
provided for in the 
statute, but its existence 
is commonly accepted 
Cyprus Partly case law, partly 
statutory 
Companies Act: 
1) Duty to avoid conflicts 
of interest, s. 191 
2) Other specific duties, 
such as particular 
disclosure obligations 
Not codified: 
1) Duty of skill and care 
2) Duties of loyalty: 
a) to act in good faith for 
the benefit of the 
company; 
b) to exercise powers for 
purposes for which they 
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were conferred 
c) to make independent 
judgments 
d) to avoid conflicts of 
interest 
Czech Republic Statutory law Commercial Code: 
1) Follow instructions of 
the general meeting, s. 
194(4) 
2) Duty of care, s. 194(5) 
3) Confidentiality, s. 
194(5) 
4) Non-competition, s. 
196 
5) Conflict of interests, s. 
196a 
Exhaustive enumeration 
of duties in the 
Commercial Code, no 
common law duties 
Denmark Statutory law Companies Act: 
1) General provision for 
liability: s. 361(1) → 
directors who, in the 
performance of their 
duties, have intentionally 
or negligently caused 
damage to the company, 
shareholder, or third 
parties, are liable to pay 
damages 
2) Risk management, 
internal control, and 
information duties, s. 115 
3) Duty of loyalty only 
fragmentarily regulated: 
a) related party 
transactions, s. 131 
b) duty of confidentiality, 
s. 132 
Duties are found 
throughout the 
Companies Act and vary 
in degree in light of the 
pertinent company. 
Furthermore, the duties 
can be derived from the 
company’s articles of 
association, the 
company’s rules of 
procedure and the 
Danish corporate 
governance 
recommendations. 
Estonia Statutory law 1) Duty to act in good 
faith, Civil Code, § 32 
Comprises: 
a) duty to share 
information 
b) equal treatment 
c) duty not to exercise 
voting rights in a way that 
is detrimental to the 
company or its members 
2) Duty of care, Civil 
Code, § 35; Commercial 
Code, § 315(1) 
Comprises: 
Exhaustive 
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a) duty to be diligent 
b) duty to be sufficiently 
informed for making 
decisions 
c) duty to restrain from 
taking unnecessary risks 
3) Duty of loyalty, Civil 
Code, § 35 
Finland Statutory law (case law is 
used as a reference in 
the literature and in 
private practice when 
interpreting the law) 
1) Companies Act: 
a) Chapter 1, s. 8: 
general clause; duty of 
care and duty to promote 
the interests of the 
company (includes 
loyalty to the company 
and shareholders);  
b) Chapter 1, s. 7: equal 
treatment of 
shareholders, typically 
but not exclusively 
applied in the context of 
the distribution of assets 
c) Chapter 6, s. 2: duty to 
see to the administration 
and organisation of the 
company 
d) basis of liability: 
- to the company for 
breaches of the duty of 
care: Ch. 22, s. 1(1) 
- to the company, 
shareholders or third 
parties for breaches of 
other provisions of the 
Companies Act: Ch. 22, 
s. 1(2) 
2) Non-competition and 
confidentiality are not 
specifically mentioned in 
the law, but are typically 
included in the 
agreements with 
directors 
Ch. 1, s. 8 is interpreted 
as including an unwritten 
duty of loyalty 
France Partly statutory law, 
partly general principles 
Commercial Code: Art. 
225-251 for the one-tier 
SA, 225-256, 257 for the 
two-tier SA 
According to 225-251 
and 256, directors are 
liable for: 
1) infringements of laws 
2) breaches of the 
articles 
Also common law duties, 
in particular with respect 
to the duty of loyalty 
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3) mismanagement 
225-257: members of the 
supervisory board are 
liable for negligence in 
the discharge of their 
duties 
Germany Statutory law 1) Duty of care, s. 93(1), 
sentence 1 Stock 
Corporation Act 
2) Duty of confidentiality, 
s. 93(1), sentence 3 
3) Duty of non-
competition, s. 88 
General duty of loyalty 
not explicitly regulated, 
but accepted by the 
courts 
Greece Statutory Law Law 2190/1920: 
1) General provision 
encompassing the duty of 
loyalty and duty of care, 
Art. 22a (dual nature: to 
achieve the objectives of 
the corporation with the 
due diligence of a 
prudent businessman 
and not to use the 
position of director for 
personal benefits to the 
company’s detriment) 
2) Duty of confidentiality, 
Art. 22a(3) 
3) Duty of non-
competition, Art. 23 
4) Regulation of related 
party transactions, Art. 
23a 
Non-exhaustive 
enumeration: general 
fiduciary duty derived 
from the agency-
relationship between the 
director and the company 
and the principle of good 
faith stemming from the 
Civil Code. 
All agents have the 
responsibility to promote 
the company’s 
performance and 
maximise its market 
value. 
Hungary Statutory law  
 
1) General rules of the 
Civil Code apply to the 
liability of directors for 
breach of duty. 
2) The Companies Act 
specifies: 
a) certain cases of 
conflicts of interests 
b) duty not to disclose 
business secrets 
c) duty of non-
competition 
No exhaustive 
enumeration of duties. 
The general fiduciary 
principles of the Civil 
Code apply to define the 
duties of care and loyalty. 
Ireland Mainly case law, 
supplemented by 
statutory rules on 
conflicts of interest 
1) Different types of 
common law and 
equitable duties 
equivalent to those under 
English law: 
a) duty of care 
b) duty to act in the best 
- 
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interest of the company 
c) duty to act for proper 
purposes 
d) duty to avoid conflicts 
of interests and secret 
profits 
2) Companies Act 1990: 
additional rules in relation 
to loans to directors and 
substantial property 
transactions involving 
directors 
3) Companies Act 1963: 
rules on reckless trading 
and fraudulent trading 
Italy Statutory law 1) General clause from 
the Civil Code, Arts. 
1175, 1375 (law of 
obligations): duty to act in 
good faith when fulfilling 
contractual obligations 
2) Self-dealing, Art. 2391 
Civil Code 
3) Corporate 
opportunities, Art. 
2391(5) Civil Code 
4) Duty of non-
competition, Art. 2390 
Civil Code 
5) Duty of care, Art. 
2392(1) Civil Code 
Exhaustive enumeration, 
but the courts take an 
active role in interpreting 
the existing law and filling 
gaps 
Latvia Statutory law 1) The general duty to act 
as a prudent and careful 
manager is laid down in 
Commercial Law 2000, s 
169(1). Case law and the 
legal literature interpret 
the general principle to 
give rise to: 
a) the duty to obey the 
law, the articles of 
association and decisions 
of the general meeting 
b) the duty of care 
elements (developed by 
case law and the legal 
literature): 
- duty to employ an 
adequate level of skill 
and care 
- risks must be 
reasonable given the 
market circumstances 
The duty of loyalty is not 
explicitly regulated in 
company law; it follows 
from the law of agency 
(Civil Code, s. 2304) and 
the fiduciary nature of the 
director’s role as an 
agent. 
Elements: 
1) Duty to act in the best 
interests of the company 
2) Duty to act loyal 
towards the shareholders 
as an aggregate 
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- duty not to delay 
decision-making 
- duty to make well-
informed decisions with 
an aim to reduce possible 
risks 
- duty to act 
independently 
2) Duty of non- 
competition, Commercial 
Law, s. 171 
3) Duty to disclose 
conflicts of interest, 
Commercial Law, s. 
309(3) 
4) Duty of confidentiality, 
Commercial Law, s. 19 
Lithuania Statutory law Civil Code, Art. 2.87: 
1) Duty of care 
2) Duty to act in good 
faith 
3) Duty of loyalty 
4) Duty to avoid conflicts 
of interest 
5) Duty to avoid 
commingling the property 
of the company and 
private property 
6) Duty to declare 
interest in proposed 
transactions 
- 
Luxembourg Statutory law 1) Art. 1382 Civil Code: 
general tort law provision 
2) Companies Act: 
a) Art. 57: duty to declare 
conflict of interest 
b) Art. 59(1) (one-tier 
board), Art. 60bis-10(1), 
60bis-18(1) (two-tier 
board): liability for 
contractual breaches or 
management mistakes 
(breaches of the duty of 
care) 
c) Art. 59(2) (one-tier 
board), Art. 60bis-10(1), 
60bis-18(2) (two-tier 
board): liability for breach 
of the articles or the 
Companies Act 
d) Art. 66: duty of 
confidentiality 
General duty of loyalty, 
which derives from the 
position of the director, 
the agency relationship 
between the director and 
the company, Art. 59 
Companies Act (general 
liability provision, see 
left), and Art. 1134 Civil 
Code (duty of parties to a 
contract to execute their 
obligations under the 
contract in good faith): 
duty to exercise powers 
in the best interest of the 
company 
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e) Arts. 72-75: general 
information duties 
NOTE: Art. 59 constitutes 
the legal basis for liability 
for breaches of all duties 
Malta Mainly statutory law Companies Act: 
1) Duty to act honestly 
and in good faith in the 
best interests of the 
company, Art. 136A(1) 
2) Duty of care, Art. 
136A(3)(a) 
3) Duty not to make 
profits from the position 
of director, Art. 
136A(3)(b) 
4) Duty to ensure that 
their personal interests 
do not conflict with the 
interests of the company, 
Art. 136A(3)(c) 
5) Duty not to use any 
property, information or 
opportunity of the 
company for their own 
benefit, Art. 136A(3)(d) 
6) Duty to exercise the 
powers they have for the 
purposes for which the 
powers were conferred, 
Art. 136A(3)(e) 
7) Duty not to compete 
with the company, Art. 
143(1) 
8) Prohibition of making 
loans or payments for 
loss of office to directors, 
Art. 144 
Directors’ duties are also 
derived from general 
principles of law, in 
particular the provisions 
of the Civil Code on 
agency relationships and 
the fiduciary duties laid 
down in the Civil Code 
Netherlands Mainly statutory law 1) Internal 
responsibilities: 
a) s. 2:8(1): the corporate 
organs must behave 
towards each other in 
accordance with what is 
required by standards of 
reasonableness and 
fairness 
b) s. 2:9: directors are 
responsible towards the 
legal person for a proper 
performance of the tasks 
assigned to them 
2) External liability (to the 
Liability derives from the 
statute, but the detailed 
requirements have been 
developed by case law 
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shareholders or 
creditors): based on tort 
law and applied by the 
courts to hold directors 
liable, inter alia, in the 
following situations: 
- entering into obligations 
with a third party, whilst 
the director knew or 
should 
have known that the 
company would not be 
able to fulfil them 
- knowingly frustrating 
creditors’ claims 
- selective payment, 
frustrating a single 
creditor’s claim and 
benefiting another 
3) s. 2:138 Civil Code: 
liability in case of 
insolvency (lex specialis 
to general tort law) 
4) s. 2:139 Civil Code 
(lex specialis to general 
tort law): if the interim 
figures or the annual 
accounts misrepresent 
the condition of the 
company, the directors 
shall be liable to the 
shareholders or third 
parties for any loss 
suffered by them as a 
result thereof 
NOTE: while the statute 
distinguishes between 
liability according to s. 
2:9, s. 2:138, or tort law, 
it is increasingly argued 
in the literature that the 
three grounds have 
converged into the same 
standard of assessment 
Poland Partly statutory law, 
partly case law 
1) Code of Commercial 
Companies: 
a) duty to abstain from 
deciding on conflicted 
transactions, Art. 377 
b) duty of non-
competition, Art. 380 
c) duty of care, Art. 483 
d) loan agreements and 
other transactions with 
Duty of loyalty not 
codified, but its existence 
is commonly accepted; it 
derives from the fiduciary 
relationship between the 
company and the director 
and provisions in the 
Code of Commercial 
Companies prohibiting 
specific types of action, 
e.g. the duty not to 
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the directors require the 
consent of the GM, Art. 
15 
2) General tort law, Art. 
415 Civil Code: ‘whoever 
by his fault caused a 
damage to another 
person shall be obliged to 
redress it’ 
compete with the 
company 
Portugal Statutory law Code of Commercial 
Companies: 
1) Duty of care, Art. 
64(1)(a) 
2) Duty of loyalty, Art. 
64(1)(b) 
Liability for a violation of 
both duties exists 
pursuant to the rules laid 
down in Art. 72 
3) Duty to disclose 
related party 
transactions, Art. 397(2) 
4) Duty of non-
competition, Art. 398(3) 
Some duties that are not 
expressly regulated in the 
statute are recognised by 
the courts as deriving 
from the general duty of 
loyalty. Directors are 
prohibited from: 
1) enjoying advantages 
from transactions 
between the company 
and third parties 
2) using means or 
information of the 
company to their own 
benefit 
3) revealing confidential 
information about the 
company 
Romania Statutory law 1) Art. 72 Companies 
Act: the duties and 
liability of directors are 
governed by general 
agency law (i.e. the law 
on the mandate under 
the New Civil Code) and 
the rules specifically 
provided for in the 
Companies Act 
2) Companies Act, Art. 
73: duty to fulfil all 
obligations prescribed by 
law and the articles of 
association (e.g., duty to 
observe the capital 
maintenance provisions, 
to keep company 
records, etc.) 
3) Formerly fiduciary 
duties arising from the 
agency relationship 
(mandate) between the 
director and the 
company, but since 2006 
codified in the 
Companies Act: 
a) duty of loyalty, Art. 
- Where the Companies 
Act does not contain any 
regulation, the rules 
under the New Civil Code 
on agency (the mandate) 
can be used to fill gaps 
(see left). In accordance 
with the nature of the 
mandate as a fiduciary 
relationship, the rules 
arising under the 
mandate are described 
as fiduciary duties. 
These include: 
a) duty to act in good 
faith, Art. 14 (this duty is 
considered as the 
essence of the duty of 
loyalty) 
b) general duty of loyalty 
(Art. 803(2)), 
encompassing the duties 
of disclosure and of 
confidentiality 
- Dogmatically, breach of 
the mandate leads to 
contractual liability. 
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144(1), encompassing: 
- duty to treat the 
business of the company 
fairly and honestly 
- to act intra vires 
- to promote exclusively 
the interests of the 
company 
- to avoid conflicts of 
interest 
- to refrain from using 
corporate opportunities 
b) duty not to compete 
with the company, Art. 
153
11 
c) duty of care, Art. 
144(1) 
Slovakia Statutory law Commercial Code, ss. 
191-196a 
1) s. 194(5): 
a) duty of care 
b) duty to exercise 
powers in accordance 
with the interests of the 
company / duty of loyalty 
c) duty of confidentiality  
2) Duty to act in good 
faith, s. 194(7) 
3) Duty of non-
competition, s. 196 
4) Prohibition of certain 
transactions (regarding 
loans, credit, property 
etc.) with the director, s. 
196a 
Directors’ duties are not 
exhaustively regulated in 
ss. 191-196a Commercial 
Code; in order to fill gaps, 
the rules on agency law 
(ss. 566-576 Commercial 
Code) apply pursuant to 
s. 66(3) 
Slovenia Statutory law 1) Companies Act (ZGD-
1): 
a) duty of care, Art. 
263(1) 
b) confidentiality, Art. 
263(1) 
c) regulation of related 
party transactions and 
general duty to avoid 
conflicts of interest, Art. 
38a 
d) duty of non-
competition, Art. 41 
2) Directors’ duties with 
respect to the financial 
operations of the 
High Court of Ljubljana: 
directors may not only be 
liable on the basis of 
ZGD-1 rules on liability, 
but also because of a 
breach of the agency 
agreement that exists 
between the company 
and the director 
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company are additionally 
regulated in the Financial 
Operations, Insolvency 
Proceedings and 
Compulsory Dissolution 
Act (ZFPPIPP) 
(applicable to all 
companies outside 
insolvency): When 
managing the company’s 
operations, the 
management shall act 
with the professional due 
diligence of the corporate 
finance profession, 
endeavouring to ensure 
that the company is at all 
times liquid and solvent 
(Art. 28(2)). 
3) Heightened standards 
exist for banks and other 
financial institutions in 
specific legislation 
Spain Statutory law LSC: 
1) Duty of care, s. 225 
2) Loyalty, s. 226 
3) Prohibition to use the 
company name, s. 227 
4) Prohibition to take 
advantage of business 
opportunities, s. 228 
5) Conflict of interest, s. 
229 
6) Duty of non-
competition, s. 230 
7) Confidentiality, s. 232 
Exhaustive regulation in 
the LSC 
Sweden Statutory law Companies Act: 
1) Duty to monitor, Ch. 8, 
§ 4(3) 
2) Conflict of interest 
regulation, Ch. 7, § 46 
(shareholders), Ch. 8, 
§ 23 (directors), Ch. 8, 
§ 34 (managing director) 
3) General basis for 
liability: Ch. 29, § 1: a 
director who in the 
performance of his or her 
duties, intentionally or 
negligently causes 
damage to the company 
shall compensate such 
damage. 
Duty of loyalty and duty 
of care are not explicitly 
regulated, but can be 
derived from the 
directors’ specific duties 
in the Companies Act. 
Duties can also be 
derived from the 
company’s articles of 
association.   
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United Kingdom Now statutory law, prior 
to 2006 common law 
1) Duty to act within 
powers, s. 171 
2) Duty to promote the 
success of the company, 
s. 172 
3) Duty to exercise 
independent judgment, s. 
173 
4) Duty of care, s. 174 
5) Duty to avoid conflicts 
of interest, s. 175 
6) Duty not to accept 
benefits from third 
parties, s. 176 
7) Duty to declare 
interest in proposed 
transaction, s. 177 
Common law duties 
codified 
 
Discussion 
Member states differ both with respect to the general approach to the regulation of directors’ duties – 
based on a system of statutory rules or general principles of law (e.g., fiduciary principles or the law of 
agency
51
) that are elaborated and amplified by the courts – and the level of detail with which the 
duties are laid down in statute. The first point relates to the well-known distinction between common 
law and civil law countries, although we will see that this distinction has lost much of its meaning in the 
context of directors’ duties. As far as the second point is concerned, we can distinguish between 
jurisdictions that provide for a largely exhaustive list of specifically defined duties and jurisdictions that 
rely on a general clause that defines the behavioural expectations of directors in broad terms. The two 
points are not parallel. Directors’ duties may be uncodified but nevertheless distinguish between 
specific duties and attempt to regulate all relevant conflicts exhaustively. This is the case with Cyprus, 
Ireland, and (until the company law reforms of 2006) the United Kingdom. On the other hand, civil law 
jurisdictions may simply contain a broad formulation of the directors’ responsibilities, which we 
observe in particular in the case of Belgium, France, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands (but no longer 
in other countries influenced by French commercial law, notably Spain and Portugal, which have 
recently moved towards a system of specific and express duties), and in the Nordic and Baltic 
countries (Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, and Sweden). Either way, we note that all legal systems 
draw on principles of general contract law, tort law, or fiduciary principles to supplement the company 
law-specific rules where necessary. For example, French, Belgian, and Dutch law utilise the general 
liability provisions of the law of tort and negligence;
52
 many jurisdictions, among them Bulgaria, 
                                                     
51
 Fiduciary principles are trust law based in common law jurisdictions, i.e. directors are seen as having to act exclusively for the 
benefit of the beneficiaries (the shareholders). Agency (sometimes called ‘mandate’), on the other hand, refers to the 
contractual relationship by means of which the principal confers authority on the agent to act on the principal’s behalf within a 
specified area of business or to carry out a particular transaction. From the common law point of view, these two concepts are 
to be distinguished. The law imposes more demanding expectations on trustees than on agents: ‘Directors are not only agents, 
but to a certain extent trustees. . . . The duty of directors to shareholders is so to conduct the business of the company, as to 
obtain for the benefit of the shareholders the greatest advantages that can be obtained consistently with the trust reposed in 
them by the shareholders and with honesty to other people; and although it is true that the directors have more power, both for 
good and for evil, than is possessed by the shareholders individually, still that power is limited and accompanied by at trust, and 
is to be exercised bona fide for the purposes for which it was given, and in the manner contemplated by those who gave it.’ N. 
Lindley, A Treatise on the Law of Partnerships, Including its Application to Companies (Callaghan & Company 1878), 364. Civil 
law jurisdictions are less familiar with the concept of the trustee; they have not developed a clear distinction between trust and 
agency. Rather, they generally assume that certain principles of good faith and honesty underlie all contractual or commercial 
relationships (see, for example, s. 242 of the German Civil Code, requiring debtors to act in good faith and take account of 
customary practice). 
52
 Belgian Civil Code, Arts. 1382, 1383; French Civil Code, Arts. 1382, 1383; Dutch Civil Code, s. 6:162. 
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Greece, Latvia, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia, explicitly refer to the law on agency to complement 
directors’ liability. 
In Map 2.1.a, we classify the Member States according to the divide between codified and common 
law duties. The directors’ duties of virtually all countries derive, at least to some extent, from case law, 
even if the company law is largely codified. The distinction between codified and common law 
countries is not so much one of a strict dichotomy as of a gradual difference or change in emphasis. 
The jurisdictions are located on a continuum and the importance accorded to case law or statutory 
law, respectively, changes incrementally, without a clear dividing line between the two regulatory 
approaches. With this caveat in mind, we assign the jurisdictions to three groups: (1) Countries with 
predominantly codified systems of directors’ duties; (2) jurisdictions where some of the main duties 
(e.g., duty of skill and care, duty not to enter into related-party transactions, etc.) are codified, but a 
significant number of duties are not; and (3) countries with predominantly case-law based duties. 
 
Map 2.1.a: Regulatory approach to directors’ duties  
 
Legend Country 
Predominantly codified duties 
 
AT, BE, BG, HR, CZ, DK, EE, FI, FR, 
DE, EL, HU, IT, LV, LT, LU, MT, NL, PL, 
PT, RO, SK, SI, ES, SE, UK 
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Partly statutory law, partly case-
 law
53
 
CY 
Case law 
 
IE 
 
In almost all countries, directors’ duties are predominantly codified. The only exceptions are Ireland, 
where directors’ duties are derived from case law, similar to the situation in the United Kingdom before 
the company law reform that led to the adoption of the Companies Act 2006, and Cyprus, where the 
main duties (duty of skill and care, duty to act in good faith for the benefit of the company, and duty to 
exercise powers for purposes for which they were conferred) are not codified. The codification (or lack 
thereof) of directors’ duties exemplifies well the affiliation of countries to different legal families. The 
countries belonging to the common law (Cyprus, Ireland, and UK) have, or have had until recently (UK 
pre-2006) largely or exclusively case-law derived directors’ duties. Therefore, they conform to the type 
of law-making and legal sources that we would expect from that legal family. This no longer applies to 
the United Kingdom, of course, but the UK’s common law heritage continues to be generally 
determinative of directors’ duties because the Companies Act 2006 aims to a large extent to codify the 
existing common law principles, rather than rewrite the law.
54
 In addition, the Companies Act 2006 
expressly stipulates that ‘regard shall be had to the corresponding common law rules and equitable 
principles in interpreting and applying’ the statutory duties.
55
 
As far as countries belonging to the first category are concerned (predominantly codified duties), a 
more detailed analysis shows that all jurisdictions rely to varying degrees on case law to define and 
amplify directors’ duties. Case law is, first of all, important in interpreting and clarifying the content of 
the codified duties. In addition, we can observe that, where the codified rules are insufficient, the 
courts and/or the legal literature may take recourse to the legal relationship between the company and 
the director, which is commonly held to be of a fiduciary nature and, accordingly, give rise to fiduciary 
duties, or to other general principles of law.
56
 Good examples of this interplay between statutory rules 
and case-law influences are France, Germany, and some of the Nordic and Baltic countries 
(Denmark, Finland, Latvia, and Sweden). The French Code de Commerce expressly provides for 
liability in case of infringements of the law or the articles of association or management mistakes 
(faute de gestion).
57
 It does not, however, mention the duty of loyalty, which has been developed by 
the courts and whose dogmatic basis remains controversial.
58
 Similarly, the German Stock 
Corporation Act contains only one provision regarding directors’ liability, which is structured around 
the duty of care,
59
 and a number of norms specifically tailored to situations that would fall within the 
remit of the duty of loyalty, using common law terminology, notably the duty not to compete with the 
company
60
 and the duty of confidentiality.
61
 Nevertheless, it is well established under German law that 
directors are bound by a general duty of loyalty developed by the courts and derived from good faith 
principles of contract law that covers cases not explicitly regulated by the statute. Finally, the Nordic 
and Baltic countries often provide only for a fragmentary codification of directors’ duties, with the 
consequences that contractual freedom plays an important role and a number of duties (for example, 
the duty of loyalty) are implied under general legal principles. 
                                                     
53
 In most countries, case law plays an important role in interpreting and amplifying directors’ duties. We classify a country as 
‘partly statutory law, partly case-law’ if several of the most important duties, e.g. the duty of skill and care and the duty of loyalty, 
are not derived from a statutory enactment, but are exclusively developed by the courts. 
54
 A notable exception are the rules on derivative actions (Companies Act 2006, ss. 260-269), which have replaced the famous 
(and for individual shareholders disadvantageous) principles established by Foss v Harbottle (1843) 67 ER 189 and its progeny. 
In countries influenced by the English common law that have not followed the UK’s lead in changing the case law, namely 
Cyprus and Ireland, the restrictive rule in Foss v Harbottle continues to apply, see Table 3.2.a below. 
55
 Companies Act 2006, s. 170(4). 
56
 See the description of directors’ duties in Table 2.1.a above. 
57
 Code de Commerce, L225-251. 
58
 See below 3.4. 
59
 German Stock Corporation Act, § 93. 
60
 German Stock Corporation Act, § 88. 
61
 German Stock Corporation Act, § 93(1), sentence 2. 
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Therefore, the source of the jurisdiction’s rules on directors’ duties and liability seems to be of 
secondary importance. Notwithstanding a country’s regular approach, the analysis suggests that the 
law in most legal systems is elastic enough to allow the courts to derive solutions for novel conflicts 
that are not addressed by the statute. Furthermore, irrespective of the paucity or indeterminacy of the 
statutory sources of directors’ duties, we find that the content of the duties is nuanced and applicable 
to a variety of conflicts, provided that the courts have had the opportunity to build on the codified rules 
and develop the legal principles.
62
 This observation implies two findings. First, the indeterminate or 
fragmentary codification of directors’ duties as such does not necessarily lead to an insufficient level of 
investor protection. Second, it may, however, suggest a higher level of legal uncertainty, at least until 
judicially developed rules are well established, which, in turn, may require time and the existence of 
procedural rules that facilitate access to justice. 
 
2.2 Addressees of directors’ duties 
2.2.1 Who owes the duties? 
Summary of the country reports 
Table 2.2.1.a: Who owes the duties? 
Country Does the 
concept of the 
de facto or 
shadow 
director exist? 
If yes, how are 
de facto or 
shadow 
directors 
defined? 
 
Under what 
conditions are de 
facto or shadow 
directors liable? 
 
Application to 
parent 
companies / 
controlling 
shareholders? 
Austria Yes 
de facto directors 
are recognised in 
case law and 
academic writing 
 
No statutory 
definition 
A de facto director 
is defined as a 
person who is not 
formally appointed 
as director and, 
thus, not 
registered in the 
Companies 
Register as 
director but who, 
in fact, 
significantly 
influences the 
management of 
the company 
 
De facto directors 
are not generally 
subject to the same 
duties as formally 
appointed directors; 
liability may, 
however attach 
under certain 
circumstances. In 
particular, liability 
for failure to file for 
insolvency and 
liability for grossly 
negligent depletion 
of assets in a pre-
insolvency context 
have been 
accepted by the 
courts. 
Yes 
Most relevant 
cases involve sole 
or controlling 
shareholder who 
in fact manages 
the company, with 
the appointed 
director only 
executing the 
directions received 
from that 
shareholder/parent 
company 
Liability also 
attaches where 
persons 
intentionally use 
their influence 
over the company 
to induce a 
director to act to 
                                                     
62
 Case in point is Dutch law, which contains only two rather indeterminate provisions on the (internal) responsibility of directors: 
ss. 2:8 and 2:9 of the Dutch Civil Code. The sections provide that ‘the legal entity and those who . . . are involved in its 
organisation must act in relation to each other in accordance with the principles of reasonableness and fairness’ (s. 2:8 DCC) 
and that directors ‘are responsible towards the legal person for a proper performance of the tasks assigned to them’ (s. 2:9 
DCC). The Dutch courts have relied on these provisions to regulate issues as diverse as the determination of the required 
standard of care and competence of directors, noncompliance with the articles of associations, entering into related-party 
transactions for which the director lacked authority, or starting a competing business. For more details see the Dutch country 
report and the summary below in Tables 2.4.2.a and 2.5.2.a. 
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Country Does the 
concept of the 
de facto or 
shadow 
director exist? 
If yes, how are 
de facto or 
shadow 
directors 
defined? 
 
Under what 
conditions are de 
facto or shadow 
directors liable? 
 
Application to 
parent 
companies / 
controlling 
shareholders? 
the detriment of 
the company or 
the shareholders 
Belgium Yes 
de facto directors 
are recognised in 
case law and 
academic writing 
and referred to in 
statutory law 
 
No statutory 
definition 
Case law defines 
a person as a de 
facto director, 
where such 
person performs 
“positive and 
independent acts 
of management”. 
Unclear whether 
mere influencing 
of management 
suffices to be held 
liable as de facto 
director. 
Concept may also 
cover shadow 
directors (i.e. 
directors who do 
not act as 
directors vis-à-vis 
third parties), 
subject to the 
requirement of 
“active” 
management 
 
Mainly relevant in 
relation to 
insolvency and 
near-insolvency 
duties. Liability 
based on tort law 
principles; liability 
based on general 
duties disputed, 
and no relevant 
case law 
unclear 
Unclear whether 
parent company 
may also fall under 
relevant provisions 
Bulgaria No 
not recognised 
as such by 
Bulgarian law; 
not recognised in 
court practice 
 
- 
 
- 
no 
strong 
presumption that 
limited liability 
shields 
shareholders in 
virtually all 
circumstances; 
controlling 
shareholder 
cannot be held 
liable as a de facto 
director 
Croatia unclear 
(in relation to de 
facto directors)  
not addressed in 
de facto 
directors 
Based on 
discussion in legal 
de facto directors 
unclear 
shadow directors 
General liability for 
yes 
Parent company 
may be held liable 
as shadow director 
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Country Does the 
concept of the 
de facto or 
shadow 
director exist? 
If yes, how are 
de facto or 
shadow 
directors 
defined? 
 
Under what 
conditions are de 
facto or shadow 
directors liable? 
 
Application to 
parent 
companies / 
controlling 
shareholders? 
legislation and 
no relevant case 
law 
discussed in 
scholarly writing 
based on 
German legal 
doctrine 
yes 
(in relation to 
shadow 
directors) 
literature, persons 
whose 
appointment was 
invalid due to a 
defect in the 
appointment 
procedure and 
persons acting as 
if they were 
directors in 
relation to both 
the company and 
in relation to third 
parties may be 
considered de 
facto directors 
(but unclear and 
disputed) 
shadow 
directors 
any person who 
can effectively 
influence 
decisions of the 
company, subject 
to conditions for 
liability 
deliberately 
exercising influence 
on company 
organs, causing the 
performance of an 
act that results in 
damage to 
company or co-
shareholders 
 
Cyprus Yes 
Both de facto 
and shadow 
directors are 
recognised  
 
statutory definition 
of shadow 
directors; any 
person on whose 
advice or 
instructions the 
directors of a 
company are 
accustomed to act 
concept of de 
facto directors 
mainly applied in 
relation to 
defective 
appointment 
 
De facto/shadow 
directors are liable 
under conditions 
applicable to de 
jure directors, but 
no clear guidance 
in Cypriot case law 
Yes 
But only in 
exceptional 
circumstances. 
Exercise of control 
rights (i.e. voting) 
will not normally 
suffice 
Czech 
Republic 
Yes 
Statutory law 
 
statutory 
definition: persons 
who, as a result of 
contract, 
shareholding, or 
 
De facto directors 
are liable under the 
same conditions 
applicable to de 
Yes 
Influence due to 
shareholding 
explicitly 
mentioned 
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Country Does the 
concept of the 
de facto or 
shadow 
director exist? 
If yes, how are 
de facto or 
shadow 
directors 
defined? 
 
Under what 
conditions are de 
facto or shadow 
directors liable? 
 
Application to 
parent 
companies / 
controlling 
shareholders? 
otherwise have 
“substantial 
influence” over 
the company’s 
conduct, despite 
not being 
appointed as 
directors 
 
jure directors 
Denmark Yes 
Recognised by 
courts 
 
no statutory 
definition, but 
person who 
effectively makes 
executive 
decisions may be 
considered de 
facto director 
without having 
been appointed 
 
Very demanding 
requirements for 
holding de facto 
directors 
responsible based 
on case law 
unclear 
No clear rule on 
application to 
parent company, 
but discussion 
about liability of de 
facto directors 
seems to centre 
around natural 
persons 
Estonia Yes 
Recognised by 
courts, primarily 
for purposes of 
criminal law 
 
no statutory 
definition, but 
according to case 
law a person who 
manages the 
company without 
being formally 
appointed as de 
jure director 
De facto directors: 
So far, this has only 
been discussed in 
relation to criminal 
liability. It is unclear 
whether general 
duties also apply to 
de facto/shadow 
directors 
yes 
liability may arise 
due to statutory 
rule about misuse 
of influence 
Finland Yes 
Has been 
discussed in 
relation to 
criminal liability 
in particular 
 
Exercising 
functions and 
fulfilling tasks of 
director without 
being formally 
appointed  
de facto directors: 
probably liable like 
de jure directors 
where appointment 
was defective  
shadow directors: 
only in exceptional 
cases 
 
yes 
but only in very 
limited 
circumstances as 
shadow directors 
France Yes 
Recognised in 
case law and 
scholarly writing 
(“dirigeants de 
fait”) 
 
no statutory 
definition, but 
according to case 
law and legal 
literature Person 
who freely and 
independently 
carries out 
 
liability based on 
general tort 
principles (solvent 
companies) 
statutory liability, 
equivalent to de 
jure director liability, 
yes 
but only in very 
limited 
circumstances – 
harm to company 
must have been 
intended;  
note: application of 
Rozenblum 
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Country Does the 
concept of the 
de facto or 
shadow 
director exist? 
If yes, how are 
de facto or 
shadow 
directors 
defined? 
 
Under what 
conditions are de 
facto or shadow 
directors liable? 
 
Application to 
parent 
companies / 
controlling 
shareholders? 
management 
activities, whether 
alone or together 
with other people, 
on a regular and 
continuous basis, 
without being a de 
jure director 
in insolvent 
companies
63
 
doctrine allows 
parent to 
(intentionally) take 
certain actions to 
the detriment of 
subsidiary in group 
context
64
 
Germany Yes 
Recognised in 
case law and 
scholarly writing  
de facto 
directors: no 
statutory 
definition, but 
accepted where 
person acts as if 
he or she was a 
de jure director 
without valid 
appointment, 
including in cases 
of defective 
appointment  
shadow 
directors: person 
who instructs and 
directs de jure 
directors, if 
instructions and 
directions are 
complied with 
 
liability accepted for 
failure to file for 
insolvency and 
liability for grossly 
negligent depletion 
of assets in a pre-
insolvency context; 
for de facto 
directors, a more 
extensive 
application of 
directors’ duties 
and liability is being 
discussed, but 
subject to dispute; 
limited case law 
outside insolvency 
context 
Yes 
Liability may arise 
for damaging 
influence and 
under German 
group law 
Liability of persons 
who intentionally 
use their influence 
over the company 
to induce a 
director to act to 
the detriment of 
the company or 
the shareholders, 
s. 117 
Greece Yes 
Recognised in 
case law and 
scholarly writing 
(“dirigeants de 
fait”) 
 
no statutory 
definition; but 
according to case 
law and legal 
literature the 
concept covers 
persons who 
“exercise the real 
direction and 
management of 
the company’s 
business affairs”; 
this may include 
 
liability as for de 
jure directors 
special liability in 
insolvency context, 
where exercise of 
influence led to 
insolvency 
criminal liability also 
applies 
yes 
mainly relevant in 
insolvency 
context, where 
parent company’s 
influence causes 
or aggravates 
insolvency 
                                                     
63
 See PH Conac, L Enriques, and M Gelter, ‘Constraining Dominant Shareholders' Self-Dealing: The Legal Framework in 
France, Germany, and Italy’ (2007) 4 European Company and Financial Law Review 491, 509. 
64
 The Rozenblum doctrine is derived from the criminal law judgment of the French Supreme Court of 4 February 1985 (‘Arrêt 
Rozenblum’). It provides that financial assistance by one group company to another will not be qualified as a misuse of 
company assets (abus de biens sociaux) if (1) a firmly established group structure exists; (2) the financial assistance was 
dictated by a common economic or financial interest of the group; and (3) it involves an element of consideration and does not 
disturb the balance of commitments of the group companies. 
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Country Does the 
concept of the 
de facto or 
shadow 
director exist? 
If yes, how are 
de facto or 
shadow 
directors 
defined? 
 
Under what 
conditions are de 
facto or shadow 
directors liable? 
 
Application to 
parent 
companies / 
controlling 
shareholders? 
controlling 
shareholder, or 
major creditors or 
suppliers who  
exercise 
“significant 
influence” over 
management of 
the company 
Hungary Yes 
Special statutory 
rules regarding 
undue influence 
on company 
 
Statutory liability 
applies to 
controlling 
shareholder 
 
Unlimited liability 
where shareholder 
caused the pursuit 
of a business policy 
“permanently 
detrimental to the 
company” 
yes 
mainly relevant in 
insolvency 
context, but under 
group law 
provisions special 
rights for creditors 
may also apply in 
solvent companies 
Ireland Yes 
Both de facto 
and shadow 
directors are 
recognised in 
case law; 
shadow directors 
explicitly 
addressed in 
statutory law 
de facto 
directors: 
concept mainly 
applied in relation 
to defective 
appointment 
shadow 
directors: 
according to 
statutory definition 
a person ‘‘in 
accordance with 
whose directions 
or instructions the 
directors of a 
company are 
accustomed to 
act.”
65
 
 
De facto directors 
are generally liable 
under conditions 
applicable to de 
jure directors (if 
natural person) 
Shadow directors 
probably have less 
extensive duties, 
but civil liability for 
fraudulent and 
reckless trading 
applies to shadow 
directors 
Yes 
In exceptional 
circumstances as 
shadow director; 
exercise of control 
rights (i.e. voting) 
will not normally 
suffice 
Italy Yes 
concept 
accepted 
(amministratore 
di fatto) by 
analogy to 
criminal law 
provisions – Art. 
2639 Civil Code 
– and civil law 
rules pursuant to 
 
no clear definition 
 
Liability accepted 
by courts 
Clear liability rule in 
case members 
intentionally 
decided or 
authorised actions 
that proved to be 
harmful for the 
Yes 
At least in 
circumstances 
where parent 
company 
intentionally 
decided or 
authorised actions 
that proved to be 
harmful for the 
                                                     
65
 An exception applies for persons offering professional advice. 
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Country Does the 
concept of the 
de facto or 
shadow 
director exist? 
If yes, how are 
de facto or 
shadow 
directors 
defined? 
 
Under what 
conditions are de 
facto or shadow 
directors liable? 
 
Application to 
parent 
companies / 
controlling 
shareholders? 
Articles 2369 
and 2030 Civil 
Code 
 
company (atti 
dannosi per la 
societa’). In this 
case, shareholders 
are jointly and 
severally liable with 
the de jure directors 
according to Article 
2476 (7) Civil Code 
company 
Latvia No 
not recognised in 
court practice 
 
- 
 
 
No (unclear) 
 
Lithuania Yes 
but only in 
relation to 
“undue intrusion” 
by shareholders 
into 
management 
affairs 
 
- 
 
Recognised in case 
of “undue intrusion” 
by shareholder; 
liability also applies 
for breach of 
certain insolvency 
related duties  
yes 
in case of “undue 
intrusion”, 
controlling 
shareholder may 
be treated as 
member of 
management body 
for liability 
purposes 
Luxembourg Yes 
Recognised in 
case law and 
scholarly writing 
 
Fact-based 
analysis by the 
courts: positive 
activity, carried 
out independently 
and freely, that 
results in directing 
the company, and 
that goes beyond 
advising the 
company  
 
liability as for de 
jure directors 
Yes 
but only in limited 
circumstances, 
based on tort law. 
Malta Yes 
Recognised in 
case law 
 
Person carrying 
out substantially 
the same 
functions in 
relation to the 
direction of the 
company as those 
carried out by a 
director 
 
liability as for de 
jure directors 
Yes 
In exceptional 
circumstances; 
exercise of control 
rights (i.e. voting) 
will not suffice 
Netherlands Yes 
statutory rules in 
relation to 
 
someone who 
(partly) 
 
liability equivalent 
to de jure directors  
Yes 
in insolvency of 
company, under 
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Country Does the 
concept of the 
de facto or 
shadow 
director exist? 
If yes, how are 
de facto or 
shadow 
directors 
defined? 
 
Under what 
conditions are de 
facto or shadow 
directors liable? 
 
Application to 
parent 
companies / 
controlling 
shareholders? 
insolvency law; 
case law 
suggests wider 
application 
determines the 
policy of the 
company as if 
s/he was a 
director 
special statutory 
liability in case of 
insolvency; also tax 
liability in certain 
circumstances;  
exceptional 
circumstances 
Poland unclear 
not addressed in 
legislation and 
no relevant case 
law 
discussed in 
scholarly writing 
in relation to 
corporate groups 
and based on 
tort law 
 
possibly parent 
company under 
exceptional 
circumstances 
 
Unclear 
unclear 
possible under tort 
law, but situation 
is unclear 
Portugal Yes 
statutory rules in 
relation to 
insolvency law; 
case law 
suggests wider 
application 
 
any person who, 
without sufficient 
title, performs in 
an autonomous 
way, either 
directly or 
indirectly, 
functions usually 
performed by de 
jure directors 
 
Mainly relevant in  
insolvency context; 
Criminal liability 
also applies to de 
facto directors 
Unclear 
Application to legal 
persons unclear 
Romania Yes 
Recognised in 
case law 
 
persons who 
overwhelmingly 
influenced the 
company’s 
activities 
 
Mainly relevant in  
insolvency context 
Yes (unclear) 
Possible liability 
under tort law 
Slovakia No 
Concept not 
generally 
recognised in 
Slovak law 
 
In limited cases, 
appointed 
directors may be 
treated like 
directors before 
the appointment 
has formally 
become valid 
 
Tort law-based 
liability may exist 
No 
Only general tort 
law liability 
Slovenia No 
Not recognised 
in Slovenian law 
- 
 
 
Whereas the 
concept of de facto 
directors is not 
recognised, liability 
No 
Except for 
knowingly inducing 
company to act in 
a way that 
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Country Does the 
concept of the 
de facto or 
shadow 
director exist? 
If yes, how are 
de facto or 
shadow 
directors 
defined? 
 
Under what 
conditions are de 
facto or shadow 
directors liable? 
 
Application to 
parent 
companies / 
controlling 
shareholders? 
attaches for 
knowingly inducing 
a company to act in 
a way that 
damages company 
or its shareholders 
damages 
company/its 
shareholders 
Spain Yes 
Part of statutory 
law 
 
Not defined in 
statute, but 
persons who 
continuously and 
independently act 
on behalf of the 
company with the 
knowledge of the 
shareholders; 
actions must 
amount to “real 
administration”; 
unclear whether 
powers must be 
exercised in 
relation to third 
parties. 
Shadow directors 
are generally 
defined as 
persons who do 
not exercise the 
powers of de jure 
directors, but 
whose 
instructions are 
complied with by 
the directors 
 
de facto and 
shadow directors 
are generally 
exposed to the 
same liability as de 
jure directors 
Yes 
Liability as de 
facto directors 
when managing 
the companies 
affairs on a regular 
and continuous 
basis 
Sweden Yes 
Recognised in 
case law and 
legal literature 
 
person not 
formally 
appointed, but 
carrying out tasks 
and making 
decisions as if he 
or she was a 
director 
 
Liability as for de 
jure director 
Yes 
If parent carries 
out tasks and 
makes decisions 
as if it was a 
(corporate) 
director; liability 
may also arise on 
basis of tort law 
United 
Kingdom 
Yes de facto 
directors: 
A de facto director 
is a person who 
assumes the 
 
De facto directors 
are subject to the 
same duties as de 
Yes 
In exceptional 
circumstances as 
shadow or de 
facto director; 
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Country Does the 
concept of the 
de facto or 
shadow 
director exist? 
If yes, how are 
de facto or 
shadow 
directors 
defined? 
 
Under what 
conditions are de 
facto or shadow 
directors liable? 
 
Application to 
parent 
companies / 
controlling 
shareholders? 
status of, and 
performs the 
functions of, a 
director, is held 
out to be a 
director, and 
undertakes 
functions in 
relation to the 
company which 
could only be 
properly 
discharged by a 
director.  
shadow 
directors: 
according to 
statutory definition 
a person ‘‘in 
accordance with 
whose directions 
or instructions the 
directors of a 
company are 
accustomed to 
act.” 
jure directors; 
Unclear whether all 
duties also apply 
with full force to 
shadow directors 
exercise of control 
rights (i.e. voting) 
will not suffice 
 
Discussion 
In all jurisdictions covered by this report, the main addressees of directors’ duties are, of course, the 
validly appointed members of the relevant company bodies. A person appointed in accordance with 
the applicable company law rules and the relevant provisions set out in the company’s articles of 
association is referred to as de jure director, and the application of the rules set out below to de jure 
directors form the core scope of this report. 
As is evident from the table above, however, the vast majority of Member States recognise that the 
duties that national company law defines for de jure directors should, under certain circumstances, 
also apply to other persons with a comparable relationship to the company and its stakeholders. In the 
table above, we distinguish between two main sets of circumstances in which company law often 
extends the scope of application of some or all rules primarily applicable to de jure directors.  
The first category concerns, in general terms, persons who act as if they were de jure directors, 
despite not having been validly appointed as such. This category can be further divided into two sub-
groups. First, the act of appointing a director may have been “defective”, e.g. because one or more 
formal requirements for a valid appointment have not been complied with. This is probably the group 
of cases with the longest history.
66
 It is also the group of cases in relation to which the suitability of an 
extension of the scope of application of directors’ duties is least controversial. Typically, neither the 
                                                     
66
 In the UK, for instance, courts have been dealing with this problem since the 19
th
 century; see D Kershaw, Company Law in 
Context (2
nd
 ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press 2012) 320. 
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“director” nor the appointing body will be aware of the defects of the appointment. Even the 
jurisdictions that do not formally recognise the application of directors’ duties to de facto directors 
according to the table above typically resolve the matter by providing that any defects that may have 
attached to the process of appointment “are healed” upon registration of a person as director with the 
relevant register.
67
  
The second sub-group concerns persons in relation to whom no attempt has been made to formally 
appoint them as directors. Nevertheless, they behave as if they had been validly appointed – i.e. they 
perform the same function and fulfil the same tasks as de jure directors would usually do. As can be 
seen above, most Member States also extend at least some of the duties to this type of director. In 
some jurisdictions the application of directors’ duties may require that such persons act as if they were 
(de jure) directors not only internally, but also vis-à-vis third parties and/or require such persons to be 
held out as directors by the company. The exact content of the duties applicable to this type of director 
differs significantly across Europe, and in a number of jurisdictions no clear definition exists of the 
requirements that have to be met before someone is treated as a director. 
The most problematic category concerns persons who do not act as if they were de jure directors, nor 
purport to be directors. Rather, they exercise a certain degree of influence over the company’s affairs 
that affords them a level of factual control comparable to the power that is typically vested in the 
board(s). As a matter of fact, in most groups of companies, the (group-wide) corporate strategy is not 
set at the level of each legal entity, but rather centrally at the parent company level. This then raises 
the question whether the parent company itself, or its directors, may be held liable in the same 
manner as the de jure directors of the legal entities they control.  
None of the Member States answers this question with an unqualified “yes”, not least because doing 
so would call into question the very concept of limited liability. However, a number of Member States 
do provide for liability of legal or natural persons wielding significant influence over the company. 
These Member States differ significantly in the degree of control and influence that may lead to the 
imposition of director-like duties on the parent company or its management. The spectrum reaches 
from jurisdictions where a controlling shareholder or parent company will virtually never be held liable 
for exercising control over a company,
68
 to jurisdictions where – at least in the company’s insolvency – 
a significant risk of liability may exist for a parent company actively exercising control.
69
 In a number of 
jurisdictions, general tort law concepts are used to achieve similar results. Where this is the case, the 
liability will often also apply to foreign-incorporated companies.
70
 
 
2.2.2 To whom are the duties owed? 
Summary of the country reports 
Table 2.2.2.a: Constituencies to whom directors’ duties are owed  
Country Duties owed to 
the company / 
source of 
directors’ 
powers 
Shareholders Creditors Other 
stakeholders 
Austria - Company 
- Powers derived 
from statute, not 
1) Company law: 
no 
2) General civil 
1) Company law: 
no 
2) General civil 
- 
                                                     
67
 See Art 3 of the codified version of the First Company Law Directive (Directive 2009/101/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 16 September 2009 on coordination of safeguards which, for the protection of the interests of members and 
third parties, are required by Member States of companies within the meaning of the second Paragraph of Article 48 of the 
Treaty, with a view to making such safeguards equivalent, OJ 2009 L 258/11). 
68
 This seems to be the position of Bulgaria, for instance. 
69
 See, e.g. the Czech law position, where the parent company may owe a duty of care in relation to the exercise of its control. 
Even where liability is provided for, the exact conditions differ significantly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 
70
 See also Section 5. below concerning this problem. 
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delegated from 
the shareholders; 
articles of 
association 
cannot change the 
basic allocation of 
powers between 
shareholders, 
supervisory board 
and management 
board; no 
instruction rights 
of shareholders, 
but where 
directors choose 
to put a question 
to the general 
meeting, they are 
bound to comply 
with decision of 
the shareholders 
law: directors are 
liable personally if 
they acted 
intentionally  and 
pursued 
significant 
economic self-
interests or an 
exceptional trust 
relationship was 
created with the 
plaintiff 
shareholder 
3) Tort law: 
a) s. 1295(2) 
ABGB: general 
liability for 
intentionally 
caused damages, 
provided that 
defendant acted 
unconscionably ; 
b) s. 1300 ABGB: 
knowingly giving 
wrong advice 
c) s. 874 ABGB: 
deceit 
d) a violation of 
rules directed at 
protecting third 
parties can also 
lead to direct 
liability, e.g. 
violation of s. 
255(1) AktG 
(criminal liability of 
directors who 
intentionally make 
incorrect 
statements in 
public reports) 
law: pre-
contractual duty to 
provide the 
creditors with 
relevant 
information 
(requirements as 
with liability to 
shareholders (2)) 
3) Insolvency law 
protective rules 
with respect to the 
creditors 
a) delayed 
application for the 
opening of 
insolvency 
proceedings, s. 
69(2) Insolvency 
Act:  
b) grossly 
negligent 
encroachment on 
creditors’ 
interests, s. 159 
Criminal Act 
Belgium - Company  
- Groups: the 
group interest can 
be taken into 
account under the 
conditions of 
Rozenblum
71
 
- Liability based 
on Art. 527 CC 
(general law of 
contract) 
Tort/Art. 528 CC 
Note: The 
relevance of this 
claim is limited to 
scenarios where 
the company has 
suffered a loss 
distinct from the 
loss suffered by 
all shareholders 
proportionally as a 
result of the 
decrease of the 
1) Tort/Art. 528 
CC 
2) Art. 530 CC 
(bankruptcy) 
Tort/Art. 528 CC 
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 See above n 64. 
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company’s assets. 
Example of 
liability: the 
shareholder 
bought his/her 
shares at a price 
that was too high, 
having based 
his/her decision 
on incorrect 
accounts 
Bulgaria Company No No No 
Croatia Company No special duties 
to the 
shareholders; but 
indirectly, by 
acting in the best 
interest of the 
company, the 
directors may 
have duties to the 
shareholders. If 
they suffer 
damage 
independently 
from the damage 
caused to the 
PLC, 
shareholders have 
a claim against 
the directors (or 
other person who 
deliberately 
influenced 
members of board 
or executive 
officers to perform 
an action which 
caused damage). 
Duties not owed 
to the creditors, 
except indirectly, 
by acting in the 
best interest of the 
company, which 
includes the 
requirement that 
the company has 
sufficient assets to 
honour the 
obligations 
towards the 
creditors. 
 
No duties to other 
stakeholders 
Cyprus Company In particular 
situations 
according to 
English case law 
(see below) 
In the vicinity of 
insolvency 
(according to 
English case law) 
No 
Czech Republic - Company 
- The executive 
and supervisory 
organs are 
subordinated to 
the GM, which 
can give 
instructions to the 
other organs 
(derived from s. 
194) 
- No 
- Shareholders 
may have a direct 
claim under tort 
law (see s. 415 
Civil Code: 
everyone is 
obliged to act so 
as not to cause 
damage to health, 
property, nature 
and the 
No No 
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environment), but 
the claim is 
generally directed 
against the 
company, not the 
individual director 
Denmark - Company 
- Powers 
delegated from 
the shareholders, 
who have 
instruction rights 
Members of the 
management who, 
in the 
performance of 
their duties, 
intentionally or 
negligently cause 
damage to 
shareholders or 
third parties are 
liable to pay 
damages, s. 
361(1) 
Yes, see left Yes, see left 
Estonia - Company 
- Powers derived 
from statute, not 
delegated from 
the shareholders 
In general no duty 
owed to the 
shareholders, but 
directors can be 
held liable to the 
shareholders (and 
creditors) where 
the damage was 
caused wrongfully 
as the result of a 
merger, 
Commercial 
Code, § 403(6) 
In general no duty 
owed to the 
creditors, unless 
the director 
breaches a duty 
established for the 
protection of the 
creditors (duty to 
organize 
accounting, file for 
bankruptcy, 
mergers etc.); this 
liability is based 
on tort law 
- 
Finland - Company 
- The directors 
have general 
powers to manage 
the company; in 
contrast, the GM 
shall only decide 
over specifically 
defined matters  
Liability can exist 
towards the 
shareholders for 
breaches of 
provisions of the 
Companies Act, 
Ch. 22, s. 1(2) 
Liability can exist 
towards third 
parties for 
breaches of 
provisions of the 
Companies Act, 
Ch. 22, s. 1(2) 
Liability can exist 
towards third 
parties for 
breaches of 
provisions of the 
Companies Act, 
Ch. 22, s. 1(2) 
France - Company 
- Groups: the 
group interest can 
be taken into 
account under the 
conditions of 
Rozenblum 
- Source of 
directors’ powers: 
with a  decision 
from 1943, French 
company law 
shifted from a 
contractual to an 
Yes; duty of 
loyalty: e.g., if the 
director transacts 
directly with the 
shareholder and 
buys the shares 
without disclosing 
that a potential 
buyer exists who 
is prepared to 
purchase them for 
a higher price 
- Directors owe 
duties directly to 
third parties, and 
are liable to these 
parties, if they 
commit a fault that 
is separable from 
their functions 
(faute séparable 
des fonctions) 
(stems from 
administrative 
law). 
Definition 
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institutional 
approach, i.e. 
directors receive 
their powers from 
statute 
separable fault: if 
the director  
1) intentionally  
2) commits a 
particularly 
serious fault that 
is incompatible 
with the normal 
exercise of the 
director’s 
functions (e.g., the 
director failed to 
insure the 
employee’s 
executive car) 
Germany - Company 
- Powers derived 
from statute, not 
delegated from 
the shareholders 
1) Company law: 
no 
2) Possibly 
general civil law or 
tort law, but 
requirements are 
restrictive 
1) Company law: 
no 
2) Possibly 
general civil law or 
tort law, but 
requirements are 
restrictive 
- 
Greece Company - Shift in the vicinity 
of insolvency to 
the creditors 
- 
Hungary - Company 
- Powers derived 
from statute, not 
delegated from 
the shareholders 
In limited cases 
duties under 
general private 
law may be owed 
directly to the 
shareholders, e.g. 
if the directors, 
upon the request 
of the 
shareholders, 
provide 
information about 
the affairs of the 
company or make 
direct approaches 
to, and deal with, 
the shareholders 
and hold 
themselves out as 
agents for them in 
connection with 
the acquisition or 
disposal of shares 
Shift in the vicinity 
of insolvency to 
the creditors 
- 
Ireland - Company 
- Powers 
delegated from 
the shareholders 
Duties may be 
owed to a 
shareholder 
directly where 
what is at issue is 
not the collective 
interests of the 
corporate entity 
Limited duty of 
directors to 
consider the 
interests of 
creditors when 
their interests 
intrude on the 
company being 
No common law 
duty to consider 
the interests of 
employees, but s. 
52 of the 
Companies Act 
1990 requires 
directors to 
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but the interests of 
the shareholder 
qua individual 
wound up, on 
occasion where a 
company is 
insolvent and 
even where 
insolvency is 
simply looming on 
the horizon 
consider the 
interests of the 
company’s 
employees as well 
as the interests of 
members (not  
significant in 
practice given the 
lack of a direct 
enforcement 
mechanism) 
Italy Company  Only if the 
director’s action 
exclusively 
affected the rights 
of the 
shareholder, Art. 
2395 Civil Code 
Art. 2394 Civil 
Code: liability 
directly to 
creditors if the 
company’s assets 
have not been 
preserved 
(particularly 
relevant when the 
company is 
insolvent) 
(majority of case 
law: tort-based 
liability, with the 
consequence that 
the claimant has 
to prove 
negligence) 
- 
Latvia - Company 
- Powers derived 
from statute, not 
delegated from 
the shareholders 
Only according to 
principles of tort 
law 
Only according to 
principles of tort 
law 
Only according to 
principles of tort 
law 
Lithuania Civil Code, Art. 
2.87(1): 
- Company 
- Members of 
other bodies of 
the company 
Art. 19(8) Law on 
Companies: ‘The 
management 
bodies of the 
company must act 
on behalf of and in 
the interest of the 
company and its 
shareholders.’ 
The Supreme 
Court has stated 
that civil liability of 
the directors can 
arise both to the 
company, when 
directors act 
against the 
interests of the 
company, and to 
third parties when 
they violate 
statutory 
restrictions that 
are aimed at 
protecting such 
third parties (3K-
7-266/2006).
72
  
- 
Luxembourg - Company General tort law or General tort law or General tort law or 
                                                     
72
 It should be noted that this case involved bankruptcy fraud and directors had already been proven guilty in criminal 
proceedings. Therefore, liability to third parties is presumably restricted to exceptional cases (bankruptcy fraud). In such cases, 
creditors can claim damages directly from directors. 
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- Groups: the 
literature wants to 
apply the 
Rozenblum 
doctrine 
Art. 59(2): 
directors “shall be 
liable jointly and 
severally both 
towards the 
company and third 
parties for 
damages resulting 
from the violation 
of the Companies 
Act or the articles 
of association”. 
Art. 59(2) (see 
left) 
Art. 59(2) (see 
left); for 
management 
faults, the 
literature wants to 
apply the French 
doctrine of faute 
separable, i.e. 
directors are only 
liable to third 
parties if the fault 
is separable from 
their functions 
Malta - Company 
- Groups: the 
director is 
primarily required 
to act in the 
interests of his/her 
company, not in 
the interests of the 
group or the 
holding company; 
but in practice the 
affairs of the 
subsidiary are 
often conducted in 
the overall 
interests of the 
group, even if this 
is potentially to 
the detriment of 
the subsidiary 
Duties are 
generally not 
owed directly to 
the shareholders, 
although there 
may be 
exceptions under 
limited 
circumstances 
It is controversial 
whether, and 
under which 
circumstances, 
duties are owed 
directly to 
creditors under 
general principles 
of tort law short of 
fraud. 
Duties are 
generally not 
owed directly to 
other 
stakeholders, 
although there 
may be 
exceptions under 
limited 
circumstances 
Netherlands - Company 
- Groups: the 
director owes the 
duties to his/her 
company, not the 
group or the 
holding company 
- Powers derived 
from statute, not 
delegated from 
the shareholders 
1) s. 2:8(1) (duty 
to act reasonably 
and fairly) is owed 
to other corporate 
organs (internal 
responsibility) 
2) s. 2:9 can only 
lead to internal 
liability (to the 
company) 
3) s. 2:139 
(liability for 
misleading 
accounts) is owed 
to the 
shareholders 
4) Directors may 
be liable to 
shareholders 
based on tort law 
1) s. 2:139 
(liability for 
misleading 
accounts) is owed 
to third parties 
2) Directors may 
be liable to third 
parties based on 
tort law 
1) s. 2:139 
(liability for 
misleading 
accounts) is owed 
to third parties 
2) Directors may 
be liable to third 
parties based on 
tort law 
 
Poland - Company 
- Powers derived 
Only according to 
principles of tort 
law (Art. 415 Civil 
Only according to 
principles of tort 
law (Art. 415 Civil 
Only according to 
principles of tort 
law (Art. 415 Civil 
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from statute (Art. 
368(1)); no 
instruction right by 
the shareholders 
or the supervisory 
board (Art. 375); 
presumption of 
management 
board 
competences to 
conduct the 
company’s 
business 
Code) Code) Code) 
Portugal - Company (Art. 
72) 
- Groups: 
directors of the 
parent company 
have the duty to 
act in the interest 
of the group (if 
subordination 
agreement or 
100% subsidiary; 
this follows from 
Arts. 504(1), 64 
and 503(2)) 
- Powers derived 
from statute, Arts. 
405, 406; no 
instruction right of 
shareholders 
Directors may be 
liable to 
shareholders 
pursuant to Art. 79 
Directors may be 
liable to creditors 
pursuant to Art. 78 
for the loss 
suffered by them 
due to the 
insufficiency of the 
company’s assets 
as a consequence 
of the intentional 
or negligent 
breach of rules 
designed to 
protect those 
assets by the 
directors (for 
example, the rules 
on maintenance of 
capital, acquisition 
of own shares, or 
mandatory 
declaration of the 
insolvency) 
Directors may be 
liable to third 
parties pursuant 
to Art. 79 
Romania - Company 
- It is 
acknowledged by 
the literature that 
some 
competences 
belong exclusively 
to the directors 
and could not 
have been 
delegated from 
the shareholders 
→ the board is an 
independent 
organ of the 
company 
Only according to 
principles of tort 
law 
Only according to 
principles of tort 
law 
Only according to 
principles of tort 
law 
Slovakia Company No No No 
Slovenia - Company 
- The board of 
directors is an 
Under some 
conditions (see 
below 3.1.) 
Under some 
conditions (see 
below 3.1.) 
- 
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independent 
organ; powers are 
not delegated 
from the 
shareholders, and 
the shareholders 
do not have an 
instruction right, 
Art. 265(1) 
Spain Company - - - 
Sweden - Company 
- Shareholders 
have an 
instruction right 
Directors are 
liable directly to 
the shareholders if 
they cause 
damage to them 
as a consequence 
of a violation the 
Companies Act, 
the applicable 
annual reports 
legislation, or the 
articles of 
association, Ch. 
29, § 1 
Directors are 
liable directly to 
third parties if they 
cause damage to 
them as a 
consequence of a 
violation the 
Companies Act, 
the applicable 
annual reports 
legislation, or the 
articles of 
association, Ch. 
29, § 1 
Directors are 
liable directly to 
third parties if they 
cause damage to 
them as a 
consequence of a 
violation the 
Companies Act, 
the applicable 
annual reports 
legislation, or the 
articles of 
association, Ch. 
29, § 1 
United Kingdom Company, not the 
shareholders, s. 
170(1) 
Duties owed to 
the shareholders if 
a special factual 
relationship exists 
between the 
directors and the 
shareholders, e.g. 
directors make 
direct approaches 
to, and deal with, 
the shareholders, 
make material 
representations to 
them etc. 
Duties not owed 
to the creditors, 
but where the 
company is in the 
vicinity of 
insolvency the 
directors when 
considering the 
company’s 
interest must have 
regard to the 
interests of the 
creditors 
- 
 
Discussion 
Directors’ duties are owed primarily to the company, i.e. to the legal entity and not to the shareholders 
owning that entity. This basic principle is universally accepted and undisputed. We also include 
information, where available, on the nature and origin of corporate power.
73
 The Member States may 
conceptualise the company, and the role of the directors and shareholders, in two ways. The 
shareholders may be seen as the source of corporate power and the director as agents who receive 
the authority to make decisions on behalf of the company by way of delegation from the shareholders. 
Alternatively, the directors may be qualified as sui generis actors or fiduciaries who act for the benefit 
of the shareholders and, depending on how the interests of the company are defined,
74
 the benefit of 
other stakeholders, but whose powers are derived directly from a statutory act of authorisation. This 
difference does not affect the principle that directors’ duties are owed to the company and (save 
exceptional cases) not directly to the shareholders. Nevertheless, it is of great practical importance 
because it determines the extent to which shareholders have direct control over the company’s 
                                                     
73
 First column in Table 2.2.2.a. 
74
 See below 2.3. 
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operations (as opposed to indirect control through the process of board appointments), for example by 
being able to give the managers directions, and the extent to which private ordering is permissible in 
shaping the governance structure of the company. The latter aspect has implications for directors’ 
duties. In a jurisdiction allowing broad contractual freedom the incorporators may contract out of 
specific behavioural constraints on the part of the directors, for example the prohibition to enter into 
related-party transactions, and they may limit the directors’ liability. 
A prime example of the first strategy is English law, where the shareholders can intervene in the 
management of the company
75
 and enjoy relatively unfettered freedom of contract to structure the 
company’s governance system in the articles.
76
 The Scandinavian jurisdictions are close to the 
common law tradition, allowing for a high degree of contractual freedom and often granting the 
shareholders instruction rights. Most jurisdictions in the French and German legal tradition, on the 
other hand, characterise the board of directors (in two-tier systems the management board and the 
supervisory board) as independent corporate organs that are to some extent insulated from the 
shareholders.
77
 This insulation commonly goes hand in hand with limited possibilities for the 
incorporators to alter the company’s governance structure in the articles.
78
 
In exceptional circumstances duties may be owed directly to shareholders, creditors, or other 
stakeholders. The basis of such a claim may be found in company law, notably in the common law 
countries UK, Cyprus, and Ireland. Here the rule is that directors owe their duties directly to the 
shareholders if a ‘special factual relationship’
79
 exists between the director and the shareholders. Such 
a relationship may arise according to the English courts where directors make direct approaches to 
the shareholders in order to induce them to enter into a specific transaction, they hold themselves out 
‘as agents for the shareholders in connection with the acquisition or disposal of shares’,
80
 or they 
make disclosures and provide information on which the shareholders rely.
81
 Cypriot and Irish law 
operate in principle along similar lines, although case law is rare in Cyprus.
82
 Irish courts have added 
that duties may be owed to shareholders in their individual capacity where the interests of the 
shareholders qua shareholder are concerned, as opposed to their collective interests represented by 
the company.
83
 In any case, this jurisprudence is restricted to the relationship between the director 
and the shareholders. Duties owed to creditors or to other constituencies, such as the employees, are 
not accepted in any of the common law jurisdictions, although the focus of the company’s interests 
may shift from the shareholders to the creditors in the vicinity of insolvency.
84
 
Theoretically, a direct legal relationship between directors, shareholders, and other constituencies 
may arise from an application of general principles of civil law, particularly tort law. The general tort 
law clauses that can be found in many French legal tradition jurisdictions may be said to be 
particularly suitable for establishing such direct legal relationships, given that they provide for liability 
                                                     
75
 The default rule in the Model Articles for Public and Private Companies, introduced by the Companies (Model Articles) 
Regulations 2008 (2008 No. 3229), provides for an instruction right of the shareholders, to be exercised by special resolution, 
see Art. 4(1) Model Articles for Private Companies Limited by Shares; Art. Art. 4(1) Model Articles for Public Companies. This 
rule can, of course, be altered in the specific articles of the company. 
76
 However, limitation of the directors’ liability is now restricted in Companies Act 2006, ss. 232-235. 
77
 For a more detailed discussion of these issues see above 1.5. 
78
 See, for example, the German principle of limited contractual freedom (Grundsatz der Satzungsstrenge) that characterises 
the law of the public stock corporation. The principle is laid down in s. 23(5) Stock Corporation Act: The articles may only 
deviate from the provisions of the statute if this is expressly permitted in the Stock Corporation Act. For a detailed discussion 
and comparative analysis see M. Lutter and H. Wiedemann (eds.), Gestaltungsfreiheit im Gesellschaftsrecht: Deutschland, 
Europa und USA (de Gruyter, 1998); and for a short exposition in English see P. Mäntysaari, Comparative corporate 
governance: shareholders as a rule-maker (Springer, 2005), 246-247. 
79
 Peskin v Anderson [2001] 1 BCLC 372, para. 33. 
80
 Ibid. para. 34. 
81
 Ibid. 
82
 Fir Ireland see the decision of the Irish Supreme Court in Crindle Investments v Wymes 1998] 4 I.R. 567, [1998] 2 I.L.R.M. 
275. 
83
 Securities Trust Ltd v Associated Properties Ltd, High Court, unreported, McWilliam J., November 19, 1980. 
84
 This shift does not mean that duties are owed to individual creditors. Rather, the directors are required to act in the interest of 
the creditors as a whole, instead of the interests of the shareholders. For UK law see Companies Act 2006, s. 172(3) and Re 
Pantone 485 Ltd [2002] 1 BCLC 267; for Irish law Jones v Gunn [1997] 3 I.R. 1, [1997] 2 I.L.R.M. 245. For a more detailed 
discussion see below 4.2. 
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for any damage caused by intentional or negligent conduct.
85
 However, French law has developed the 
doctrine of faute séparable des fonctions, which provides that third parties may only bring a claim 
directly against the director where the director has committed a wrong separable from his or her 
functions. The courts define a separable wrong as the intentional commission of a particularly serious 
fault that is incompatible with the normal exercise of the director’s functions.
86
 In addition, similar to 
the jurisprudence of the common law jurisdictions, the French courts have held that directors owe a 
duty of loyalty to shareholders where they transact directly with them, for example by purchasing their 
shares.
87
 We find references to general tort law provisions in other countries as well, for example in 
the Czech Republic, Poland, or Romania, but there the principles have not been amplified and tailored 
to the specific circumstances of directors’ duties, and they do not seem to play an important role in 
practice.
88
 
The tort law of countries following the German legal tradition is usually characterised by narrower 
provisions. For example, they apply if the tortfeasor has inflicted intentional damage in violation of 
public policy
89
 or if so-called protective provisions have been violated, i.e. provisions that are designed 
to protect specific constituencies.
90
 Often, these protective provisions constitute criminal offences, 
such as incorrect statements in public reports or misuse of wages. Thus, they cannot be relied on as 
complements of the company law duties capturing general directorial misconduct, but they afford 
additional protection to shareholders and some other constituencies in particularly severe cases of 
wrongdoing. 
Finally, a number of legal systems distinguish in their company laws between internal liability of the 
director (to the company) and external liability to shareholders or third parties, for example Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Sweden. External liability 
usually requires conduct that goes beyond mere mismanagement or conflicts of interest (i.e. beyond a 
breach of the general duties of care and loyalty).
91
 It is triggered by a breach of specific legal 
requirements of the companies legislation or the articles of association,
92
 conduct that affects 
exclusively the rights of the shareholders,
93
 or the drawing up of misleading accounts.
94
 
In summary, all legal systems allow for exceptions to the general rule that the duties of directors are 
owed to the company and not to shareholders, creditors, or other parties directly. But the Member 
States differ both in the determination of the situations when such direct legal relationships arise and 
the legal mechanisms that they employ to supplement the core directors’ duties. In some legal 
systems, corporate law devices are simply extended to encompass shareholders or third parties; 
others rely on tort law or quasi contractual principles. These issues are not only of conceptual interest, 
but of great practical relevance for purposes of enforcement. Where it can be argued that duties are 
owed directly to the shareholders, they do not have to rely on the company to bring an action or take 
recourse to a derivative action, if such a mechanism exists, but can bring a lawsuit in their own name. 
This is particularly important where the corporate organ that is authorised to enforce the company’s 
claims against the director (usually the board of directors or the supervisory board) may be conflicted 
                                                     
85
 See, e.g., Arts. 1382, 1383 French Civil Code; Arts. 1382, 1383 Belgian Civil Code. 
86
 Cass. Com. 20.05.2003 n°851: RJDA 8-9/03 n°842, p.717; Cass. Com. 10.02.2009 n°07-20.445: RJDA 5/09 n°445. 
87
 Cass. Com. 27.02.1996, JCP E 1996, II, 838: Directors were found in breach of duty where they purchased shares and resold 
them a few days later at a substantially higher price. 
88
 This is different in the Netherlands, where directors have been found liable under general tort law in a number of cases, often 
for acts in the vicinity of insolvency that frustrated creditors’ claims (Section 6:162 sub 1 Civil Code), see HR 6 oktober 1989, NJ 
1990, 286, m.nt. J.M.M. Maeijer (Beklamel); HR 3 april 1992, NJ 1992, 411 (Van Waning/Van der Vliet); HR 18 februari 2000, 
NJ 2000, 295; JOR 2000/56 (New Holland Belgium/Oosterhof); HR 12 juni 1998, NJ 1998, 727; JOR 1998/107 (Coral/Stalt). 
89
 Austria: s. 1295(2) Civil Code; Germany: s. 826 Civil Code. 
90
 Austria: s. 1311 Civil Code; Germany: s. 823(2) Civil Code. 
91
 The rules in Denmark and Portugal are broader, providing that directors shall be liable to pay damages whenever they cause 
intentionally or negligently damage to the company, shareholders, or third parties (s. 361(1) Danish Companies Act), or when 
damage to third parties results 'directly from the exercise of their duties' (Art. 79(1) Portuguese Code of Commercial 
Companies). 
92
 Belgium: Art. 528 Commercial Code; Finland: Ch. 22, s. 1(2) Companies Act; Luxembourg: Art. 59(2) Companies Act; 
Sweden: Ch. 29, s. 1 Companies Act. 
93
 Italy: Art. 2395 Civil Code. 
94
 Netherlands: s. 2:139 Dutch Civil Code. 
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in a practical sense and the derivative action mechanism is not easily accessible.
95
 Even where a 
cause of action of the individual shareholder exists, it should be noted, however, that such an action is 
only possible if the shareholder has suffered a loss different from the loss suffered by all shareholders 
proportionally as a result of the decrease in the value of the company’s assets (so-called reflective 
loss principle).
96
 The reason is that otherwise both the shareholder and the company could claim 
damages from the director, leading to double recovery. As far as can be judged, this problem is 
recognised by all jurisdictions that allow personal shareholder claims and is solved in a similar way. 
 
2.3 The interests of the company 
Summary of the country reports 
Table 2.3.a: Content of the interests of the company  
Country Mentioned 
where? 
General 
definition 
 
Employees 
 
Creditors 
Austria s. 70(1) AktG: 
‘Wohl des 
Unternehmens’ 
Shareholders, 
employees, 
public interest = 
stakeholder 
oriented 
 
Included 
 
Not mentioned as 
stakeholders, but 
the literature 
assumes that the 
creditors’ interests 
must also be 
taken into account 
Belgium Developed in case 
law and by the 
literature 
Shareholders; 
group interests 
can be taken 
into account 
under the 
conditions of 
Rozenblum 
 
Uncertain 
whether included; 
a Royal Decree 
of 2007 has laid 
down a 
stakeholder 
interpretation of 
the company’s 
interests as the 
applicable 
standard in the 
particular context 
of takeovers. 
Literature: 
stakeholder view 
is inappropriate 
unless in crisis 
situations 
- Uncertain 
whether included, 
see ‘employees’ 
- Different 
opinions on 
whether included 
in the vicinity of 
insolvency 
Bulgaria s. 237(2) 
Commercial Act: 
the directors have 
to exercise their 
duties ‘for the 
benefit of the 
company and all 
shareholders’ 
Supreme Court: 
the interests of 
the company as 
a separate legal 
entity are formed 
by the general 
meeting, i.e. the 
majority of 
shareholders.  
s. 237(2) 
Not included Not included 
                                                     
95
 The derivative action will be discussed in detail below at 3.2. 
96
 See for example Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd (No 2) [1982] Ch 204. 
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qualifies this 
principle by 
requiring the 
interests of all 
shareholders to 
be taken into 
consideration. 
→ shareholder 
primacy 
Croatia Art 252 
Companies Act 
‘dobrobit društva’ 
(well-being of the 
company) 
Most important 
criterion is the 
profitability of 
the future 
business; not 
the same as the 
interests of the 
majority or all 
shareholders 
Indirectly 
included, not 
explicitly 
mentioned 
Indirectly 
included, not 
mentioned 
explicitly 
Cyprus - Primarily 
shareholder 
interests, but it 
has been 
accepted that 
the interests of 
the company 
may also include 
the interests of 
the creditors 
See definition See definition 
Czech Republic Mentioned for 
example in s. 199 
No statutory 
definition; 
shareholder-
centred view: 
companies are 
managed by the 
directors for the 
benefit of the 
shareholders 
(interpretation of 
s. 194) 
Not included Not included 
Denmark ss. 108, 127 - No statutory 
definition; the 
exact meaning 
of the term 
‘interests of the 
company’ is not 
clear 
- Some 
academics: the  
directors have to 
act in the 
interests of the 
members as a 
whole 
Not included Generally not 
included, but the 
interests of the 
company change 
when the 
company is on the 
verge on 
insolvency 
Estonia Not codified Stakeholder 
theory 
Included  Included  
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Finland Companies Act, 
Chapter 1, s. 8 
(but no definition 
given in the law) 
Shareholder-
centred: the 
company’s 
interests are 
equal to those of 
the shareholders 
(see also 
Chapter 1, s. 5: 
the purpose of a 
limited company 
is to generate 
profits for the 
shareholders) 
Not mentioned in 
the law 
Not mentioned in 
the law 
France Art. 1848 Civil 
Code: ‘l'intérêt de 
la société’ 
Differently 
interpreted 
depending on 
the context : 
1) Conception 
contractuelle: 
the company’s 
interests are 
equivalent to the 
shareholders’ 
interests 
2) Conception 
institutionnelle: 
the company is 
regarded as 
having its own 
interests, which 
go beyond the 
shareholders’ 
interests; can be 
found in different 
provisions 
Included in the 
conception 
institutionnelle: 
the company is 
considered as a 
separate 
economic agent, 
pursuing its own 
objectives, which 
represent the 
common 
interests of 
shareholders, 
employees, 
creditors, 
suppliers and 
customers 
(Vienot report) 
Included in the 
conception 
institutionnelle 
Germany s. 93(1) AktG: 
‘Wohl der 
Gesellschaft’ 
Stakeholder 
theory: acting in 
the interests of 
the company 
requires that the 
interests of all 
affected 
constituencies 
are taken into 
consideration, 
including those 
of society at 
large 
Included Included  
Greece Art. 2 of Law 
3016/2002; 
Art. 22a of Law 
2190/1920 
- No statutory 
definition 
- Directors have 
to act in the best 
interest of the 
company, which 
does not merely 
equate to the 
Not included Shift to creditors 
in case of financial 
distress  
 
 
 
 
69 Directors’ Duties and Liability in the EU  
 
interests of the 
shareholders 
(see Art. 
22a(3a)-(3b)) 
- Some articles 
refer to the 
interests of other 
stakeholders 
(creditors, 
employees, 
banks, etc.); 
however, there 
is no general 
shift towards a 
stakeholder 
model; non-
shareholder 
interests are 
mainly protected 
by other laws 
(labour 
regulation etc.)  
→ shareholder-
centred view  
Hungary Not specified in 
Hungarian 
company law; no 
case law 
No definition or 
prevailing 
theory. 
Uncertainties 
regarding the 
meaning of the 
term, apart from 
the 
understanding 
that directors 
shall be 
prevented from 
using their 
position to 
advance their 
own interests. 
Only on the basis 
of their 
employment 
relationship, 
covered by 
labour law 
regulation 
Not included 
Ireland - Shareholder 
primacy, the 
interests of the 
company are 
equated with the 
collective 
interests of the 
shareholders, 
but in some 
contexts the 
interests of other 
stakeholders 
can become 
relevant (see 
Companies Act 
1990, s. 52(1)). 
To some extent 
included, see 
Companies Act 
1990, s. 52(1): 
directors owe a 
duty to ‘consider 
the interests of 
the company’s 
employees in 
general, as well 
as the interests 
of its members.’ 
Included in 
specific situations 
e.g. vicinity of 
insolvency (see 
2.3.) 
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In the group 
context, it has 
been held that 
the best 
interests of the 
company may 
be served by 
ensuring the 
survival of other 
group 
companies, and 
authority exists 
that has 
regarded it as a 
general 
proposition that 
a director is 
entitled to 
consider the 
interests of the 
group as a 
whole 
Italy References to the 
interest of the 
company in Art. 
2358 (company’s 
own shares), Art. 
2373 (conflict of 
interests), and Art. 
2441 (option 
right). However, 
no general 
definition of the 
term in the Civil 
Code. 
Shareholder 
primacy: no 
room for a 
pluralistic or 
enlightened 
shareholder 
value approach 
Not included Not included 
Latvia Not codified Shareholder 
primacy 
unclear/disputed unclear/disputed 
Lithuania Article 19(8) Law 
on Companies: 
‘the management 
bodies of the 
company must act 
on behalf of and in 
the interest of the 
company and its 
shareholders’ 
- Lithuanian 
Supreme Court: 
the interests of 
the company 
and the interests 
of the 
shareholder may 
be different 
- Corporate 
governance 
code and 
literature: the 
general duty of 
loyalty requires 
the director to 
act for the 
benefit of the 
company, its 
shareholders, 
creditors, 
Included, see 
definition left 
 
Included, see 
definition left 
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employees, and 
the public 
welfare 
Luxembourg Art. 1859(2) Code 
Civil: ‘l’intérêt de 
la société’ 
Not defined in 
the statute; it is 
a fluctuant and 
case-law defined 
concept that 
does not 
correlate with 
the interests of 
the 
shareholders. 
What the 
corporate 
interest is 
depends on the 
nature of the 
corporate 
activities; for 
some types of 
company the 
shareholder 
value theory 
might be 
adequate, 
whereas for 
other types the 
stakeholder 
theory  
applies 
May be included, 
depending on the 
type of corporate 
activity, see left 
May be included, 
depending on the 
type of corporate 
activity, see left 
Malta Art. 136A(1) 
Companies Act: 
duty to act in good 
faith in the best 
interests of the 
company 
Relevant are 
both the short-
term interests of 
the present 
members and 
the long-term 
interests of 
future members 
→ shareholder 
primacy 
Not included Not included 
Netherlands Interest of the 
company not 
defined in 
statutory law,
97
 
but understood as 
“inclusive” system 
Stakeholder 
theory, but no 
statutory 
definition 
Included  Included  
Poland Mentioned several 
times throughout 
the Code of 
Commercial 
Companies, e.g. 
Art. 249 
No statutory 
definition; the 
meaning is not 
settled. The 
literature argues 
that the interests 
To some extent 
included, but 
shareholder 
focus (see left) 
To some extent 
included, but 
shareholder focus 
(see left) 
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 But see Article 2:129 of the Dutch Civil Code: management in “the interests of the Corporation and of the enterprises 
connected with it” (emphasis added). 
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of the company 
are derived from 
the economic 
interests of the 
groups involved 
in it 
(shareholders 
and other  
stakeholders), 
but that 
shareholder 
interests should 
have the 
strongest 
influence on 
the interpretation 
of the concept of 
the company’s 
interests 
Portugal For example in 
Art. 64(1)(b) Code 
of Commercial 
Companies 
Art. 64(1)(b): 
The interests of 
the company are 
equated with 
‘the long term 
interests of the 
partners and 
taking into 
account the 
interests of other 
relevant parties 
such as 
employees, 
clients and 
creditors in 
ensuring the 
sustainability of 
the company’ 
Included, but it is 
argued by the 
literature and 
held by some 
courts that 
priority should be 
given to the 
interests of the 
shareholders 
Included, but it is 
argued by the 
literature and held 
by some courts 
that priority should 
be given to the 
interests of the 
shareholders 
Romania - - Not defined in 
the Companies 
Act or the New 
Civil Code 
- High Court of 
Cassation: the 
company’s 
interests are 
represented by 
the common 
intention of the 
shareholders to 
associate with a 
view to obtaining 
a profit 
- Literature: the 
company’s 
interest 
comprises the 
The majority of 
the literature 
argues that 
directors do not 
have to take the 
interests of 
stakeholders into 
account → pure 
shareholder 
value approach 
The majority of 
the literature 
argues that 
directors do not 
have to take the 
interests of 
stakeholders into 
account → pure 
shareholder value 
approach 
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common, 
collective, and 
legitimate 
interest of the 
shareholders to 
have a share in 
the profits 
(influenced by 
the neoliberal 
French doctrine 
of the ‘intérêt 
social’) 
Slovakia For example in s. 
194(5) 
Commercial Code 
- No definition in 
the statute or in 
case law 
- Literature: 
Shareholder 
primacy 
Not included Not included  
Slovenia For example in 
Art. 508 (the 
general meeting 
must be convened 
if it is necessary 
for the interests of 
the company) 
The company’s 
interests are 
understood as 
including the 
shareholders, 
management, 
employees, 
other market 
participants (e.g. 
suppliers, 
banks), the 
state, and the 
public at large. 
The 
shareholders’ 
interests shall 
take priority, but 
limited by the 
interests of other 
stakeholders. 
Included, but 
subordinated to 
the shareholders’ 
interests 
Creditors’ 
interests are 
generally 
subordinated to 
the shareholders’ 
interests; but as a 
company nears 
insolvency, the 
creditors’ interests 
prevail and 
directors have to 
act primarily to 
protect them 
Spain Art. 226 Ley de 
Sociedades de 
Capital: ‘interés 
social’ 
The concept is 
not well 
developed in 
Spanish law. 
Frequently, the 
interests of the 
company are 
equated with 
those of the 
majority 
shareholders. 
Supreme Court: 
to be interpreted 
in line with 
shareholder 
primacy 
Not included Not included  
Sweden Various sections 
of the Companies 
No general 
definition, but 
- - 
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Act understood as 
going beyond a 
pure 
shareholder-
centric  
approach 
United Kingdom s. 172 CA 2006: 
duty ‘to promote 
the success of the 
company’ 
Enlightened 
shareholder 
value approach 
Included, s. 
172(1)(b), but 
directors must 
primarily consider 
the interests of 
the shareholders 
Included if vicinity 
of insolvency, s. 
172(3) 
 
Discussion 
Companies, as legal persons, only “exist” in the realm of the law. As such, any question about the 
“interests of the company” is, in essence, necessarily a question about the content of the law. The 
table above summarises the legal position of the Member States in relation to this question.  
Why is this important in the context of directors’ duties? First, as will be explored in more detail 
below,
98
 the behavioural expectations of the law in relation to directors’ actions are often defined by 
reference to the interests of the company. Where directors owe a duty of loyalty to the company, this 
duty can only be interpreted if and to the extent that we have a clear understanding of the legally 
relevant interests that the director should guard. 
Second, and related to this point, the interests of the company also play a role in shaping the role of 
managers in the corporation. Where the interests of the company are defined in a way that includes 
multiple constituencies, the managerial role necessarily involves the balancing of these interests. As 
explained above, the extent to which such balancing is required of or permitted to corporate managers 
also influences the degree of managerial discretion that a legal system grants to directors.
99
 
 
2.4 Duty of care 
The duty of care addresses one of the main aspects of the agency problem between the shareholders 
and the company. It aims at ensuring that directors devote sufficient time, care, and diligence to 
managing the company, act only on an informed basis, possess the necessary skills and experience 
to make sound business decisions, and consider the likely outcome of their decisions carefully. In this 
sense, it is a concept familiar to all legal systems. However, the legal systems differ with regard to the 
precise behavioural expectations that the duty of care imposes on directors, for example the definition 
of ‘due care’, the responsiveness of the duty to different types of director (e.g., executive vs. non-
executive director, or member of board committees, such as the audit committee, vs. other directors) 
or the distribution of responsibilities among the board members, and the burden of proof for showing 
due care (or lack thereof). 
Apart from the aim of constraining the directors’ discretion, the duty of care has another side. It is 
often argued that directors may become risk averse if the liability risk faced by them is too high. Since 
directors operate under conditions of uncertainty and the ex post judicial review of business decision 
may give rise to hindsight bias, they may forgo investment opportunities with a positive net present 
value in favour of less risky alternatives.
100
 This problem is appreciated in most jurisdictions. One 
solution is the famous business judgment rule, which emerged in the US as early as 1829,
101
 and 
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 See in particular Sections 2.4 and 2.5. 
99
 See e.g. M Gelter, ‘Taming or Protecting the Modern Corporation - Shareholder-Stakeholder Debates in a Comparative Light’ 
(2011) 7 NYU Journal of Law & Business 641. 
100
 See, e.g., S.M. Bainbridge, ‘The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine’ (2004) 57 Vand. L. Rev. 83, 114-116. 
101
 See below n 130. 
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which has recently spread, in one form or another, to several jurisdictions in Europe. However, the 
response of the Member States is not uniform. Even those jurisdictions that have adopted the 
business judgment rule differ with regard to the scope of the rule, the threshold requirements that 
have to be satisfied for directors to be protected, and the possibilities to rebut the protections of the 
rule. 
In the following subsections, we discuss the dogmatic foundation of the duty of care (2.4.1.), the 
behavioural expectations established by the duty (2.4.2.),
102
 and the existence and content of the 
business judgment rule or equivalent mechanisms (2.4.3.). 
  
2.4.1 Dogmatic foundation 
Summary of the country reports 
Table 2.4.1.a: Dogmatic foundation of the duty of care  
Country Statutory 
corporate law 
Contractual / 
fiduciary 
principles 
Tort law Other 
Austria Yes, s. 84(1) - Yes, for liability 
towards third 
parties, provided 
the director 
breaches a 
provision which is 
designed to 
protect that third 
party 
- 
Belgium Internal liability, 
Art. 527 CC: 
liability for faults 
committed in the 
exercise of the 
directors’ 
management 
(referring to 
contract law, i.e. 
rules of agency 
apply by analogy 
where 
appropriate) 
- External liability 
according to tort 
law (Art. 1382 
Civil Code): for 
breaches of the 
general duty of 
care and 
breaches of 
statutory 
obligations. 
However, 
personal liability of 
directors to third 
parties requires 
an individual fault, 
e.g. breach of a 
statutory 
obligation that is 
addressed to the 
director. 
- 
Bulgaria Yes, s. 237(2) 
Commercial Act 
- - - 
Croatia Yes, s. 252(1) 
Companies Act 
- - - 
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 This comprises the issues raised above: (1) How is the standard of care defined? (2) Does the standard of care differ 
depending on the role and position of the director and the type of company? (3) Is the standard of care modified if directors 
delegate duties? In particular, are directors required to monitor and supervise the discharge of the delegated functions? (4) Who 
bears the burden of proof for showing due care (or lack thereof)? 
 
 
 
 
76 Directors’ Duties and Liability in the EU  
 
Cyprus No - Yes, tort of 
negligence 
(adopted from 
English law) 
- 
Czech Republic Yes, s. 194(5) 
Commercial Code 
- - - 
Denmark Yes, s. 361(1) 
Companies Act  
- - - 
Estonia Yes, § 35 Civil 
Code for all 
members of the 
directing body of a 
legal person; in 
addition § 315(1) 
Commercial Code 
for the members 
of management 
boards of 
companies 
- - - 
Finland Yes, Companies 
Act, Ch. 1, s. 8 
- - - 
France Yes, Art. 225-251 
(for the unitary 
board SA), but no 
statutory definition 
of the standard of 
care 
- Art. 1382 Code 
Civil for liability of 
de facto directors 
- 
Germany Yes, s. 93(1) - - - 
Greece Yes, Arts. 22, 22a 
of Law 2190/20   
Art. 22a(1) derives 
from a general 
fiduciary principle 
that requires 
directors to act 
prudently 
- - 
Hungary No Principles of 
general civil law 
apply (law of 
service 
contract/breach of 
contract) 
General tort law 
principles apply 
- 
Ireland No Yes, the duty of 
care is regarded 
as both an 
equitable and a 
common law duty 
- - 
Italy Yes, Art. 2392(1) 
Civil Code 
- - - 
Latvia Yes, Commercial 
Law 2000, s 
169(1) 
- - - 
Lithuania Yes, Civil Code, 
Art. 2.87(1) 
- - - 
Luxembourg Art. 59(1) One legal basis General tort law - 
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Companies Act 
does not directly 
impose a duty on 
the directors, but it 
constitutes the 
legal basis to 
bring an action 
against a director 
for the duty of 
care as such (as 
opposed to the 
legal basis for 
liability, see left) is 
the agency 
relationship 
between the 
director and the 
company, Arts. 
1984 et seq. Civil 
Code. But see 
right: the courts 
also apply tort law 
principles 
(Arts. 1382, 1383 
Civil Code) are 
interpreted by 
case law as 
containing an 
underlying duty of 
prudence and 
diligence that is 
imposed on any 
individual in any 
circumstance of 
his life, making 
them liable to all 
those to whom 
they cause 
damage. The 
courts holds that 
Art. 59(1) is 
merely an 
application of Arts. 
1382 and 1383 
Civil Code 
Malta Yes,  
Art. 136A(3)(a) 
Companies Act 
- - - 
Netherlands Derived from s. 
2:9 Civil Code 
- - - 
Poland Yes, Art. 483 
Code of 
Commercial 
Companies 
- - - 
Portugal Yes, Art. 64(1)(a) 
Code of 
Commercial 
Companies 
- - - 
Romania Yes, Art. 144(1) Initially fiduciary 
principles arising 
from the law on 
agency, but since 
2006 codified in 
the Companies 
Act 
- - 
Slovakia Yes, s. 194(5) - - - 
Slovenia Yes, Art. 263(1) 
ZGD-1 
- - - 
Spain Yes, s. 225 LSC - - - 
Sweden The duty of care is 
not expressly 
provided for in the 
Companies Act; 
however, it is 
implicitly 
contained in Ch. 
8, § 23, 34 and 
- - - 
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41. 
United Kingdom Yes, s. 174 - Originally the duty 
of care stemmed 
from the tort of 
negligence 
- 
 
Discussion 
All legal systems analysed by this study have behavioural constraints in place that address the 
problem of mismanagement or lack of due care by the directors and that can, accordingly, be 
summarised under the heading ‘duty of care’, even though the legal system may not always be 
familiar with this term. An example is the Dutch Civil Code, which merely stipulates that directors are 
responsible for ‘a proper performance of the tasks assigned to [them]’.
103
 It is commonly accepted 
that, following this rule, directors have to act diligently and carefully in managing the company and that 
they are, in principle, liable if they do not meet the required standard of care. 
However, the dogmatic foundation of the duty of care varies greatly across Member States. In some 
jurisdictions, the duty is not codified, but derives from case law (e.g., Cyprus and Ireland), in the 
majority of legal systems it is laid down in the company legislation. Where it is not codified, the exact 
dogmatic foundation and the relationship with general principles of tort law remain sometimes 
ambiguous. Where it is codified, some legal systems provide for one general standard of care (for 
example, Germany, the Netherlands, UK) and some for different, more specific duties (for example, 
Spain, which combines the general duty of directors to perform their duties with due diligence and the 
specific additional duty to be informed). 
A substantive difference does not follow from these variations in regulatory techniques. Rather, the 
effectiveness of the duty of care as a mechanism to align the interests of the directors and 
shareholders and, at the same time, grant the directors a sufficiently broad margin of discretion in 
order to promote innovation and efficient (but not excessive) risk-taking depends on the precise 
definition of the standard of care and the restraint that the courts show in reviewing business 
decisions. We have no reason to conclude that these elements can be specified in a more appropriate 
way by one regulatory technique, rather than another. The discussion below will show that countries 
that share a common legal origin and adopt similar regulatory strategies may still differ in the 
formulation of the required behavioural standard and the approach of their courts to reviewing 
business decisions, whereas jurisdictions from different traditions may well arrive at similar results. 
 
2.4.2 Behavioural expectations 
Summary of the country reports 
Table 2.4.2.a: Content of the duty of care  
Country General standard 
of care: 
1) definition 
2) objective / 
subjective etc. 
Differences in 
the standard of 
care depending 
on the director’s 
position and 
type of company 
Delegation Burden of proof 
for showing due 
care/lack of due 
care 
Austria 1) Care of a 
diligent and 
conscientious 
business leader 
2) Objective: does 
Yes, the standard 
depends on size, 
business, financial 
situation etc. of 
the company and 
Failure to monitor 
or negligent 
delegation leads 
to liability 
Director, s. 84(2) 
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 Dutch Civil Code, Art. 2:9. 
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not depend on the 
director’s abilities 
→ normal 
negligence 
standard 
the responsibility 
of the director 
within the co. 
(case law) 
Belgium 1) Art. 527 CC: 
directors must 
manage the 
company 
prudently and 
diligently → 
normal negligence 
2) Objective, but 
scope for 
individual 
characteristics of 
situation through 
‘margin of 
appreciation’; 
ignorance/ 
inaptitude/ 
absenteeism are 
not accepted as 
defences 
- In general, a 
director’s 
competences or 
membership of a 
committee are not 
formally elements 
of the judicial 
determination of 
liability, although it 
cannot be ruled 
out that courts 
may take the 
membership of 
audit or 
remuneration 
committees into 
account when 
determining what 
‘similar given 
circumstances’ 
are 
- Professional 
managers are 
judged more 
strictly in practice 
No general legal 
requirement to 
supervise other 
directors, but 
failure to monitor 
may be qualified 
negligence in 
case of systematic 
absenteeism 
overstepping the 
margin of 
discretion 
Claimant; except 
Art. 528 CC 
(liability for 
breaches of the 
CC and the 
articles, i.e. 
breaches of an 
obligation of 
result): 
presumption of 
fault, which can 
only be rebutted if 
the director shows 
that he/she (i) did 
not participate in 
the contested 
decision (e.g. by 
remaining absent 
from the meeting, 
provided that 
his/her absence 
was excusable, or 
by having voted 
against the 
decision); (ii) is 
not blameworthy; 
and (iii) 
challenged the 
decision at the 
earliest general 
assembly meeting 
(or, in case of 
members of the 
executive 
committee, the 
earliest meeting of 
the board of 
directors). 
Bulgaria 1) The due 
diligence of a 
good merchant 
who acts in the 
interest of the 
company and all 
shareholders; 
higher than the 
ordinary 
negligence 
standard because 
it is owed by 
professionals 
Point of reference 
is the professional 
group to which the 
director belongs, 
but the standard 
of care of all 
board members is 
principally equal 
(s. 237(1) 
Commercial Act 
and Court of 
Appeals Burgas) 
When the power 
to act on behalf of 
the company is 
delegated to one 
of the board 
members 
(executive 
director), the 
delegating 
directors continue 
to be subject to 
behavioural 
expectations 
similar to those of  
Claimant 
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2) Objective non-executive 
directors 
Croatia 1) The care of a 
prudent 
businessman = 
the care which 
would be taken by 
an independent 
entrepreneur, 
aware of his 
duties, who 
manages not his 
own, but other 
people’s assets 
2) Objective, but 
directors have to 
use special 
abilities or 
knowledge that 
they have 
Yes, what is 
prudent for a non-
executive director 
is not necessarily 
prudent for an 
executive director 
Delegation does 
not exclude 
liability 
Director, except 
when the creditors 
enforce the claim 
Cyprus The Companies 
Law does not 
specify the 
required level of 
skill and care; it 
has been held that 
if a director acts in 
good faith he or 
she cannot be 
held responsible 
to pay damages, 
unless guilty of 
grossly culpable 
negligence in a 
business sense. 
The Cypriot courts 
have not 
developed their 
own interpretation 
of the duty of skill 
and care but refer 
to the common 
law approach in 
Re City Equitable 
Fire Assurance 
Co. [1925] Ch 407 
Generally the 
same standard is 
applied to 
executive and 
non-executive 
directors 
No case law Claimant 
Czech Republic 1) No definition of 
the standard of 
care in the statute. 
Literature: the 
care that a 
professional 
equipped with the 
necessary 
knowledge and 
skills takes with 
No rules in the 
Commercial 
Code, no case law 
 
No rules in the 
Commercial 
Code, no case law 
 
Director, s. 194(5) 
Commercial Code 
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regard to his own 
property (diligentia 
quam in suis). 
Courts: Directors 
do not have to 
possess all 
possible technical 
knowledge, but 
the fundamental 
knowledge 
enabling them to 
identify and 
prevent impending 
damage 
2) Objective 
Denmark 1) Simple 
negligence 
standard 
2) Generally 
objective; see 
Calypso case: 
figurehead 
director (semi-
skilled worker who 
did not actively 
participate in the 
running of the 
company and 
signed documents 
whenever he was 
asked to do so), 
but professional 
knowledge or 
qualifications 
increase the 
required standard 
Generally the 
same standard, 
also with regard to 
employee elected 
and non-executive 
board members or 
directors who do 
not receive 
remuneration.  
But higher 
standard of care if 
the relevant 
breach is in a field 
in which the 
director holds a 
professional 
qualification 
Directors must 
ensure that the 
agent is 
competent and 
are required to 
monitor the agent 
Claimant 
Estonia 1) The care that a 
reasonable 
person in the 
same position 
under the same 
circumstances 
would employ 
(standard of an 
average, 
reasonable 
business 
leader)
104
 
2) Objective 
The required level 
of care depends 
on the area of 
activity and 
operating range of 
the company; the 
wider the 
operating range 
and the more 
complicated the 
area of activity, 
the stricter are the 
requirements. 
Furthermore, the 
standard of care 
depends on the 
background, 
No case law Director 
                                                     
104
 It is noteworthy that directors in Estonia have been found in breach of the duty of care for taking unnecessary business risks 
(Supreme Court case no 3-1-1-89-11 [2011]: taking risks that exceed the company’s everyday business activities and that are 
contrary to the supervisory board’s guidelines are unjustified). 
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qualification and 
obligations of the 
director. 
Finland 1) Behaviour that 
would be required 
from a careful 
individual in the 
specific situation 
2) Objective 
The division of 
tasks between 
directors may be 
relevant when 
assessing the 
extent of the 
directors’ liability: 
one director may 
bear a greater 
responsibility than 
another 
Directors may 
delegate, but the 
liability remains 
with the directors, 
who have the duty 
to monitor and 
ensure that the 
delegated tasks 
are properly 
discharged; 
similarly, the 
directors must 
‘monitor’ each 
other; case law 
exists where  
directors have 
been found liable 
for not arranging 
for a proper 
bookkeeping 
system
105
 
Generally the 
claimant, but Ch. 
22, s. 1(3) 
provides for a 
reversal in 
particular 
circumstances: ‘If 
the loss has been 
caused by a 
violation of this 
Act other than a 
violation merely of 
the principles 
referred to in 
chapter 1 [general 
principles of 
equality or loyalty 
or general 
mismanagement], 
or if the loss has 
been caused by a 
breach of the 
provisions of the 
articles of 
association, it 
shall be deemed 
to have been 
caused 
negligently, in so 
far as the person 
liable does not 
prove that he or 
she has acted 
with due care) 
France 1) Standard of a 
reasonably careful 
and diligent 
director 
2) Objective, but 
can be raised if 
the defendant has 
specific 
knowledge and 
experience 
Yes; for example, 
the care required 
from the director 
of a listed 
company is higher 
than that of the 
director of a small 
family-owned 
business 
Directors have 
been found liable 
for lack of 
monitoring 
Generally, 
claimant, but 
rebuttable 
presumption if the 
director 
participated in a 
faulty decision of 
the board 
Germany 1) s. 93(1): The 
care of a diligent 
and conscientious 
manager 
Yes, the directors 
have to meet 
higher standards if 
they act within 
Delegation is 
permissible, but 
the management 
board is required 
Director, s. 93(2) 
                                                     
105
 Case KKO 2001:85. The chairman of the board claimed that he had agreed with another director to take charge of the 
bookkeeping. The Supreme Court did not free the chairman from liability. The control over accounts appropriately organised is 
specifically mentioned in the law. On the other hand, KKO 1997:110 seems to entitle directors to trust that matters they have 
delegated between themselves are properly taken care of unless they have reason to believe that this is not the case (the case 
concerned a bank’s irresponsible lending). This case saw the defendant’s position as chairman, preparation and presentation of 
a matter to the board, and self-interest as incriminating factors. Expertise, on the other hand, was not seen as equally decisive. 
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2) Objective their field of 
responsibility. 
In addition, the 
scope and content 
of the duties 
depends on the 
type and size of 
business, the 
general financial 
and market 
conditions etc. 
to provide for an 
internal monitoring 
system, s. 91(2). 
Directors are 
liable if they do 
not select the 
agents with due 
care, do not 
instruct or 
supervise them 
properly  
Greece 1) Art. 22a: 
directors must 
display the care of 
a “prudent 
businessman” 
 
Yes; the diligence 
of the prudent 
businessman shall 
be judged by 
taking into 
account the 
capacity of each 
member and the 
duties that have 
been assigned to 
him (Art. 22a(2)). 
In addition, the 
standard of care 
varies depending 
on, the company’s 
size, its objective, 
and whether it is 
listed or not. 
Failure to monitor 
is considered as a 
breach of the duty 
of care 
Director, Art. 
22a(2) 
Hungary 1) The care and 
diligence as 
generally 
expected from 
persons in the 
director’s position 
and giving priority 
to the interests of 
the company 
2) Objective 
Generally, the 
standard does not 
differ across 
sectors or 
between listed 
and non-listed 
companies. The 
courts can, 
however, adjust 
the required 
standard of 
conduct according 
to the specific 
facts of the case. 
Directors are 
supposed to act 
personally 
Director 
Ireland 1) A universally 
accepted 
definition of the 
standard of care 
does not exist in 
Irish law; the 
courts employ a 
flexible, common-
sense approach 
that is fact-
specific. 
2) Initially: 
subjective; 
Yes, factors 
considered by the 
courts include the 
size of the 
company, the type 
of director and his 
or her experience 
and qualifications, 
the type of duties 
undertaken and 
the remuneration 
of the director 
 
- Barings was 
approved by Irish 
courts: directors 
are entitled to 
delegate functions 
and trust the 
competence and 
integrity of their 
staff to a 
reasonable extent, 
but the exercise of 
the power of 
delegation does 
Claimant 
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recently the courts 
have moved 
towards a stricter 
application that 
promotes 
objective 
minimum 
expectations. 
However, the 
courts still take 
individual 
circumstances or 
the director’s 
knowledge and 
experience into 
account when 
defining the 
standard of care. 
not absolve a 
director from the 
duty to supervise 
the discharge of 
the delegated 
functions 
- It was also held 
that a director who 
relied on his co-
directors ‘with an 
optimism that was 
certainly not 
justified, but which 
perhaps was 
understandable’ 
acted honestly 
and responsibly 
- Courts 
emphasise that 
non-executive 
directors perform 
an oversight role. 
It is sometimes 
contended that 
non-executive 
directors can only 
be expected to 
perform this role 
in relation to 
information given 
to them or which 
they ought to have 
requested. 
Italy 1) The director 
must exercise his 
duties with the 
knowledge, skill 
and experience 
that may 
reasonably be 
expected by an 
average director 
carrying out a 
similar role and by 
the specific care 
and competence 
that the director 
has 
2) Objective, but 
subjective 
elements increase 
the standard of 
care 
Yes: the standard 
depends on the 
specific role 
(natura 
dell’incarico) 
carried out by the 
director 
Delegation is 
permissible; the 
director must 
supervise agents 
and ensure that 
the management 
and accounting 
structure of the 
company is 
adequate. 
Delegated 
managers have a 
duty to report to 
the board of 
directors and 
board of statutory 
auditors at least 
every 6 month on 
the management 
of the company 
(Art. 2381(5) Civil 
Code)). The 
directors are 
required to make 
Director 
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informed 
decisions and 
may request 
clarifications on 
the management 
of the company 
(Art. 2381(5) Civil 
Code) 
Latvia 1) Statutory 
definition: in 
fulfilment of their 
duties, directors 
must act as 
prudent and 
careful managers 
2) The literature 
argues that this 
should be 
interpreted as an 
objective 
standard: what 
can be expected 
from a prudent 
and careful 
manager in a 
business or in a 
particular type of 
business (stricter 
than the standard 
of care under 
general civil law) 
Probably yes: 
what it means to 
be a prudent and 
careful manager is 
evaluated on a 
case-by-case 
basis 
No case law Director 
Lithuania 1) Civil Code, Art. 
2.87: duty to act 
with reasonable 
care 
Literature: duty to 
act in the same 
way as a 
reasonable 
person with the 
necessary skills 
and experience 
who performs 
similar duties 
2) Objective with 
subjective 
elements: the 
standard of care is 
that of a prudent, 
diligent and 
careful person, 
but in assessing 
the actions of the 
director the courts 
take into account 
the age, 
The standard 
depends on the 
functions 
performed by the 
defendant director 
Delegation of 
tasks does not 
lead to the 
exclusion of 
liability 
 
- Art. 6.248(3) 
Civil Code: ‘A 
person shall be 
deemed to have 
committed fault 
where taking into 
account the 
essence of the 
obligation and 
other 
circumstances he 
failed to behave 
with the care and 
caution necessary 
in the 
corresponding 
conditions.’ 
- According to the 
Supreme Court 
the claimant must 
prove wrongful 
acts (breach of 
director’s duty), 
damages, and 
causality. If these 
three elements 
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education, 
experience, etc. of 
the director 
(however, this 
does not mean 
that subjective 
elements lower 
the standard of 
care; from the 
case law of the 
Supreme Court it 
can be inferred 
that the objective 
standard shall 
serve as an 
irreducible 
minimum) 
are shown, fault is 
presumed. Then it 
is left for the 
director to prove 
that there was no 
fault (3K-7-
444/2009). There 
is a close link 
between the 
breach of 
director’s duties 
and fault, but they 
are considered as 
two separate 
elements. 
Luxembourg 1) No statutory 
definition; case 
law and literature: 
what can 
reasonably be 
expected of a 
director of 
average and 
reasonable 
prudence and 
competence 
acting under the 
same 
circumstances, 
called ‘le critère 
du bon père de 
famille’ 
2) Objective for 
paid directors; 
subjective for 
unpaid directors, 
i.e. the courts take 
into account the 
abilities of the 
particular director 
- In determining 
the standard of 
care, the courts 
distinguish 
between a director 
who is paid for his 
services and a 
director who does 
not receive 
compensation 
(see left) 
- In general, the 
definition of the 
standard of care is 
flexible enough to 
allow the courts to 
distinguish 
according to the 
facts of the 
individual case 
Delegation to an 
Administrateur-
délégué or 
Directeur délégué 
à la gestion 
journalière 
permissible 
(Companies Act, 
Art. 60) and 
common in 
practice 
Claimant (different 
for responsabilité 
légale under Art. 
59(2) for breaches 
of the Companies 
Act or the articles 
of association: 
once a breach is 
established, the 
director is 
presumed to have 
committed a fault) 
Malta 1) Art. 136A(3)(a): 
the degree of 
care, diligence 
and 
skill which would 
be exercised by a 
reasonably 
diligent person 
having both – 
a) the knowledge, 
skill and 
experience that 
may reasonably 
be expected of a 
The standard 
applies to all 
directors, 
irrespective of 
whether they act 
as executive or 
non-executive 
directors 
- The model 
articles allow the 
directors to 
delegate 
competences 
- Art. 136A(2)(b): 
the directors are 
responsible for the 
general 
supervision of the 
company’s affairs 
- Some case law 
holds that 
directors are 
Claimant 
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person carrying 
out the same 
functions as are 
carried out by that 
director in relation 
to the company; 
and 
b) the knowledge, 
skill and 
experience that 
the director has 
2) Objective, but 
subjective 
elements increase 
the standard of 
care 
entitled to focus 
their attention on 
the essential 
aspects of the 
company’s 
business and rely 
on the work of 
employees; 
however, it has 
been argued that 
delegation does 
not completely 
absolve the 
directors from 
supervising the 
delegates 
Netherlands 1) Case law: a 
director is 
required to meet 
the standard of 
care which can be 
expected of a 
director who is 
competent for his 
task and performs 
his/her duties with 
diligence 
2) Objective 
Courts consider 
all circumstances 
of the case, 
including: the 
nature of the 
activities of the 
company, the 
risks which 
generally result 
from this type of 
activity, the 
division of tasks 
within the board of 
directors and the 
knowledge that 
the director had or 
should have had 
at the time of the 
disputed action 
While the 
management of 
the company is 
the task of the 
board of directors 
as a whole, 
delegation is 
permissible. 
However, where 
tasks are 
delegated, the 
board is required 
to monitor the 
performance of 
these tasks. 
- Internal liability 
(s. 2:9): Claimant, 
but the burden of 
proof is on the 
director to show 
that he cannot be 
held responsible 
for an unlawful act 
adopted by all 
directors (s. 2:9 
second sentence) 
- External liability 
(general tort and 
liability in 
bankruptcy): 
Generally the 
claimant, but the 
burden of proof is 
on the directors if 
they have total 
control over the 
company, did not 
keep proper 
books or did not 
file the annual 
accounts with the 
chamber of 
commerce 
- s. 2:139 
(misleading 
accounts): fault of 
the directors is 
presumed 
Poland 1) Directors shall 
exercise a degree 
of diligence  
proper for the 
professional 
nature of their 
Benchmark is the 
knowledge and 
experience 
relevant to the 
size and profile of 
the company; it is 
expected that a 
A clear 
assignment of 
tasks between 
directors can help 
to limit the 
exposure of 
individual 
Director 
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actions 
2) Objective; a 
person who 
accepts an 
appointment as 
director while 
lacking the 
relevant 
knowledge and 
experience for the 
position may be 
considered as 
being in breach of 
the standard care 
director of an 
investment fund or 
bank has higher 
degree of 
experience or 
knowledge than a 
director of an 
ordinary company 
directors. E.g., if 
one director 
supervises 
financial 
operations and 
the damage 
occurred in this 
field, the 
responsibility of 
this manager is 
heightened. 
However, division 
or delegation of 
tasks does not 
lead to the 
complete 
exclusion of 
liability  
Portugal 1) Art. 64(1)(a): 
directors must 
display the 
willingness, 
technical 
competence and 
understanding of 
the company’s 
business that is 
appropriate to 
their role, and 
execute their 
duties with the 
diligence of a 
careful and 
organised 
manager 
2) Objective 
Supreme Court: 
the standard is not 
that of the ‘bonus 
pater familias, but 
a manager with 
certain capacities 
… From the 
objective nature of 
the standard of 
care results the 
indifference to the 
personal 
circumstances of 
the director, 
namely his 
incapacity or 
- The standard of 
care depends on 
the type, object 
and size of the 
company, the 
economic sector 
where the 
company is active, 
the nature and 
importance of the 
decision taken 
(day-to-day 
management 
decision or 
extraordinary 
decision), the time 
available to obtain 
information, and 
the type of 
behaviour usually 
adopted under 
such 
circumstances. 
- In addition, it 
varies according 
to the functions 
performed by 
directors in the 
different corporate 
governance 
models available 
under Portuguese 
law (Latin, 
German, or Anglo-
Saxon model)
106
 
Duties can be 
allocated among 
the directors (Art. 
407(1)) or the 
current 
management of 
the company 
delegated to one 
or more directors 
or an executive 
committee (Art. 
407(3)). In that 
case,  the other 
directors are 
responsible for the 
general vigilance 
of the 
performance of 
the delegatees 
and for any losses 
incurred through 
acts or omissions 
on their part, 
when, having 
knowledge of 
such acts or 
omissions, they 
fail to seek the 
intervention of the 
board to adopt the 
necessary 
measures (Art. 
407(8)) → 
oversight liability, 
but lower standard 
Director, Art. 72(1) 
                                                     
106
 (1) In the classic or Latin model, although it is possible to assign certain functions to specific members, all the directors on 
the board are competent to make business decisions. Thus, the same standard of care applies and the directors are jointly and 
severally liable for a breach of duty. Internally, they enjoy a right to recourse according to the proportion of their fault (Code of 
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incompetence.’ - Directors with 
supervisory 
functions are 
generally subject 
to the same 
standard of care 
as executive 
directors, Art. 
81(1). They are 
jointly liable with 
the managers if 
the damage would 
not have occurred 
had they properly 
executed their 
supervision 
duties, Art. 81(2) 
than that 
applicable to 
executive 
directors (duty to 
monitor, examine 
critically the 
information 
received by the 
other directors or 
agents, and make 
enquiries if 
necessary) 
Romania 1) The standard 
required from a 
‘good 
administrator’ → 
the level of 
diligence, 
prudence, and 
competences that 
would be required 
from a good 
administrator 
found in the 
particular 
business situation 
of the director 
2) Objective; no 
reference to the 
knowledge, skill or 
experience of the 
director 
The standard of 
care depends on 
the ‘particular 
situation’ of the 
director 
- Delegation of 
duties to a 
management 
committee is 
common in the 
one-tier system; in 
the two-tier 
system, duties 
can also be 
allocated among 
the members of 
the executive 
board or 
delegated 
- In this case: duty 
to gather 
information (Art. 
140) and monitor 
the managers 
(Art. 142(2)) 
- Courts: the duty 
of inquiry entails 
the obligation of 
the directors to be 
proactive and 
solicit documents 
and information 
from executives 
- The duty to 
The initial burden 
of proof is on the 
director to show 
that he/she acted 
with prudence and 
diligence. If the 
director adduces 
evidence to the 
contrary, the 
burden may be 
reversed (Court of 
Appeal of 
Bucharest, 
Commercial 
Division, no. 167 
13.04.2011). 
See now also Art. 
1548 New Civil 
Code, in force 
since 2011, which 
provides for a 
presumption of 
fault if the debtor 
does not fulfil a 
contractual 
obligation 
(however, it is 
problematic 
whether the article 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Commercial Companies, Art. 73). The internal division of powers by delegation Code of Commercial Companies, Art. 407(1) 
and (2)) may have an impact on the internal relationships between the directors and their right to recourse. 
(2) In the one-tier or Anglo-Saxon model, the members of the executive board of directors (“Conselho de Administração 
Executivo”) are bound by the ordinary standard of care. Non-executive directors who are members of the audit committee 
perform functions similar to those of the audit board in the classic model. As they perform the auditing functions, they are 
subject to the duty of care and must employ high standards of professional diligence in the interest of the company (Art. 64(2)). 
Special, analytic and specific monitoring is demanded. 
(3) In the two-tier or German model, the members of the executive board of directors (“Conselho de Administração Executivo”) 
are subject to the ordinary standard of care. The standard applicable to the members of the “general and supervisory board” 
(“Conselho Geral e de Supervisão”) corresponds to that of the audit committee’s members in the Anglo-Saxon model. However, 
in relation to matters which, under the law or the articles of association, belong to the executive board, but require the prior 
consent of the general and supervisory board (Art. 442), the ordinary standard of care is applicable. 
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monitor does not 
require the day-to-
day supervision of 
management, but 
it is understood as 
the more general 
task of being 
familiar with the 
internal operations 
of the company 
also applies to the 
non-fulfilment of 
means, such as 
the duty of care, 
or only obligations 
of results; no case 
law applying the 
new article to 
directors’ duties) 
Slovakia 1) The director 
must act with due 
professional care, 
obtain and use all 
relevant 
information 
2) Objective 
No case law on 
the question of 
whether factors 
such as the size 
and nature of the 
business and the 
function and role 
of the director 
determine what 
‘professional care’ 
means in the 
relevant context 
No explicit rules 
on monitoring and 
no case law; it is 
argued that where 
directors delegate 
functions, the act 
of delegation will 
have to conform 
to the duty of care 
standards and 
directors have to 
monitor the 
discharge of the 
delegated tasks 
- Supreme Court: 
the claimant must 
prove all elements 
of the claim, but 
the issue is not 
settled and the 
prevailing opinion 
in the literature 
disagrees with the 
court 
- Literature: the 
burden of proof is 
on the director 
Slovenia 1) Directors must 
act with the 
diligence of a 
conscientious and 
fair manager, Art. 
263(1) 
Supreme Court: 
this should be 
construed as the 
highest diligence 
of a good expert, 
and not the 
diligence that is in 
any case required 
from reasonable 
persons in 
commercial 
transactions 
2) Objective 
The required 
standard of care is 
determined by 
considering the 
rules, customs 
and expertise 
established within 
the particular 
profession. It 
differs according 
to the size of the 
company, its 
activities and 
particular 
situation, as well 
as the allocation 
of responsibilities 
among the 
directors.  
The ZFPPIPP 
specifies risk 
management and 
monitoring 
obligations: The 
directors are 
required to ensure 
that the company 
provides for 
adequate risk 
management 
procedures, which 
shall include the 
determination, 
measurement or 
assessment, 
management and 
monitoring of 
risks, including 
reporting on the 
risks to which the 
company is or 
could be exposed 
in its operations 
(Art. 30). 
Director, Art. 
263(2) 
Spain 1) Care of an 
orderly 
businessman; 
expressly 
regulated: duty to 
be informed 
2) Objective 
The standard of 
care depends on 
the type of 
business activity, 
whether or not the 
company is listed, 
the position of the 
director held on 
Outside directors 
are not liable for 
the executive 
management, but 
they are required 
to select the 
agents carefully, 
instruct and 
Claimant (but s. 
237 may be of 
assistance if 
liability is based 
on a decision by 
the whole board, 
see below 2.6) 
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the board 
(executive or non-
executive) 
supervise them 
Sweden 1) Behaviour that 
would be required 
from a careful 
individual in the 
specific situation 
2) Generally 
objective, but 
subjective 
elements may 
increase the 
standard of care 
Generally the 
same standard, 
also with regard to 
employee and 
non-executive 
board members or 
directors who do 
not receive 
remuneration. 
However, 
directors’ 
responsibility may 
vary depending on 
their expertise, 
working tasks, 
amount of 
remuneration etc. 
An expert in a 
certain area may 
carry greater 
responsibility than 
the other directors 
with regard to 
damage or loss 
which has been 
caused to the 
company within 
the field of 
expertise. This 
view may, 
however, be 
disputed on the 
grounds that the 
board is a 
collegial body, 
which means that 
an individual 
member of the 
board shall not 
bear the primary 
responsibility for 
decisions made 
within a certain 
area 
- The board of 
directors is 
exclusively or 
predominantly 
composed of non-
executive 
directors; 
management 
duties are 
delegated to 
executives. Even 
though the board 
may delegate, it 
remains ultimately 
responsible. 
- Ch. 8, § 4(3): 
The board of 
directors shall 
ensure that the 
company’s 
organisation is 
structured in such 
a manner that 
accounting, 
management of 
funds, and the 
company’s 
finances are 
monitored in a 
satisfactory 
manner 
Claimant 
United Kingdom 1) s. 174 CA 
2006: the general 
knowledge, skill 
and experience 
that may 
reasonably be 
expected of a 
person carrying 
out the functions 
carried out by the 
Yes, see s. 174: 
‘carrying out the 
functions carried 
out by the director 
in relation to the 
company’. But 
note Barings: ‘The 
standard of care is 
not different in 
relation to 
Barings decision: 
1) Continuing duty 
to acquire and 
maintain sufficient 
knowledge and 
understanding of 
the company’s 
business  
2) The agents can 
be trusted to a 
Claimant 
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director in relation 
to the company, 
and the general 
knowledge, skill 
and expertise that 
the director has 
2) Objective, but 
subjective 
elements increase 
the standard of 
care 
different types of 
director. Rather, 
when applying the 
standard, what is 
expected of a 
part-time director 
is less than what 
is expected of a 
full-time director.’ 
reasonable extent, 
but duty to 
supervise the 
discharge of the 
delegated 
functions 
3) The extent of 
the duty to 
supervise 
depends on the 
director’s role in 
the management 
of the company 
 
Discussion 
The effectiveness of the duty of care as a deterrent to the deficient discharge of management 
functions depends essentially on two aspects: the determination of the required standard of care and 
the allocation of the burden of proof for showing that the standard was not met or (if the burden is 
reversed) that the director acted with due care. We will discuss both aspects in turn, summarising our 
findings in Map 2.4.2.a (Standard of care) and Map 2.4.2.b (burden of proof). 
 
Standard of care 
We distinguish between three approaches to defining the required standard of care, which we label, in 
the order of strictness (i.e. starting with the most demanding standard) objective/subjective standard, 
objective standard, and reduced standard. 
(1) The objective/subjective standard establishes an objective lower benchmark that has to be 
satisfied by all directors, notwithstanding their individual skill, expertise, or experience. The 
benchmark is defined with reference to the care exercised by a prudent businessman with the 
knowledge and expertise that can reasonably be expected of a person in a comparable 
situation. However, the required standard is heightened if the director in question possesses 
particular knowledge or experience. In this case, the law expects the director to deploy his or 
her abilities to the advantage of the company.  
(2) The objective standard refers to the prudent businessman, similar to the 
objective/subjective standard, but does not explicitly provide for increased expectations in light 
of the individual skills of the defendant director.  
(3) Finally, the reduced standard usually also starts from an objective formulation of the care 
and diligence that directors are expected to employ. In contrast to the other two approaches it 
allows exceptions that lead to a relaxation of the objective benchmark, for example if the 
director lacks the knowledge or experience of an average businessman or does not occupy a 
full-time position on the board.  
The Member States are classified according to the three formulations in Map 2.4.2.a. 
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Map 2.4.2.a: Standard of care 
 
Legend Country 
Objective/subjective standard 
with reference to the prudent 
businessman (or a comparable 
formulation), where subjective 
elements increase the required 
standard of care  
HR, FR, IT, LT, MT, UK 
Objective, with reference to the 
prudent businessman (or a 
comparable formulation) 
AT, BE, BG, CZ, DE, DK, EE, FI, HU, 
LV, NL, PL, PT, RO, SK, SI, ES, SE 
Reduced standard: relaxation of 
the objective benchmark, for 
example because subjective 
lack of experience leads to a 
reduction of the required 
standard of care 
CY, EL, IE, LU 
 
The clear majority of jurisdictions provides either for the objective/subjective or the objective standard. 
The four outliers are Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, and Luxembourg. We will deal with them in turn. 
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 Cyprus: The Cyprus Companies Law does not specify the required level of skill and care. It 
has been held that if a director acts in good faith he or she cannot be held responsible to pay 
damages, unless guilty of grossly culpable negligence in a business sense. The Cypriot courts 
have not developed their own interpretation of the duty of skill and care but refer to the 
common law approach in the English Court of Appeal judgment Re City Equitable Fire 
Assurance Co.
107
 This decision was commonly interpreted as establishing a fairly relaxed 
standard where subjective elements, i.e. the lack of experience of the defendant director, 
result in a lower standard of care. This is no longer the law in the United Kingdom,
108
 but it 
would apply in Cyprus, where the English pre-independence jurisprudence is a common point 
of reference. 
 Greece: Greek law provides that in determining the diligence expected of the board members 
(standard of the ‘prudent businessman’), the ‘capacity of each member’ shall be taken into 
account.
109
 The relevant rules were amended in 2007. The old law distinguished between the 
CEO, who was subject to liability for any type of negligence, and other directors, who faced a 
lower risk of liability. This distinction has now been abolished, but the formulation in the 
amended law still demands a differentiation between board members in light of subjective 
elements (their capacity) and the allocation of tasks on the board. 
 Ireland: The ambivalent position of Ireland is a heritage of the influence of English law. The 
traditional position in the UK was that directors should only be held accountable to the 
standard of care and diligence that can be expected of them individually. While there was 
some disagreement in the academic literature whether the standard was entirely subjective or 
some objective element was retained, it was generally argued that lack of knowledge, 
inexperience and other subjective deficiencies reduced the standard of care.
110
 Since the 
1990s, the courts moved to a dual objective/subjective standard that is now codified in the 
Companies Act 2006.
111
 The implications of this change for Irish law are uncertain. Irish case 
law has not developed a generally applicable definition of the standard of care. Rather, the 
courts employ a flexible, fact-specific approach that takes account of the individual director’s 
knowledge and experience. On the other hand, inspired by the shift in English law and as a 
reaction to the increased public focus on corporate governance, the Irish courts have moved 
towards a stricter test that promotes objective minimum expectations. Thus, it can be said that 
the case law is in a state of flux and Irish law may rapidly converge on the European median. 
 Luxembourg: Pursuant to Luxembourg law, the standard of care is objective for paid directors 
but subjective for unpaid directors, i.e. the courts take into account the subjective abilities of 
the latter. This may not necessarily mean that the standard is lower, but often part-time, 
outside directors will effectively be held accountable to a more lenient standard. 
It is important not to overstate the difference between group 1 (objective/subjective standard) and 
group 2 (objective standard). The objective standard often refers to the general definition of 
negligence in the jurisdiction (with appropriate modifications in order to take account of the 
professional environment in which the director operates). The general negligence standard is framed 
objectively, but the information available to us indicates that legal systems will take account of the 
abilities and knowledge of the defendant. If a harmful outcome could have been avoided if the 
defendant had made reasonable use of his or her abilities, the law will hold this against the defendant. 
Thus, while the formulation of the required standard of care may differ between groups 1 and 2, with a 
greater emphasis on the individual abilities of the director in the legal systems allocated to group 1, 
the content of the behavioural expectations imposed on directors is very similar. As discussed above, 
even the ‘outliers’ may move in the direction of such an understanding of due care. Accordingly, as far 
                                                     
107
 [1925] Ch 407. 
108
 In the UK, the law changed with the judgments in Norman v Theodore Goddard [1991] BCLC 1027 and Re D’Jan [1994] 1 
BCLC 561. The rules established in these decisions are now codified in the Companies Act 2006, s. 174. 
109
 Art. 22a(2) Law on Companies, as amended by Law 3604/2007. 
110
 This was famously called the ‘amiable-lunatic standard’, stemming from Hutton v West Cork Railway Co (1883) 23 Ch D 654. 
111
 Companies Act 2006, s. 174. 
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as the required standard of care is concerned, we can observe significant convergence in the EU 
Member States. 
In spite of the relative convergence as regards the law on the books, the perception of how the 
standard of care applies in practice differs widely in the Member States. This can be illustrated by 
means of the first question of Hypothetical III. The answers are based on the following facts: 
A large banking institution is engaged in retail as well as investment banking. In 2000, a 
new CEO was appointed, who also sits on the board of directors. The CEO made the 
decision to invest heavily in collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) backed by residential 
mortgage backed securities, including lower rated securities that pooled subprime 
mortgages to borrowers with weak credit history. The investments were initially 
successful, generating high profits for the company. However, beginning in 2005, house 
prices, particularly in the United States, began to decrease. Defaults and foreclosures 
increased and the income from residential mortgages fell rapidly.  
As early as May 2005, economist Paul Krugman had warned of signs that the US housing 
market was approaching the final stages of a speculative bubble. Early in 2007, a large 
US subprime lender filed for bankruptcy protection and a number of investors announced 
write downs of several billion dollars on their structured finance commitments. In July, 
2007, Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s downgraded bonds backed by subprime 
mortgages. At the end of 2007, two hedge funds that had invested heavily in subprime 
mortgages declared bankruptcy. In spite of these warning signs, the CEO had continued 
to invest in CDOs until shortly before the Lehman bankruptcy in September 2008, 
accumulating a total exposure of more than 20 billion Euros. The subprime mortgage 
crisis necessitated massive write downs, leading to an annual loss of eight billion in 2008, 
which can be attributed in equal measure to the CDO transactions undertaken in 2005-
2008. 
The correspondents were asked to assess the likely liability of the CEO for breach of the duty of 
care in light of these facts. The answers show that settled case law that would allow an 
assessment of the hypothetical scenario with any degree of certainty is the exception. In the 
vast majority of Member States, judgments to the point either do not exist at all, or the law is in 
the process of evolving. It is also interesting to note that even where legal principles exist that 
are described by the literature, or codified by the statute, in similar terms (such as the concept 
of an implied or express business judgment rule
112
), the perception of whether the CEO is likely 
to be in breach of duty varies between Member States. 
 
Table 2.4.2.b: Excessive risk-taking 
Country Liability for excessive risk exposure Code
113 
Austria Liability is unlikely: Judges generally defer to 
business decisions which have been taken with 
due preparation of the facts as long as there is 
no conflict of interest, unless the decision is 
‘absolutely untenable’ (following the principles 
of the German ARAG/Garmenbeck decision
114
). 
Here this is presumably not the case; judges 
N 
                                                     
112
 For a detailed discussion of the business judgment rule see below 2.4.3. 
113
 Refers to a perception of high likelihood of liability (L), low likelihood of liability (N), or unclear legal situation (U). 
114
 BGHZ 135, 244. The decision established an unwritten business judgment rule in German law. The court held that a 
management board member who acted solely in the interest of the company and who carefully determined the basis of his 
decision-making was only liable where the boundaries of the discretion had been ‘clearly transgressed’ and where ‘the 
willingness to engage in entrepreneurial risk-taking had been carried too far in an irresponsible manner’. These principles are 
now codified with some modifications in s. 93(1) Stock Corporation Act (see the discussion of the business judgment rule below 
at 2.4.3). 
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would probably analyse the behaviour of 
comparable banking institutions and base their 
decision on whether the misconceptions as to 
the CDOs were shared by other market 
participants. 
Belgium Relevant criterion is whether any other 
reasonable director, placed in similar 
circumstances, would have entered into the 
involved transaction; if so, the business 
judgement falls within a protected margin of 
discretion. Here, considering the ample 
presence of warning signs, it may be argued 
that the CEO is liable. 
L 
Bulgaria Unclear U 
Croatia The CEO is protected by the business judgment 
rule, unless the warning signs were clear 
enough to rebut the threshold requirements of 
the rule. 
N 
Cyprus Uncertain, no case law on the issue; Cypriot 
courts may follow the English common law 
associated with the Companies Act 1948, which 
applied a relatively lenient standard.
115
 
U 
Czech Republic Breach of duty is possible, but litigation would 
be unlikely in practice unless the director’s 
conduct could be qualified as criminal activity. 
U 
Denmark Liability is likely: Danish courts apply a version 
of the business judgement rule in that they are 
reluctant to intervene in business decisions 
unless they were clearly reckless. Here, the 
investments appear to have been reckless 
given the existing warning signs. 
L 
Finland Liability not likely for transactions in 2005, 2006, 
and early 2007 as this type of investment was 
common market practice and generated high 
profits. For the end of 2007 and 2008 liability is 
possible as warning signs became clearer. 
L 
France In French law, the business judgment rule does 
not apply, but French courts are hesitant to 
second-guess business decisions. This situation 
is similar to that of some French banks. No suit 
has been filed and it is doubtful that a judge 
would find a management mistake. It cannot be 
said generally when warning signs become so 
obvious that initially permissible risk-taking 
constitutes a violation of the duty of care. This is 
decided by the courts on a case by case basis. 
Usually it is held that the situation must have 
been so desperate that there would have been 
N 
                                                     
115
 See above text to n 107. 
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no hope for survival of the company. 
Germany Liability is likely at least for the losses 
attributable to the years 2007 and 2008. Courts 
have held that speculative investments 
constitute a breach of the duty of care and are 
not protected by the business judgment rule 
where (1) the probability of failure is clearly 
higher than the probability of success; (2) the 
risk is disproportionate to the potential profit; or 
(3) the investment endangers the company’s 
existence. 
L 
Greece Liability is likely; the business judgment rule will 
presumably not apply because of the CEO’s 
persistence in making risky investments in spite 
of all warning signs and the bankruptcy of 
comparable firms 
L 
Hungary Liability is likely: The CEO may be considered 
as breaching the duty of care by continuing the 
investments in CDOs when the market became 
extremely risky by the end of 2007. 
L 
Ireland Irish courts are hesitant to interfere in business 
decisions. Initially they applied a purely 
subjective standard, with the consequence that 
business decisions did not give rise to liability 
unless they were in breach of the articles of 
association or could be classed as dishonest or 
grossly incompetent. Recently courts have 
become more prepared to evaluate directorial 
conduct and draw a distinction between 
calculated risks and rash and reckless risks. 
However, in the present case it is difficult to 
assess whether the warning signs would be 
sufficient to give rise to liability. 
N 
Italy Liability is likely: At least towards the end of the 
period, warning signs became so clear that it 
can be argued that the CEO acted grossly 
negligently by engaging in excessively risky 
transactions. This is the case even if it is 
accepted that the standard of review for 
business decisions in Italy follows a pattern 
similar to the ‘business judgement rule’ 
L 
The Netherlands It is likely that the CEO is considered to have 
acted ‘severely culpable’ and that he is, 
accordingly, liable since he ignored clear 
warning signs. In practice, however, it is difficult 
to judge when red flags are so obvious that the 
threshold of ‘severe culpability’ is crossed. 
L 
Poland Unclear, no case law. According to some 
commentators, even highly risky investments 
are not considered to be unlawful. 
U 
 
 
 
 
98 Directors’ Duties and Liability in the EU  
 
Portugal In principle the CEO would be liable. Directors 
are protected by the business judgment rule 
only insofar as risky business decisions are in 
line with the general standard of entrepreneurial 
rationality. Here, it will be difficult to show the 
rationality of highly risky investments with 
collaterals that were consistently regarded as 
weak or overvalued by the economic and 
financial community long after 2005. 
L 
Romania Liability is likely: The business judgment rule 
does not apply where the director does not act 
on an informed basis or the information 
available to the director indicates that the 
business decision will expose the company to 
losses. It can be argued here that this is the 
case. 
L 
Slovenia Unclear whether, and under what conditions, a 
business judgment rule may be applied by the 
courts. 
U 
Spain An implied business judgment rule applies to 
the effect that the CEO is not liable, provided 
that he was well informed, the decision was not 
illegal, and there was no conflict of interest. 
These conditions seem to be satisfied in the 
present case, provided that there were at least 
some other opinions at the time arguing that the 
investments in CDOs were sound. 
N 
UK Liability is unlikely: 
1) As far as the content of business decisions is 
concerned, courts ask whether the decision 
could rationally or plausibly have made sense in 
the shareholders’ interests at the time the 
decision was made. That is possible in this case 
even if some warning signs existed. 
2) Decision-making process: 
objective/subjective standard applies. Here, the 
facts do not suggest that inadequate care was 
taken in deciding to make the sub-prime 
investments. 
N 
 
Burden of proof 
Map 2.4.2.b classifies the Member States according to who bears the burden of proving that the 
director acted with due care (or failed to do so). Thus, the map focuses on one aspect of a claim for 
damages based on a breach of the duty of care: the care taken by the director in making the business 
decision. This constitutes, arguably, the central element of the duty. While the burden of proof for 
other elements, for example the requirement that the company has suffered a loss, is often on the 
plaintiff, the level of care employed by the director is a function of processes that relate to board 
proceedings and the director’s state of mind. Accordingly, they cannot easily be reviewed by the 
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claimant, especially if the claim is enforced by the shareholders. The allocation of the burden of proof 
consequently assumes particular importance. 
 
Map 2.4.2.b: Burden of proof for a breach of the duty of care  
 
Legend Country 
Director AT, HR, CZ, EE, DE, EL, HU, IT, LV, 
PL, PT, RO, SI 
Claimant 
 
BE, BG, CY, DK, FI, FR, IE, LT, LU, 
MT, NL, SK, ES, SE, UK 
 
It should be noted that the allocation of the burden of proof is generally more nuanced than a binary 
choice. The above map depicts the general rule, but many countries allow for exceptions or qualify 
this rule in particular circumstances. We address the most important qualifications in the following 
paragraphs. 
Distinction between obligations of means and obligations of result. Some Member States, in particular 
France, Belgium and Luxembourg, follow the general procedural rule imposing the burden of proof on 
the claimant for so-called obligations of means (obligations de moyens), but provide for a reversal of 
the burden of proof in cases of obligations of result (obligations de résultat). The former refer to the 
obligation to employ best efforts in performing a specified task, without assuming responsibility for 
achieving a certain result, whereas the latter include the result as part of the obligations assumed by 
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the debtor, with the consequence that the debtor is in breach of a contractual or statutory duty if the 
result is not achieved. The directors’ duty to manage the company and act in the company’s best 
interest is commonly interpreted as an obligation of means.
116
 Accordingly, in order to establish liability 
for mismanagement, the claimant bears the burden of proving that the director has acted negligently. 
Examples of management mistakes are excessively risky or imprudent investments, neglect of the 
director’s supervisory functions, or the conclusion of contracts that the company will most likely not be 
able to honour. On the other hand, breaches of the company legislation or the articles of association 
are considered to be obligations of result. For example, it has been argued that the failure of the 
director to participate in board meetings and be actively involved in the management of the company 
constitutes a violation of an obligation of result.
117
 In this case, the burden of proof shifts to the director 
who has to show that his absence was excusable and that he challenged the wrongful board 
resolution at the earliest possibility. 
Slovakia. In Slovakia, the legal situation does not seem to be settled. Two rulings of the Supreme 
Court of Slovakia have held that liability claims for damages, including those brought against company 
directors, follow the general rule of civil procedure requiring the claimant to prove all elements of the 
cause of action. The prevailing opinion in the literature disagrees and argues that the liability regime of 
directors is more specific and stricter than the general regime. Accordingly, it is suggested that 
directors have to prove that they acted with due care, i.e. that they obtained all relevant information 
and made a carefully considered decision. 
 
Variations in the standard of care and delegation 
The Member States show relatively little variation with respect to the remaining questions regarding 
the scope and content of the duty of care. As mentioned above, we analyse whether the applicable 
standard of care differs depending on the role and position of the director and the type of company, 
and how the standard changes when the directors delegate duties. 
As far as the first point is concerned, the statutory definition of the standard of care usually does not 
distinguish between directors depending on the role they perform and the position they occupy in the 
company. Generally, the law simply speaks of ‘directors’ or ‘the board of directors’ and applies the 
same standard to all board members. However, where the law contains a definition of what constitutes 
due care, this definition generally leaves room for differentiation in the application of the standard. For 
example, if the law provides that directors should employ the care and skill that a reasonable person 
would use under the same circumstances,
118
 it is clear that this standard varies with the position of the 
director. Even where the law contains only a general reference to the prudent businessman (or a 
similar formulation), it seems natural to require more of directors who work full-time and hold an 
important position in the company, such as chief executive or chairman of the audit committee, since 
the understanding of what constitutes ‘prudent’ or ‘diligent’ behaviour depends on the context. This is 
recognised in virtually all jurisdictions. In practice, the courts tend to expect more from executive, full-
time directors than from non-executive directors. This variation in the applicable standard of care lies 
probably in the nature of the different roles of the board members and is, therefore, an issue that has 
become relevant in most Member States, notwithstanding the precise formulation of the duty in the 
law. 
While the general approach to taking account of differences in the directors’ professional experience, 
knowledge of, and familiarity with, the company is fairly similar, we observe nuanced differences in the 
Member States. The laws of some Member States provide explicitly, or the courts have determined, 
                                                     
116 However, once it has been established that a board decision constitutes a breach of duty, some legal systems provide for the 
rebuttable presumption that all directors, whether present or not when the decision was adopted, acted with the required degree 
of fault. The burden is then on the director to show that he or she opposed the decision and acted generally without fault. See 
French Supreme Court (Cour de Cassation), Cass. Com. 30.03.2010 n°08-17.841, FP-P+B+R+I, n° 08-17.841, Fonds de 
garantie des dépôts (FGD) c/ Sté Caribéenne de conseil et d'audit: P. Le Cannu: RJDA 7/10 n°760. Revue des sociétés 2010, 
p. 304. 
117
 For Belgium: M. Vandenbogaerde, Aansprakelijkheid van vennootschapsbestuurders (Intersentia 2009), 63. 
118
 See, e.g., the Estonian country report. 
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that the standard of care expected of directors depends on the position held and level of reward 
received by the director. A clear enunciation of this view can be found in the famous Barings decision 
of the UK High Court,
119
 which was also followed (with modifications depending on the context) by 
Irish courts.
120
 In Luxembourg, the courts define the standard of care differently for a director who is 
paid and one who does not receive compensation.
121
 Similarly, Belgian law applies the general 
agency law principle that unpaid agents are judged more leniently than paid agents to directors.
122
 In 
Greece, the law requires that the care of a ‘prudent businessman’ shall be determined in light of the 
duties assigned to the director.
123
 This effectively establishes different standards for executive and 
non-executive directors. Most countries focus on factors such as the role of the director and the 
allocation of functional responsibilities between board members.
124
 Thus, while the analysis conducted 
by the courts follows similar parameters, the assessment is highly fact-specific and the observed 
nuanced differences, combined with the more significant differences in the general formulation of the 
standard of care discussed above, may or may not lead to different outcomes in individual cases. 
A question that is largely unresolved in most jurisdictions is the process by which courts may rationally 
evaluate and balance the different factors that play a role in the determination and interpretation of the 
applicable standard of care. A topical example is the responsibility of a non-executive director who 
holds a key position in the company, for example chairman of the board or of the audit committee. The 
relevant considerations that commonly inform the court’s assessment are not necessarily congruent. 
For example, non-executive directors are generally judged more leniently than executive directors (if 
not in law, then at least in practice). On the other hand, a director who has particular qualifications and 
acts within his or her area of expertise, as will often be the case with the chair of the audit committee, 
is held to a higher standard.
125
 Some non-European courts have found non-executive directors in 
comparable positions to be liable,
126
 but in the EU little guidance exists on the issue. In the wake of 
the financial crisis courts seem to adopt a less deferential approach, both to managerial decision-
making and the monitoring activities expected by non-executive directors, but legal uncertainty is 
relatively high. 
As far as monitoring duties of the directors and the consequences of a delegation of functions for the 
standard of care are concerned, we observe again a fairly coherent general approach throughout the 
EU. Virtually all jurisdictions hold, either in the statutory law, in case law, or in the literature, that the 
delegation of tasks does not lead to an exculpation of the delegating director(s). The Member States 
differ, however, in the specificity and comprehensiveness with which they regulate the problem. Some 
legal systems have specified clearly how delegation affects the standard of care, whereas others 
simply state that the failure to monitor the discharge of the delegated tasks may be qualified as 
negligence. We may, therefore, distinguish between high-intensity and low-intensity regulation of this 
issue. High-intensity jurisdictions distinguish between two or three elements of the duty of care in the 
                                                     
119
 Re Barings plc (No. 5) [1999] 1 BCLC 433, confirmed [2000] 1 BCLC 523, CA. 
120
 Re Vehicle Imports Ltd, unreported, High Court, Murphy J, November 23, 2000. For more details see the Irish country report, 
4.4. 
121
 See already the discussion above ‘Standard of care’. 
122
 Art. 1992 Belgian Civil Code. 
123
 Art. 22a(2) Law on Companies. 
124
 Austria: the type of company and specific responsibilities of the director within the company are considered (RIS-Justiz 
RS0116167); Denmark: directors are judged more strictly if they act in a field in which they hold a professional qualification (J.S. 
Christensen, Kapitalselskaer (1st ed., 3rd sup., Thomson Reuters Professional 2009)); Germany: the allocation of functional 
responsibilities among board members influences the behavioural expectations of directors (T. Raiser & R. Veil, Recht der 
Kapitalgesellschaften (5th ed., C.H. Beck 2010)); heightened expectations if the director acts within the area of his or her 
expertise (BGH, Judgement of 2 September 2011 - II ZR 234/09, Wertpapier-Mitteilungen (WM) 2011, 2092); Italy: reference in 
2392(1) Civil Code to the ‘knowledge, skill and experience that may reasonably be expected of an average director carrying out 
a similar role’ (emphasis by us); Netherlands: the division of tasks within the board of directors is important (Staleman/Van de 
Ven, HR 10-01-1997, NJ 1997, 360); Portugal: the standard of care varies according to the functions performed by the directors 
in the different corporate governance models; Spain: the degree of diligence varies depending on the position of the defendant 
director on the board. For more details see Table 2.4.2.a above. 
125
 See the references above n 124. 
126
 Australian Securities & Investments Commission (ASIC) v Rich 174 FLR 128 (2003) (holding that the qualifications, 
experience and expertise of the defendant director, as well as his occupation of the positions of chairman of the board and 
chairman of the finance and audit committee give rise to particular responsibilities); Australian Securities & Investments 
Commission (ASIC) v Healey [2011] FCA 717 (finding executive as well as non-executive directors of an investment company 
to be in breach of duty because they did not identify inaccuracies in the accounts). 
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context of delegation. First, the standard of care is applied to the act of delegation, i.e. the director is 
required to select the person to whom functions are delegated carefully, instruct this person 
adequately, and provide for training where necessary. Second, the director has to monitor the 
performance of the delegated tasks. This does not involve day-to-day supervision, but regular 
monitoring and additional inquiries where reasons for concern or suspicion exist. Where problems are 
identified, directors are required to take the necessary steps and intervene in the performance of the 
delegated tasks. Third, it is not sufficient to be reactive, i.e. to act only when a problem arises. Rather, 
directors are under a continuing duty to familiarise themselves with all relevant aspects of the 
company’s operations, ensure that they are apprised of new developments, and that systems are in 
place that facilitate the transmission of information within the business. Some legal systems provide 
more generally that directors are responsible for the establishment of effective risk management and 
control systems, which include sound accounting structures and, depending on the size of the 
business and the industry, additional operational and compliance controls. This latter aspect of the 
duty of care has become particularly relevant in financial institutions, where the financial crisis 
exposed significant risk management failures in some institutions. 
Examples for high-intensity jurisdictions are the UK, Germany, or Slovenia. However, it should be 
noted that there is no clear divide between high-intensity and low-intensity jurisdictions. Rather, as the 
third column of Table 2.4.2.a shows, the countries differ in degrees. In addition, where a legal system 
has not developed the specific behavioural expectations outlined in the preceding paragraph, this may 
simply be a function of the lack of case law. These duties are usually not laid down in the statute, or 
only laid down in general and fragmentary terms.
127
 The emergence of coherent and comprehensive 
rules, therefore, requires that the courts have the opportunity to build on and amplify the existing 
regulatory framework.
128
 
The answers received to Hypothetical III (duty of care) illustrate the degree of legal uncertainty that 
currently exists in the EU with regard to delegation and monitoring. We assume in the hypothetical 
that the CEO of a large banking institution repeatedly used ostensibly arms-length transactions with 
investment firms that were controlled by his nominees to transfer assets at an undervalue to a 
company owned by himself. We ask whether (1) the members of the audit committee and (2) the other 
non-executive directors are liable for oversight failure. Table 2.4.2.c shows the general tendency of 
legal systems to expect more of directors with specific knowledge and expertise, such as members of 
the audit committee, than of other non-executive directors. However, the table also implies differences 
in emphasis with regard to the amplification of the duty of directors to supervise internal operations. 
Some jurisdictions emphasise the heightened responsibilities of the members of the audit committee 
in financial matters, others the general responsibility of the whole board for the establishment of sound 
internal control systems. Yet other jurisdictions allow directors to rely on the information provided by 
colleagues and lower-level managers in most cases, unless specific facts give rise to suspicion. It is 
difficult to assess in how far these differences in emphasis would lead to different outcomes in 
litigation. A conclusive assessment of the non-executive directors’ liability would require a much more 
detailed set of facts, but the table may indicate the general approach of the legal systems to these 
issues. 
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 See for Germany s. 91 Stock Corporation Act; for Slovenia Arts. 31, 32 ZFPPIPP. In the UK, relatively detailed provisions on 
risk management and internal control are contained in the corporate governance code, see UK Corporate Governance Code 
2012, C.2. 
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 A good example for the derivation of specific monitoring and oversight duties from general duty of care standards is the 
Barings case, cited above n 119. 
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Table 2.4.2.c: Duty to supervise 
Country Audit committee Non-executive directors 
who are not committee 
members 
Austria Members of the audit 
committee have to control 
the books and, in doing so, 
meet the regular standard of 
negligence for supervisory 
board members 
Other members of the 
supervisory board are also in 
principle subject to a 
negligence standard, but 
they are generally justified in 
relying on the accuracy of 
the accounts  
Belgium A director’s competences or 
membership of a committee 
are not formally elements of 
the judicial determination of 
liability, although it cannot be 
ruled out that courts will take 
the membership of the audit 
committee into account 
when determining the 
standard of care 
The threshold for liability is 
relatively high, as directors 
are not required to monitor 
their colleagues 
Bulgaria The members of the audit 
committee must have 
unlimited access to the 
financial information of the 
bank and ensure that the 
bank’s assets are 
safeguarded against misuse. 
Hence, they are likely to 
have breached their duties 
by not identifying the true 
nature of the ostensibly 
arms-length transactions. 
The members of the board 
have equal rights and 
obligations, regardless of the 
internal distribution of 
functions among them, but 
no explicit obligation to 
supervise each other. If the 
transactions are carried out 
without the knowledge and 
participation of the rest of 
the directors, they will not be 
liable. 
Croatia Subject to the same rules as 
all board members, but if the 
audit committee members 
have special knowledge or 
abilities they must use such 
knowledge and abilities  
All board members are 
generally subject to the 
same rules; they are 
required to be acquainted 
with company transactions 
and must take all reasonable 
measures to be informed of 
the actions of the 
management 
Cyprus Uncertain, no case law on 
supervisory duties; some 
indication that Cypriot courts 
may follow the old English 
common law under City 
Equitable Fire Assurance,
129
 
Uncertain, see right 
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 See In Re City Equitable Fire Assurance Co. [1925] Ch 407. According to this decision, non-executive directors are entitled 
to rely upon the judgment, information and advice of the executives. They are under no obligation to examine the company’s 
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which is a light-touch 
approach 
Czech Republic The audit committee must 
assess the effectiveness of 
internal auditing and risk 
management. If they 
negligently failed to establish 
and assess such systems, 
they are liable. 
Other directors may be liable 
if they should have 
recognised that the 
transactions are damaging 
to the company 
Denmark Liable if information was 
available to the audit 
committee members that 
indicated that there was a 
problem 
Even if the audit committee 
members are liable, liability 
may not extend to the other 
members of the board, 
unless the alarming 
information was also 
available to them. A director 
cannot excuse himself by 
arguing that he relied on the 
audit committee to discover 
any wrongdoing. 
Finland The members of the audit 
committee are liable if the 
real nature of the 
transactions taken by the 
CEO was evident from the 
information received by the 
audit committee or there 
were other reasons to doubt 
the true nature of those 
transactions 
Same standard as for audit 
committee members: they 
are liable if they had reason 
to doubt the true nature of 
the transactions on the basis 
of the information available 
to them. They may have had 
less possibility than the audit 
committee members to 
notice the suspicious 
transactions and it is 
possible that only the latter 
are liable. 
France Members of the audit 
committee are not subject to 
specific liability rules or a 
separate standard of care in 
light of their position and/or 
expertise. However, if the 
board of directors is held 
liable for having approved 
the transaction, members of 
the audit committee will face 
a secondary action by other 
members of the board in 
order to share a larger 
portion of the damages by 
arguing that they are more 
Directors are generally not 
required to monitor their 
colleagues. If a director 
provides incorrect 
information to them or 
deceives them, they will 
probably not be held liable 
for not having identified the 
incorrect statements, unless 
they were obvious. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
books and records. The decision is no longer fully applicable in the UK, where the rules have become more stringent in the 
wake of the Barings decision (above n 119). See also the discussion above, text to n 108. 
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liable. 
Germany Board members who have 
specific knowledge or skill in 
a particular area such as 
accounting are required to 
meet a higher standard of 
care when acting in their 
area of expertise. Depending 
on the quality of the control 
structures in place, the 
frequency with which the 
related transactions 
occurred, and the value of 
the transactions the directors 
should have recognised the 
irregularities and 
investigated further. 
Other members of the 
supervisory board are also 
under an obligation to 
monitor the activities of the 
management. Therefore, 
they may also be found 
liable in the present case, 
but what is expected of them 
may in practice be less than 
what is expected of the 
members of the audit 
committee if they lack expert 
knowledge in accounting 
and such knowledge was 
necessary to identify the 
irregularities. 
Greece The diligence of the prudent 
businessman is determined 
in light of the capacity of the 
directors and the duties 
assigned to them. Therefore, 
presumably more is 
expected of members of the 
audit committee, but difficult 
to assess due to the scarcity 
of case law. 
Failure to monitor is 
considered to be a breach of 
the duty of care, but the 
hypothetical is difficult to 
assess due to the lack of 
guidance from case law 
Hungary The directors may have 
breached their duty to 
supervise, but there is no 
case law or legislation 
indicating how this case 
would be decided 
The directors may have 
breached their duty to 
supervise, but there is no 
case law or legislation 
indicating how this case 
would be decided 
Ireland Case law in the area of 
disqualification in relation to 
banks in Ireland indicates 
that directors are under a 
duty to inform themselves 
appropriately in relation to 
the company’s affairs. The 
members of the audit 
committee would be 
expected to use their 
expertise in accounting to 
identify the irregularities. 
A duty to monitor is 
expected in relation to other 
directors but it is difficult to 
identify the circumstances 
where the other directors will 
be in dereliction of their duty 
in failing to spot a complex 
transaction as being 
connected with one of the 
directors. If they have 
relevant financial expertise, 
they would be expected to 
exercise it. And if they do not 
have it, they would be 
expected to take steps to 
educate themselves. 
Italy Liability is likely since Unclear 
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members of the company’s 
internal audit committee are 
supposed to be able to 
identify the true nature of the 
ostensibly arms-length 
transactions in carrying out 
their duties in accordance 
with the knowledge, skill and 
experience that may 
reasonably be expected of 
an average director carrying 
out a similar role. They must 
also use the specific care 
and competence that the 
individual member may 
have. 
The Netherlands The members of the audit 
committee may be held 
liable for not being cautious 
enough while monitoring the 
CEO’s actions. In case law 
the specific knowledge and 
expertise a member of the 
supervisory board is deemed 
to have could be a factor 
determining the outcome in 
court proceedings. This may 
apply to the members of the 
audit committee.  
The other board members 
may also be held liable as all 
board members should take 
sufficient care when fulfilling 
their specific supervisory 
tasks; they bear a collective 
responsibility for the 
performance of the 
company. However, possibly 
a lower standard applies 
than the one outlined to the 
left (because possibly no 
specific knowledge in 
accounting/finance) 
Poland Duty to monitor exists, but 
whether the members of the 
audit committee have 
violated their duties in the 
present case is difficult to 
judge due to the lack of 
guidance in the case law 
The members of the 
supervisory board have the 
duty to monitor the 
management, but whether 
the directors have violated 
their duties in the present 
case is difficult to judge due 
to the lack of guidance in the 
case law 
Portugal Liability is likely; the 
members are subject to a 
particularly high standard of 
professional care 
Liability is likely if the 
directors failed to identify the 
wrongdoing of the CEO due 
to the lack of appropriate 
monitoring 
Romania Presumably the members of 
the audit committee would 
be subject to a higher 
standard of care, but unclear 
how this case would be 
decided 
Directors are not required to 
supervise their colleagues. 
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Slovenia Members of the audit 
committee would effectively 
be held to a higher standard 
of care because they would 
be expected to take 
advantage of their auditing 
expertise 
Directors are not explicitly 
required to monitor their 
colleagues on the board. 
However, the supervisory 
board is required to monitor 
the management board; 
members of the supervisory 
board may be in breach of 
their duty if they could have 
identified wrongdoing by the 
CEO, but did not do so. 
Spain It does not seem to be the 
case that members of the 
audit committee are subject 
to a higher standard of care 
than other directors; they 
also do not have to have 
specific expertise 
Outside directors are not 
liable for the actions of the 
executive management 
unless in cases of fault in 
eligendo, in vigilando or in 
instruendo. On the other 
hand, they are liable to the 
company if they negligently 
perform the tasks that are 
assigned to them as non-
executive directors. 
Monitoring is one of them. 
UK No liability if the directors 
took care that internal 
controls were in place to 
provide for the reporting of 
the transactions. If on the 
other hand the directors 
were aware of the red flags 
but did not take any steps to 
address the issues they may 
be found liable. 
The extent of the duty to 
supervise depends on the 
director’s role in the 
management of the 
company. It was held that 
the duty of directors to 
question accounts prepared 
by the company’s finance 
director was limited to 
matters which would have 
been apparent to a man of 
the director’s business 
experience and knowledge. 
However, all directors have 
responsibility for the 
existence of internal control 
structures (see left). 
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2.4.3 Business judgement rule 
Summary of the country reports 
Table 2.4.3.a: Business judgment rule and similar  
mechanisms to address risk aversion 
Country Adoption of an 
institution 
comparable to 
the US business 
judgment rule 
(BJR) in statute 
or case law 
Threshold 
requirements for 
the protections 
of the BJR to 
apply 
Burden of proof 
for the threshold 
requirements 
Possibilities for 
liability when the 
protections 
apply 
Austria No explicit BJR, 
but long-standing 
acceptance by the 
courts that 
directors have a 
margin of 
discretion when 
taking business 
decisions. Some 
commentators 
argue that the 
margin of 
discretion afforded 
to directors under 
Austrian law is 
more effective in 
shielding directors 
from liability than 
some codified 
BJRs, such as the 
German BJR. 
- - - 
Belgium Courts accord 
directors a ‘margin 
of discretion’; they 
will not interfere 
with business 
decisions if the 
director’s act falls 
within that margin 
No threshold 
requirements, but 
breach must 
involve an 
obligation of 
means. In case an 
obligation of result 
is breached, the 
director bears the 
burden of proof. 
- - 
Bulgaria Literature: the 
duty of care is 
procedural in 
character; it does 
not apply to the 
content of the 
decision taken, 
e.g. whether it is 
in the interests of 
the company 
Literature: the 
directors must 
make an objective 
assessment and 
act on an 
informed basis 
Burden of proof 
for all elements of 
liability is on the 
claimant 
- 
Croatia Yes, in s. 252(1) 1) Entrepreneurial 
decision (not 
Director - 
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applicable to 
supervisory 
board) 
2) Director must 
reasonably 
believe that he 
acts in the best 
interest of the 
company 
3) Not excessively 
risky (to be judged 
objectively) 
4) Based on 
appropriate 
information 
5) No conflict of 
interest 
6) Good faith 
Cyprus No BJR - - - 
Czech Republic No - - - 
Denmark Yes, developed by 
the courts: the 
courts are 
reluctant to 
intervene in 
business 
decisions if the 
threshold 
requirements are 
satisfied 
1) Business 
decision 
2) Directors have 
informed 
themselves of all 
material 
information 
reasonably 
available to them 
3) No disloyal 
behaviour 
Claimant Claimant must 
show that the 
directors 
exercised their 
discretion 
recklessly 
Estonia Liability for any 
type of 
negligence, no 
clear expression 
of the BJR. 
However, the 
courts distinguish 
between the 
decision-making 
process and the 
outcome of the 
director’s act and 
have held that 
directors are not 
liable solely for 
the reason that 
their business 
decisions were 
detrimental to the 
company 
- - - 
Finland Not expressed in 
the Companies 
If the directors 
have based their 
Claimant, unless 
burden of proof 
- 
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Act, but the 
preparatory works 
to the Act refer to 
the BJR and 
acknowledge that 
risk-taking is 
characteristic for 
business and that 
decisions are 
typically made 
under conditions 
of uncertainty. 
decision on 
information that is 
sufficient and 
appropriate, 
considering the 
circumstances, 
they will not be 
held liable. 
reversed (see 
above Table 
2.4.2.a for more 
details) 
France No BJR, but 
French courts are 
not likely to 
second-guess 
business 
decisions as long 
as the company 
does not become 
insolvent 
- - - 
Germany Yes, s. 93(1), 
sentence 2 
1) Management 
decision 
2) The director 
reasonably 
believes to act for 
the good of the 
company 
(subjective, but 
the director is not 
protected if he 
misjudged the 
risks of a business 
decision in an 
irresponsible way) 
3) No conflict of 
interest  
4) Based on 
appropriate 
information 
Director No 
Greece Yes, Art. 22a 1) Business 
decision 
2) Reasonable 
3) In the 
company’s best 
interests 
4) Good faith 
5) Based on 
sufficient 
information 
6) No conflict of 
interest 
Director Rationality review 
exists, but 
belongs to the 
threshold criteria 
that have to be 
shown by the 
director (the 
decision must 
have been 
reasonable) 
Hungary No explicit BJR, 
but courts do not 
- - - 
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hold directors 
liable if their 
decisions fall 
within the 
boundaries of 
normal business 
risk 
Ireland No BJR - - - 
Italy The approach 
developed by the 
courts resembles 
the Delaware 
BJR, but it has 
never been 
expressly 
endorsed by the 
courts 
The director must 
not have acted 
grossly negligently 
in the process of 
making the 
business 
decisions. 
If gross 
negligence: the 
court will review 
the fairness of the 
transaction (vaglio 
della legittimità 
della decisione) 
Contractual 
liability standards 
apply: once it has 
been established 
that the company 
has suffered a 
loss due to the 
director’s actions, 
the director has to 
demonstrate the 
lack of gross 
negligence 
Rationality review 
(decisione 
irrazionale o 
arbitraria) 
Latvia No BJR - - - 
Lithuania Developed by 
case law 
The director is not 
liable if his/her 
decision complies 
with legal 
requirements, 
does not exceed 
normal economic 
risk, and is not 
obviously loss-
making to the 
company 
- - 
Luxembourg No statutory BJR, 
but courts accord 
directors a certain 
margin of 
discretion, i.e. 
management 
errors do not give 
rise to liability as 
long as the 
directors stay 
within their margin 
of discretion 
(marge 
d’appréciation). In 
addition, directors 
are only subject to 
an ‘obligation de 
moyens’, i.e. a 
duty to use their 
best endeavours 
without having to 
achieve a 
1) Courts consider 
the circumstances 
that existed at the 
time when the 
directors’ decision 
was made and the 
information which 
was known or 
should have been 
known to the 
director when 
deciding whether 
the director acted 
within his/her 
margin of 
discretion 
2) The BJR does 
not apply to the 
responsabilité 
légale under Art. 
59(2) for breaches 
- - 
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concrete result. of the Companies 
Act or the articles 
of association 
Malta No BJR, but the 
courts do not hold 
directors liable for 
culpa levissima, 
i.e. slight 
negligence which 
could have even 
been committed 
by an attentive 
person 
- - - 
Netherlands No BJR, but it is 
widely recognized 
in the literature as 
well as in case 
law that judges 
should apply a 
margin of 
discretion when 
assessing 
directors’ liability 
- - - 
Poland No BJR 
- Supreme Court: 
the reference to 
an economic risk 
cannot exculpate 
the manager 
when damage 
caused to the 
company was the 
result of careless 
management 
- However, in 
some judgments 
Polish courts 
accepted a 
degree of 
managerial 
discretion and 
allowed directors 
to take risks 
inherent in 
economic 
activities 
- - - 
Portugal - Yes, Art. 72(2) 
- It is controversial 
whether the BJR 
applies only to the 
directors who 
perform 
management 
functions or also 
to members of the 
audit committee; 
The director must 
have acted: 
1) in an informed 
manner 
2) free of any 
personal interests 
3) not irrationally: 
the director has to 
show that he took 
Director Rationality review 
exists, but 
belongs to the 
threshold criteria 
that have to be 
shown by the 
director 
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some 
commentators 
argue that the 
BJR applies to the 
latter if the 
decision involves 
a discretionary 
margin 
- The majority of 
the legal literature 
argues that the 
BJR does not 
apply in actions 
brought by 
creditors, by 
shareholders in 
their own capacity 
and by third 
parties, because 
the law requires 
the breach of 
specific rules 
which protect 
those people 
(there is no 
discretion; the 
question is simply 
one of compliance 
or non-
compliance) 
a reasonable and 
adequate decision 
compared with the 
possible set of 
decisions that 
could have been 
taken. Directors 
must not to 
dissipate the 
company’s assets 
or take 
disproportionate 
risks. → objective 
standard 
Romania Yes, Art. 144(1) 1) Existence of a 
business decision 
taken within the 
powers (intra 
vires)  
2) The director 
was disinterested 
and acted in good 
faith (the director 
was reasonably 
entitled to believe 
that he/she acted 
in the best interest 
of the company) 
3) The director 
was adequately 
informed prior to 
taking the 
decision 
Director (see also 
the general 
remarks regarding 
the burden of 
proof above in 
Table 2.4.2.a) 
No 
Slovakia No express BJR; 
acccording to s. 
194(7) 
Commercial 
Code, a director is 
not liable for 
actions taken in (i) 
- - - 
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good faith and (ii) 
with professional 
diligence, 
meaning that the 
objective standard 
also applies in 
reviewing 
business 
decisions 
Slovenia No statutory 
regulation, but 
some judges have 
expressed the 
willingness to 
apply the US BJR 
in judicial practice; 
however, case law 
does not yet exist 
- - - 
Spain Not explicitly 
regulated, but the 
literature 
interprets some 
judgments as 
accepting the BJR 
Some court 
decisions: the 
BJR prevent the 
review of business 
decisions, 
provided that: 
1) the director 
acts in the best 
interests of the 
company 
2) the decision is 
not irrational 
3) no technical 
mistakes 
Normal rules 
apply 
Rationality review 
Sweden No BJR is 
expressed in the 
Companies Act, 
but it is mentioned 
in the literature. In 
addition, 
according to case 
law certain 
mistakes of the 
board in making 
business 
decisions will be 
tolerated, 
provided that 
these mistakes 
remain within the 
range of the 
discretion 
accorded to the 
director. 
If the directors 
have based their 
decision on 
information that is 
sufficient and 
appropriate, 
considering the 
circumstances, 
they will not be 
held liable. 
Claimant - 
United Kingdom No, at least not 
explicit, although 
courts are 
- - - 
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prepared to grant 
directors a margin 
of discretion 
 
Discussion 
The business judgment rule is an invention of the US courts that dates back at least to the first 
decades of the 19
th
 century.
130
 In its modern version, which has mainly been shaped by the Delaware 
courts, it is interpreted as ‘a presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a 
corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken 
was in the best interests of the company.’
131
 If this presumption is not rebutted by the claimant, i.e. if 
the claimant does not show that the directors did not act on an informed basis, in bad faith, or in 
breach of the duty of loyalty, the courts will respect the directors’ business judgment, ‘unless it cannot 
be “attributed to any rational business purpose.”’
132
 If the presumption is rebutted by the claimant, the 
burden of proof shifts to the directors to demonstrate that the transaction was ‘entirely fair’ to the 
corporation.
133
 Thus, the Delaware version of the business judgment rule consists of three elements: 
First, a number of threshold requirements that have to be satisfied for the protections of the rule to be 
triggered (acting on an informed basis, in good faith, without conflict of interest); second, a procedural 
element that allocates the burden of proof and provides for a shift in the burden when the 
presumptions are rebutted; and third, a standard of review that is either very light (irrationality test) or, 
if the presumptions are rebutted, consists in a complete fairness review. These three elements make 
the Delawware business judgment rule very effective in protecting directors against liability if the 
context does not give rise to a conflict of interest.
134
 It is important to note that this effectiveness is a 
function of a combination of the three elements: the relatively high threshold requirements (for 
example, in order to refute the presumption that the director acted on an informed basis, the claimant 
has to show gross negligence
135
), the allocation of the burden of proof (initially on the claimant), and 
the limited review if the presumptions cannot be not rebutted (irrationality
136
). 
Accordingly, we test the jurisdictions of the Member States along all three dimensions. We first ask 
whether an express, codified business judgment rule exists or the courts accord directors an implied 
margin of discretion, within which business decisions are not subjected to full review. If an express or 
implied business judgment rule can be found, we then examine the threshold requirements, the 
burden of proof for these requirements, and the remaining standard of review if the protections apply.  
Map 2.4.3.a shows (1) the Member States that have adopted a codified business judgment rule that 
resembles the US version at least to some extent, without necessarily being identical in the three 
dimensions of the rule; (2) the Member States that have no express business judgment rule, but 
where case law indicates that the courts are willing to grant the directors a margin of discretion and 
exercise restraint in reviewing business decisions or, if no case law to the point exists, where the 
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 Percy v. Millaudon, 8 Mart. (n.s.) 68 (La. 1829). While the precise contours of the rule have changed over time, its main 
tenets are already clearly discernible in the early case law: ‘But when the [director] has the qualifications necessary for the 
discharge of the ordinary duties of the trust imposed, we are of opinion that on the occurrence of difficulties, in the exercise of it, 
which offer only a choice of measures, the adoption of a course from which loss ensues cannot make the agent responsible, if 
the error was one into which a prudent man might have fallen. . . . The test of responsibility therefore should be, not the 
certainty of wisdom in others, but the possession of ordinary knowledge; and by shewing that the error of the agent is of so 
gross a kind, that a man of common sense, and ordinary attention, would not have fallen into it.’ Id. at 4. 
131
 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). 
132
 Re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, 907 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 2005) (quoting Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 
720 (Del.1971); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del.1985)). 
133
 See, for example, Walt Disney, 907 A.2d 747. 
134
 See, e.g., In re Citigroup Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litigation, 964 A.2d 106 (Del.Ch. 2009), dealing with the fallout from the 
global financial crisis. The case served as a template for our Hypothetical III. Under Delaware law, the defendant directors and 
officers of Citigroup were not found liable for the losses that the company had suffered from exposure to the subprime lending 
market. 
135
 Re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, 906 A.2d 27, 52 (Del. 2006). 
136
 The Delaware courts have defined a business transaction as irrational if it ‘is so one sided that no business person of 
ordinary, sound judgment could conclude that the corporation has received adequate consideration’, see Glazer v. Zapata 
Corp., 658 A.2d 176, 183 (Del. Ch. 1993). In other words, liability under this standard is ‘confined to unconscionable cases 
where directors irrationally squander or give away corporate assets’, Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 263 (Del. 2000). 
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literature argues that the law should be interpreted in this way; and (3) the Member States that have 
no express or implied business judgment rule. 
Map 2.4.3.a: Business judgment rule and managerial discretion  
 
Legend Country 
Codified BJR with similarities to 
the Delaware approach  
HR, DE, EL, PT, RO 
No express BJR, but the courts 
and/or the literature 
acknowledge that the directors 
enjoy a margin of discretion and 
that their decisions will not be 
reviewed if they act within this 
margin 
AT, BE, BG, CY, DK, FI, HU, IT, LT, LU, 
ES, SE, SI, UK 
No express or implied BJR 
 
CZ, EE, FR, IE, LV, MT, PL, SK 
 
General comments: The business judgment rule as a codified legal institution has spread over the last 
six or seven years to a number of European jurisdictions. The first country to introduce the rule was 
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Germany,
137
 followed by Portugal,
138
 Romania,
139
 Croatia,
140
 and Greece.
141
 The majority of legal 
systems in the EU, however, do not contain an explicit formulation of the business judgment rule. In 
that case, the margin of discretion accorded to the directors depends on the interpretation of the duty 
of care’s behavioural expectations by the respective courts. Often, clear definitions and bright-line 
rules are missing, with the consequence that the limits of the implied protection of business judgments 
are shifting and not easy to identify. Naturally, therefore, the border between what we classify as 
group 2 (no express business judgment rule, but the courts and/or the literature acknowledge that the 
directors enjoy a margin of discretion and that their decisions will not be reviewed if they act within this 
margin) and group 3 (no business judgment rule) is blurred. Three countries on the borderline are 
Cyprus, Poland, and the United Kingdom. Courts in these countries have not endorsed the business 
judgment rule and also do not expressly accord the directors a margin of discretion. It is suggested 
that the United Kingdom and Cyprus, which follows the UK case law in most respects, fall on one side 
of the demarcation (implied business judgment rule), because the UK courts take a hands-off 
approach if the directors have taken an informed decision and the transaction was not tainted by bad 
faith or a conflict of interest. Poland is on the other side (no business judgment rule), as the Polish 
Supreme Court has held that the reference to an economic risk cannot exculpate the manager when 
damage caused to the company was the result of careless management. However, in some 
judgments Polish courts accept a degree of managerial discretion and allow directors to take risks 
inherent in economic activities.  
In the end, the difference between groups 2 and 3 is one of emphasis. In most jurisdictions, there is 
evidence that the courts appreciate that a review of decisions taken under conditions of uncertainty 
has to acknowledge that the decision-maker has to rely ex ante on expectations and probabilities, and 
that a full ex post review may suffer from hindsight bias.
142
 Nevertheless, some differences can be 
observed. The Netherlands may be said to be an example of a jurisdiction at one end of the spectrum, 
where, in particular in inquiry proceedings,
143
 the investigator and the courts conduct a thorough 
review of the company’s affairs in order to assess whether mismanagement has occurred,
144
 without 
taking recourse to any form of business judgement rule. At the other end of the spectrum are the 
countries that have codified the business judgment rule and thus explicitly provide for an area of 
managerial decision-making that will not be reviewed by the courts. However, this does not mean that 
directors face the lowest risk of liability for breaches of the duty of care in these countries. Given that 
the level of protection afforded by the business judgment rule is a function of several factors, the 
advantage of recognising a protected margin of discretion by statute may be offset by rules that shift 
the burden of proof to the directors. This is in fact the case in most of the countries that have codified 
the business judgment rule. 
Procedural nature of the duty of care: Some countries interpret the duty of care as procedural in 
nature, i.e. the courts will not review the content of the decision if it has been taken on the basis of 
adequate information and in the absence of any conflict of interest. This approach can be found, for 
example, in Bulgaria and the United Kingdom. While these jurisdictions do not use the terminology of 
the business judgment rule, and we classify them, accordingly, differently, their interpretation of the 
                                                     
137
 Gesetz zur Unternehmensintegrität und Modernisierung des Anfechtungsrechts (UMAG), Law of 22 September 2005, 
Federal Law Gazette I, p. 2802. The statutory amendment, in turn, is based on a decision of the Federal Court of Justice 
(Bundesgerichtshof) of 1997, BGHZ 135, 244 (ARAG/Garmenbeck), which adopted principles resembling the business 
judgment rule. 
138
 Decree-Law no. 76-A/2006 of 29 March. 
139
 Company Law Reform of 2006. 
140
 Amendments of 2007, Official Gazette 107/2007. 
141
 L. 3604/2007. 
142
 For a justification of the US business judgment rule in light of the problem of hindsight bias, see Bainbridge, n 100 above, 
114-116. 
143
 Investigations into the policy and affairs of a legal person conducted by an investigator appointed by the Enterprise Chamber 
(ondernemingskamer) of the Amsterdam Court of Appeal upon the application of, among others, shareholders holding at least 
10% of the issued share capital, see Dutch Civil Code, ss. 2:344-2:359. For more details regarding the Dutch inquiry 
proceedings see below 3.2. 
144
 Dutch Civil Code, s. 2:355. 
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duty of care is very close to the Delaware understanding of the business judgment rule.
145
 This 
illustrates that the existence or lack of a formal business judgment rule is of secondary importance, 
compared to the procedural or substantive function of the duty of care and the precise definition of the 
duty’s elements. 
2.5 Duty of loyalty 
The duty of loyalty, broadly understood, addresses conflicts of interest between the director and the 
company. Particularly in common law, it has a long tradition as a distinct and comprehensive duty that 
encompasses a variety of situations where the interests of the director are, or may potentially be, in 
conflict with the interests of the company.
146
 It may not be surprising that the duty of loyalty was fairly 
early well developed in common law, given that the business corporation as a legal institution evolved 
in a series of innovations and reforms from partnership and trust law
147
 and that the position of the 
director was, accordingly, seen as that of a trustee or fiduciary who had to display the utmost integrity 
in dealing with the property of the beneficiaries.
148
 In other legal traditions, the fiduciary position of 
directors is less accentuated and the duty to avoid conflicts of interest and not to profit from the 
position on the board of companies is less pronounced. Nevertheless, the social conflicts that the 
common law duty of loyalty is intended to address are, of course, identical and are recognised in most 
jurisdictions as in need of regulatory intervention.  
The most important conflicts addressed by the duty of loyalty are: (1) related-party transactions (self-
dealing), i.e. transactions between the company and the director, either directly or indirectly because 
the director is involved in another business association that transacts with the company (as major 
shareholder, partner, etc.) or because a person related to the director (for example a close relative) 
deals with the company; (2) corporate opportunities, i.e. the exploitation of information that ‘belongs’ 
(in some sense of the word, which will need to be defined more precisely) to the company, for 
example information regarding a business venture that is of commercial interest to the company. Most 
other aspects associated with the expectation that the director act loyal towards the company can be 
related to these two main applications of the duty of loyalty, even though they may be regulated 
separately in some jurisdictions. Examples are the duty not to compete with the company, not to 
accept benefits from third parties that are granted because of the directorship, or not to abuse the 
powers vested in the directors for ulterior purposes. We will focus in our analysis on the two main 
expressions of the duty of loyalty, related-party transactions and corporate opportunities, making 
references to other formulations of the behavioural expectations of directors in the legal systems of 
the Member States where appropriate. 
While the duty of care is pervasive in the Member States and the formulation of the directors’ 
behavioural expectations does not differ widely between jurisdictions, the regulatory techniques 
employed to address conflicts of interest are markedly different. What we call here duty of loyalty, 
following the common law terminology, is a compilation of functionally comparable legal instruments 
that are, however, not necessarily duty-based in the strict sense. They range from broad fiduciary 
standards to approaches that utilise rules determining internal authority, external representation, or 
classify related-party transactions into prohibited agreements, agreements requiring disclosure and 
approval, and ordinary transactions valid without further requirements. While no one approach is, by 
definition, superior to another, it seems that the effectiveness of the respective rules depends on the 
flexibility that they allow and that some approaches lend themselves more to an application sensitive 
to the particularities of the individual case than others. We will address these issues below in the 
relevant context. 
 
                                                     
145
 See, e.g., Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000), speaking of ‘process due care’ when referring to due care in the 
decision-making context. 
146
 For an early enunciation in common law see the English House of Lords decision in Bray v. Ford [1896] A.C. 44. 
147
 See, e.g., R.R. Formoy, The Historical Foundations of Modern Company Law (Sweet & Maxwell, 1923); B.C. Hunt, The 
development of the business corporation in England, 1800-1867 (Harvard University Press, 1936). 
148
 See Bray v. Ford, n 146 above, 51. 
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2.5.1 Dogmatic foundation 
Summary of the country reports 
Table 2.5.1.a: Dogmatic foundation of conflicts of interest regulation 
Country Statutory 
corporate law 
Fiduciary 
principles 
Tort Other 
Austria Yes, three 
express 
provisions: 
1) Duty to act in 
the best interests 
of the company, s. 
70 AktG 
2) Duty of non-
competition, s. 79; 
3) Duty of 
confidentiality, s. 
84(1) last 
sentence 
Yes - - 
Belgium Art. 1134, 3 Civil 
Code; specific 
applications in 
case of conflicts of 
interest: art. 
523/524/524ter 
CC 
General duty to 
act in good faith 
(in the company 
law context 
interpreted as the 
duty to act in the 
company’s 
interest), but not 
well developed 
- - 
Bulgaria 1) Disclosure of 
conflicts of 
interest: s. 237(3) 
Commercial Act 
2) Non-
competition: s. 
237(4) 
3) Confidentiality: 
s. 237(5) 
Director’s 
mandate, s. 280 
Obligations and 
Contracts Act: 
general duty of 
loyalty 
- - 
Croatia - Yes - - 
Cyprus Duty to disclose 
self-dealing laid 
down in s. 191 CA 
Other aspects of 
the duty of loyalty 
(except disclosure 
of self-dealing) 
stem from 
common law 
No - 
Czech Republic 1) Non-
competition, s. 
196 Commercial 
Code 
2) Conflict of 
interests, s. 196a 
3) s. 194(5) (duty 
to act with due 
- 
 
- - 
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managerial care) 
is interpreted as 
being the main 
duty of directors, 
which includes the 
requirement to act 
loyally towards the 
company; ss. 196, 
196a are 
specifications of 
this general duty 
Denmark Two express 
provisions: 
1) Regulation of 
related party 
transactions, s. 
131 
2) Duty of 
confidentiality, s. 
132 
- - - 
Estonia Yes 
1) General duty of 
loyalty: Civil Code, 
§ 35 
2) Prohibition of 
competition: 
Commercial 
Code, § 312(1) 
3) Confidentiality: 
Commercial 
Code, § 313(1) 
4) Prohibited 
loans: 
Commercial 
Code, § 281 
- - - 
Finland Companies Act, 
Ch. 1, s. 8 is 
interpreted as 
including the duty 
of loyalty 
- - - 
France No Legal basis for 
duty of loyalty 
unclear; some 
authors argue that 
it is based on the 
role that directors 
assume, others 
that it is based on 
the principle of 
good faith 
- - 
Germany The duty of loyalty 
finds its 
expression in s, 
88 (duty of non-
Yes - - 
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competition), but it 
derives from 
general fiduciary 
principles 
Greece - The duty of 
loyalty can be 
derived from Art. 
22a(3): directors 
have a duty to 
manage corporate 
assets in the best 
interests of the 
company; this 
encompasses the 
requirement to 
avoid any action 
that could conflict 
with the corporate 
interests or 
obstruct the 
corporate 
objectives 
- In addition, 
specific aspects of 
the duty of loyalty 
are expressly 
regulated, e.g. 
non-competition 
(Art. 23) or related 
party transactions 
(Art. 23a) 
- - Application of the 
general principle 
of good faith and 
the prohibition of 
abusive behaviour 
laid down in Art. 
288 Civil Code 
Hungary The general duty 
of loyalty is not 
regulated in the 
Companies Act, 
only certain cases 
of conflicts of 
interest 
Principles of 
general civil law 
apply (law of 
service 
contract/breach of 
contract) 
- - 
Ireland Generally no, but 
some rules in Part 
3 of the 
Companies Act 
1990 
Yes, comprising 
three elements: 
1) duty to act in 
the best interest of 
the company 
2) duty to act for 
proper purposes 
3) duty to avoid 
conflicts of 
interests and 
secret profits 
- - 
Italy 1) General duty to 
act in good faith 
when fulfilling 
contractual 
obligations, Arts. 
1175, 1375 Civil 
- - - 
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Code 
2) Self-dealing, 
Art. 2391 Civil 
Code 
3) Corporate 
opportunities, Art. 
2391(5) Civil 
Code 
Latvia Some aspects of 
the duty of loyalty 
regulated in the 
Commercial Law, 
e.g. the duty to 
disclose conflicts 
of interest (s. 
309(3)) 
Yes, derived from 
the law of agency 
(Civil Code, s. 
2304) and the 
fiduciary nature of 
the director’s role 
as an agent 
- - 
Lithuania Yes, Civil Code, 
Art. 2.87: 
1) duty to act in 
good faith 
2) duty of loyalty 
3) duty to avoid 
conflicts of 
interest 
4) duty to avoid 
commingling the 
property of the 
company and 
private property 
5) duty to declare 
interest in 
proposed 
transactions 
- - - 
Luxembourg Some aspects of 
the duty of loyalty 
regulated in the 
Companies Act, 
e.g. the duty to 
disclose conflicts 
of interest (Art. 
57) 
General duty of 
loyalty derives 
from the position 
of the director, the 
agency 
relationship 
between the 
director and the 
company, Art. 59 
Companies Act, 
and Art. 1134 Civil 
Code (duty of 
parties to a 
contract to 
execute their 
obligations under 
the contract in 
good faith) 
- - 
Malta Yes, Companies 
Act, Art. 136A: 
1) Duty to act 
General fiduciary 
obligations laid 
down in the Civil 
- - 
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honestly and in 
good faith in the 
best interests of 
the company, Art. 
136A(1) 
2) Duty not to 
make profits from 
the position of 
director, Art. 
136A(3)(b) 
3) Duty to ensure 
that their personal 
interests do not 
conflict with the 
interests of the 
company, Art. 
136A(3)(c) 
4) Duty not to use 
any property, 
information or 
opportunity of the 
company for their 
own benefit, Art. 
136A(3)(d) 
Code also apply, 
but they largely 
overlap with Art. 
136A Companies 
Act 
Netherlands s. 2:146: in case 
the company has 
a conflict of 
interest with one 
or more directors, 
the company is 
represented by its 
supervisory 
directors. 
The conflicted 
director who 
nevertheless 
represents the 
company is liable 
pursuant to s. 2:9 
to the company 
- A director who is 
prohibited from 
acting because of 
a conflict of 
interest (see left) 
may be liable to 
third parties on 
the basis of tort 
law (s. 6:162) 
- 
Poland No, but some 
statutory 
provisions are 
considered as 
expressions of the 
duty of loyalty 
(e.g., Arts. 15, 370 
Code of 
Commercial 
Companies). 
Liability for breach 
of the duty of 
loyalty is based on 
the general 
liability provisions 
of Art. 483 CCC or 
The duty of loyalty 
derives from the 
fiduciary 
relationship 
between the 
company and the 
director and 
provisions in the 
Code of 
Commercial 
Companies 
prohibiting specific 
types of action, 
e.g. the duty not 
to compete with 
the company 
- - 
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Art. 415 Civil 
Code (tort law) 
Portugal Yes, Art. 64(1)(b) 
Code of 
Commercial 
Companies 
- - - 
Romania Yes, Art. 144 
Companies Act 
Initially fiduciary 
principles arising 
from the law on 
agency, but since 
2006 codified in 
the Companies 
Act 
- - 
Slovakia Derived from s. 
194(5) 
Commercial Code 
- - - 
Slovenia Companies Act:  
- General duty to 
avoid conflicts of 
interest and 
regulation of 
related party 
transactions, Art. 
38a 
- Duty of non-
competition, Art. 
41 
- Confidentiality, 
Art. 263(1) 
- - - 
Spain Yes, regulated in 
the LSC are: 
1) General duty of 
loyalty, s. 226 
2) Prohibition to 
use the company 
name, s. 227 
3) Prohibition to 
take advantage of 
business 
opportunities, s. 
228 
4) Conflict of 
interest, s. 229 
5) Duty of non-
competition, s. 
230 
- - - 
Sweden The duty of loyalty 
is set forth in the 
general clause of 
Ch. 8 § 34 in the 
Companies Act, 
providing that the 
board and the 
Not all of the 
duties of the 
directors can be 
determined on the 
basis of the 
Companies Act. 
The mandate of a 
- - 
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managing director 
may not 
undertake 
measures which 
might provide an 
undue advantage 
to a shareholder 
or other person to 
the disadvantage 
of the company or 
another 
shareholder. 
board member is 
accompanied by 
the general duty 
of loyalty towards 
the company. 
United Kingdom Now statutory 
corporate law, in 
particular: 
1) Duty to avoid 
conflicts of 
interest, s. 175 
2) Duty to declare 
interest in 
proposed 
transaction, s. 177 
- - - 
 
Discussion 
The duty of loyalty is less coherently regulated in the Member States than the duty of care.
149
 Most 
Member States contain at least some express rules on transactions of the director with the company, 
corporate opportunities, and/or competitive behaviour by the director. However, the express rules on 
conflict of interest situations are only in a few, if any, cases exhaustive.
150
 This does not necessarily 
indicate gaps in the legal system, because all jurisdictions are familiar with fiduciary principles derived 
from general civil law, for example the law on agency. These fiduciary concepts inform much of 
corporate law and can be relied on where the rules on directors' duties do not address a particular 
conflict. Indeed, this is what we observe in several jurisdictions, notably Cyprus and Ireland, but also 
civil law jurisdictions such as France, Germany, Hungary, Latvia, and Poland. Legal systems with a 
two-tier board structure often also use the allocation of authority between the different organs as a 
mechanism to alleviate conflicts of interest, which explains the absence of some rules regulation 
conflicted interest situations in such jurisdictions that are found in one-tier board systems. 
Two interesting cases are the Netherlands and Finland, both jurisdictions with a fragmentary 
regulation of the duty of loyalty. In these two Member States, the courts have built on the general 
formulation of the directors’ position as set out in the companies act and utilised duties not specifically 
designed to address related party transactions and corporate opportunities. The relevant Dutch rules 
require directors to act 'in accordance with what is required by standards of reasonableness and 
fairness'
151
 and provide that they shall be liable 'for a proper performance of the tasks assigned' to 
them.
152
 The Finnish rule requires managers to 'act with due care and promote the interests of the 
company.'
153
 Thus, the courts have displayed some ingenuity in finding solutions where the law did not 
provide an explicit answer. 
                                                     
149
 See above Table 2.4.1.a. 
150
 The most comprehensive regulation can be found in modern codifications of company law, such as the Spanish Corporate 
Enterprises Act of 2010 or the UK Companies Act 2006. 
151
 Dutch Civil Code, s. 2:8(1). 
152
 Dutch Civil Code, s. 2:9(1). For an application of these provisions to the conflict of interest context see below n Error! 
Bookmark not defined.. 
153
 Companies Act, Ch. 1, s. 8. 
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While the dogmatic foundations, therefore, do not seem to be decisive for a comprehensive regulation 
of conflicts of interest, it may be the case that narrowly tailored rules are more effective in preventing 
violations and ensuring legal certainty. We will discuss below how the different approaches compare 
with each other and where deficiencies may exist. 
 
2.5.2 Behavioural expectations 
Summary of the country reports 
Table 2.5.2.a: Behavioural expectations in a conflict of interest case 
Country Requirements 
for self-dealing 
Requirements 
for corporate 
opportunities 
Resigning 
directors 
Other 
behavioural 
expectations 
Austria The supervisory 
board represents 
the company in 
dealings with the 
members of the 
management 
board, s. 97 AktG 
 
s. 79: duty not to 
compete → 
1) Members of the 
management 
board may not 
operate another 
business; 
2) be member of 
another 
company’s 
supervisory board; 
3) be a personally 
liable partner of 
another business 
association; 
4) enter into 
transactions in the 
company’s line of 
business; 
--unless 
authorised by the 
supervisory board 
(authorisation in 
the articles or by 
shareholder 
resolution not 
sufficient) 
s. 79 (non-
competition): duty 
generally ends 
when the director 
ceases to be a 
director 
Confidentiality, s. 
84(1) last 
sentence: duty not 
to reveal business 
secrets; this duty 
extends beyond 
the end of the 
director’s term in 
office 
Belgium Art. 523 CC: 
1) Ex ante 
disclosure to the 
board and auditor 
2) The conflicted 
director does not 
need to abstain 
from voting, 
unless the 
company has 
issued securities 
to the public 
(which includes 
- No specific 
corporate 
opportunities 
regulation in the 
Companies Code. 
The literature has 
developed a 
corporate 
opportunities 
doctrine based on 
the general duty 
to act in good faith 
(which comprises, 
for directors, a 
- The duty of 
loyalty ends when 
the service 
contract ends. 
However, non-
compete clauses 
may be construed 
to apply after 
resignation.  
- Resignation can 
in itself be a basis 
for liability if it is 
given in an 
untimely and 
Duty to act in 
good faith, which 
also gives rise to 
the duty not to 
compete and the 
duty of 
confidentiality 
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listed companies) 
3) 
Notwithstanding 
compliance with 
Art. 523, liability is 
triggered if the 
transaction results 
in an ‘abusive’ or 
‘excessive’ 
advantage to the 
director (e.g., 
misuse of assets), 
Art. 529 CC 
duty of loyalty) 
and inspired by 
Anglo-Saxon tests 
(business line, 
etc.), but opinion 
differs as to the 
exact scope of the 
doctrine and there 
is no established 
case law.  
- Enforcement has 
to rely on the 
general rules of 
Art. 527 CC 
- Possibly 
application of the 
conflicts of 
interest regime or 
the prohibition of 
‘abuse of 
company assets’  
harmful way, but 
no case law exists 
on this point 
Bulgaria s. 240b: 
1) Directors must 
inform in writing 
the board of 
directors (or the 
management 
board in two-tier 
systems) when 
they (or related 
persons) enter 
into a contract 
with the company 
that goes beyond 
its usual business 
or materially 
deviates from 
market terms 
2) The board of 
directors (or 
management 
board) decides 
about the 
conclusion of such 
contracts. The 
interested director 
cannot vote or 
participate in the 
decision-making 
process. 
 
1) Duty of non-
competition, s. 
237(4):  
- Directors shall 
not execute 
business 
transactions or 
participate in 
companies as 
managers or 
board members if 
this would 
constitute a 
competitive 
activity 
- Competitive 
activity: the 
transaction must 
fall within the 
actual line of 
business of the 
company; it is not 
sufficient if it falls 
within its 
objectives as 
specified in the 
articles 
- Exception: if the 
articles of 
association allow 
the competitive 
activity expressly, 
or the body which 
elects the board 
member has given 
Only the duty of 
confidentiality 
applies after 
resignation 
1) Disclosure of 
conflicts of 
interest, s. 237(3): 
A person 
nominated as 
director must, 
prior to his 
election, notify the 
general meeting 
or the supervisory 
board of his 
participation in 
any companies as 
an unlimited 
liability partner, of 
holding over 25 
per cent of the 
equity in any other 
company, and of 
his participation in 
the management 
of other 
companies. When 
these 
circumstances 
arise after the 
election, the 
director must 
issue a written 
notice 
2) Confidentiality, 
s. 237(5) 
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its express 
consent (this is in 
one-tier systems 
the GM and in 
two-tier systems 
the supervisory 
board) 
2) Very little case 
law and no 
developed 
corporate 
opportunities 
doctrine 
Croatia Supervisory board 
represents 
company in 
dealings with the 
management 
board 
1) Prohibition of 
competition, s. 
248: without the 
consent of the 
supervisory board, 
a member of the 
management 
board cannot, 
either for his 
account or for the 
account of others, 
perform activities 
pursued by the 
PLC, act as a 
member of the 
management or 
supervisory board 
in another 
company engaged 
in business similar 
to that of the PLC, 
or use the PLC’s 
premises to 
conduct any 
business. Without 
such consent, the 
director also 
cannot be a 
member of 
another company 
or be personally 
liable for its 
obligations if that 
company 
performs the 
same activities as 
the PLC in 
question. 
2) Directors are 
required not to 
use confidential 
information, 
acquired in the 
course of their 
Unclear General unwritten 
duty of loyalty 
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duty, for their 
personal benefit 
Cyprus - s. 191 CA: 
directors who are 
directly or 
indirectly 
interested in a 
contract or 
proposed contract 
with the company 
must declare the 
nature of their 
interest at a 
meeting of the 
board of directors; 
s. 191 does not 
require the 
interested director 
from abstaining 
from voting, but 
the articles 
commonly contain 
such a provision 
- Failure to comply 
with s. 191 
renders the 
agreement 
voidable, but it 
may be accepted 
by the company in 
general meeting 
- Directors must 
not make use of 
the company’s 
property or any 
information and 
opportunities 
which arise from 
holding office 
- Cypriot courts 
may apply the 
English 
precedents 
No provision 
under Cyprus law 
on the 
continuation of the 
duty of a director 
not to make use of 
corporate 
opportunities even 
after his 
resignation as 
director, or for the 
continuation of 
any other 
director’s duty 
after resignation 
1) Duty to act in 
good faith for the 
benefit of the 
company and 
exercise their 
powers for the 
purposes for 
which they were 
conferred: 
subjective test 
2) Duty not to put 
themselves in a 
position where 
their own interest 
conflicts with the 
interests of the 
company: no 
violation if the 
company 
consents after full 
and proper 
disclosure 
Czech Republic 1) s. 196a(1), (2) 
Commercial 
Code: credit or 
loan contract with 
directors; contract 
securing the debts 
of directors; free-
of-charge transfer 
of property from 
the company to 
directors require: 
a) approval by GM 
b) conclusion 
‘under the 
conditions usual in 
trade’ 
2) s. 196a(3): 
transfer of assets 
for consideration 
exceeding 10% of 
the company’s 
capital requires:  
a) that the price is 
determined by an 
s. 196(1) 
Commercial 
Code: duty not to 
compete → 
directors shall not 
carry on business 
activities in a 
similar line of 
business as the 
company 
No rules dealing 
with resigning 
directors 
Confidentiality, s. 
194(5) 
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expert; and  
b) the GM gives 
ex ante consent 
Does not apply to 
assets acquired in 
the ordinary 
course of 
business 
Denmark s. 131: no 
member of the 
management may 
participate in a 
transaction that 
involves an 
agreement 
between the 
company and that 
member (→ strict 
prohibition, the 
director is 
disqualified from 
participation and 
has to leave the 
meeting), or 
between the 
company and a 
third party, if the 
member has a 
material interest in 
the transaction 
and that material 
interest could 
conflict with the 
interests of the 
company (e.g., 
the director is a 
major shareholder 
in a company that 
transacts with the 
director’s 
company; no 
further case law 
definition of 
“material interest” 
and “conflict with 
the interests of the 
company”) 
No corporate 
opportunities 
doctrine under 
company law; only 
regulation: the 
service contract 
usually includes a 
non-competition 
clause → contract 
law applies. In 
addition, the 
ordinary 
standards of duty 
of care and loyalty 
may be used to 
prevent directors 
from exploiting 
corporate 
opportunities. 
Duties no longer 
apply 
Confidentiality, s. 
132 
Estonia The supervisory 
board represents 
the company in 
dealings with the 
members of the 
management 
board, 
Commercial 
Code, § 317(8) 
Commercial 
Code, § 312: duty 
of non-
competition. 
Without the 
consent of the 
supervisory board, 
a member of the 
management 
Duties no longer 
apply (except the 
duty not to 
disclose the 
company’s 
business secrets) 
- Confidentiality: 
Commercial 
Code, § 313(1) 
- Prohibited loans: 
Commercial 
Code, § 281 
(loans of the 
company to the 
directors are 
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board shall not: 
1) be a sole 
proprietor in the 
area of activity of 
the company; 
2) be a partner of 
a partnership 
which operates in 
the same area of 
activity as the 
company; 
3) be a member of 
the managing 
body of a 
company which 
operates in the 
same area of 
activity (except for 
groups) 
prohibited) 
Finland Companies Act, 
Ch. 6 § 4: a 
director is 
prohibited from 
participating in 
decisions 
regarding matters 
between the 
company and 
himself 
Ch. 1, s. 8 would 
apply: the director 
may be judged as 
not having 
promoted the 
interests of the 
company and thus 
be held liable if 
there was an 
identifiable harm 
to the company 
- Possibly 
application of Ch. 
1, s. 8, but the 
duties only apply 
as long as the 
director holds 
office.  
- Directors are 
bound by 
confidentiality as 
regards 
information 
received as a 
board member 
also after 
resignation and 
can be held liable 
for violation of 
business secrets 
in accordance 
with the Criminal 
Code Ch. 30, § 5 
General duty to 
act in the best 
interest of the 
company 
France The law 
distinguishes 
between: 
1) Prohibited 
agreements (e.g. 
loans or 
guarantees by the 
company to the 
director): directors 
cannot enter into 
the agreement; 
ratification by GM 
not possible 
2) Regulated 
The case law on 
the corporate 
opportunities 
doctrine is not well 
developed. 
Directors (but not 
the managers of 
the SARL) are 
allowed to run 
competing 
businesses. 
Resigning 
directors who set 
up a competing 
business and 
attracted other 
employees of their 
former company 
to the new 
business were 
found liable for 
breach of the duty 
of loyalty 
General duty to 
act in the best 
interests of the 
company, which 
comprises the 
duty not to 
disclose 
confidential 
information and 
not to compete 
with the company 
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agreements: 
transactions 
between the 
company and the 
director that are 
not prohibited, but 
also not entered 
into in the ordinary 
course of 
business; valid if 
prior authorisation 
by the board (the 
interested director 
must not vote). 
If the director 
takes part in the 
vote, the 
transaction is 
void, regardless of 
whether the 
director’s vote is 
essential or the 
transaction is 
beneficial to the 
company. 
Shareholder 
authorization does 
not exempt the 
director from 
liability. 
3) Transactions 
entered into in the 
ordinary course of 
business and at 
arm’s length: valid 
without 
authorisation; not 
even disclosure is 
required 
Germany The supervisory 
board represents 
the company in 
dealings with the 
members of the 
management 
board, s. 112 
1) Duty not to 
compete, s. 88: 
members of the 
management 
board are not 
permitted to 
operate a trading 
business 
(Handelsgewerbe) 
or enter into 
transactions in the 
company’s line of 
business, unless 
the supervisory 
board gives its 
consent 
2) Unwritten 
corporate 
Resigning 
directors continue 
to be subject to 
the prohibition to 
exploit corporate 
opportunities 
(BGH WM 1985, 
1443: director 
resigns and forms 
a new company to 
exploit the 
business 
opportunity) 
- 
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opportunities 
doctrine: 
encompasses 
corporate 
opportunities 
made available to 
family members 
and other cases 
that do not fall 
within s. 88 
Greece Art. 23a: 
1) Absolutely 
prohibited 
contracts, e.g. 
loan, credit or 
guarantee/security 
agreements   
between the 
company and a 
director (or a 
related person) 
2) Contracts 
subject to certain 
limitations: 
contracts that do 
not fall under the 
definition of 
absolutely 
prohibited 
contracts and that 
are not within the 
scope of ordinary 
business 
transactions need 
approval by the 
GM 
3) Other contracts 
can be freely 
concluded without 
approval by the 
GM, provided that 
they fall within the 
company’s 
ordinary business 
transactions (Art. 
23a(2)) 
- Art. 23: directors 
participating in the 
management of 
the company and 
managers must 
not take on their 
own account or on 
the account of a 
third party any 
action that falls 
within the 
company’s 
objectives, or be 
partner in an 
unlimited 
company that 
conducts the 
same business, 
without 
permission of the 
general meeting 
- This prohibition 
covers mainly the 
executive 
directors, de 
factor directors, 
and major 
shareholders who 
can exercise 
influence over the 
board’s decisions 
- Literature: non-
executive 
directors are 
considered to 
participate in the 
company’s 
management 
indirectly; hence 
they are caught by 
Art. 23 
- No case law on 
this issue 
- The duty 
stemming from 
Art. 23 continues 
for a ‘reasonable 
time’ after the 
director resigns 
(Art. 23 in 
conjunction with 
Arts. 288, 281 of 
the Civil Code) 
- This prohibition 
may be extended 
contractually 
 
Duty of 
confidentiality, Art. 
22a(3) 
Hungary No specific rules 
(except for private 
limited companies 
1) Directors are 
prohibited from: 
- acquiring shares, 
Solved by asking 
whether a causal 
link exists 
Duty of 
confidentiality 
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where 
authorisation of 
the general 
meeting is 
required). 
According to 
general rules of 
the Civil Code 
covering 
representation 
and agency, the 
agent is prohibited 
from acting if the 
other party is 
himself or 
represented by 
him as well.  The 
supervisory board 
is not supposed to 
represent the 
company and act 
on behalf of it, 
either in general 
or in this specific 
situation. The law 
is unsatisfactory 
and the New Civil 
Code does not 
seem to change 
that. 
other than shares 
in public limited 
companies, in any 
business 
organization 
whose main 
activity is similar 
to that of the 
company 
- accept an 
executive office in 
a business 
association whose 
main business 
activity is similar 
to that of the 
company 
Exceptions: if 
permitted in the 
articles of 
association or the 
supreme body of 
the company has 
given its consent 
2) Directors are 
also prohibited 
from entering into 
any transactions 
falling within the 
scope of the main 
activities of the 
company, unless 
permitted in the 
articles of 
association. The 
authority to grant 
permission may 
be delegated to 
the supervisory 
board. Otherwise 
the supervisory 
board has no role 
to play in this 
situation. 
between the 
director’s conduct 
and the loss 
suffered by the 
company in spite 
of the resignation 
Ireland A director must 
not have an 
unauthorised 
personal interest 
in transactions 
with the company 
1) fairness of the 
transaction is 
irrelevant 
2) duty to disclose 
any interest in a 
transaction with 
- A director must 
not make a secret 
profit through the 
use of 
opportunities 
which have arisen 
in the course of 
his or her 
management of 
the company’s 
affairs.  
The requirements 
- The no-conflict 
and no-profit rules 
continue to apply 
after resignation 
where post-
resignation 
behaviour is 
tainted by prior 
breaches of duty 
- Whether the 
English maturing 
business 
1) Duty to act in 
the best interest of 
the company 
(applies also 
where related a 
party transaction 
has been 
disclosed 
pursuant to 
Companies Act 
1963, s.194) 
2) Duty to act for 
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the company, 
Companies Act 
1963, s.194 
3) authorisation: 
a) the articles of 
association or 
shareholder 
agreements may 
authorise the 
directors to enter 
into certain types 
of contract; OR 
b) approval: it is 
controversial 
whether consent 
has to be declared 
by the company in 
general meeting 
or the board of 
directors (most 
authority supports 
the latter view; but 
note that there is 
persuasive 
authority 
suggesting that for 
the purposes of 
compliance with 
s.194 it is 
irrelevant whether 
the contract is 
approved by the 
board or not so 
long as the 
requisite 
disclosure has 
been made) 
3) consequences 
of violation: the 
company can 
avoid the contract 
are not well 
established, but it 
has been held that 
liability can arise 
irrespective of 
whether the 
company could 
have made a 
profit → 
comparable to 
English cases that 
generally do not 
allow capacity 
facts as an 
excuse 
- Authorisation by 
the board of 
directors is 
possible; Irish 
case law suggests 
that the conflicted 
director should not 
participate in the 
decision of the 
board, but the 
issue has not 
been the subject 
of the direct ruling 
and the model 
articles would 
allow the director 
to vote 
opportunities 
doctrine is 
applicable has not 
yet been decided; 
the decisions in 
Island Export 
Finance Ltd v. 
Umunna [1986] 
BCLC 460; 
Balston Ltd v. 
Headline Filters 
Ltd [1990] FSR 
385; and 
Framlington 
Group plc v. 
Anderson [1995] 1 
BCLC 475 would 
have persuasive 
value for courts in 
Ireland 
proper purposes 
Italy Art. 2391: 
1) Duty to declare 
the nature and 
extent of any 
direct or indirect 
interest to the 
directors and the 
statutory auditors 
2) The conflicted 
director can 
attend and vote at 
the board 
meeting, provided 
that the board’s 
resolution 
Art. 2391(5): 
1) Corporate 
opportunity: 
questionable 
whether this has 
to be within the 
company’s line of 
business (no case 
law yet, but 
unlikely because 
otherwise 2391(5) 
would be 
redundant and 
already covered 
by the duty of 
Directors cannot 
take advantage of 
corporate 
opportunities after 
they resign if they 
resign because 
they want to use 
the opportunity, as 
this would be a 
way of avoiding 
the mandatory 
rule 
Heightened 
requirements for 
related-party 
transactions if the 
company is listed 
or widely held: a 
committee, with a 
majority of 
independent 
directors, must 
give its opinion on 
any related-party 
transaction 
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appropriately 
justifies the 
reasons and the 
opportunity for 
entering into the 
transaction 
3) If there has not 
been the required 
disclosure by the 
conflicted director 
and  the 
resolution, which 
was adopted with  
the determining 
vote of the 
interested 
director, may 
harm the 
company, it may 
be challenged by 
the remaining 
directors and the 
board of statutory 
auditors (voidable) 
non-competition) 
2) The article 
requires that the 
director must have 
obtained the 
opportunity ‘in 
connection with 
the appointment’ 
→ unclear 
whether the 
director must have 
learned of the 
opportunity in his 
role as director 
3) No breach of 
duty if the 
company is 
unable to take 
advantage of the 
opportunity 
Latvia 1) The 
supervisory board 
represents the 
company in 
dealings with the 
members of the 
management 
board 
2) The member of 
the management 
board must 
disclose any 
conflict of interest 
between the 
company and him-
/herself or his/her 
spouse, a relative 
or brother/sister-
in-law before the 
board meeting 
and is not entitled 
to vote in the 
meeting 
(Commercial Law, 
s. 309(3))
154
 
Duty of non-
competition, s. 
171 Commercial 
Law: without prior 
consent of the 
supervisory board 
(or the general 
meeting if no 
supervisory board 
is formed) a 
director may not: 
- be a partner of a 
partnership acting 
in the same field 
of business as the 
company; 
- enter into 
transactions in the 
same field of 
business; 
- be a member of 
the management 
board of any other 
company in the 
same field of 
business 
Unclear - 
Lithuania 1) Civil Code, Art. 
2.87(5): a director 
1) 2.87(3): duty to 
avoid conflicts of 
No special 
statutory rules for 
1) General duty of 
loyalty: case law 
                                                     
154
 Note: In a decision from 2009 the Riga City Vidzeme Municipality Court did not recognise that a conflict of interest existed in 
a situation where the management board member concluded an agreement with a company owned by him. The court argued 
that the Commercial Law does not prohibit the management board member from entering into agreements with a related 
company. 
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must notify other 
members of the 
board or 
shareholders 
about any 
circumstances 
where his/her 
personal interests 
conflict, or may 
conflict, with the 
interests of the 
company 
2) Civil Code, Art. 
2.87(6): directors 
may enter into a 
contract with the 
company, but they 
must notify the 
other corporate 
bodies or 
shareholders of 
the contract (if 
there is a collegial 
management 
body then the 
notification is 
usually made to 
such body; if there 
is only a 
managing director 
then shareholders 
must be notified) 
3) No approval 
requirements. 
Failure to disclose 
the conflict results 
in the invalidity of 
the contract (3K-
3-557/2009). 
4) The conflicted 
director must 
abstain from the 
decision-making, 
Art 35(6) of the 
Law on 
Companies: A 
director is not 
entitled to vote 
when the board 
discusses issues 
related to his work 
or his 
responsibility. 
interest → a 
director must 
avoid a situation 
where his 
personal interests 
conflict with the 
interests of the 
company; this 
includes the 
obligation not to 
use the property 
or information that 
he/she obtains in 
the capacity of a 
director for 
personal gain 
(note: no case law 
on this issue; a 
systematic 
interpretation of 
the Civil Code 
would lead to the 
conclusion that 
the director can 
pursue a business 
opportunity that 
he acquired in a 
personal capacity 
as long as his 
personal interests 
do not conflict with 
the interests of the 
company) without 
the consent of the 
shareholders. 
If the opportunity 
does not fall within 
the company’s 
line of business, it 
may be 
considered not to 
be against the 
interests of the 
company 
(however, usually 
the articles state 
that the company 
is interested in 
pursuing any type 
of economic 
activity that is not 
prohibited by law)  
2) See Art. 2.87(5) 
(left) 
resigning 
directors. Usually 
non-competition 
clauses are 
included in the 
contract that apply 
after resignation. 
ambiguous 
(requires directors 
to avoid conflicts 
of interest or act in 
accordance with 
the articles and 
the decisions of 
other corporate 
bodies). 
Literature: duty to 
act for the benefit 
of the company, 
its shareholders, 
creditors, 
employees and 
the public welfare 
2) Duty to act in 
good faith 
3) Duty to avoid 
commingling the 
property of the 
company and 
private property 
(all Civil Code, 
Art. 2.87) 
Luxembourg Companies Act, 
Art. 57: duty to 
declare conflict of 
Not regulated Not regulated Companies Act, 
Art. 66: duty of 
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interest in a 
transaction 
submitted for 
approval to the 
board, unless the 
transaction falls 
within the scope 
of the company’s 
current operations 
and is entered into 
under normal 
conditions. 
The director may 
not take part in 
the decision-
making. In 
addition, the 
conflict of interest 
must be reported 
to the next 
general meeting 
of shareholders. 
confidentiality 
Malta Art. 136A(3)(c): 
duty of directors to 
ensure that their 
personal interests 
do not conflict with 
the interests of the 
company. 
Conflicted interest 
transactions are 
only valid under 
the following 
conditions: 
1) The director 
must declare the 
nature of the 
conflict to the 
other directors at 
the first meeting at 
which he/she 
knows about the 
potential conflict, 
Art. 145(1) 
2) Model articles: 
the director must 
not vote at the 
board meeting 
deciding on the 
conflicted 
transaction (but 
the articles or the 
GM can provide 
for a different rule 
and allow the 
director to vote) 
1) Art. 136A(3)(d): 
Duty not to use 
any property, 
information or 
opportunity of the 
company for their 
own or anyone 
else’s benefit, nor 
obtain benefit in 
any other way in 
connection with 
the exercise of 
their powers, 
except with the 
consent of the 
company in 
general meeting 
or except as 
permitted by the 
company’s 
memorandum or 
articles of 
association 
2) Art. 143(1): 
duty not to 
compete with the 
company → only 
applies to 
activities actually 
performed by the 
company, or 
which could 
reasonably be 
foreseen to be 
undertaken by the 
It is argued by the 
literature that the 
corporate 
opportunities 
doctrine 
developed by the 
English courts 
should apply, but 
no case law exists 
1) Duty to act 
honestly and in 
good faith in the 
best interests of 
the company, Art. 
136A(1): 
subjective 
standard, 
directors must 
have honestly 
believed to act in 
the best interests 
of the company 
2) Duty not to 
make secret or 
personal profits 
from their position 
without the 
consent of the 
company, nor 
make personal 
gain from 
confidential 
information, Art. 
136A(3)(b) 
3) Duty to act 
within powers and 
not for an 
improper purpose, 
Art. 136A(3)(e) 
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company in the 
near future. 
Authorisation can 
be given by the 
company in GM 
Netherlands - Law as of 
January 1, 2013: 
prohibition of 
directors who 
have a direct or 
indirect interest in 
a transaction to 
participate in the 
decision-making 
process regarding 
that transaction. If 
as a result of the 
prohibition no 
board resolution 
can be passed, 
the supervisory 
board decides.  
- If the director 
does not comply 
with these 
requirements: the 
director is liable 
for breach of the 
duty to properly 
manage the 
company (s. 2:9), 
provided that his 
fault is personal 
and sufficiently 
serious 
- Definition of 
conflict of interest: 
if the director as a 
result of (i) a 
personal conflict 
of interest or (ii) 
an indirect interest 
in the transaction 
(e.g. family 
interest or interest 
in another 
company) cannot 
be expected to 
protect the 
interests of the 
company as 
should be 
expected of an 
unbiased director 
- No statutory 
regulation (but 
see Corporate 
Governance 
Code, II.3.1(d)) 
 - Legal literature: 
a business 
opportunity is a 
corporate 
opportunity if the 
company has a 
reasonable 
interest in the 
opportunity (test: 
connection with 
the activities of 
the company) 
- Courts: have 
held directors who 
usurped corporate 
opportunities 
liable for starting a 
competing 
company (based 
on ss. 2:8, 2:9) 
- In addition, 
possibly violation 
of a non-
competition 
provision in the 
employment 
contract of the 
director 
The duty to 
properly manage 
the company (s. 
2:9) is no longer 
applicable; but 
general principles 
of tort law 
continue to apply 
- 
Poland Art. 377: In the 
event of a direct 
Art. 380(1): 
- A member of the 
Duties no longer 
apply (except the 
- 
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or indirect conflict 
of interest 
between the 
company and a 
management 
board member (or 
the member’s 
spouse and other 
close relatives) 
the management 
board member 
shall abstain from 
participating in 
deciding such 
matters 
2) Art. 379: in a 
contract between 
the company and 
a management 
board member, 
the company shall 
be represented by 
the supervisory 
board 
management 
board shall not, 
without consent of 
the company, 
involve himself in 
a competitive 
business, nor 
shall he be 
director in a 
competing 
company or 10% 
shareholder 
- Consent is given 
by the supervisory 
board 
duty of 
confidentiality) 
Portugal 1) Art. 397(1): the 
company is 
prohibited to enter 
into loan or other 
credit agreements 
with directors or to 
pay in advance 
remuneration for 
more than one 
month 
2) Art. 397(2): 
transactions 
between the 
company and a 
director are void 
unless: 
a) prior 
authorisation by 
the board (the 
conflicted director 
must abstain from 
voting) 
b) assent of the 
supervisory board 
or audit board 
c) disclosure in 
the annual report 
OR: no 
authorisation or 
other 
requirements if 
the transaction is 
Business 
opportunities 
doctrine: not 
codified, but 
developed in 
analogy to Arts. 
254, 398(3), 428 
by the literature 
1) Directors are 
prohibited from 
taking advantage 
of business 
opportunities 
without the 
consent of the GM 
or the general and 
supervisory board  
2) An opportunity 
belongs to the 
company if it falls 
within its scope of 
activity, the 
company has an 
objectively 
relevant interest in 
the opportunity, or 
has expressed its 
interest and 
received a 
contractual 
proposal or is in 
negotiations 
1) A director was 
held liable for 
breach of duty 
who set up a 
competing 
enterprise with 
facilities next to 
the first company 
while holding 
office. He did so 
by using 
information 
regarding clients, 
prices and 
employees 
obtained during 
the performance 
of his duties. The 
court held that the 
director was liable 
because of the 
unlawful use of 
information 
received when he 
was a director in 
favour of the new 
company 
incorporated by 
him 
2) No rules or 
case law on 
directors who 
resign to exploit 
Duty of non-
competition, Art. 
398(3): the 
directors shall not 
exercise any 
activity competing 
with the company, 
unless the GM 
gives its 
authorisation. 
Competing 
activity: any 
activity that falls 
within the 
corporate objects 
of the company, 
provided that it is 
actually performed 
by the company, 
Arts. 398(5), 
254(2) 
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part of the 
company’s regular 
activities and no 
special benefit is 
granted to the 
director 
3) The prohibition 
only applies to 
opportunities of 
which the director 
becomes aware 
while performing 
his functions; 
opportunities 
offered to the 
director in a 
personal capacity 
are excluded 
corporate 
opportunities, but 
according to some 
Portuguese 
commentators the 
prohibition of 
using corporate 
opportunities is 
also applicable to 
directors who 
have resigned 
from office in 
order to exploit a 
specific existing 
opportunity 
Romania 1) Art. 144(3):  
a) If directors (or a 
member of their 
family) have a 
personal interest 
in a transaction 
with the company, 
they must disclose 
the conflict of 
interest to the 
board and to the 
internal auditors, 
and refrain from 
participating in the 
decision on the 
transaction 
b) If the disclosure 
obligation is not 
complied with: the 
interested 
transaction 
remains valid, but 
has to pass the 
test of fairness in 
a court of law 
c) These 
obligations do not 
apply to 
transactions in the 
ordinary course of 
business 
2) Art. 144(4): 
prohibition of the 
provision of any 
financial 
advantages, 
loans, guarantees 
etc. by the 
company to the 
directors 
3) Art. 150: 
1) Corporate 
opportunities 
doctrine 
Scope: unclear, 
as no explicit 
statutory 
regulation and no 
case exist 
2) Duty not to 
compete with the 
company, Art. 
153
11 
- Competing 
companies: 
“companies 
pursuing the same 
type of activity” 
- The provision 
refers only to 
executive 
directors and 
managers; non-
executive 
members of the 
board are not 
bound by a 
statutory duty, but 
they may be 
subject to a 
contractual 
obligation not to 
compete 
- No case law  
No statutory 
regulation or case 
law 
Duty of 
confidentiality, Art. 
144(1) 
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transactions of the 
director with the 
company involving 
assets amounting 
to more than 10% 
of net assets 
require approval 
by the GM 
Slovakia s. 196a: directors 
(and related 
persons) shall not 
be granted credit 
or a loan by the 
company; have 
company property 
transferred to 
them or provided 
for their use; or a 
liability secured by 
the company, 
unless the 
supervisory board 
gives its prior 
consent and the 
transaction is 
conducted on an 
arms’ length basis 
1) No business 
opportunity 
doctrine, only the 
general duty of 
loyalty applies: 
directors shall not 
pursue a business 
opportunity if this 
conflicts with the 
interests of the 
company 
2) Duty of non-
competition, s. 
196: directors 
must not: 
a) enter into 
transactions that 
are related to the 
company’s 
business activity 
b) mediate the 
company’s 
business 
arrangements for 
other parties 
c) participate as a 
shareholder or 
member with 
unlimited liability 
in another 
company pursuing 
a similar business 
activity 
d) be a manager 
or director of 
another company 
pursuing a similar 
business activity 
- The duty of 
confidentiality 
continues to apply 
after resignation, 
which may apply 
where the director 
exploits company 
information for the 
benefit of another 
party 
- The decision to 
resign in order to 
take advantage of 
a business 
opportunity may 
be a breach of the 
duty of loyalty, but 
no case law on 
this point 
1) Duty of 
confidentiality, s. 
194(5)  
2) Duty to act in 
good faith, s. 
194(7) 
 
Slovenia Regulation of 
related party 
transactions, Art. 
38a:  
1) Transactions 
with another 
company in which 
a director (or a 
family member) 
1) Duty of non-
competition, Art. 
41(1): members of 
the management 
board and the 
supervisory board 
may not 
participate as 
director or 
The ban on 
competition may 
continue after the 
end of the 
director’s term of 
office 
Duty of 
confidentiality, Art. 
263(1) 
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holds at least 10% 
of the share 
capital, is member 
of a dormant 
company, or 
participates in any 
other way in the 
profits, require the 
consent of the 
supervisory board 
(or the GM if the 
company does not 
have a 
supervisory 
board) 
2) If the director 
(or family 
member) holds 
less than 10%: the 
directors must 
notify the 
supervisory board 
within three 
working days 
employee in 
another company, 
or pursue as 
entrepreneur an 
activity that is or 
could be in 
competition with 
the activity of the 
company 
2) A member of 
the management 
board may not 
pursue an activity 
with a view to 
profit in the area 
of the company’s 
activity without the 
consent of the 
supervisory board, 
Art. 271 
3) The general 
duty of loyalty can 
be interpreted as 
prohibiting the 
exploitation of 
corporate 
opportunities, but 
no case law since 
the duty was 
introduced very 
recently (2012) 
Spain - s. 229: self-
dealing is 
permitted if the 
director: 
1) informs the 
board of directors 
of the conflict 
2) abstains from 
any decisions 
relating to the self-
dealing 
transaction 
(Note: the 
provisions is wide 
and encompasses 
not only self-
dealing, but any 
conflict of interest, 
e.g. affecting 
internal decision-
making 
processes) 
- In addition, 
transactions can 
be challenged on 
s. 228: directors 
are prohibited 
from exploiting 
corporate 
opportunities if: 
1) they have 
become aware of 
the opportunity by 
reason of their 
position 
2) the company 
has an interest in 
the opportunity (it 
falls within the 
company’s line of 
business) and has 
not ruled out the 
investment. 
The director must 
communicate the 
conflicting 
situation to the 
company; the 
company can 
authorize the 
1) Duty of secrecy 
(s. 232) continues 
after resignation. 
Legal literature: it 
ends when the 
consequences of 
disclosure are no 
longer detrimental 
to the company or 
the information 
can be disclosed 
2) Some case law 
exists that has 
held resigning 
directors liable for 
the exploitation of 
corporate 
opportunities 
(Supreme Court, 2 
September 2012, 
RJ/2012/9007) 
Non-competition, 
s. 230: 
authorisation of 
the GM required 
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the ground that 
they are unfair, 
i.e. not in the best 
interest of the 
company 
transaction (the 
conflicted director 
must abstain) 
Sweden 1) Ch. 7, § 46: 
shareholder may 
not vote in respect 
of the following 
matters: 
a) legal 
proceedings 
against them 
b) their discharge 
from liability in 
damages or other 
obligations 
towards the 
company 
c) legal 
proceedings or a 
discharge in 
respect of another 
person, where the 
shareholder 
possesses a 
material interest 
which may conflict 
with the interests 
of the company 
2) Ch. 8, § 23: 
directors may not 
participate in a 
matter regarding: 
a) agreements 
between the 
board member 
and the company 
b) agreements 
between the 
company and a 
third party, where 
the board member 
in question has a 
material interest 
which may conflict 
with the interests 
of the company 
c) agreements 
between the 
company and a 
legal person 
which the board 
member is entitled 
to represent 
No binding 
regulation, the 
general duty of 
loyalty may apply. 
Directors have a 
duty to pursue 
corporate 
opportunities on 
behalf of the 
company. 
The duties no 
longer apply when 
a director resigns. 
However, 
according to some 
scholars, directors 
who set up a 
competing 
business, take 
advantage of 
business secrets 
of the company 
and/or of 
corporate 
opportunities, can 
be found liable for 
breach of the 
general duty of 
loyalty. 
No statutory rule 
regarding 
confidentiality in 
the Companies 
Act, but the 
general duty of 
loyalty provides 
that the director 
may not reveal 
information that 
may jeopardise 
the company’s 
interests. 
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d) litigation and 
other legal 
proceedings are 
equated with 
agreements within 
the meaning of 
the preceding 
paragraphs 
United Kingdom 1) s. 177: the 
director declares 
the nature and 
extent of his 
interest to the 
other directors 
before the 
company enters 
into the 
transaction. (note 
that some 
transactions 
require members’ 
approval, ss. 188-
225); the 
interested director 
does not have to 
abstain from 
voting (but see 
Art. 16 Model 
Articles for Public 
Companies: the 
director is not to 
be counted as 
participating in the 
meeting for 
quorum or voting 
purposes) 
2) Ex ante 
authorisation by 
shareholders, s. 
180(4)(a) 
3) Ex post 
ratification by 
shareholders , s. 
239 (the 
interested director 
cannot vote) 
s. 175(2): 
1) Exploitation of 
any property, 
information or 
opportunity 
2) The company 
does not need to 
be able to make 
use of the 
opportunity 
3) Line of 
business test 
applied by older 
case law, but see 
O’Donnell v 
Shanahan [2009] 
B.C.C. 822: an 
opportunity falling 
outside the scope 
of business of the 
company may 
nevertheless give 
rise to the 
prohibitions of the 
corporate 
opportunities 
doctrine 
s. 170(2)(a): the 
duty not to exploit 
corporate 
opportunities 
continues after 
resignation. 
Old case law: 
maturing business 
opportunities 
doctrine → 
directors are liable 
if they resign in 
order to take up 
the opportunity or 
use special 
knowledge of a 
business 
opportunity or 
trade secrets (as 
opposed to 
general know-how 
acquired in the 
course of their 
employment) 
1) Duty to act in 
accordance with 
the company’s 
constitution and 
proper purpose 
doctrine, s. 171 
2) Duty to 
promote the 
success of the 
company, s. 172 
3) Duty to 
exercise 
independent 
judgment, s. 173 
4) General duty to 
avoid conflicts of 
interest, s. 175(1) 
5) Duty not to 
accept benefits 
from third parties, 
s. 176 
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Discussion 
Related party transactions 
 
Map 2.5.2.a: Related party transactions 
 
Legend Country 
The country applies a broad 
rule to conflicted transactions 
that makes all or the most 
important such transactions 
(exempting, for example, 
transactions in the ordinary 
course of business) conditional 
upon disclosure and a decision 
by a disinterested organ (i.e. the 
conflicted director cannot 
participate in the decision that 
authorises the interested 
transaction) 
BE, BG, DK, FI, FR, EL, LT, LU, NL, 
PT, RO, ES, SE 
The country uses the two-tier 
board system and allocates 
decision-making power for 
AT, EE, DE, HR, LV, PL, SK, SI 
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transactions between the 
company and the director to the 
supervisory board 
The country makes all or the 
most important conflicted 
transactions conditional upon 
disclosure, but the interested 
director can participate in the 
decision that authorises the 
interested transaction 
CY, IE, IT, MT, UK 
Fragmentary regulation CZ, HU 
 
As is to be expected, the regulatory landscape follows largely the distribution of the one-tier and two-
tier models in the EU. Two countries that offer formally a choice between the one-tier and two-tier 
systems are included in the group of countries with a mandatory two-tier board structure: Croatia, 
where the unitary board system has only recently been introduced (2007) and has no tradition in 
company law, and Slovenia, where the majority of companies opt for the two-tier system. Hungary 
would also fall into this category, given that the choice between the one-tier and two-tier model only 
dates back to 2006 and most companies have a supervisory board, but the law does not use the 
existence of the supervisory board to reallocate decision-making power.
155
 
Two-tier versus one tier board system: The two-tier board system is less flexible than a broadly 
defined and generally applicable no-conflict rule. In two-tier board systems, the law simply re-allocates 
decision-making power (to a supervisory organ with regard to transactions between the company and 
a member of the management organ),
156
 but it does not impose a duty on directors to avoid any kind 
of conflict of interest. This has the consequence that particular questions are left unregulated, for 
example the problem of who decides on a transaction that is not formally between the company and 
the director, but in which the director is interested. A good example is a contract between the 
director’s company and another company in which the director is a substantial shareholder. In some 
countries, for example Germany, the management board would continue to have the power to 
represent the company in such a transaction.
157
 
However, this does not apply to all two-tier board systems. Slovenian law, for examples, specifically 
provides that the authorisation by the supervisory board is required where the director (or a family 
member) holds 10% or more of the share capital, is a silent partner, or participates in any other way in 
the profits of the other undertaking. If the holding amounts to less than 10%, the director must still 
notify the supervisory board within three working days. 
Alternative tests: French law allows an interested transaction (other than those entered into in the 
ordinary course of business) if it was authorised by the board, with the interested director abstaining 
from voting, the transaction has no prejudicial consequences for the company, or it is approved by the 
general meeting. 
Intermediate cases: Ambivalent cases are Cyprus, Ireland, Malta, and the United Kingdom. The 
company law does not prohibit interested directors from participating and voting in the board meeting 
that decides on the interested transaction, but good practice (and the model articles of association that 
apply if the company does not adopt alternative articles) require the director to abstain from voting. In 
addition, in the UK, companies with a premium listing on the London Stock Exchange are subject to 
additional requirements.
158
 The Listing Rules promulgated by the UK Listing Authority (UKLA) require 
                                                     
155
 See the discussion below ‘Fragmentary regulation’. 
156
 See, for example, German Stock Corporation Act, § 112. 
157
 OLG Saabrücken, AG 2001, 483. 
158
 Companies listed on the Main Market of the London Stock Exchange can choose between premium and standard listing. 
Premium listing involves the most stringent standards of regulation with rules that are partly super-equivalent, i.e. that go 
beyond the requirements imposed by EU law. 
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such companies to disclose related party transactions to their shareholders and obtain shareholder 
approval for the transaction.
159
 Related party transactions are defined as transactions between the 
company and, among others, a director, shadow director, or substantial shareholder of the 
company.
160
 Exceptions apply to small transactions and a number of other enumerated 
transactions.
161
 Importantly, the interested director is not allowed to vote on the resolution approving 
the related party transaction.
162
 In spite of these qualifications, we assign the intermediate cases to 
group 3 because the rules preventing the interested director from participating in the decision 
regarding the self-dealing transaction do not stem from binding company law and are limited in their 
scope. 
As regards Belgian law, it should be noted that a distinction is drawn between private companies and 
companies that have issued shares to the public (including listed companies). The general rule is that 
the conflicted director does not have to abstain from participating in the decision approving the related 
party transaction, unless the articles of association provide otherwise. However, the rules are more 
stringent if the company has issued shares to the public. The Companies Act requires directors of 
such companies not to participate in the proceedings of the board or vote on the matter.
163
 
Fragmentary regulation: In the Czech Republic, the law only regulates a limited number of specifically 
defined interested transactions, namely credit or loan contracts with the directors, contracts securing 
the debts of directors, free-of-charge transfers of property from the company to directors, and 
transfers of assets for consideration exceeding 10% of the company’s capital. In Hungary, the law 
does not contain any specific rules on related party transactions in the public company (in private 
companies, authorisation of the general meeting is required). Therefore, it is necessary to take 
recourse to general principles of civil law, notably the law on representation and agency. According to 
agency law, the agent is prohibited from contracting with him- or herself or from acting if the other 
party is also represented by the agent. While a supervisory board exists in many companies, the law 
does not reallocate decision-making power to that board where the company engages in related-party 
transactions. The supervisory board is not expected to represent the company and act on behalf of it, 
either in general or in this specific situation. These rules are commonly regarded as being 
unsatisfactory. 
Netherlands: The law in force until December 2012 regulated conflicts of interest as a matter of 
representation, i.e. the interested director lacked authority to represent the company, with the 
consequence that a conflicted transaction was not valid in relation to third parties that contracted with 
the director’s company. These rules were widely criticised as leading to legal uncertainty and were 
reformed by the Management and Supervision Law, which entered into force on January 1, 2013. The 
new regime no longer relies on corporate representation, but introduces a bright-line prohibition of 
directors who have a direct or indirect interest in a transaction to participate in the decision-making 
process regarding that transaction. If as a result of the prohibition no board resolution can be passed, 
the supervisory board will be entrusted with the decision (or, if a supervisory board does not exist, the 
general meeting, unless provided for otherwise in the articles of association). 
 
Corporate opportunities 
Corporate opportunities can be defined as business opportunities in which the corporation has an 
interest. The effectiveness of the regulation of corporate opportunities thus depends on two factors. 
First, is the exploitation of corporate opportunities by the directors for their own account restricted and, 
if yes, under which conditions (disclosure, disinterested approval, etc.) are the directors free to pursue 
a business opportunity that belongs to the corporation? Second, how is it determined when a business 
                                                     
159
 Listing Rules, LR 11.1.7R. 
160
 LR 11.1.4R. Substantial shareholders are holders of 10% or more of the company’s voting rights (LR 11.1.4AR). 
161
 Threshold ratios for small and smaller transactions are 0.25% and 5% of the company’s value, respectively. Small 
transactions are exempted from the rules and for smaller transactions modified requirements apply. See LR 11.1.6R, LR 
11.1.10R, LR 11 Annex 1 R. 
162
 LR 11.1.7R(4). 
163
 Companies Code, Art. 523 § 1, 4. 
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opportunity ‘belongs’ to the corporation? With respect to both dimensions, the law may adopt a narrow 
approach (i.e., the regulation is applicable to a narrowly defined set of cases) or a broad approach 
(applicable to a wide range of directors’ activities). It could be said that the narrow approach imposes 
a smaller risk of liability on directors and facilitates the realisation of business opportunities, which 
may contribute to an efficient allocation of resources, while the broad approach ensures a more 
comprehensive protection of shareholders. For example, as far as the first dimension is concerned, 
the law may only address direct conflicts of interest, i.e. where the director him- or herself exploits a 
corporate opportunity (narrow approach), but not indirect conflicts created by the activities of a 
company or other business association in which the director has an interest (broad approach). As far 
as the second dimension is concerned, the law may define the necessary link between the business 
opportunity and the company narrowly, requiring the opportunity to fall within the line of business 
actually pursued by the company (or at least identified as one of the company’s objects in the articles 
of association), or broadly, capturing for example any type of economic activity and disregarding the 
capacity of the company (financial or otherwise) to make use of the opportunity. 
The Member States employ two general strategies to regulate corporate opportunities. One group of 
countries (in particular, those belonging to the common law) impose a fairly broad duty on directors 
not to exploit any information or opportunity of the company, as this would constitute a case of a 
prohibited conflict of interest, and a second, larger group relies on the duty not to compete with the 
company. No country establishes an absolute prohibition. All jurisdictions allow directors to exploit 
corporate opportunities after authorisation by the board of directors, supervisory board, or general 
meeting of shareholders, as applicable. 
Furthermore, in most jurisdictions the rules apply both to direct conflict cases (the director him- or 
herself takes advantage of the opportunity) and indirect conflicts (the director is involved in a business 
that engages in activities that are potentially or actually of economic interest to the company). The 
legal systems differ in details, for example with respect to the question of when the interest of the 
director in a competing business is significant enough to trigger the prohibitions of the no-conflict or 
non-compete rule or when the activities of a person affiliated with the director implicate the director 
him- or herself. But all legal systems that regulate these conflicts (which is not the case for all 
jurisdictions analysed) provide for some mechanism that goes beyond the purely formal director-
company relationship and includes affiliates that are economically identical or closely related to the 
director.
164
 
The Member States differ systematically with regard to the second dimension: the definition of the 
necessary link between the business opportunity and the company. Interestingly, the difference 
correlates with the regulatory strategy employed by the legal system: the duty not to exploit corporate 
opportunities on the one hand, or the prohibition to compete with the company on the other hand. If 
the jurisdiction adopts the former strategy, the duty generally encompasses all cases of an actual or 
potential conflict, i.e. the director is prohibited from exploiting the business opportunity notwithstanding 
the company’s current activities or financial means. The non-compete rule, on the other hand, is 
generally interpreted narrowly. ‘Competing with the company’ is understood as pursuing an economic 
activity within the scope of the company’s business, i.e. engaging in actual, not only potential, 
competition with the company. 
However, it is not clear that this correlation lies in the nature of the regulatory strategy adopted. 
Essentially, this is a simple matter of how the boundaries of the no-conflict and non-compete duties 
are defined and interpreted. For example, Portugal’s company law contains a codified version of the 
non-compete duty.
165
 In addition, it is argued that an unwritten corporate opportunities doctrine exists 
that applies if the business opportunity falls within the company’s scope of activity or the company has 
expressed an interest in the opportunity and received a contractual proposal or is in negotiations.
166
 
                                                     
164
 For details see Table 2.5.2.a and the country reports. 
165
 Portuguese Code of Commercial Companies, Art. 398(3). 
166
 Jorge Manuel Coutinho de Abreu, Deveres de cuidado e de lealdade dos admnistradores e interesse social, in Reformas do 
Código das Sociedades (N.º 3 da Colecção, Almedina 2007), 17, 26-27. 
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Thus, the definition of “corporate opportunity” is narrower than the one developed by, for example, the 
English courts. In this manner, the corporate opportunities doctrine and the codified duty not to 
compete with the company are aligned. On the other hand, under the heading ‘prohibition of 
competition’, Austria and Germany prohibit directors from operating any other business enterprise, 
notwithstanding its line of business.
167
 Nevertheless, it may be argued that the structure of the 
corporate opportunities doctrine as found in common law jurisdictions is more conducive to an open-
ended, flexible interpretation, given that it is based on a broadly understood requirement to avoid 
conflicts of interest of any kind, whereas the use of the term ‘competition’ implies a proximity of the 
prohibited activity and the company’s business. On this view, the differences in the scope of the 
prohibition would be a natural consequence of the different legal strategies initially adopted. 
On the basis of the foregoing considerations, we divide the Member States in Map 2.5.2.b below into 
the following groups.  
(1) The broad approach is based on what can be called the ‘no-conflict rule’: Directors are 
required to avoid any type of conflict of interest with the company, which means in this context 
that they must refrain from exploiting business opportunities. As explained, the legal systems 
that employ this approach define the term ‘corporate opportunity’ broadly, encompassing any 
business opportunity that is actually or potentially of economic interest to the company. The 
prohibition does not only apply if the company has expressed an interest in the opportunity or 
it can be assumed that such an interest exists because of the close link with the company’s 
current operations. The theoretical possibility of a (future) overlap with the company’s 
activities is sufficient. In addition, the financial capacity of the company to exploit the 
opportunity is irrelevant.  
(2) The narrow approach relies on the duty not to compete with the company. The director is 
generally
168
 only required to refrain from pursuing economic activity in the company’s line of 
business.  
(3) Finally, the third group comprises jurisdictions that do not contain any binding regulation of 
corporate opportunities, either by way of a statutory no-conflict or non-compete provision or a 
well-established case-law based corporate opportunities doctrine. 
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 Austrian Stock Corporation Act, § 79(1); German Stock Corporation Act, § 88(1). 
168
 For a more detailed discussion see below. 
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Map 2.5.2.b: Corporate opportunities 
 
Legend Country 
Duty not to make use of 
corporate opportunities (broad 
definition, i.e. not requiring that 
the director must act in the 
company’s line of business)  
CY, IE, LT, MT, UK 
Duty not to compete (narrow 
definition, i.e. generally 
requiring that the director must 
act in the company’s line of 
business) 
AT, BG, CZ, DE, EE, EL, HR, HU, IT, 
LV, PL, PT, RO, SI, SK, ES 
No binding regulation BE, DK, FI, FR, LU, NL, SE 
 
General comments: The majority of jurisdictions contain some regulation of corporate opportunities. 
The common law countries Ireland and the UK, as well as the mixed jurisdictions strongly influenced 
by English common law (Cyprus and Malta), but also Lithuania have developed a corporate 
opportunities doctrine stemming from the duty to avoid conflicts of interest. The paradigm of this 
doctrine, and its most developed version, can be found in the UK. The UK courts have produced a 
wealth of case law on corporate opportunities that have shaped the details of the doctrine and clarified 
that: (1) directors do not have to learn of the corporate opportunity in their capacity as director, but it is 
sufficient that they obtain knowledge of the opportunity in a private capacity, for example during their 
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spare time; (2) it is irrelevant whether the corporate opportunity falls within the company’s line of 
business or not, as long as the possibility is not excluded that the company may now or in the future 
adjust or refocus operations so that the business opportunity becomes economically interesting to the 
company; and (3) the fact that the company is currently unable to exploit the opportunity for financial 
reasons or because of the existence of a legal impediment (e.g., a restricted objects clause in the 
company’s articles) that may be removed through appropriate action (for example, a resolution by the 
general meeting amending the objects clause) is immaterial.
169
 
In the other jurisdictions inspired by the English principles, the reach of the corporate opportunities 
doctrine is often less clear than in the UK. This is generally not a function of a conscious deviation 
from the English law, but simply of the paucity of case law that could settle these questions. Often the 
literature discusses in how far the English principles should apply, but the smaller size of the 
jurisdiction and possibly non-legal reasons for the less frequent use of the judicial system mean that 
the courts did not have the possibility to decide on the issue or develop their distinct solutions. In the 
absence of case law to the contrary, we have classified these jurisdictions in the same way as the UK, 
but it should be kept in mind that the courts may well decide differently should a case come before 
them. 
Austria, Germany, and Slovenia: Three ambivalent jurisdictions are Austria, Germany, and Slovenia. 
These jurisdictions, belonging to the same legal family, have influenced each other and provide for 
similar rules prohibiting competitive activity by the directors. They distinguish between two types of 
activity: The operation of another business enterprise and the conclusion of transactions.
170
 The 
former is prohibited in a general and comprehensive way, notwithstanding the scope of the other 
enterprise’s business, in order to ensure that the director devotes his or her undivided attention to the 
company. Therefore, this part of the prohibition is not, in essence, a non-compete rule, but is 
concerned with a more general conflict of interests. The latter prohibition only applies if the director is 
active within the company’s line of business and follows the traditional non-compete rules that can be 
found in other jurisdictions. Consequently, the three jurisdictions stand somewhat between group 1 
and group 2. We assign them to group 2 (non-compete) since they leave scope for a number of 
conflicted interest transactions that may be caught by the corporate opportunities doctrine (group 1), 
for example transactions that are potentially of economic interest to the company, but do not fall within 
the scope of current, actual operations.
171
 
Both corporate opportunities doctrine and duty not to compete: A few jurisdictions now provide both 
for a corporate opportunities doctrine and a duty not to compete with the company (Italy, Malta, and 
Spain). The case of Malta illustrates well the difference in scope between the two regulatory 
instruments. The corporate opportunities doctrine is phrased in an open-ended way, whereas the duty 
not to compete with the company applies only to activities actually performed by the company or 
which can reasonably be foreseen to be undertaken in the near future. It was mentioned that this 
difference is not a necessary consequence of the employment of either the no-conflict or the non-
compete rule. In Italy and Spain, the corporate opportunities doctrine was introduced recently into the 
Civil Code and Corporations Act, respectively. The traditional approach to regulating these issues was 
by means of the prohibition to compete, which remains in force. It is uncertain how the two provisions 
relate to each other and what the reach of the corporate opportunities doctrine is in the two countries. 
Case law is scarce or non-existent. We accordingly assign both countries to group 2. 
No binding regulation: Several jurisdictions do not contain any binding rules on corporate 
opportunities, either in the company legislation or in case law. These are: France, Belgium, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the Scandinavian jurisdictions. However, this does not mean that 
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 For a comprehensive discussion see P. Davies and S. Worthington, Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law 
(Sweet & Maxwell, 9th ed. 2012), paras. 16145 to 16-164. 
170
 Austrian Stock Corporation Act, § 79(1); German Stock Corporation Act, § 88(1); Slovenian ZGD-1, Art. 41. 
171
 However, it should be noted that especially German law is flexible in that the existence of an unwritten duty of loyalty is 
accepted, which was used by the courts to address cases not caught by the codified duty (see, for example, BGH WM 1967, 
679, where the court held that the director was in breach of fiduciary duties by acquiring property that was not required by the 
company for its current operations). 
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the issue is left without any regulation. The service contract concluded with the director may contain a 
non-compete clause, with the consequence that directors are contractually liable if they engage in 
competitive behaviour. This is common practice in most jurisdictions. In addition, the legal 
mechanisms of the jurisdictions in this group are, in general, flexible enough to address the usurpation 
of a corporate opportunity by the director. In French law, the existence of a general duty of loyalty is 
commonly acknowledged, although the legal basis of the duty is somewhat unclear. In addition, it was 
argued by some French commentators that the exploitation of corporate opportunities may constitute 
the criminal offence of l’abus des biens sociaux.
172
 In Belgium, liability for disloyal behaviour is based 
on the general provision establishing responsibility of directors for management mistakes and failures 
to exercise their mandate properly.
173
 As discussed, under Luxembourg law, the duty of loyalty can 
also be derived from general provisions, but it was pointed out that the courts tend to be reluctant to 
intervene in cases of competitive behaviour or the exploitation of corporate opportunities by directors, 
given the general liberal approach embedded in Luxembourg company law. In the Netherlands, 
general principles of, for example, the duty of care or tort law, have been utilised in some cases to 
arrive at suitable solutions.
174
 In Finland, the duty of directors to ‘promote the interests of the 
company’, set out as a general principle in Part 1 of the Finnish Limited Liability Companies Act,
175
 is 
interpreted broadly as the statutory basis of an unwritten duty of loyalty. Directors who take advantage 
of corporate opportunities may be judged as not having promoted the interests of the company. 
Similarly, in Sweden the lack of an explicit regulation of corporate opportunities or competitive 
behaviour is potentially compensated for by an application of the duty loyalty.
176
 
The analysis shows that the jurisdictions in group 3 do not, per se, exhibit regulatory gaps compared 
with the legal systems in the other two groups. As was already mentioned in a different context,
177
 the 
law seems elastic enough to be able to address conflicts where regulatory intervention is deemed 
necessary. It should also be noted that examples exist where jurisdictions with no express regulation 
of corporate opportunities and no comprehensively codified duty of loyalty have achieved results 
driven by case law and judicial innovation that are similar to UK law, which we regard as the 
paradigmatic case of the corporate opportunities doctrine.
178
 The main difference with regard to 
outcomes seems to be the increased legal uncertainty due to the lack of clearly specified rules 
addressing different conflict situations. In most jurisdictions of group 3, the scope of the prohibitions to 
compete with the company and exploit corporate opportunities is evolving and authoritative case law 
is scarce. It should be emphasised that this is not a result of the lack of codified rules, but more 
generally of clearly specified rules, which may derive from statutory law or case law, as can be seen in 
the UK, where the corporate opportunities doctrine was, of course, entirely case-law based until 2006. 
Arguably, however, the distillation of rules tailored to specific conflict situations from general (and 
possibly unwritten) principles of law requires that certain conditions are satisfied, notably that the 
courts have the opportunity to adjudicate and refine the legal principles.
179
 
The following table summarises the liability of directors according to different jurisdictions under the 
following stylized facts: The director sits on the board of Company A and is majority shareholder and 
managing director in Company B, which is active in the same line of business. Company B acquires 
an asset that would also be of economic interest to Company A.
180
 
 
                                                     
172
 M. Cozian et al., Droit des sociétés (Lexis Nexis, 20th ed. 2007), para. 617. 
173
 Art. 527 of the Code des societies provides: ‘Les administrateurs . . . sont responsables, conformément au droit commun, de 
l’exécution du mandat qu’ils ont reçu et des fautes commises dans leur gestion.’ 
174
 See for example Court of Appeals Arnhem, 29 March 2011, LJN BQ0581, JOR 2011/216, holding a director liable for starting 
a competing business on the basis of sections 2:8 and 2:9 Dutch Civil Code. 
175
 Ch. 1, s. 8. An English translation of the Limited Liability Companies Act can be obtained at: 
http://www.finlex.fi/en/laki/kaannokset/. 
176
 R. Dotevall, ‘Liability of Members of the Board of Directors and the Managing Director – A Scandinavian Perspective’, 37 Int’l 
L. 7, 20-21 (2003). 
177
 See above 2.1. 
178
 See n 171 above. 
179
 For a discussion of this issue see already above 2.1. 
180
 The information is based on the answers to Hypothetical IV, question 4, appended to the country reports. 
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Table 2.5.2.b: Liability for exploitation of corporate opportunities/ 
competing with the company 
Country Legal rule Liability Code
181
 
Austria Duty not to compete If the director is member 
of the management 
board of A: liability, 
unless the supervisory 
board gives its consent. 
If the director is member 
of the supervisory board 
of A: no prohibition to 
compete. 
L 
Belgium No binding regulation The literature argued that 
the general duty of 
loyalty is implicated, but 
no established case law 
U 
Bulgaria Duty not to compete Liability if similar line of 
business, unless the 
general meeting or 
supervisory board (if 
any) give their consent 
L 
Czech Republic Duty not to compete Liability if similar line of 
business 
L 
Croatia Duty not to compete Liability unless the 
supervisory board gives 
its consent. 
L 
Cyprus Corporate 
opportunities doctrine 
Courts draw on the 
principles established by 
the English common law 
associated with the 
Companies Act 1948, but 
very little case law 
U 
Denmark No binding regulation The duties of care and 
loyalty may apply and 
prohibit the director from 
influencing the decision 
to exploit the opportunity 
L/U 
Finland No binding regulation According to the legal 
literature, the director is 
liable on the basis of the 
duty of care, which 
encompasses the duty of 
loyalty 
L/U 
France No binding regulation Directors of the société 
anonyme are generally 
allowed to run competing 
businesses; no corporate 
N/U 
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 Refers to the perceived high likelihood of liability (L), low likelihood of liability (N), or unclear legal situation (U). 
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opportunities doctrine. 
However, the case law is 
evolving and the courts 
may hold the director has 
breached the duty of 
loyalty. 
Germany Duty not to compete Violation both of the 
prohibition not to be 
managing director or 
member of the 
management board of 
another company and 
not to trade in the 
company’s line of 
business. But no liability 
if the supervisory board 
gives its consent. 
L 
Greece Duty not to compete If the director is involved 
in the management of 
Company A he is 
prohibited from acting for 
rival Company B 
L 
Hungary Duty not to compete Liability if similar line of 
business, unless 
permitted in the articles 
or the supreme body of 
the company gives its 
consent 
L 
Ireland Corporate 
opportunities doctrine 
It is likely that the 
director would be held 
liable for breach of the 
corporate opportunities 
doctrine following 
principles of English 
case law, but no Irish 
judgments on the issue. 
L 
Italy Both corporate 
opportunities doctrine 
and duty not to 
compete 
Violation of the duty not 
to compete with the 
company, which prohibits 
directors to be appointed 
as directors or general 
managers in competing 
companies unless 
authorised by the 
shareholders. In addition, 
violation of the corporate 
opportunities doctrine. 
L 
The Netherlands General provisions of 
ss. 2:8, 2:9 Civil Code 
and tort law apply 
The mere fact that a 
director competes, 
through his stake in 
L/U 
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another company, with 
the company he is 
serving as director in 
itself does not constitute 
an act of tort. Additional 
circumstances must be 
put forward by the 
claimant. 
Poland Duty not to compete Liability, unless the 
supervisory board gives 
its consent 
L 
Portugal Both corporate 
opportunities doctrine 
and duty not to 
compete 
Liability for performing 
functions in a competitor 
company, unless the 
general meeting (or, if 
the company has opted 
for the two-tier model 
with an executive board 
and a general and 
supervisory board) has 
given its consent; in 
addition, liability under 
the unwritten corporate 
opportunities doctrine for 
acquiring the asset. 
L 
Romania Duty not to compete The duty not to compete 
is only violated if the 
defendant is an 
executive director or 
member of the 
management board in 
the two-tier system and 
the board has not given 
its approval. Possibly the 
duty of confidentiality 
applies. 
U 
Slovenia Duty not to compete Both members of the 
management board and 
the supervisory board 
are under the duty not to 
be director in another 
company. In addition, A 
member of the 
management board may 
not pursue an activity 
with a view to profit in the 
area of the company’s 
activity without the 
consent of the 
supervisory board. 
L 
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Spain Both corporate 
opportunities doctrine 
and duty not to 
compete 
Violation of the 
prohibition of 
competition, unless the 
general meeting 
authorises the competing 
directorships. In addition, 
violation of the 
prohibition to take 
advantage of business 
opportunities (provided 
that the company has not 
ruled out the 
investment). 
L 
UK Corporate 
opportunities 
doctrine
182
 
Liability for appropriation 
of a corporate 
opportunity; in addition 
liability for serving on the 
board of a competing 
company, provided that 
this gives rise to a 
conflict of duties (which 
is likely, given that the 
companies operate in the 
same line of business) 
and that the dual 
appointment has not 
been authorised by the 
directors of both 
companies. 
L 
 
The answers to the stylized facts indicate that most jurisdictions of above subsample would hold the 
director liable in the case of an actual, not only potential, conflict of interest where the director 
acquires directly or indirectly an asset that is of economic interest to the company. In the majority of 
jurisdictions liability is based on two grounds: the fact that the director holds the position of managing 
director in a competing company and that he/she indirectly takes advantage of a corporate opportunity 
by arranging for the competitor company to acquire the asset in question. In this scenario, the result 
does not depend on the strategy employed by the jurisdiction: application of the corporate 
opportunities doctrine or the duty not to compete with the company. If the director had not acquired 
the asset through Company B, but merely performed his/her functions as executive director of B, the 
corporate opportunities doctrine would possibly not apply. In the absence of a statutory or contractual 
duty not to compete, the director would be free to serve on the boards of both companies. Thus, in 
theory, jurisdictions that employ only the corporate opportunities doctrine may not prohibit conduct 
potentially detrimental to the interests of the director’s company.
183
 In practice, however, it is unlikely 
that the corporate opportunities doctrine leads to regulatory loopholes. If the companies operate in the 
same line of business, they will inevitably encounter business opportunities attractive to both 
companies. In addition, in jurisdictions following the English common law, the corporate opportunities 
doctrine is embedded in the general no-conflict rule, which is flexible in its scope of application and 
                                                     
182
 The common law did not expressly prohibit competing directorships. The Companies Act 2006 is somewhat more explicit, 
but continues to frame the issue in conflict-of-interest terms, see s. 175(7). 
183
 This was indeed the position under early English common law, see London and Mashonaland Co Ltd v New Mashonaland 
Exploration Co Ltd [1891] WN 165. 
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may well be used by the courts to intervene and hold the director responsible where the companies 
engage in actual competition.
184
 
In a number of countries (Belgium, France, Romania, the Netherlands, and the Nordic countries) 
corporate opportunities are less comprehensively regulated than in the other jurisdictions of the above 
subsample. In Belgium and France, this is a result of the general indeterminacy of the law with respect 
to the duty of loyalty and the lack of case law dealing with corporate opportunities. Romanian law does 
not address the problem of corporate opportunities, and the section of the Companies Law providing 
for a prohibition of competition applies only to executive directors. In addition, the prohibition can be 
disapplied relatively easily by a resolution of the board of directors. The Netherlands and the Nordic 
countries also do not provide for statutory rules specifically tailored to the corporate opportunities or 
competition scenario, but the answers indicate that general principles of, for example, the duty of care 
or tort law, can be utilised (and have been utilised in practice in some cases) to arrive at suitable 
solutions to the conflict. 
We now vary the facts of the hypothetical. We assume that the director does not engage in a 
competitive activity as managing director or majority shareholder of a company active in the line of 
business of Company A, but that he/she acquires a business opportunity that would, in theory, be of 
economic interest to Company A for private purposes. We further assume that the board of Company 
A considers the business opportunity, but determines that the investment is not advisable at present 
because the company is experiencing financial difficulties.
185
 
 
Table 2.5.2.c: Acquisition of a corporate opportunity for private purposes 
Country Legal rule Liability Code
186
 
Austria Duty not to compete No liability if the 
company rejects the 
opportunity, and most 
likely also no liability if 
the company had not 
rejected the opportunity 
because the duty not to 
compete does not apply 
in the private sphere 
N 
Belgium No binding regulation No liability N 
Bulgaria Duty not to compete No liability N 
Czech Republic Duty not to compete No liability N 
Croatia Duty not to compete No liability N 
Cyprus Corporate 
opportunities doctrine 
Unclear, depends on the 
extent to which the 
Cypriot courts would 
draw on English common 
law associated with the 
Companies Act 1948. In 
any case, no liability if 
the fully informed board 
with the interested 
U 
                                                     
184
 More recent English judgments (predating the Companies Act 2006) can be understood in this way, see Bristol & West 
Building Society v Mothew [1998] Ch. 1; CMS Dolphin Ltd v Simonet [2002] B.C.C. 600. Some Irish cases also suggest this 
approach, see Spring Grove Services (Ireland) Ltd v O’Callaghan, High Court, unreported, Herbert J., July 31, 2000. 
185
 The information is based on the answers to Hypothetical IV, question 6, appended to the country reports. 
186
 Refers to the perceived high likelihood of liability (L), low likelihood of liability (N), or unclear legal situation (U). 
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director abstaining from 
voting gives its consent. 
Denmark No binding regulation Unclear, but probably no 
liability 
N/U 
Finland No binding regulation Unclear. If the 
company’s financial 
position is too weak to 
take advantage of the 
business opportunity 
there may be no 
damage. 
U 
France No binding regulation No liability N 
Germany Duty not to compete No statutory regulation of 
the issue; probably no 
liability if the opportunity 
is offered to the company 
and the company 
declines it. 
N 
Greece Duty not to compete No liability N 
Hungary Duty not to compete No liability N 
Ireland Corporate 
opportunities doctrine 
The director is free to 
exploit the opportunity, 
provided that appropriate 
disclosure has been 
made. The conflicted 
director must abstain 
from participating in the 
board’s decision. 
N 
Italy Both corporate 
opportunities doctrine 
and duty not to 
compete 
It is questionable 
whether the company 
must be able to take 
advantage of the 
opportunity. The 
prevailing view in the 
literature wants to hold 
directors responsible 
even if the company is 
not capable of exploiting 
the opportunity, but no 
case law. 
U 
Portugal Duty not to compete; 
corporate 
opportunities doctrine 
possibly in analogy to 
the statutory rules 
No liability if the board of 
directors decides not to 
pursue the opportunity. 
The conflicted director 
must abstain from 
participating in the 
board’s decision. 
N 
Romania Duty not to compete No liability N 
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Slovenia Duty not to compete No liability because the 
director does not pursue 
a competing activity for 
profit. In any case, the 
director can exploit the 
opportunity if the 
supervisory board gives 
its consent. 
N 
Spain Both corporate 
opportunities doctrine 
and duty not to 
compete 
If Company A is not 
interested in the 
investment the corporate 
opportunities doctrine 
does not apply. The 
conflicted director must 
abstain from participating 
in the board’s decision. 
N 
UK Corporate 
opportunities doctrine 
Corporate opportunities 
doctrine applies. The 
lack of financial capacity 
by the company to 
exploit the opportunity 
does not absolve the 
director from liability. The 
board may be able to 
authorise the director to 
exploit the opportunity,
187
 
but the conflicted 
director’s votes do not 
count. 
L 
 
The legal treatment of this scenario is markedly different from the hypothetical above. Three points are 
noteworthy. First, under such stylised facts the potential differences in outcome between the duty not 
to compete with the company and the corporate opportunities doctrine are more clearly visible than 
under the scenario discussed above in Table 2.5.2.b. In legal systems applying the duty not to 
compete, the director would not be held liable since competition is usually defined as entrepreneurial 
activity in the line of business of the company. Second, the answers also show that the corporate 
opportunities doctrine is not always wider than the duty not to compete, but that its scope depends on 
the precise formulation of the doctrine. The approach followed by the UK is the strictest. In Cyprus the 
legal situation is less clear, largely due to the lack of case law. Even though Irish law is influenced by 
English common law, the courts in Ireland apply more flexible rules and allow directors to exploit a 
business opportunity if the company has chosen not to pursue it. The civil law jurisdictions of the 
above sub-sample providing both for the duty not to compete and the corporate opportunities doctrine, 
(Italy and Spain) would come to the result that the director is free to take advantage of the opportunity 
if the company is not interested in the investment, or that the legal situation is unclear because the 
rules are not well developed. They therefore obscure the divide between the corporate opportunities 
doctrine and the duty not to compete. 
Third, the Member States do not hold the director liable where the company, through its board of 
directors or supervisory board, authorises the director to exploit the opportunity. A number of legal 
                                                     
187
 In the case of a public company, the articles of association must explicitly allow board authorisation. For private companies, 
the default rule is that the board can authorise conflicted transactions unless the articles provide otherwise, Companies Act 
2006, s. 175(5). 
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systems address the conflict of interest that this exception creates particularly in one-tier board 
systems by prohibiting the conflicted director from participating in the board’s decision. Such a rule 
may alleviate the conflict of interest to some extent, but it does not take account of the possibility that 
the conflicted director, especially if he/she is the chief executive officer or chairman of the board, 
wields significant influence over the other board members, which may call into question the objectivity 
of the board’s decision. This is the reason why English common law traditionally adopted a strict 
stance with regard to corporate opportunities. Financial incapacity of the company, as well as other 
(non-structural) impediments to exploiting the corporate opportunity, did not have the consequence of 
allowing the director to take advantage of the opportunity.
188
 Furthermore, authorisation by the board 
was not sufficient; only the shareholders could approve the transaction.
189
 The restrictive approach 
continues after the 2006 codification of the common law as far as the irrelevance of capability facts is 
concerned,
190
 but now board authorisation is permitted. In two-tier board systems this problem is 
attenuated, but arguably not non-existent, and the effectiveness of the authorisation mechanism 
depends on the ability of the supervisory board to function as an independent and objective control 
organ. 
The least specific rules can again be found in Belgium, France, Romania, and the Nordic countries. In 
France and Romania, the director is not required to procure board authorisation and, accordingly, 
rules requiring the abstention of the conflicted director in any board resolution deciding on the 
investment opportunity, do not apply. In Belgium, the interested director is not prohibited from 
participating in the deliberations and decision of the board, unless the company has issued securities 
to the public. As discussed above in the context of Table 2.5.2.b, the Nordic countries rely on general 
principles in regulating these issues, which makes it difficult to assess the case, but also gives the 
courts the flexibility to intervene where necessary. 
Resigning directors: The last issue to be discussed in this context is the treatment of resigning 
directors. The resignation may invite regulatory intervention if the director resigns for the purpose of 
establishing a competing business and he or she makes use of information, business contacts, or 
general skills and expertise acquired while serving on the board of the company. Often this issue will 
be addressed in the service contract with the director, which will contain a non-compete agreement 
imposing the obligation on the director not to compete with the company for a number of years. 
Outside the scope of the contractual solution, the law in many Member States is not settled. The 
difficulty is that the codified law often does not deal with the problem of resigning directors explicitly 
and case law is scarce. Again, the most elaborate rules can be found in the UK, where the courts 
have developed a test to distinguish between the ‘general fund of knowledge and experience’ that 
directors acquire in the course of their work and that they are ‘free to exploit … in a new position’,
191
 
and the exploitation of a specific or ‘ripe’ business opportunity that they came across while serving on 
the board (so-called maturing business opportunity), which leads to liability for breach of duty.
192
 While 
these principles are not spelled out in a similarly nuanced way in any of the other jurisdictions 
analysed, some legal systems have produced case law relying on the duty of loyalty to hold directors 
liable who set up a competing business and attract other employees of their former company to the 
new business (France,
193
 Portugal
194
) or who resign to exploit a business opportunity that was offered 
to the director’s company (Germany
195
). In other jurisdictions, it is argued by the literature that former 
                                                     
188
 For a discussion of the case law and the distinction between ‘structural impediments’ and practical inability’ see D. Kershaw, 
Company Law in Context (OUP, 2nd ed. 2012), pp. 514-575, in particular 552. 
189
 Davies and Worthington, n 169 above, para. 16-159. 
190
 Companies Act 2006, s. 175(2). 
191
 Island Export Finance Ltd v Umunna [1986] BCLC 460. 
192
 Now s. 170(2)(a) of the UK Companies Act 2006 provides that resigning directors continue ‘to be subject to the duty in 
section 175 (duty to avoid conflicts of interest) as regards the exploitation of any property, information or opportunity of which he 
became aware at a time when he was a director’. 
193
 CA Montpellier, 16 November 1999; Cass. Com. 12.02.2002: Rev. Sociétés 2002, p.702, L. Godon. 
194
 Court of Appeal of Lisbon, decision in action no. 242/2009-7 of 12 May 2009; confirmed by the Supreme Court of Justice in 
action no. 242/09.3YRLSB.S1 of 31 March 2011. 
195
 BGH WM 1985, 1443. In this case, the German Federal Court of Justice pointed out that the director’s violation of the duty of 
loyalty was twofold: First, he did not take advantage of the business opportunity for the benefit of the company, and second, he 
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directors can be held liable if their post-resignation behaviour is tainted by prior breaches of duty 
(Ireland) or if a causal link exists between the resignation and the intention to exploit a corporate 
opportunity (Italy). However, the law is characterised by a great degree of uncertainty and the general 
rule is that directors’ duties no longer apply after the director ceases to hold office. 
 
2.6 Nature of liability 
Summary of the country reports 
Table 2.6.a: Miscellaneous provisions on the nature of liabili ty of directors 
Country Liability of 
directors if 
board decision 
Joint/several/joint 
and several 
liability 
Showing of loss 
causation by 
whom? 
Special cases 
Austria Primarily 
members who 
vote in favour of 
the proposal are 
liable; outvoted 
members may be 
under an 
obligation to 
prevent the 
implementation of 
the decision, e.g. 
by calling a 
supervisory board 
meeting or 
informing the 
chairman 
Joint and several Claimant Burden of proof 
for loss and loss 
causation shifts to 
defendant for 
particular types of 
breach, usually 
involving a 
violation of the 
capital 
maintenance 
rules, s. 84(3) 
Belgium Art. 528 CC 
(liability for 
breaches of the 
CC and the 
articles): all 
members of the 
board are liable, 
unless (1) no 
fault; and (2) the 
director 
denounced the 
breach at the first 
general meeting 
or meeting of the 
board after 
becoming aware 
of the breach 
 
Joint and several if 
common fault; in 
solidum if 
concurrent fault
196
 
 
Claimant Presumption of 
loss causation if 
the director fails to 
call a general 
meeting within 
two months after it 
was established 
that the 
company’s net 
assets have fallen 
below half of the 
registered capital 
(Art. 633 CC) or 
the directors 
submits the 
company’s 
accounts late for 
approval to the 
general meeting 
(Art. 92 CC) 
and third parties 
suffer a loss  
                                                                                                                                                                     
caused a competitor to enter the market (by forming a new company after resignation to exploit the patent that was offered to 
him in his capacity as managing director of his former company). 
196
 Joint and several liability and liability in solidum are for most purposes identical. Both lead to full liability of all parties and the 
right of the creditor to choose from whom to demand payment. 
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Bulgaria A director who 
votes against a 
board resolution 
that gives rise to 
liability is not 
liable. A director 
who does not 
attend the board 
meeting in 
question or 
abstains from 
voting is required 
to try actively to 
prevent the 
breach of duty in 
order to escape 
liability. 
Joint and several, 
s. 240(2) 
Claimant - 
Croatia Liability of 
directors is judged 
individually 
Joint and several Claimant Burden of proof 
for loss and loss 
causation shifts to 
defendant for 
particular types of 
breach, usually 
involving a 
violation of the 
capital 
maintenance 
rules, s. 252(3) 
Cyprus Liability of 
directors is judged 
individually, but 
liability is 
collective if the 
directors 
unanimously 
resolve to adopt 
the relevant 
decision against 
the interests of 
the company; 
such collective 
liability may not 
apply to a director 
who expressly 
objects to the 
decision and 
takes the 
necessary steps 
to protect the 
company 
Joint and several Claimant - 
Czech Republic Liability of 
directors is judged 
individually 
Joint and several Claimant - 
Denmark No liability if the 
director does not 
participate in the 
board decision; 
Joint and several, 
s. 363(2) 
Claimant, but 
courts have 
reduced the 
requirements for 
- 
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but directors can 
be required to 
attempt to change 
a decision giving 
rise to a breach of 
duty; moreover, 
passivity does not 
discharge 
responsibility 
showing 
causation in case 
of gross breaches 
(leading case: 
incorrect stock 
market 
announcement) 
Estonia Only members 
who vote in favour 
of the proposal 
are liable 
Joint and several Claimant - 
Finland No liability if an 
individual director 
was actively 
against a 
particular 
resolution and did 
not act negligently 
or with intent; 
however, as the 
directors have an 
obligation to act, 
being passive and 
not taking part in 
board decisions 
does not 
exculpate the 
director from 
liability 
Joint and several Claimant - 
France French Supreme 
Court: each 
member of the 
board of directors 
who, by his action 
or abstention, 
participates in a 
wrongful decision 
of the board is 
liable unless it is 
established that 
he behaved as a 
cautious and 
careful director, 
notably by 
opposing such 
decision  
→ rebuttable 
presumption that 
the director is 
liable for the 
wrongful decision 
 
Joint and several Generally on the 
claimant since 
directors are only 
subject to a best 
effort obligation in 
the management 
of the company 
(obligations de 
moyens). 
However, this 
may be different 
in case of a 
breach of the 
company’s 
statutes or an 
infringement of 
legal or regulatory 
provisions. In 
these situations, 
directors enter 
into a commitment 
guaranteeing a 
certain result 
(obligation de 
résultat). 
Directors are 
liable to third 
parties in case of 
a faute séparable 
des fonctions, see 
above 2.3. 
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Germany Liability of 
directors is judged 
individually 
Joint and several Claimant Burden of proof 
for loss and loss 
causation shifts to 
defendant for 
particular types of 
breach, usually 
involving a 
violation of the 
capital 
maintenance 
rules, s. 93(3) 
Greece - Liability for 
management fault 
attaches to the 
individual director 
- But duty to 
monitor all 
decisions made 
by the board as a 
collective 
corporate organ 
as well as on an 
individual level by 
each director 
- Collective duty 
of all board 
members to 
ensure that the 
annual accounts 
are correct 
Joint and several - Loss causation 
must generally be 
shown by the 
claimant 
- In case of a 
breach of the duty 
of non-
competition, the 
mere conduct of 
the competitive 
action allows  the 
company  to bring 
an action against 
the director for 
damages (Art. 
914 Civil Code 
(general tort law 
provision) in 
conjunction with 
Art. 23 of 
L.2190/1920) 
-  
Hungary Any director who 
did not take part 
in the decision or 
voted against it is 
exempt from 
liability 
Joint and several Claimant - 
Ireland Liability of 
directors is judged 
individually 
Joint and several Claimant - 
Italy Liability is 
excluded if the 
director enters his 
dissenting opinion 
in the minutes and 
notifies in writing 
the chairman of 
the statutory 
board 
Joint and several Claimant - 
Latvia Liability of 
directors is judged 
individually (but 
voting  against a 
board decision 
does not 
Joint and several Claimant  
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automatically 
excuse the 
director) 
Lithuania The regular rules 
on joint and 
several liability 
apply to board 
decisions (see 
right) 
 
- Art. 6.279(1): 
Where several 
persons jointly take 
part in causing 
damage, they shall 
be jointly and 
severely liable for 
compensation  
- Art. 6.279(2): In 
order to determine 
the reciprocal 
claims of jointly 
and severally liable 
persons, the 
different degree of 
gravity of their 
respective fault 
shall be taken into 
consideration, 
except in cases 
when it is 
otherwise provided 
for by laws. 
 
Claimant - 
Luxembourg Distinguish 
between liability 
under Art. 59(1) 
(responsabilité 
contractuelle) and 
Art. 59(2) 
(responsabilité 
légale): in the 
former case, 
directors are only 
liable for 
individual 
wrongdoing, in the 
latter case fault is 
presumed and the 
director can only 
avoid liability 
under the 
following 
conditions: 
1) he/she was not 
personally 
involved in the 
breach; and 
2) has not 
committed any 
wrongdoing (the 
mere absence at 
a board meeting 
Joint and several 
in case of Art. 
59(2) Companies 
Act 
Claimant Directors are 
liable to third 
parties under Art. 
59(2) for breaches 
of the Companies 
Act or the articles 
of association 
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where such 
wrongdoing was 
authorised will not 
exonerate the 
director if the 
absence was not 
justified or was 
the result of the 
indifference of the 
director towards 
the company); 
and 
3) he/she reports 
the breach at the 
next general 
meeting 
Malta 1) Art. 147(1): 
where a particular 
duty has been 
entrusted to one 
or more of the 
directors, only 
such director or 
directors shall be 
liable in damages 
2) Art. 147(2): A 
director shall not 
be liable for the 
acts of his co-
directors if he 
proves either - 
a) that he did not 
know of the 
breach of duty 
before or at the 
time of its 
occurrence and 
that on becoming 
aware of it he 
dissented in 
writing; or 
b) that, knowing 
that the co-
directors intended 
to commit a 
breach of duty, he 
took all 
reasonable steps 
to prevent it 
NOTE: simply 
resigning is not 
sufficient to avoid 
liability in this 
case 
Joint and several, 
Art. 147(1) 
Claimant - 
Netherlands s. 2:9 Civil Code: 
If a matter 
Joint and several Claimant - 
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belongs to the 
field of work of 
two or more 
directors, then 
each of them is 
liable for the full 
consequences of 
a failure in 
performance, 
unless he is not to 
blame for this 
failure and he has 
not been 
negligent in taking 
measures to avert 
the consequences 
thereof 
Example: a 
director was on 
holiday when the 
improper 
performance 
occurred and tried 
to mitigate the 
consequences 
after his return 
Poland Liability of 
directors is judged 
individually 
Joint and several, 
Art. 485 
Claimant - 
Portugal Directors are not 
liable when the 
losses arise from 
a decision of the 
management 
body and they did 
not participate in 
the decision 
because they 
were neither 
present nor 
represented or, 
although present, 
they were 
prevented from 
voting or were 
outvoted; an 
express vote 
against the 
decision is 
required (Art. 
72(3)) 
Joint and several, 
Arts. 72(4), 73(1) 
Claimant - 
Romania The director can 
defend himself by 
recording his 
opposition to a 
business decision 
in writing and 
Directors are jointly 
liable for meeting 
all obligations 
prescribed by the 
law and the articles 
of association, Art. 
Claimant - 
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informing the 
auditors about it 
73 Companies Act 
Slovakia - Literature: The 
dissenting vote of 
a director at the 
board meeting as 
such does not 
relieve him/her of 
liability, if the 
board collectively 
proceeds with the 
action that gives 
rise to the liability 
Joint and several, 
s. 194(6) 
Claimant - 
Slovenia Liability of 
directors is judged 
individually 
Joint and several, 
Art. 263(2) 
Claimant - 
Spain s. 237: all 
members of the 
governing body 
adopting the 
detrimental 
decision are 
liable, unless they 
prove that having 
taken no part in its 
adoption or 
implementation, 
they were 
unaware of its 
existence or, if 
aware, took all 
reasonable 
measures to 
prevent the 
damage or at 
least voiced their 
objection thereto 
(note: this does 
not lead to a shift 
in the burden of 
proof) 
Joint and several, 
s. 237 
Claimant - 
Sweden No liability if an 
individual director 
has made 
reservations 
against a decision 
by having his 
opinion recorded 
in the board 
minutes. 
However, the 
director will be 
liable if he 
subsequently 
participates in the 
implementation of 
the decision. 
Joint and several, 
Ch. 29, § 6 
Claimant - 
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Moreover, if the 
member 
participated in 
making decisions 
of a more general 
character at some 
earlier stage, 
he/she will 
unlikely avoid 
liability if the 
board makes 
more concrete 
decisions in his 
absence. Further, 
repeated absence 
from board 
meetings may 
mean that the 
director has 
neglected his 
monitoring duty 
and that he may 
be held liable for 
the loss suffered 
by the company 
United Kingdom Liability only 
attaches to those 
directors who are 
in breach of their 
duties 
Joint and several Claimant Breach of duty of 
loyalty: the 
director is 
considered to be 
a constructive 
trustee of the 
profits obtained 
 
Discussion 
The board of directors is a collegiate body,
197
 but liability is in all Member States personal; it does not 
attach to the board as a corporate organ (which does not have legal personality), but to the individual 
director. This gives rise to the question how collegiate decisions that constitute a breach of duty 
translate into liability of the directors who participated in the decision by voting in favour of or against 
it, and directors who were absent but were later involved in the implementation of the decision or 
could have prevented its implementation. These questions have not been addressed in all Member 
States. In particular in those jurisdictions where case law on directors’ duties is rare it may not always 
be clear which steps a board member should take in order to exculpate himself. In general, however, 
the principles developed by the legal systems that have dealt with this question show a high degree of 
coherence. 
As a general rule, where the concurrent acts of several parties cause damage, the parties are jointly 
and severally liable to the injured person.
198
 The concept of joint and several liability is applied in all 
Member States to the liability of directors for board resolutions (or other concurrent acts by more than 
one director) that violate directors’ duties. The consequence is that the claimant (the company, 
shareholders, or third parties where personal right are infringed
199
) can claim compensation for the 
whole amount of the loss from any one of the directors, or various amounts from any and all of the 
                                                     
197
 The same consideration applies to the management and supervisory boards in two-tier systems. 
198
 The definition of joint and several liability differs in the Member States, but for purposes of directors’ liability these differences 
are not relevant. 
199
 See 2.2.2. above. 
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directors. Internally the directors may then take recourse against each other on the basis of their 
proportionate fault.
200
 
For board resolutions we can derive the following principles from the case law, disregarding the 
(limited) variations that may exist in the Member States.  
First, directors who vote in favour of resolutions in violation of directors’ duties are jointly and severally 
liable if they have acted with fault. As far as liability for negligent misconduct is concerned, this means 
that the assessment has to proceed on an individual level, since the applicable standard of care is 
defined in all Member States in consideration of circumstances that relate to the individual director.
201
 
However, some jurisdictions use the fact that the director has participated in a board decision as a rule 
allocating the burden of proof. Following a recent judgment by the French Supreme Court,
202
 French 
law holds that once it is established that the resolution by the board constitutes a breach of duty (for 
which the claimant bears the burden of proof), the burden shifts to the director, who is required to 
show that ‘he behaved as a cautious and careful director, notably by opposing the decision’.
203
 
Luxembourg,
204
 Maltese,
205
 and Dutch
206
 and Spanish law
207
 contain similar burden of proof rules. 
Second, directors who vote against resolutions in violation of directors’ duties are in principle not 
liable. However, several jurisdictions provide that voting against the resolution alone is not sufficient to 
exonerate the director. Rather, the director must have attempted to change the decision, have his or 
her objection recorded in the minutes, and may need to inform the auditor of the resolution. 
Furthermore, liability may arise if the board proceeds with the implementation of the decision and the 
director does not take reasonable steps to prevent the implementation. 
Third, the director may even face liability if he or she was absent while the board resolved to take the 
challenged decision. According to the decision of the French Supreme Court mentioned above,
208
 the 
rebuttable presumption of liability for the wrongful board resolution applies irrespective of the director’s 
presence or absence. Another ground for liability may be the director’s failure to attend the board 
meeting as such. In several Member States, it was emphasised that the directors have an obligation to 
participate in the decision-making by the board and that repeated absence may amount to negligence 
with regard to the director’s monitoring duty.
209
 
While these principles are not equally well developed in all Member States, we have not identified any 
approaches clearly in contradiction of them. The most significant variation in the Member States 
seems to be the procedural function that joint and several liability assumes in Luxembourg, Malta, the 
Netherlands, and Spain. This is in particular relevant for jurisdictions where the burden of proof is 
normally with the plaintiff.
210
 
 
                                                     
200
 This is expressly provided for by Lithuanian law, see Art. 6.279(2) Civil Code, but constitutes a general principle underlying 
the law of joint and several liability in all Member States. 
201
 This holds also for jurisdictions that define the standard of care in a largely objective way. Individual elements such as the 
function and position of the director in the company or the director’s experience and knowledge will always play a role in the 
evaluation of the case. For more details see the discussion above 2.4.2 ‘Variations in the standard of care and delegation’. 
202
 Cass. Com. 30.03.2010 n°08-17.841, FP-P+B+R+I, n° 08-17.841, Fonds de garantie des dépôts (FGD) c/ Sté Caribéenne 
de conseil et d'audit: P. Le Cannu: RJDA 7/10 n°760. Revue des sociétés 2010 p. 304. 
203
 For a more detailed discussion of this decision see the French Country Report, p. A 365. Luxembourg law contains a similar 
provision for so-called responsabilité légale, see the Luxembourg Country Report, p. A 672. 
204
 In Luxembourg, the burden of proof shifts to the director in case of the so-called responsabilité légale, see the Luxembourg 
Country Report, p. A 672. 
205
 Maltese Companies Act, Art. 147(2). See the Maltese Country Report, p. A 719. 
206
 Dutch Civil Code, Art. 2:9. 
207
 Spanish Corporate Enterprises Act, Art. 237. 
208
 See n 202. 
209
 For example, Finland and Sweden. 
210
 See above 2.4.2 ‘Burden of proof’. 
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2.7 Limitation of liability 
Summary of the country reports 
Table 2.7.a: Possibilities to limit directors’ liability  
Country Exclusion in 
articles 
Ex ante 
authorisation by 
shareholder 
Ex post 
ratification by 
shareholders or 
waiver 
Indemnification 
in third party 
lawsuits or for 
costs of 
proceedings and 
D&O insurance 
Austria Not permissible - Directors are not 
liable if they were 
acting in 
accordance with a 
lawful resolution 
of the general 
meeting, s. 84(4) 
AktG 
NOTE: this does 
not affect the 
creditors’ ability to 
enforce the 
company’s claims 
against the 
director 
- Approval by the 
supervisory board 
does not 
exonerate the 
directors 
Waiver and 
settlement may be 
declared five 
years after the 
claim came into 
existence, 
provided that no 
minority of at least 
20% registers an 
objection, s. 84(4). 
In waiving the 
claims or entering 
into the 
settlement, the 
company is 
represented by 
the supervisory 
board; the GM 
must give its 
consent. The five 
year restriction 
does not apply if 
all of the 
shareholders give 
their consent. 
NOTE: waiver or 
settlement are not 
effective with 
respect to 
creditors and in 
bankruptcy. 
D&O insurance is 
available; 
coverage 
excluded for 
intentional 
misconduct and 
often also for 
gross negligence 
Belgium The validity of 
such clauses is 
disputed, since 
the law on liability 
of directors is 
mandatory law. In 
any case, such a 
clause cannot be 
relied on against 
third parties. 
Some case law 
holds that 
directors are not 
liable when 
merely executing 
general meeting 
decisions. 
However, this 
does not free 
them from having 
to comply with the 
Companies Code 
and the articles of 
association and 
Permissible, the 
conflicted director 
can vote as 
shareholder. 
However, the 
waiver does not 
affect the rights of 
third parties or the 
right of minority 
shareholders who 
do not approve 
the ratification to 
bring a derivative 
claim. 
- Indemnification 
permissible 
- D&O insurance 
is available and 
becoming more 
common 
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does not 
constitute a 
ratification of other 
managerial errors. 
Bulgaria 1) Duty of care: 
exclusion for 
intentional 
conduct and gross 
negligence not 
permissible 
2) duty of non-
competition, s. 
237(4): can be 
excluded in the 
articles 
3) duty of 
confidentiality, s. 
237(5), and duty 
to disclose to the 
company facts 
which may be 
relevant to the 
activity as 
directors, s. 
237(3): 
mandatory; 
exemption in the 
articles not 
permissible 
The corporate 
organ responsible 
for appointing 
directors can 
exempt some or 
all of the board 
members from the 
duty of non-
competition for 
specific 
transactions, for 
participation in 
specific 
companies, for 
certain periods, or 
generally 
s. 221, no. 10: the 
directors may only 
be released from 
liability by the GM; 
according to 
common practice, 
this happens at 
the annual 
general meeting. 
The director in 
question can vote 
if he is also a 
shareholder. 
D&O insurance 
available but not 
common 
Croatia Not permissible Permissible, 
directors not liable 
if their actions 
were based on a 
resolution by GM; 
the conflicted 
director cannot 
vote as 
shareholder 
1) Ratification not 
possible 
2) Waiver: 
permissible 
a) after 3 years; 
b) GM gives its 
consent; and 
c) no objection 
from 10% minority 
shareholder 
The waiver is not 
valid to third 
parties, in 
particular the 
creditors 
- Indemnification 
possible under 
some conditions 
- D&O insurance 
available but not 
common 
Cyprus Not permissible No general power 
of shareholders to 
exempt a director 
from liability for 
breach of duty 
The general 
meeting may 
accept 
agreements that 
are voidable 
pursuant to s. 191 
(self-dealing); but 
no general power 
of shareholders to 
exempt a director 
from liability for 
- The company 
may indemnify 
directors against 
the costs incurred 
in legal 
proceedings in 
which judgment is 
given in the 
director’s favour 
or the director is 
 
 
 
 
174 Directors’ Duties and Liability in the EU  
 
breach of duty acquitted 
- D&O insurance 
available but not 
common 
Czech Republic Not permissible, s. 
194(5) 
Commercial Code 
Directors are not 
liable for damage 
caused by their 
execution of a 
specific instruction 
of the general 
meeting, unless 
such instruction is 
illegal, s. 194(5) 
No explicit 
provision; not 
permissible 
 
D&O insurance 
available 
Denmark Not permissible 
 
Not permissible - The GM can 
grant a discharge 
or waive liability 
with simple 
majority; the 
waiver is binding 
on the company if 
the information 
received by the 
GM was 
essentially correct 
and complete, s. 
364(2) 
- If 10% minority 
shareholders 
oppose waiver, 
any shareholder 
can commence 
legal proceedings 
to recover 
damages for the 
company, s. 
364(3) 
- If the company is 
declared 
bankrupt, the 
waiver is no 
longer binding, 
provided that the 
bankruptcy 
petition is not 
presented later 
than 24 months 
after the waiver, s. 
364(4) 
D&O insurance 
available, but not 
common in small 
and medium-sized 
enterprises; even 
in large listed 
companies 
directors are not 
always covered by 
D&O insurance 
Estonia Restriction of 
liability to, for 
example, gross 
negligence in the 
articles is 
permissible (but 
not valid in 
relation to third 
Breaches of the 
duty of care: the 
director is 
exculpated if he 
acts on the basis 
of a lawful 
resolution by the 
general meeting 
Waiver valid if: 
- resolution of the 
supervisory board 
- all significant 
circumstances 
about the breach 
of duty were 
D&O insurance is 
available, but not 
widely used due 
to the high 
insurance 
premium (except 
in international 
group companies)  
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parties or the 
liquidator); in 
addition, limitation 
or waiver of 
liability for 
intentional breach 
of duty is not valid 
or the supervisory 
board 
disclosed and 
known to the 
supervisory board 
- explicit waiver 
with regard to a 
specific breach of 
duty 
BUT: creditors 
and the liquidator 
can enforce the 
claim in spite of 
the waiver 
Finland - Possible, except 
for deliberate 
actions and gross 
negligence (Ch. 
22, s. 9(1)). 
Exclusion applies 
only to liability 
against the 
company, not 
shareholders and 
third parties. 
- The right of the 
company to 
damages may 
otherwise only be 
restricted by the 
articles of 
association with 
the consent of all 
shareholders (Ch. 
22, s. 9(2)) 
Unanimity of the 
shareholders 
required. 
The annual 
general meeting 
decides on a 
discharge of the 
board of directors, 
which constitutes 
a waiver of the 
company’s claims, 
provided that the 
information given 
to the AGM was 
materially correct 
and sufficient (Ch. 
22, s. 6(2)). The 
director in 
question must 
abstain from 
voting as a 
shareholder. 
The discharge is 
not binding in 
bankruptcy and 
the administrator 
can file a suit if 
the proceedings 
have started 
within two years 
from the director’s 
action. 
D&O insurance 
available and 
fairly common, 
especially in listed 
companies, but 
also in a number 
of private 
companies 
France Not permissible, 
Art. L.225-253 
Commercial Code 
(for public 
companies) 
Not permissible, 
Art. L.225-253 
Commercial Code 
(for public 
companies) 
Not permissible, 
Art. L.225-253 
Commercial Code 
(for public 
companies) 
D&O insurance 
available and 
common in listed 
companies; 
infrequently used 
in non-listed 
companies 
Germany Not permissible Exculpates 
directors for 
breaches of the 
duty of care, s. 
93(4). As regards 
self-dealing and 
the duty not to 
compete with the 
1) Waiver: s. 93(4)  
- requires a 
resolution of the 
general meeting 
not later than 
three years after 
the claim came 
D&O insurance 
available and 
common in the 
public stock 
corporation (AG); 
mandatory 
retention of 10%, 
s. 93(2) sentence 
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company, the 
supervisory board 
can give ex ante 
authorisation 
into existence, 
and no objection 
by 10% minority 
shareholder 
- the waiver is not 
valid in relation to 
creditors, s. 93(5) 
2) ex post 
approval of 
competitive 
conduct (s. 88) by 
the supervisory 
board is not 
permissible 
3 
Greece Not permissible 
 
No liability if the 
director’s action 
was based on a 
lawful resolution 
of the GM, Art. 
22a(2) 
Waiver: possible 
pursuant to Arts. 
22a(4), 35, but not 
earlier than two 
years after the 
claim was 
established; the 
GM must consent 
and there should 
be no objections 
from minority 
shareholders 
representing 20% 
of the capital 
D&O insurance 
available, but not 
common 
Hungary Under principles 
of agency law, 
liability can be 
excluded, except 
for intent, gross 
negligence, or 
criminal 
behaviour. In 
addition, the 
director’s salary 
must be reduced 
proportionally. 
In single-member 
companies 
directors may be 
instructed in a 
written form by the 
shareholder; if the 
director acts 
according to such 
instructions, 
he/she is not 
liable. In other 
companies, 
directors are 
bound by the 
decisions of the 
GM and are 
supposed to act in 
compliance with 
them. Thus, a 
majority vote in 
GM can have the 
effect of ex-ante 
authorisation. 
The general 
meeting decides 
on a discharge of 
the board of 
directors, which 
constitutes a 
waiver of the 
company’s claims, 
provided that the 
information given 
to the GM was 
correct and 
sufficient. 
D&O insurance 
available, but not 
common 
Ireland Companies Act 
1963, s. 200(1): 
any provision in 
the company’s 
articles of 
- Shareholders 
can authorise 
conduct which 
would otherwise 
be a breach of 
- Shareholders 
can ratify a breach 
- No conclusive 
judicial statement 
on the question of 
- It is permissible 
for a company to 
indemnify a 
director against 
the costs in 
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association or any 
contractual 
provision which 
exempts a director 
or indemnifies 
him/her against 
liability “in respect 
of any negligence, 
default, breach of 
duty or breach of 
trust” is void 
duty 
- No conclusive 
judicial statement 
on the question of 
whether the 
conflicted director 
can vote; these 
matters are 
usually settled at 
board level. The 
conflicted director 
is entitled to vote 
in such cases 
whether the 
conflicted director 
can vote 
relation to 
proceedings 
which were 
successfully 
defended or in 
relation to a 
successful 
application for 
relief under s.391, 
see Companies 
Act 1963, s. 
200(b) 
- D&O insurance 
available, but not 
common, except 
in large listed 
companies 
Italy Possibly 
permissible for 
breaches of 
negligible 
importance (colpa 
lieve) 
No rules in the 
Civil Code, but the 
provisions on ex 
post resolution 
may apply by 
analogy 
Waiver: by 
ordinary resolution 
of the GM, 
provided that 
there are no 
objections from 
minority 
shareholders 
representing 20% 
of the capital 
D&O insurance 
available and 
common in large 
companies; rarely 
used in small and 
medium-sized 
enterprises 
Latvia Not permissible 1) No liability if the 
director acted 
bona fide 
according to a 
lawful decision of 
the general 
meeting (i.e. the 
resolution must 
have been legal 
and within the 
powers of the GM) 
2) Supervisory 
board approval 
not sufficient 
The GM may 
release directors 
from liability for 
specific actions 
after disclosure of 
such actions to 
the GM. 
NOTE: The 
release does not 
limit the right of 
minority 
shareholders to 
bring a derivative 
action or the rights 
of the creditors 
and administrator 
in insolvency 
proceedings 
D&O insurance 
available, but not 
common 
Lithuania Permissible, 
except for 
intentional fault or 
gross negligence, 
Civil Code, Art. 
6.252 
- Art. 34(5) of the 
Law on 
Companies: The 
articles of 
association may 
provide that the 
board must obtain 
the approval of 
the general 
meeting of 
shareholders 
Supreme Court: 
ratification by the 
shareholders does 
not exclude or 
limit the directors’ 
liability 
D&O insurance 
available, but not 
common 
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before adopting 
the decisions 
referred to in 
subparagraphs 3, 
4, 5 and 6 of 
paragraph 4. The 
approval of the 
GM shall not 
release the board 
from responsibility 
for the decisions 
adopted. 
- Generally, 
ratification by 
shareholders 
(even if ex ante) 
does not limit the 
responsibility of 
directors (as to 
any fiduciary duty) 
Luxembourg Permissible in the 
articles of 
association or in 
particular 
agreements 
between the 
director and the 
company. Some 
limits apply 
(voluntarily 
agreed, without 
fraud, not 
prohibited by a 
particular legal 
provision, legal 
principles, or to 
protect creditors 
or the general 
interest) 
There is no case 
law as to whether 
a director could be 
allowed ex ante 
by the 
shareholders to 
take a particular 
action and be 
absolved of 
liability. Belgian 
case law should 
be applied here 
and holds that 
such a vote would 
be effective. 
- Discharge by the 
GM has the 
consequence that 
the company 
waives its right to 
enforce claims 
against the 
directors for 
management 
errors (provided 
the director did 
not act 
intentionally); this 
applies to liability 
under Art. 59(1) 
as well as 59(2) 
- In relation to 
third parties, the 
discharge has no 
effect 
- Indemnification 
permissible, 
except for 
intentional fault, 
gross negligence, 
or criminal liability 
- D&O insurance 
is available and 
has become very 
common 
Malta Not permissible, 
Art. 148(1) 
The shareholders 
can authorise 
related party 
transactions and 
allow the director 
to compete with 
the company 
Shareholders can 
release a director 
from liability for a 
fully disclosed 
breach of duty 
- Indemnification 
not permissible, 
Art. 148(1), with 
the exception of 
indemnity against 
liability incurred by 
the director in 
defending any 
proceedings in 
which judgment is 
given in his/her 
favour or in which 
he/she is 
acquitted 
- D&O insurance 
available, but not 
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common 
Netherlands Exclusion of 
liability in the 
articles is contrary 
to binding law (s. 
2:9) and 
accordingly void 
pursuant to s. 
3:40 
Ex ante exclusion 
of liability for 
serious 
mismanagement 
is not permissible 
Discharge by the 
GM is valid if 
based on correct 
information in the 
annual accounts; 
furthermore, a 
discharge does 
not prevent 
individual 
shareholders from 
instituting 
proceedings 
D&O insurance 
available and very 
common, also for 
mid-sized 
companies; 
usually combined 
with a clause 
providing for  
indemnification by 
the company 
Poland Not permissible 
 
1) Duty of non-
competition, Art. 
380: consent can 
be given ex ante 
by the supervisory 
board 
2) Duty of care: 
acting on the 
basis of a 
resolution by the 
GM does not 
exclude liability, 
because the GM 
cannot give the 
board binding 
instructions with 
respect to the 
management of 
the affairs of the 
company 
1) Duty of non-
competition, Art. 
380: the consent 
of the supervisory 
board (see left) 
may also be given 
after the duty has 
been breached 
2) Other duties: 
a) The company 
and the director 
may enter into an 
agreement 
releasing the 
director from 
liability, Art. 508 
Civil Code 
b) Settlement is 
possible: the 
company is 
represented by 
the supervisory 
board, the GM 
must give its 
consent (Art. 
395(3), discharge 
of duties) 
c) The GM can 
issue a resolution 
releasing the 
director from 
liability, provided 
that the GM was 
fully informed 
NOTE: waiver or 
discharge by the 
GM cannot be 
used as a defence 
in a derivative 
action or in 
bankruptcy, Art. 
487 
- Generally 
permissible, but 
not often 
concluded in 
practice 
(insurance is 
preferred) 
- D&O insurance 
available and 
fairly common in 
larger companies, 
but not so much in 
small and 
medium-sized 
enterprises 
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3) Directors as 
shareholders shall 
not participate in a 
resolution 
regarding their 
liability, Art. 413 
Portugal - Not permissible, 
Art. 74(1) 
- Some 
commentators 
argue that it is 
possible to 
exclude directors’ 
liability for 
negligence; only 
gross negligence 
or intent could not 
be excluded 
No liability if the 
act is based on a 
resolution by the 
shareholders, Art. 
72(5). According 
to the legal 
literature, the 
provision has to 
be interpreted 
restrictively. 
Decisions based 
on false 
information do not 
exculpate the 
directors. If the 
decision is 
voidable and the 
directors 
understand that 
the potential loss 
of carrying out the 
resolution is 
relevant, they may 
be liable if they 
execute it. 
- Art. 74(2): waiver 
is only possible by 
express resolution 
of the 
shareholders and 
no objection by a 
minority of at least 
10%; the 
conflicted director 
must abstain from 
voting as 
shareholder 
- Art. 74(3): The 
resolution adopted 
by the general 
meeting to 
approve the 
accounts shall not 
imply a waiver of 
the company’s 
claims, unless the 
facts that 
establish the 
liability were 
specifically made 
known to the 
shareholders and 
no 10% minority 
objects 
- In principle, the 
general prohibition 
of provisions 
exempting or 
limiting the 
directors’ liability 
also extends to 
any indemnity 
arrangements, i.e. 
provisions of the 
articles of 
association by 
which, directly or 
indirectly, the 
company 
assumes the 
financial costs of 
the liability of its 
own directors 
- D&O insurance 
available and 
relatively common 
Romania Permissible, 
except for 
violations of the 
duty to act in 
good-faith and for 
intentional 
misconduct or 
gross negligence 
- It is unclear 
whether the 
shareholders can 
authorise a 
related-party 
transaction. It may 
be argued that a 
transaction that is 
contrary to the 
company’s 
interests is void 
and can neither 
be authorised nor 
ratified. In any 
case, the 
conflicted director 
cannot vote on 
such a resolution 
(Art. 127). 
- Other ex ante 
authorisations of 
breaches of the 
Ratification of the 
duty of care is 
permissible as 
long as long as 
the breach is 
generated by 
culpa levis only; 
no ratification of 
breaches of the 
duty of loyalty 
- The articles of 
incorporation or 
the agreement 
with the director 
may provide that 
the company shall 
indemnify the 
director for the 
costs of defending 
against a liability 
claim. 
- D&O insurance 
is available and 
mandatory for 
joint stock 
companies 
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duty of loyalty can 
presumably not be 
authorised 
Slovakia Not permissible, 
Art. 194(8) 
- s. 194(7): 
directors are not 
liable for any 
damage caused 
by their conduct in 
executing a 
decision of the 
general meeting. 
However, s. 
194(7) does not 
apply if the 
general meeting’s 
decision is 
contrary to the law 
or the articles of 
association. 
- Approval by the 
supervisory board 
does not relieve 
the directors of 
liability 
- The company 
may waive claims 
for damages 
against directors, 
or may enter into 
a settlement 
agreement with 
the directors, only 
after three years 
from the 
establishment of 
such claims, 
provided that the 
GM gives its 
consent and no 
minority of at least 
5% records a 
protest against 
such decision in 
the minutes at the 
general meeting 
- The waiver or 
settlement is not 
valid in relation to 
creditors 
- Indemnification 
probably not 
permissible, but 
no regulation in 
the statute and no 
case law 
- D&O insurance 
available, but not 
common, except 
for large listed 
companies 
Slovenia Literature: rules 
on liability are 
mandatory and 
cannot be 
modified to the 
advantage of the 
director in the 
articles of 
association 
Art. 263(3): 
directors are not 
liable if the act 
that caused the 
damage was 
based on a lawful 
resolution of the 
GM. Approval by 
the management 
or supervisory 
board does not 
exculpate the 
directors. 
Art. 263(3): waiver 
is permissible 
three years after 
the claim came 
into existence if 
the GM gives its 
consent and no 
minority of at least 
10% objects in 
writing 
- Indemnification 
not permissible 
- D&O insurance 
available, but not 
common 
Spain Not permissible Not permissible, s. 
236(2) 
Ratification not 
permissible, s. 
236(2), but waiver 
is possible (if not 
opposed by 5% 
minority 
shareholders), s. 
238 
- Indemnification 
not permissible 
- D&O insurance 
available and 
common in large 
companies 
Sweden Not permissible No liability if the 
director acts on 
the basis of an 
instruction by the 
GM 
Discharge may be 
granted or a 
settlement 
entered into by 
the general 
meeting, provided 
that the owners of 
- The company 
can indemnify 
directors for 
damages to third 
parties 
- D&O insurance 
available and 
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not less than 10% 
of all shares in the 
company do not 
vote against the 
proposal, Ch. 29, 
§§ 7, 8 
fairly common 
 
United Kingdom Not permissible, s. 
232(1) 
Permissible, s. 
180(4)(a); the 
conflicted director 
can vote as 
shareholder 
Permissible, s. 
239; the conflicted 
director cannot 
vote as 
shareholder 
- Indemnification 
not permissible, s. 
232(2), unless 
provision is made 
for indemnity 
against liability 
incurred by the 
director to a 
person other than 
the company and 
it does not provide 
indemnity against 
criminal or 
administrative 
sanction (s. 234) 
- D&O insurance 
available and 
common 
 
Discussion 
We can identify five methods to limit or exclude the liability of directors for breach of duty in the 
Member States: Exclusion of liability in the articles; ex ante authorisation of certain types of conduct 
by the shareholders, i.e. before the conduct that gives rise to liability occurs; ex post ratification of 
breaches of duty or waiver of the company’s claim; indemnification of the director against liability 
incurred not to the company, but to a third party, or against the costs of third party lawsuits; and 
directors and officers liability insurance (D&O insurance). We will give a brief overview of the trends in 
the Member States for each method in turn. 
Exclusion of liability in the articles. As far as the exclusion of liability for breach of directors’ duties in 
the articles of association is concerned, the common denominator in the Member States is as follows: 
Liability cannot be excluded for intentional conduct and gross negligence, and limitations in the articles 
are not effective in relation to third parties. Even though it is not always explicitly stated, it can be 
assumed that shareholders qualify as third parties where they do not enforce claims of the company, 
but personal rights.
211
 Many Member States are stricter and consider the liability provisions to be 
binding law, with the consequence that articles (or contractually agreed clauses) limiting a director’s 
liability or providing for indemnification are void. In Belgium and Luxembourg the approach is generally 
more flexible than in other Member States, but the precise rules are controversial. It is acknowledged 
that exclusion cannot go so far as to limit liability for fraudulent behaviour, to the detriment of third 
parties, or in violation of the corporate interest. Some commentators argue that exclusion clauses 
should be valid within these limits; others submit that the rules on directors’ liability are binding and not 
subject to private ordering. 
Ex ante authorisation. In order to assess the legitimacy and effects of ex ante authorisation of 
directors’ conduct by the shareholders in general meeting or by the board of directors (supervisory 
board in two-tier systems), it is necessary to distinguish between behaviour falling within the scope of 
the duty of care on the one hand and the duty of loyalty on the other hand. As regards the former, the 
                                                     
211
 See 2.2.2. for the distinction between individual shareholder rights and claims of the company. 
 
 
 
 
183 Directors’ Duties and Liability in the EU  
 
majority of Member States provide that directors are not liable if their conduct was based on a lawful 
decision by the general meeting.
212
 In some Member States, it is specified that authorisation does not 
affect the creditors’ right to enforce the company’s claims against the directors.
213
 We do not find such 
a rule in all Member States that allow for ex ante authorisation by the general meeting,
214
 indicating 
that some gaps may exist with respect to creditor protection. 
As far as the duty of loyalty is concerned, it is the view in most jurisdictions that ex ante authorisation 
must follow the procedures that the law sets out for the different scenarios analysed here under the 
rubric of the duty of loyalty.
215
 For example, if directors can only enter into related party transactions, 
exploit a corporate opportunity, or compete with the company if the general meeting or the board of 
directors (supervisory board) give their consent, then liability of the director cannot be avoided by 
authorisation (or ratification) of the director’s acts outside these procedures. In other words, the 
procedures regulating conflict of interest situations are generally seen as binding. This has traditionally 
been different in the common law jurisdictions, which is a function of the notion that corporate power 
originates from the shareholders and the articles of association are akin to a contract.
216
 
Consequently, the shareholders enjoyed contractual freedom to allow or disallow conflicted 
transactions as they saw fit. These rules are in principle still effective, but where codification of 
conflicted interest transactions has taken place,
217
 the statutory procedures have to be followed unless 
the common law is preserved. Whether, and to what extent, this is the case is not always clearly 
expressed, which may give rise to legal uncertainty.
218
 
Ex post ratification or waiver. A majority of Member States allow for ex post ratification of breaches of 
duty or the waiver of existing damages claims of the company under certain conditions. The most 
elaborate such mechanism would consist of the following elements: (1) The waiver or discharge must 
be based on a valid resolution of the general meeting; (2) the general meeting must have been fully 
and correctly informed; (3) the waiver or discharge cannot be declared earlier than a number of years 
after the company’s claim has come into existence (typically three and up to five);
219
 (4) minority 
shareholders holding a specified percentage of the share capital, which may be as low as 5%
220
 and 
as high as 20%,
221
 do not object; and (5) the waiver has no effect in relation to shareholders bringing a 
derivative action, creditors enforcing the company’s claims, or in bankruptcy. The actual regulation in 
the Member States is fairly heterogeneous; no legal system contains all of these elements, and some 
legal systems follow an entirely different strategy. A typical provision in between these extremes would 
allow the general meeting to waive the company’s claim after three years if it is fully informed, no 
minority holding at least 10% of the share capital registers an objection, and stipulate that the waiver 
is not valid in the company’s insolvency.
222
 Arguably, the last point is essential in order to avoid gaps 
with regard to creditor protection. 
The common law jurisdictions employ a different approach. Conceptually, the respective rules are not 
concerned with a waiver or discharge by the company, but with ratification by the shareholders as part 
of the shareholders’ ultimate authority to decide on company affairs. Consequently, the rules do not 
contain above provisos regarding minority shareholder or creditor protection.
223
 Deviations from the 
basic principle of decision-making by majority voting, if any, deal with the disqualification of the votes 
                                                     
212
 Supervisory board approval in two-tier systems is not sufficient. 
213
 Austria: s. 84(5) Stock Corporation Act; Germany: s. 93(5) Stock Corporation Act. 
214
 See, for example, Art. 22a(2) Greek Codified Law 2190/1920 on Companies Limited by Shares. 
215
 See above 2.5 for a detailed discussion of these procedures. 
216
 See above 2.2.2. 
217
 Cyprus: s. 191 Companies Act; Ireland: s. 194 Companies Act 1963; Part 3 of the Companies Act 1990; UK: ss. 175-177 
Companies Act 2006. 
218
 For Ireland see the Irish Country Report, pp. A 535-536. For the UK, see Companies Act 2006, s. 180(4). 
219
 Typically the legal systems provide for three years (e.g., Croatia, Germany, Slovakia, Slovenia), but the period may be 
shorter (Greece: two years) or longer (Austria: five years). 
220
 Slovakia, Spain. 
221
 Austria, Greece, Italy. 
222
 Croatia, Germany, Slovenia, 
223
 See for example s. 239 UK Companies Act 2006. 
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of the liable director.
224
 Under this approach, minority shareholder and creditor protection must be 
achieved through different routes, which may stem from concepts such as abuse of majority power
225
 
or from insolvency law. 
Indemnification. Most Member States do not contain specific rules on indemnification of directors 
against liability incurred to third parties or against the costs of third party lawsuits. In this case, the 
general rules on exclusion and limitation of liability are applicable. Where the legal system provides for 
a regulation of indemnification, it follows often more lenient standards than the legality of exclusion 
clauses in the articles. For example, in Cyprus and Ireland the company may indemnify the director 
against the costs incurred in proceedings in which judgment is given in favour of the director. 
Luxembourg allows indemnification in all cases except intentional fault, gross negligence, or criminal 
liability. The UK invalidates an indemnification clause if it provides indemnity against criminal or 
administrative penalties or against the costs incurred in defending criminal proceedings in which the 
director is convicted. 
D&O insurance. D&O insurance is available in all Member States. In some jurisdictions, the 
permissibility of this mechanism to limit the director’s exposure was discussed controversially in the 
past, given that it may attenuate the deterrent effect of the binding liability provisions in the company 
legislation, in particular if the company pays the insurance premium, and encourage noncompliance 
with directors’ duties. However, it has now been widely accepted that D&O insurance is legitimate and 
serves a useful purpose by enabling the company to attract high-quality managers and limit the 
directors’ exposure to damages claims that will often exceed their financial capacity. This is 
particularly important where the jurisdiction provides for causes of action that give rise to liability of 
directors who act in good-faith, as is possible under most definitions of the duty of care. Furthermore, 
it should be noted that D&O insurance does not formally lead to an exclusion of liability. The director is 
liable for purposes of the law and administrative or criminal sanctions continue to apply. Liability risk is 
not shifted from the directors to the shareholders or creditors, but to the insurance undertaking against 
payment of a premium. 
In most Member States, the company is party to the insurance policy. It is legally permitted and will in 
practice usually pay the premium.
226
 Coverage for intentional misconduct is virtually always excluded 
in the insurance contract, coverage for gross negligence is often, but not always, excluded. We 
observe that insurance is common in countries with a large number of listed companies. In most 
countries, however, it is not widespread in small and medium-sized enterprises. 
 
3. Enforcement 
 
In order to ensure effective investor protection, enforcement of directors’ duties is a necessary 
complement to the substantive rules on directors’ duties and liability. In the following sections, we will 
focus on enforcement of the company’s claims. Accordingly, we will not discuss personal claims, i.e. 
actions brought by shareholders or third parties in their own name for the infringement of individual 
rights owed directly to them. Enforcement of such rights generally does not pose problems. By 
definition, personal claims are characterised by a loss suffered by the claimant (shareholder or third 
party) personally and not shared with other shareholders (or third parties).
227
 In addition, they arise 
from duties owed directly to them and not to the company.
228
 Therefore, the two main problems 
beleaguering the enforcement of directors’ duties do not apply. First, assuming that the duty is owed 
                                                     
224
 UK Companies Act 2006, s. 239(3), (4). The pre-2006 common law did not even contain this qualification of the majority 
principle, see North West Transportation Co Ltd v Beatty (1887) L.R. 12 App. Cas. 589. 
225
 For English law see . [1916] 1 AC 554 (Privy Council). 
226
 In Portugal, this sentence applies with the proviso that directors of listed companies have to give a guarantee of €250,000 for 
their potential liability and that the company is not permitted to pay the premium for liability coverage as regards this amount. 
227
 Reflective loss principle, see above text to n 96. 
228
 Se above 2.2.2. 
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to the company and the company is consequently the proper claimant, the organ authorised to act on 
behalf of the company may be conflicted. In particular, this is the case in the one-tier system if the 
authorised organ is the board of directors and the defendant director is still a board member. It may 
also be a problem in two-tier systems where the authorised organ is often the supervisory board 
because of the close practical link between the members of the two boards. Second, enforcement of 
the company’s claim leads to recovery by the company, which accrues to all shareholders in 
proportion to their shareholdings. Therefore, enforcement of the company’s claims through 
shareholders by means of a derivative action faces a collective action problem. The costs are borne 
by the shareholders who bring the action, while the passive shareholders benefit from the claimant’s 
efforts.
229
 
In the following sections, we will focus on both problems by analysing first who has authority to act on 
behalf of the company in enforcing the company’s claims (Table 3.1.a) and second, under which 
conditions (minority) shareholders can bring a derivative action if the authorised organ does not act 
(Table 3.2.a). As far as the second issue is concerned, we will quantify the ease with which 
shareholders can bring a minority action along three dimensions that are, arguably, of equal 
importance in assessing the effectiveness of the minority shareholder suit: standing requirements, 
conditions for bringing the action, and cost rules (Tables 3.2.b and 3.2.c). 
 
3.1 Standing to sue 
Summary of the country reports 
Table 3.1.a: Authority to represent the company in enforcing directors’ duties  
Country Company as claimant: 
represented by whom? 
Shareholders in their 
own name 
Third parties 
Austria 1) Management board 
(because of its general 
power to represent the 
company) 
2) The supervisory board 
is required to enforce the 
claim if requested by the 
GM to do so, s. 134(1) 
3) The supervisory board 
may enforce a claim 
without shareholder 
consent (and even 
contrary to a shareholder 
resolution) if non-
enforcement would 
constitute a violation of 
its own duties (e.g., the 
duty of care, because as 
a consequence the 
company would incur a 
loss and be liable to its 
creditors), s. 97 
Generally not, except 
where shareholders 
enforce personal claims 
(e.g., based on tort law) 
in their own name 
1) Third parties enforce 
their own claims (e.g., 
based on tort law) in their 
own name 
2) s. 84(5): the creditors 
can enforce the 
company’s claims against 
the directors, provided 
that they cannot obtain 
satisfaction of their claim 
from the company and 
the directors have acted 
grossly negligently 
(negligence suffices in 
the cases of s. 84(3), i.e. 
in particular where capital 
maintenance provisions 
were violated) 
Belgium The general assembly 
has exclusive power to 
bring a liability claim 
- Shareholders have 
standing to file a claim 
against the company for 
- Creditors pursuant to 
Arts. 1166, 1382 Code 
Civil or Actio Pauliana 
                                                     
229
 In economic terms, the derivative action may for this reason be qualified as a public good, see A. van Aaken, ‘Shareholder 
Suits as a Technique of Internalization and Control of Management. A Functional and Comparative Analysis’ 68 RabelsZ 288 
(2004). 
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against a director (actio 
mandati). The board of 
directors or a specially 
appointed agent 
represents the company 
in the proceedings (Art. 
561 CC). 
annulment or suspension 
of a board decision under 
general rules of civil 
procedure law if they are 
an ‘interested party’, 
which is generally 
already accepted on the 
ground that they hold 
shares, provided that 
shareholder rights have 
been infringed (but no 
distinction between 
corporate and personal 
harm) 
- A shareholder can only 
bring a personal liability 
claim against a director if 
he/she has suffered a 
loss distinct from the loss 
suffered by all 
shareholders 
proportionally as a result 
of the decrease of the 
company’s assets or the 
increase of liabilities 
incurred by the company. 
- A qualified minority of 
shareholders can bring a 
liability claim on behalf of 
the company (see 
derivative action). 
(fraudulent conveyance) 
- Other third parties could 
theoretically bring a claim 
for annulment of a board 
decision under general 
civil procedure law (see 
left), but the only reported 
court decision rejected 
the standing of 
employees, arguing that 
the invoked rules were 
not designed to protect 
third party interests and 
that even a broad 
conception of the 
company’s interests 
would not confer 
judiciable rights on third 
parties; it is unclear 
whether creditors are 
able to bring claims 
under this mechanism 
Bulgaria No clear regulation; it is 
argued that the general 
meeting has authority, 
possibly also the 
supervisory board in the 
two-tier model 
If the claim is based on 
tort law 
If the claim is based on 
tort law 
Croatia Supervisory board in 
claims against members 
of the management 
board 
Shareholders can sue if 
they suffer damage that 
is independent from the 
damage caused to the 
company 
Creditors if they cannot 
obtain satisfaction from 
the company and the 
directors acted with gross 
negligence, s. 252(5) 
Cyprus Board of directors 1) If their personal rights 
have been infringed (e.g., 
prohibition of a 
shareholder to vote at the 
general meeting) 
2) The company’s affairs 
are conducted in an 
oppressive manner (s. 
202 CA = English unfair 
prejudice remedy) 
No 
Czech Republic 1) Management board 
2) The supervisory board 
is required to enforce the 
No No 
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claim if requested by 
minority shareholders 
holding more than 3% of 
the registered capital (if 
total share capital > CZK 
100m) or 5% (if total 
share capital ≤ CZK 
100m) 
Denmark General meeting, s. 
364(1) Companies Act 
Possible if the 
shareholder has suffered 
a loss, but the company 
has not, s. 361(1) 
Possible if the third party 
has suffered a loss, but 
the company has not, s. 
361(1) 
Estonia Supervisory board Only if the directors 
breach a duty established 
for the protection of the 
shareholders and the law 
provides expressis verbis 
for the possibility of the 
shareholders to enforce 
the claim (e.g. merger or 
division) or the director’s 
liability is based on tort 
(see Pere Leib case) 
Creditors can enforce 
claims of the company if 
the company’s assets are 
not sufficient to satisfy 
their claims. 
Enforcement of claims in 
their own name if the 
director breaches a duty 
that is established for the 
protection of the creditor. 
Finland - Board of directors (part 
of the general duties and 
powers of the board, Ch. 
22, s. 6); the director in 
question is disqualified 
from the consideration of 
the matter (Ch. 6, s. 4) 
- In addition, general 
meeting (Ch. 22, s. 6) 
If the director is liable 
directly towards them 
If the director is liable 
directly towards them 
France Board of directors for 
action ut universi 
Action individuelle only 
possible if they claim 
compensation for the 
individual harm suffered. 
The individual harm must 
not be the consequence 
of a loss sustained by the 
company (reflective loss). 
Examples for individual 
harm: misappropriation 
by a director of dividends 
owed to the 
shareholders; 
overvaluation of a 
contribution in kind, 
which causes the dilution 
of existing shareholdings; 
investors buy shares on 
the basis of incorrect 
market information 
Third parties can sue if 
the directors has 
committed a fault that is 
separable from his 
functions (faute 
séparable des fonctions), 
see above 2.3. 
Germany Supervisory board, s. 
112; the general meeting 
can require enforcement 
Generally not, but the law 
allows some exceptions, 
see, e.g., s. 117(1): 
Creditors pursuant to s. 
93(5), if they cannot 
obtain satisfaction from 
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by simple majority, s. 147 shareholders have a 
claim for damages if a 
person uses his/her 
influence on the company 
to induce the directors to 
act to the detriment of the 
company and the 
shareholders suffer a 
loss different from the 
loss suffered by the 
company (i.e. no claim in 
case of reflective loss) 
the company and the 
directors breached their 
duties grossly negligently 
Greece - Generally, the board of 
directors represents the 
company (Art. 22b); it 
must file the lawsuit in 
case of an intentional 
breach of duty or upon 
the request of the GM or 
10% minority 
shareholders 
- If the claim is directed 
against all members of 
the board, the court or 
the GM may appoint a 
special representative to 
represent the company 
(Art. 22b(3)) 
Shareholders can bring a 
lawsuit in their own name 
(personal lawsuit) if they 
have suffered direct 
damage (and not the 
company), i.e. their 
individual rights are 
violated by the directors 
(based on general tort 
law in conjunction with 
Art. 71 Civil Code) 
Subrogation action 
(plagiastiki agogi), Art. 72 
Civil Procedure Code 
(creditors can enforce the 
claims of the company if 
they cannot obtain 
satisfaction from the 
company) 
Hungary Decision on enforcing the 
claim is supposed to be 
passed by the GM but 
there are no specific 
rules covering 
representation. It is 
assumed that at the time 
of submitting the claim 
the defendant is no 
longer a director or there 
is at least one director 
who is not sued. No 
specific rights of 
representation allocated 
to supervisory board. In 
case of claims under the 
minority protection 
regime the minority 
shareholder may 
represent the company. 
Not for enforcement of 
directors’ duties owed to 
the company 
Creditors if the duties 
owed to them in the 
vicinity of insolvency 
have been violated 
Ireland Board of directors or 
resolution by the 
member, depending on 
how the authority to 
instigate legal 
proceedings is allocated 
in the articles. Very often, 
the power to seek 
enforcement will be with 
1) Shareholders can sue 
in their own name if a 
breach of a personal duty 
owed to them is at issue 
2) Statutory oppression 
remedy, Companies Act 
1963, s. 205 ( but 
damages are not 
No 
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the board. The members 
can overrule the board’s 
decision in the case of 
fraud. 
available as a remedy 
under s. 205) 
Italy 1) Board of directors 
2) Shareholders can 
direct the board to 
commence litigation by 
ordinary resolution 
3) Board of auditors by 
two-thirds majority 
4) Two-tier model: 
supervisory board or 
shareholder resolution 
- Yes, if the director’s 
action did not harm the 
company’s interests, but 
exclusively affected the 
rights of the shareholders 
(no recovery of reflective 
loss) 
- Example from case law: 
purchase of newly issued 
shares at a price based 
on misleading financial 
statements prepared by 
the directors 
- Creditors can sue under 
Art. 2394 (liability of 
directors if the company’s 
assets have not been 
preserved) 
- The creditors’ action is 
autonomous from the 
company’s claims, with 
the consequence that the 
creditors do not need to 
wait until the company 
has decided not to sue 
the directors (this is 
disputed) 
Latvia The general meeting 
decides whether the 
claim should be initiated. 
If members of the 
management board are 
sued, the supervisory 
board represents the 
company in the litigation. 
If members of the 
supervisory board are 
sued, the management 
board represents the 
company. 
Only for claims according 
to general civil law and 
for loss suffered directly 
by the particular 
shareholder and not by 
the company 
- Creditors pursuant to s. 
170 Commercial Law if 
they cannot obtain 
satisfaction for their 
claims from the company. 
- The claim is enforced 
for the benefit of the 
company 
- This right exists even if 
the company has waived 
the claim, entered into a 
settlement with the 
director, or the losses 
have been incurred in the 
fulfilment of a decision of 
the GM or the 
supervisory board 
Lithuania Head of the company 
(who is a corporate 
organ) 
No No 
Luxembourg The general meeting 
decides on enforcement 
and represents the 
company 
- Not for management 
errors 
- According to Art. 59(2) 
Companies Act for 
violations of the 
Companies Act or the 
articles of association 
- Under general tort law 
for specific, individual 
prejudice, which is 
different from the 
prejudice suffered by the 
company 
- Not for management 
errors 
- According to Art. 59(2) 
Companies Act for 
violations of the 
Companies Act or the 
articles of association 
- Under general tort law 
Malta Board of directors 1) In the limited 
circumstances where 
duties are owed directly 
In the limited 
circumstances where 
duties are owed directly 
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to shareholders 
2) Unfair prejudice 
remedy, Art. 402 
to third parties 
Netherlands Board of directors 
(terminology according to 
the Dutch Civil Code, i.e. 
not the supervisory 
board) 
Possible for claims 
under: 
1) s. 2:8(1) (duty to act 
reasonably and fairly) 
2) s. 2:139 (liability for 
misleading accounts) 
3) Tort law 
Possible for claims 
under: 
1) s. 2:8(1) (duty to act 
reasonably and fairly) (for 
employees) 
2) s. 2:139 (liability for 
misleading accounts) 
3) Tort law 
Poland - The GM decides on the 
enforcement of claims, 
Art. 393(2) 
- The respective director 
is excluded from 
participating in the vote if 
he/she is also 
shareholder, Art. 413 
- In the judicial 
proceedings, the 
company is represented 
either by the supervisory 
board or by a special 
attorney appointed by the 
GM 
No (duties only owed 
under tort law directly to 
shareholders) 
No (duties only owed 
under tort law directly to 
third parties) 
Portugal - General meeting, Art. 
75(1); conflicted directors 
cannot vote as 
shareholders 
- Upon the request of 
shareholders 
representing at least 5% 
of the share capital, the 
court appoints a special 
attorney to represent the 
company in the action 
(cost rules: Art. 76(3)) 
- Possible pursuant to 
Art. 79 for direct loss 
caused by directors to 
the shareholders (e.g., 
refusal to pay a dividend 
lawfully approved by the 
general meeting) 
- The same provision 
applies to third parties if 
directors breached a 
provision designed to 
protect such parties 
Creditors pursuant to 
Arts. 606-609 Civil Code 
if the company or the 
shareholders fail to 
enforce the company’s 
claims (Art. 78(2)) 
Romania General meeting, Art. 
155 
Only for claims under tort 
law 
Only for claims under tort 
law or when the company 
is in insolvency 
proceedings 
Slovakia Supervisory board No Creditors if they cannot 
obtain satisfaction from 
the company, s. 194(9) 
Slovenia 1) The GM decides by 
simple majority about the 
instigation of legal 
proceedings against the 
directors, Art. 327(1) 
2) The chairman of the 
supervisory board (Art. 
283) or a special 
Generally not, but the law 
allows the following 
exceptions:  
1) Art. 264(1): 
shareholders have a 
claim for damages if a 
person uses his/her 
influence on the company 
- Creditors if they cannot 
obtain satisfaction from 
the company, Art. 263(4) 
- Initiation of the 
insolvency proceedings is 
not required as a pre-
condition; rather, it is 
sufficient that the 
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representative (Art. 
327(3)) represents the 
company in the 
proceedings 
to induce the directors to 
act to the detriment of the 
company and the 
shareholders suffer a 
loss different from the 
loss suffered by the 
company (i.e. no claim in 
case of reflective loss) 
2) In cases of intra-group 
transactions where a 
controlling company 
causes damage to a 
dependent company 
financial situation of the 
company is such that it 
does not allow the 
payment of the 
company’s obligations as 
they fall due 
Spain General meeting, s. 238 Shareholders or third 
parties can bring a claim 
for damages against the 
directors in their own 
name if the directors 
have acted in a way that 
directly harms their 
interests and the loss 
suffered is not merely 
reflective of the 
company’s loss, s. 241 
Creditors can bring an 
action if the company or 
shareholders do not do 
so and when the 
company has insufficient 
assets to repay its debts, 
s. 240 LSC 
Sweden General  meeting, Ch. 
29, § 7 
Shareholders may have a 
direct claim based on Ch. 
29, § 1 
Creditor who cannot be 
compensated may 
enforce claims of the 
company against the 
director, provided that the 
damaging action created 
or aggravated the 
company’s insolvency 
United Kingdom Board of directors 1) Only if a personal right 
of the shareholders has 
been invaded 
2) Unfair prejudice 
remedy, s. 994 
No 
 
Discussion 
General comments. Table 3.1.a shows significant variation between the Member States. In a number 
of one-tier board systems (and legal systems allowing for a choice, but where the companies usually 
adopt the one-tier model
230
) the board of directors has the authority to instigate proceedings on behalf 
of the company.
231
 A second group of such countries provide that the general meeting shall have the 
power to decide whether or not to enforce the claim. Once the decision on enforcement has been 
made, the company is represented by the board of directors or a specially appointed agent.
232
 A third 
group of one-tier board model countries (as defined for present purposes) accord the right to bring an 
action both to the board of directors and the shareholders in general meeting.
233
 
                                                     
230
 See above 1.5 and 1.6. 
231
 Cyprus, France, Ireland, Malta, UK. 
232
 Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden. 
233
 Finland, Italy. 
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Legal systems promulgating a two-tier board structure (or jurisdictions offering a choice, but where the 
companies usually adopt the two-tier model
234
) are characterised by a similar level of diversity. 
Several jurisdictions stipulate that the supervisory board has the authority to instigate legal 
proceedings and represent the company; in some legal systems the supervisory board is required to 
do so upon the request by the general meeting.
235
 Alternatively, some jurisdictions allocate the power 
to decide on an enforcement action to the general meeting,
236
 the managing director,
237
 the board of 
directors,
238
 or either the management board or the supervisory board.
239
 In the ensuing litigation the 
company is then represented by the supervisory board, the chairman of the supervisory board, or a 
special representative. 
It is difficult to assess which of these arrangements is the most effective in order to address the 
conflict of interest problem mentioned above. While some strategies clearly raise concerns regarding 
the authorised organ’s possible conflict of interest, notably the allocation of authority to the board of 
directors in the one-tier system and to the managing director or management board in the two-tier 
system (for claims against the executive directors), the data indicate that enforcement levels are low in 
all Member States.
240
 Where they are relatively higher in some jurisdictions than in others, e.g. the 
UK, this seems to be more a function of ownership structure, a sophisticated institutional environment, 
or simply the number and size of companies, rather than the success of the legal rules in dealing with 
the relevant conflicts of interest.
 
Class action. Class actions are now, in one form or another, available in a number of Member States, 
for example Denmark, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain, or Sweden.
241
 However, they do not play an 
important role in the context of directors’ duties since the scope of these mechanisms is often 
restricted. In addition, it is a precondition for the admissibility of a class action that the claims that are 
put forward are based on similar interests. Since only personal claims of the shareholders can be the 
subject of a class action, but not the claims of the company, and personal claims require the 
infringement of individual rights, their practical relevance may be limited.
242
 
 
3.2 Derivative action 
Summary of the country reports 
Table 3.2.a: Regulation of derivative actions  
Country Threshold Conditions Cost rules 
Austria 10% minority 
shareholders (5% if the 
audit report identified 
facts that give rise to 
liability) can order the 
supervisory board to 
enforce a claim against a 
manager or assign a 
special representative to 
enforce the claim 
- The company can 
reclaim the litigation 
costs from the minority 
shareholders; where 
minority shareholders 
intentionally or grossly 
negligently cause the 
company to bring an 
unsuccessful claim 
against a director, the 
                                                     
234
 See above 1.5 and 1.6. 
235
 Croatia, Estonia, Germany, Slovakia. 
236
 Bulgaria, Hungary, Latvia, Luxembourg, Poland, Slovenia. 
237
 Lithuania. 
238
 The Netherlands (board of directors here refers to the management board, not the supervisory board). 
239
 Austria, Czech Republic. 
240
 See M. Gelter, ‘Why do Shareholder Derivative Suits Remain Rare in Continental Europe?’ 37 Brook. J. Int’l L. 843, 848-849. 
241
 For a collection of country reports analysing the possibilities for collective redress in different jurisdictions and a translation of 
the relevant legislation into English see http://globalclassactions.stanford.edu/.  
242
 Circumstances are, of course, conceivable under which the necessary similarity of interests is satisfied, and in the US they 
are relatively common. See Gelter, n 240, 847 (referring to Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 845 A.2d 1031 (Del. 
2004), for the relevant test to distinguish between class actions and the derivative suit). 
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NOTE: this is not a 
derivative action in the 
strict sense because the 
company is represented 
by the supervisory board 
or the special 
representative; the 
minority shareholder may 
only intervene according 
to civil procedure rules 
minority shareholders are 
liable for the damage 
suffered by the defendant 
Belgium 1% of voting rights or 
1,250,000 EUR of the 
share capital in the public 
company; 10% of voting 
rights in the private 
limited company (must be 
held on the day the 
general meeting decides 
whether to acquit the 
directors) 
If the general meeting 
resolved to acquit the 
director/waive the 
company’s claim, the 
claimant shareholders 
with voting rights must 
not have voted in favour 
of acquittal 
 
Claimants must advance 
the costs and are not 
reimbursed by the 
company if the claim is 
unsuccessful. Claimants 
are reimbursed if the 
action is successful. 
Bulgaria 10% or 5% in case of 
listed companies 
Court approval not 
necessary 
The general cost rules of 
the civil procedure code 
apply 
Croatia 10% Shareholder for at least 3 
months 
General rules on costs 
apply, whereby the costs 
are allocated according 
to the success in the 
proceedings, i.e. if the 
claim is successful, the 
costs are borne by the 
person found liable 
Cyprus 1 share Foss v Harbottle
243
 
principles → derivative 
action permissible if: 
1) the act complained of 
was ultra vires; 
2) special majority 
3) fraud on the minority 
and wrongdoer control 
The award of the costs 
lies in the discretion of 
the court. 
Czech Republic > 3% of the registered 
capital (if total share 
capital > CZK 100m) or > 
5% (if total share capital 
≤ CZK 100m) 
The minority 
shareholders must first 
request the supervisory 
board to enforce the 
claim (see above 3.1) 
and the SB must fail to 
do so 
The general cost rules of 
civil procedure apply; 
since the company is the 
plaintiff and the 
shareholders sue in the 
name of the company, 
the company must pay 
the  minority 
shareholders’ court fees 
and the costs of legal 
counsel 
Denmark 10% (for the derivative 
action under s. 364(3)) 
The claimant 
shareholders must have 
opposed a resolution to 
The claimant 
shareholders must pay 
the legal costs involved, 
                                                     
243
 (1843) 2 Hare 461. 
 
 
 
 
194 Directors’ Duties and Liability in the EU  
 
grant exemption from 
liability or waive the 
company’s claim, s. 
364(3) 
OR: 
The company does not 
bring the legal action → 
this derivative action is 
not laid down in statute 
and its permissibility is 
controversial in the 
literature; no court 
decision 
but may have such costs 
reimbursed by the 
company to the extent 
that they do not exceed 
the amount recovered by 
the company, s. 364(3) 
 
Estonia No derivative action n/a n/a 
Finland 10% OR it is shown that 
a decision of the 
company not to enforce 
its claim would violate the 
principle of equal 
treatment, Ch. 22, s. 7 
It is likely that the 
company itself is not 
going to sue 
The shareholder bears 
the cost if he/she loses 
France 1) General rule of the 
Civil Code: 1 share 
2) The Commercial Code 
provides for an additional 
(not alternative) action 
sociale ut singuli for the 
SA: shareholders holding 
more than 5% of the 
share capital can act 
together in enforcing 
claims of the company 
The action sociale ut 
singuli pursuant to the 
Commercial Code is of a 
subsidiary nature. It can 
only be initiated if the 
representatives of the 
company refuse to take 
legal action. 
Normal cost rules apply. 
This has the 
consequence in practice 
that the derivative action 
is not commonly used 
because the 
shareholders bear the 
up-front costs of the 
proceedings. 
Germany 1% or EUR 100,000 Claim admission 
procedure, s. 148(1). The 
court shall grant 
permission to pursue the 
claim if: 
1) the shareholders 
acquired the shares 
before they knew, or 
should have known, of 
the breach of duty; 
2) they requested the 
company to bring a claim, 
but the company failed to 
do so within a reasonable 
time limit; 
3) prima facie the 
company suffered a loss 
due to dishonesty or 
gross violation of legal 
provisions or the articles; 
4) pursuing the claim is 
not outweighed by the 
interests of the company 
s. 148(6): the claimant 
has to bear the costs of 
the admission procedure 
if the application is 
dismissed, unless the 
dismissal is due to facts 
relating to the interest of 
the company that the 
company could have 
disclosed prior to the 
application, but did not 
disclose; if the application 
is successful, but the 
claim is dismissed in 
whole or in part, the 
company shall reimburse 
the claimants 
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Greece 10% minority 
shareholders can request 
the board of directors to 
bring a lawsuit, or 1 
share if intentional 
conduct is alleged 
NOTE: this is not a 
derivative action in the 
strict sense because the 
company is the party to 
the lawsuit 
The claimants must have 
been shareholders for at 
least three months before 
the action is brought 
The company must cover 
the costs, Art. 22b(3) 
Hungary 5% The general meeting 
decided not to enforce 
the claim of the company 
No specific rules. 
According to general 
rules on Civil Procedure, 
costs of 
submitting/enforcing the 
claim are to be born in 
advance by the claimant 
and finally allocated to 
the losing party. Party to 
the proceedings is the 
company, not the 
minority shareholder. 
Therefore, the company 
should pay or, if this does 
not happen, the 
shareholders have a 
claim against the 
company for 
reimbursement (based on 
restitution) 
Ireland 1 share Foss v Harbottle applies: 
1) the action must be 
brought bona fide for the 
benefit of the company 
for wrongs to the 
company and not for an 
ulterior purpose 
2) the persons against 
whom the action is taken 
must have majority 
control of the company 
and have blocked an 
action being brought in 
the name of the company 
3) the claimant must 
show wrongdoing by 
those in control and have 
a good prima facie case 
Case law shows that if 
the court decides to grant 
leave to maintain a 
derivative action, there is 
a high likelihood that the 
plaintiff will obtain an 
indemnity for the costs 
from the company 
Italy - 20% or a different 
percentage as set out in 
the articles (which cannot 
exceed one third of the 
corporate capital)  
- In the case of listed 
No If the claim is successful 
the company will 
indemnify the claimants 
against the costs incurred 
in bringing the 
proceedings, unless 
these are imposed on (or 
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companies and 
companies whose 
shares, although not 
listed on a regulated 
market, are widely 
distributed among the 
public (societa’ che fanno 
ricorso al capitale di 
rischio), the claim may be 
brought by a group of 
shareholders 
representing at least 
2.5% of the outstanding 
share capital, Art. 
2393(1), (2)bis Civil Code 
recovered from) the 
losing party. 
If the claim is settled or 
not successful, the 
claimants do not have 
any right to be 
indemnified 
Latvia 5% or LVL 50,000 
(approximately EUR 
71,144), Art. 172(2) 
 
- Shareholders generally 
only have the right to 
request the enforcement 
of the claim by the 
company. Such request 
must be addressed to the 
competent corporate 
body, which is for claims 
against board members 
the council. If the 
company does not have 
a council, the GM 
decides. 
- If the company fails to 
bring the claim within a 
month from the day when 
the request was received, 
shareholders can bring 
the claim directly. 
However, the claim still 
has to be submitted in 
company’s name. 
Shareholders act as 
representatives dominus 
litis of the company. 
Formally the company is 
the party to the lawsuit.  
- Shareholders must 
submit the claim within 
three months from the 
day when they initially 
requested enforcement. 
- See Art. 172(2)-(6) 
Latvian Commercial Law 
Since the company is the 
party to the lawsuit, it 
bears the costs. 
However, the company 
has the right to reclaim 
the litigation costs if they 
can be considered as 
damages caused by an 
unjustified action. This is 
the case if the 
shareholders have acted 
with: 
1) malice 
or 
2) gross negligence. 
If these requirements are 
satisfied, the 
shareholders are jointly 
and severally liable for 
the damage caused, 
Art. 172(7) Latvian 
Commercial Law. 
Lithuania One share, Law on 
Companies, Art. 16(1)(4) 
Limited case law; no 
restrictive conditions 
have been developed 
No statutory rules or case 
law. As a general rule, 
claimant pays for the 
claim and all related legal 
expenses. 
Luxembourg Currently no derivative 
action 
n/a n/a 
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A draft act is pending in 
parliament that would 
create a derivative action 
modelled after the 
Belgian action sociale ut 
singuli. 
Malta Unclear whether a 
derivative action is 
possible following the 
English jurisprudence – 
no case law 
- - 
Netherlands - No derivative action 
- But shareholders 
holding at least 10% of 
the capital or a nominal 
value of EUR 250,000 
can request the 
Enterprise Chamber of 
the Civil Court of Appeal 
of Amsterdam to conduct 
an enquiry into the policy 
and conduct of the 
business of the company. 
The court may order the 
suspension of directors, 
appointment of 
supervisory directors with 
special powers, 
suspension of resolutions 
of the management 
board or suspension of 
voting rights(Arts. 2:344 
et seq. DCC) 
→ this is of great 
practical relevance 
n/a n/a 
Poland 1 share Art. 486(1): Where the 
company has failed to 
bring action for relief 
within one year from the 
disclosure of the injurious 
act 
The role of the derivative 
action is minimal in 
practice because of cost 
rules: 
1) Upon application by 
the defendant, the court 
may order bail to be 
provided as a security for 
damage that the 
defendant stands to 
suffer, Art. 486(2) 
2) The court may order 
the plaintiff to redress the 
damage caused to the 
defendant if it finds the 
action to be unfounded 
and the claimant acted in 
bad faith or flagrant 
negligence when bringing 
the action, Art. 486(4) 
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Portugal 5% (2% in case of stock 
exchange listed 
company, Art. 77(1)) 
The company decides 
not to bring an action 
(Art. 77(1)) or fails to 
bring it within six months 
The claimants bear the 
legal expenses; no 
reimbursement is owed 
by the company (Art. 
77(2)). If the defendant 
director alleges that the 
claimant brought the 
action to pursue interests 
not legally protected, 
he/she can ask for a 
ruling on the matter or for 
a guarantee to be given 
(Art. 77(5)) 
Romania 5% shareholders have 
the right to introduce an 
action in damages in their 
own name, but on 
account of the company, 
Art. 155 
Refusal of the simple 
majority of shareholders 
to bring the action ut 
universi, and the 
claimants must have 
been shareholders at the 
time when the instigation 
of an action was debated 
in the GM 
The claimants bear the 
costs of the proceedings, 
but can claim 
reimbursement from the 
company if the lawsuit is 
successful. This has led 
to a low number of 
derivative actions in 
practice. 
Slovakia 5% Failure of the supervisory 
board to enforce the 
rights of the company 
upon the request of 
minority shareholders 
without undue delay 
Where minority 
shareholders bring a 
claim against a director in 
the name of the company 
the costs of the 
proceedings are borne by 
the shareholders bringing 
the suit. They will only be 
able to recover the costs 
if they succeed with the 
claim. 
Slovenia 10% or a nominal amount 
of at least EUR 400,000, 
Art. 328(1) 
1) Art. 328(1): the GM 
rejects the proposal for 
filing a lawsuit, it fails to 
appoint a special 
representative, or the 
management or the 
special representative do 
not act in accordance 
with the resolution 
adopted by the GM 
2) Art. 328(2):  
a) the claimants must 
deposit their shares with 
the central clearing and 
depository house and 
may not dispose of them 
until the issue of a final 
decision on the claim 
b) the claimants must be 
able to prove that they 
were the shareholders at 
least three months prior 
to the GM which rejected 
The legal costs shall be 
covered by the company, 
Arts. 328(3), 321 
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their proposal 
Spain 5% Derivative action is 
permissible if the general 
meeting decides not to 
claim liability, a resolution 
was adopted to file the 
claim, but it is not 
executed, or there is no 
decision by the general 
meeting, s. 239 LSC 
The claimants can obtain 
reimbursement from the 
company if the directors 
are found liable; 
otherwise the claimants 
bear the costs of the 
proceeding 
Sweden 10%, Ch. 29, § 9 - The claimants shall bear 
the litigation costs but 
shall be entitled to 
reimbursement from the 
company for costs which 
are covered by damages 
awarded to the company 
in the proceedings, Ch. 
29, § 9(2) 
United Kingdom 1 share Claim admission 
procedure, ss. 261-263: 
the court assesses 
several factors, inter alia 
whether a member acting 
in good faith would seek 
to continue the claim 
Civil Procedure Rule 
19.9E: The court may 
order the company to 
indemnify the claimant 
against liability for costs 
incurred in the 
permission application or 
in the derivative claim or 
both. 
The courts will grant an 
indemnification order 
where a shareholder has 
in good faith and on 
reasonable grounds sued 
as plaintiff in a minority 
shareholder’s action, and 
which it would have been 
reasonable for an 
independent board of 
directors to bring in the 
company’s name 
(Wallersteiner v. Moir) 
→ this test should be 
satisfied where 
permission is given for 
the claim to continue 
under the statutory 
derivative action 
procedure 
 
Discussion 
In the following sections we analyse the rules regulating derivative actions in more detail along the 
three dimensions sketched in Table 3.2.a: Standing, i.e. rules that specify which shareholders can file 
a derivative action (anyone holding at least one share, or only shareholders that satisfy a holding 
threshold expressed in percentage or as a minimum nominal value amount); further conditions that 
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must be satisfied to bring an action (for example that the defendant director must be in control of the 
general meeting or the claimants must have deposited their shares with the central depository); and 
cost rules, i.e. procedural rules determining whether the company or the claimant bear the costs of the 
proceedings and, if the latter is the case, when the claimant can claim reimbursement from the 
company. In order to judge whether the derivative action mechanism guarantees an effective 
enforcement of directors’ duties all three elements are of importance and need to be considered 
concurrently (for such an assessment see Tables 3.2.b and 3.2.c and Map 3.2.d below).
244
 
 
Standing 
Map 3.2.a: Derivative action – standing 
 
Legend Country 
1 share 
 
CY, FR, IE, LT, PL, UK 
> 1 share, but < 5% 
 
BE, CZ, DE, IT, PT 
                                                     
244
 In the following analysis, we do not classify Malta. While a derivative action mechanism does in principle exist, it plays a 
marginal role in practice. In theory, the English common law (the rule in Foss v Harbottle) should apply, but due to the scarcity 
of case law it is difficult to assess in which form the English rules would be transposed into the Maltese legal system. In 
practice, minority shareholders tend to rely on the unfair prejudice remedy pursuant to Art. 402 of the Maltese Companies Act, 
which is, however, more limited in its scope of application since it requires that the company’s affairs have been conducted in a 
manner that is ‘oppressive, unfairly discriminatory against, or unfairly prejudicial, to a member’. 
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5% to ≤ 10% 
 
BG, HU, LV, RO, SK, ES 
10% or more 
 
AT, HR, DK, FI, EL, SI, SE 
No derivative action 
 
EE, LU, NL 
Not classified (white): MT 
All figures above are based on the public, stock exchange listed company. In private companies the 
threshold to bring a derivative action is potentially higher.
245
 The Member States vary greatly with 
regard to the relevant minimum. The requirements range from 1 share in Cyprus, France, Ireland, 
Lithuania, Poland, and the UK to 10% in Austria, Croatia, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Slovenia, and 
Sweden. If we also consider non-listed, closely held companies, the maximum threshold is even 
higher: 20% in Italy. 
 
Conditions for bringing a derivative action 
Map 3.2.b: Conditions for bringing a derivative action  
 
  
                                                     
245
 See, e.g., Bulgaria. 
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Legend Country 
No further conditions (except 
possibly a minimum period of 
time during which the 
shareholder must have held the 
shares, or the responsible 
organ, e.g. general meeting or 
supervisory board, must have 
decided not to pursue the 
action) 
AT, BE, BG, HR, CZ, DK, FI, FR, EL, 
HU, IT, LV, LT, PL, PT, RO, SK, SI, ES, 
SE 
The court has to grant 
permission to pursue the claim 
and considers a number of 
criteria to balance the interest of 
the shareholder in bringing the 
action and the interest of the 
company not to engage in 
litigation 
DE, UK 
The shareholders can only bring 
the derivative action if restrictive 
requirements are satisfied (for 
example, following Foss v 
Harbottle, derivative actions are 
only possible if the directors 
have committed a wrong that 
benefitted them personally, i.e. 
they committed a fraud, and 
they have de jure or de facto 
control of the general 
meeting
246
) 
CY, IE 
Not applicable because no 
 derivative action 
EE, LU, NL 
Not classified (white): MT 
The vast majority of countries allow derivative actions, once the threshold for standing is passed, 
without particularly restrictive additional requirements. The four outliers are, on the one hand, 
Germany and the UK, which provide for a claim admission procedure and grant the court discretion in 
reviewing whether the interest of the shareholders in pursuing the claim is not outweighed by the 
interest of the company in avoiding litigation (for example because litigation would be disruptive, 
damage the reputation of the company, or come at a sensitive time when the dedication of the 
executives is more important), and on the other hand, Cyprus and Ireland, which apply with no 
significant modifications the rule in Foss v Harbottle. 
Significant differences exist also within these groups. The German claim admission procedure is 
structured in a way that refusal by the court to grant permission should be the exception if the other 
requirements of the law are satisfied (the claimants must have been shareholders at the time they 
learned about the alleged breach of duty; they requested the company to instigate proceedings, and 
the company failed to do so within a reasonable time; and the claimants present a prima facie case 
that the loss suffered by the company is due to dishonesty or gross violation of legal provisions or the 
articles).
247
 The limited discretion of the courts can be derived from the formulation of the statute: The 
                                                     
246
 This rule makes derivative actions for negligence or in widely held companies effectively impossible. 
247
 German Stock Corporation Act, § 148(1). 
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courts shall reject the application only if enforcement of the claim is ‘outweighed by the interests of the 
company’.
248
 In contrast, UK courts enjoy a wider discretion. If one of the grounds of a mandatory 
refusal to grant permission is not present,
249
 the courts shall, in considering whether to give 
permission, ‘take into account’ a number of factors listed non-exhaustively in the act, for example the 
good faith of the claimant or the importance that a director acting in good faith would attach to 
continuing the claim.
250
 
In some countries in group 1, the additional requirements, while generally easy to satisfy, may be 
onerous depending on the position of the shareholder and the shareholder’s intentions with regard to 
the investment. For example, in Slovenia, the claimants must deposit their shares with the central 
clearing and depository house and may not dispose of them until the issue of a final decision on the 
claim. 
 
Cost rules 
Map 3.2.c: Derivative action – cost rules 
 
  
                                                     
248
 ibid., sentence 2, no. 4. 
249
 Companies Act 2006, s. 263(2). 
250
 Companies Act 2006, s. 263(3). 
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Legend Country 
The company pays all costs 
 
CZ, EL, HU, LV, SI 
The shareholder has to 
advance some costs (for 
example those of the admission 
procedure, if any), but can claim 
reimbursement from the 
company under some 
conditions without bearing the 
litigation risk 
CY, DE,
251
 IE, UK 
The shareholder pays and 
bears the litigation risk; or the 
company pays but can reclaim 
the costs from the shareholder 
AT, BE, BG, HR, DK, FI, FR, IT, LT, PL, 
PT, RO, SK, ES, SE 
Not applicable because no 
 derivative action 
EE, LU, NL 
Not classified (white): MT 
 
Ease of enforcement 
It may be useful to integrate the three elements of derivative actions discussed above (standing, 
conditions to bring the derivative action, and cost rules) into a minority shareholder enforcement index 
in order to facilitate cross-country comparison and allow an appreciation of the overall ease with which 
shareholders can enforce breaches of directors’ duties in each Member State if the authorised organs 
of the company fail to do so. We therefore quantify the three elements on a scale from 1 to 4, with 4 
indicating the most advantageous rule for purposes of minority shareholder protection, and aggregate 
the scores. The assignment of the scores to different statutory rules regarding the three components 
of the derivative action mechanism is shown in Table 3.2.b, and the constituent as well as aggregate 
scores per country are listed in Table 3.2.c. 
Two caveats are in order. First, in quantifying the regulation of derivative actions in this way, we make 
the assumption that the three components are of equal importance. This assumption is, in our view, 
warranted. Restrictive provisions on standing and the conditions for bringing a derivative action 
impose clear statutory limitations on the possibility of shareholders to enforce the claims of the 
company against the directors. Either element may have the propensity to render minority 
shareholders suits altogether impractical. For example, the very generous rule on standing that exists 
in Cyprus, Ireland, and the United Kingdom (1 share) is all but neutralised by the restrictive conditions 
of Foss v Harbottle (now superseded by a statutory derivative action mechanism in the UK, but still in 
force in the other two countries). On the other hand, a light regulation of the procedure of shareholder 
suits in Denmark, Greece, and a number of other countries is outweighed by the requirement that 
shareholders must hold at least 10% of the outstanding capital. This has, at least in large companies, 
the consequence that the derivative action will generally only be available to institutional shareholders. 
Furthermore, disadvantageous cost rules create practical, but no less effective, impediments. 
Nevertheless, such schematic quantification inevitably involves simplifications and a value judgment, 
which is amplified by the division of the different regulatory approaches into only three (or, in the case 
of standing, four) groups (see Table 3.2.b below). Therefore, it must be emphasised that the 
                                                     
251
 In Germany, the claimant has to bear the costs of the admission procedure if the application is dismissed, unless the 
dismissal is due to facts relating to the interest of the company that the company could have disclosed prior to the application, 
but did not disclose. If the application is successful, but the claim is dismissed in whole or in part, the company shall reimburse 
the claimant, s. 148(6) Stock Corporation Act. 
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enforcement index is only intended as a rough approximation of the conduciveness of the regulatory 
environment to minority shareholder suits and that the availability of the derivative action in a given 
case will depend on a host of other factors that are not part of below calculus. 
Second, a high or low score in the enforcement index should not be equated with a high or low level of 
minority shareholder protection in the respective jurisdiction. The jurisdiction may have developed 
substitute mechanisms that supplement private enforcement and give minority shareholders other 
avenues to complain of an alleged breach of duty or focus on public enforcement through 
administrative sanctions and criminal law. We will discuss the substitute mechanisms in the next 
section and show that a number of Member States, for example the Netherlands and the UK, use 
such functional substitutes to counteract the deficiencies of the derivative action. 
 
Table 3.2.b: Minority shareholder enforcement index – quantification 
 Standing Conditions Cost rules 
4 points 1 share: CY, FR, IE, 
LT, PL, UK 
No further conditions: 
AT, BE, BG, HR, CZ, 
DK, FI, FR, EL, HU, IT, 
LV, LT, PL, PT, RO, 
SK, SI, ES, SE 
Company pays all 
costs: CZ, EL, HU, LV, 
SI 
3 points > 1 share, but < 5%: 
BE, CZ, DE, IT, PT 
The court has to grant 
permission: DE, UK 
The claimant has to 
advance some costs, 
but can claim 
reimbursement under 
some conditions 
without bearing the 
litigation risk: CY, DE, 
IE, UK 
2 points 5% ≤ 10%: BG, HU, 
LV, RO, SK, ES 
- - 
1 point 10% or more: AT, HR, 
DK, FI, EL, SI, SE 
The shareholders can 
only bring the 
derivative action if 
restrictive requirements 
are satisfied: CY, IE 
The shareholder pays 
and bears the litigation 
risk: AT, BE, BG, HR, 
DK, FI, FR, IT, LT, PL, 
PT, RO, SK, ES, SE 
 
Table 3.2.c: Minority shareholder enforcement index – scores per country 
Country Standing Conditions Cost rules Total 
AT 1 4 1 6 
BE 3 4 1 8 
BG 2 4 1 7 
HR 1 4 1 6 
CY 4 1 3 8 
CZ 3 4 4 11 
DK 1 4 1 6 
FI 1 4 1 6 
FR 4 4 1 9 
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DE 3 3 3 9 
EL 1 4 4 9 
HU 2 4 4 10 
IE 4 1 3 8 
IT 3 4 1 8 
LV 2 4 4 10 
LT 4 4 1 9 
PL 4 4 1 9 
PT 3 4 1 8 
RO 2 4 1 7 
SK 2 4 1 7 
SI 1 4 4 9 
ES 2 4 1 7 
SE 1 4 1 6 
UK 4 3 3 10 
 
Map 3.2.d: Minority shareholder enforcement index  
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Legend Country 
Total score of the enforcement 
 index of 10-11 
CZ, HU, LV, UK 
Total score of 8-9 
 
BE, CY, FR, DE, EL, IE, IT, LT, PL, PT, 
SI 
Total score of 6-7 
 
AT, BG, HR, DK, FI, RO, SK, ES, SE 
No derivative action 
 
EE, LU, NL 
Not classified (white): MT 
 
Substitutes for weak private enforcement 
Investigation procedures: In the Netherlands, shareholders holding at least 10% of the capital or a 
nominal value of EUR 250,000 can request the Enterprise Chamber of the Civil Court of Appeal of 
Amsterdam to conduct an enquiry into the policy and conduct of the business of the company. The 
court may order the suspension of directors, appointment of supervisory directors with special powers, 
suspension of resolutions of the management board or suspension of voting rights. This is of great 
practical relevance and compensates to some extent for the lack of a derivative action mechanism. 
Similarly, in a number of Member States minority shareholders holding between 1% and 10% of the 
share capital may request the court to appoint a special investigator who examines the conduct of the 
members of the company’s management bodies.
252
  
Disqualification of directors: Most jurisdictions provide for disqualification of the director as a sanction 
in the company’s insolvency or where the director is convicted of a crime. However, as a substitute for 
weak private enforcement, disqualification is particularly effective where the sanction is also available 
outside insolvency and for management mistakes that do not amount to a criminal offence. This is the 
case in Finland if the director has materially violated legal obligations in relation to the business and in 
Ireland and the UK, among other reasons, if the conduct of the director ‘makes him unfit to be 
concerned in the management of a company’.
253
 In the latter two countries, disqualification of directors 
is of great practical relevance because of the strictness of the rule in Foss v Harbottle and has 
produced notable case law informing the interpretation of directors’ duties not only for purposes of the 
disqualification procedure, but for directors’ liability in general.
254
 
Administrative and criminal sanctions: In all jurisdictions analysed, private enforcement is furthermore 
supplemented by administrative and criminal proceedings that may result in fines or, in serious cases, 
imprisonment. The breaches that give rise to such sanctions are enumerated in the company laws or 
penal codes and relate typically to the misappropriation of corporate assets, fraudulent misstatements 
in the balance sheet or the profit and loss accounts, unlawful preference of creditors, or the failure to 
file for the opening of insolvency proceedings. It has been pointed out by practitioners and 
commentators from several jurisdictions that administrative and criminal sanctions constitute the main 
                                                     
252
 For example, Austrian Stock Corporation Act, § 130(2) (10% if facts indicate a material violation of the law or the articles 
(‘grobe Verletzungen des Gesetzes oder der Satzung’)); German Stock Corporation Act, § 140(2) (1%, with the same proviso 
as under Austrian law); Lithuanian Civil Code, Art. 2.124 (10%). 
253
 Irish Companies Act 1990, s. 160(2)(d); UK Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, ss. 6(1), 8(2). In addition to 
disqualifications, Irish company law also contains a restrictions regime, i.e. the possibility to apply for a court order prohibiting 
directors of insolvent companies from acting as director of another company for a period of five years, unless the court is 
satisfied that the director ‘has acted honestly and responsibly in relation to the conduct of the affairs of the company’ (with the 
burden of proof resting on the director) or the company meets heightened capital requirements, see Irish Companies Act 1990, 
s. 150. 
254
 For a discussion of the relevance of disqualification orders in the UK see Davies and Worthington, n 169 above, para. 10-2. 
The situation is similar in Ireland. Leading cases include Re Tralee Beef and Lamb Ltd (In Liquidation); Kavanagh v Delaney 
[2004] IEHC 139, [2005]1 ILRM 34; Re CB Readymix Ltd (In Liquidation); Cahill v Grimes [2002] 1 I.R. 372; Re Lynrowan 
Enterprises Ltd, unreported, High Court, O’Neill J., July 31, 2002, discussed in the Irish country report. 
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deterrent to misconduct by directors. This assessment indicates that the private enforcement of 
directors’ duties in the respective jurisdictions is hampered, given that the scope of application of 
administrative and criminal sanctions is more restrictive than directors’ duties under civil law, the 
evidentiary burden is higher under criminal law, and public enforcement authorities are often subject to 
resource constraints that do not apply in the same way to private actors. Private litigation should, 
therefore, be the more frequently observed enforcement mechanism. In addition, in some countries 
neither criminal nor civil sanctions are applied regularly. For example, it was submitted that in Cyprus 
discretion whether to instigate criminal proceedings lies in the hands of the Attorney General, but that 
these powers are used rarely and that civil liability for breach of directors’ duties, while also only 
litigated sparingly, is more important. 
 
 
4. Directors’ duties and liability in the vicinity of 
insolvency 
 
This section summarises the findings in relation to directors’ duties in companies approaching 
insolvency. In most jurisdictions, directors’ duties have primarily been designed to address managerial 
agency problems and – partly depending on the prevailing ownership structures – conflicts between 
majority and minority shareholders. Underlying this approach is a notion of shareholders as residual 
risk-bearers within the corporation.
255
 This view is economically justified as long as the company 
possesses a substantial amount of equity capital, which is the value at risk from the shareholders’ 
perspective. However, once a company approaches insolvency – i.e. the equity capital “evaporates” – 
the economic risk borne by shareholders also disappears; this changes the incentives of both 
directors and shareholders.
256
 In this situation, the economic risk is mainly borne by the company’s 
creditors, who assume the role of residual claimants.
257
 All EU Member States have developed legal 
responses to address the problems associated with changed incentives (and roles) as companies 
approach insolvency.
258
 
In the following sections we describe the strategies adopted by Member States in relation to this 
problem, focussing in particular on the legal framework applicable in situations where a company 
attempts to trade its way out of insolvency. Our findings in relation to the insolvency-related duties 
seem to be of particular importance when combined with the private international law framework of 
different Member States. This will be addressed in more detail in Section 5, dealing with cross-border 
issues. 
 
                                                     
255
 See J Winter et al., Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on a Modern Regulatory Framework for 
Company Law in Europe (Brussels, 2002), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/modern/report_en.pdf; see also PL Davies, ‘Directors’ Creditor-Regarding 
Duties in Respect of Trading Decisions Taken in the Vicinity of Insolvency’, (2006) 7 European Business Organization Law 
Review 301. 
256
 See e.g. Davies, ibid; T Bachner, ‘Wrongful Trading – A New European Model for Creditor Protection?’ (2004) 5 European 
Business Organization Law Review 293; H  Eidenmüller, ‘Trading in Times of Crisis: Formal Insolvency Proceedings, workouts 
and the Incentives for Shareholders/Managers’ (2006) 7 European Business Organization Law Review 239. 
257
 Davies, ibid, at 324. 
258
 See also S Kalss and G Eckert, ‚Generalbericht‘ in: S Kalss (ed), Vorstandshaftung in 15 europäischen Ländern (Vienna: 
Linde 2005). 
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4.1 Duty to file for insolvency and wrongful trading prohibitions 
Summary of the country reports in tabulated form 
Table 4.1.a: Duty to file for insolvency and wrongful trading prohibitions  
Country duty to file for insolvency or 
wrongful trading 
Austria duty to file 
Belgium duty to file 
Bulgaria duty to file 
Croatia duty to file 
Cyprus wrongful trading prohibition 
Czech Republic duty to file 
Denmark hybrid approach (both)
259
 
Estonia duty to file 
Finland duty to file 
France duty to file 
Germany duty to file 
Greece duty to file 
Hungary duty to file 
Ireland wrongful trading prohibition 
Italy duty to file 
Latvia duty to file 
Lithuania duty to file 
Luxembourg duty to file 
Malta duty to file 
Netherlands wrongful trading prohibition 
Poland duty to file 
Portugal duty to file 
Romania wrongful trading prohibition 
Slovakia duty to file 
Slovenia duty to file 
Spain duty to file 
Sweden duty to file 
United Kingdom wrongful trading prohibition 
                                                     
259
 Case law has established a rule similar to the UK wrongful trading prohibition. Directors who know (or ought to know) that 
the company has no reasonable prospect of avoiding insolvency must minimise the potential losses to creditors, or else will be 
held liable. In addition, a duty to file for insolvency also applies. 
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Discussion 
Map 4.1.a: Duty to file for insolvency and  
wrongful trading prohibitions in Europe 
 
Legend Countries 
Duty to file 
AT, BE, BG, DE, EE, EL, ES, FR, FI, HR, HU, IT, LV, 
LT, LU, MT, PL, PT, SE, SI, SK 
wrongful trading CY, IE, NL, RO, UK 
Both DK 
 
All Member States examined by us employ one of two main legal strategies to ensure creditors’ 
interests are properly taken into account in near-insolvent companies.
260
  
First, the vast majority of Member States provide for a duty on the part of a company’s directors to 
timely file for insolvency. Typically, this strategy is then buttressed by a consequential liability of 
directors for any depletion of the company’s assets resulting from the delayed insolvency filing. In 
most Member States employing this strategy, this liability can only be enforced by the liquidator, and 
thus results in a proportional satisfaction of all creditors’ claims. 
                                                     
260
 Denmark combines the two approaches; see the Danish Report in Annex I. 
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The second main strategy is very similar in nature. Instead of setting a legal requirement for the 
insolvency filing, some Member States provide for a duty to cease trading at a particular point in time 
where creditors’ interests are at risk. 
The first regulatory strategy is clearly more widely spread. It is triggered by the insolvency of the 
company, rather than merely a threat of insolvency. The “wrongful trading” strategy, on the other 
hand, differs in so far as it does allow companies, for at least a limited time, to continue trading in a 
state of (balance sheet) insolvency.
261
 At the same time, the wrongful trading remedy can – at least in 
theory – be triggered even before the company is formally insolvent. The remedy is based on a 
realistic assessment of a company’s prospects. Thus, directors of a formally insolvent company that 
has a realistic chance to trade its way out of its situation may be justified in continuing the business, 
while directors in a not-yet insolvent company may be obliged to cease its operations where the 
avoidance of a (future) insolvency seems highly unlikely.  
The two legal strategies clearly constitute functional equivalents, and – based on our assessment of 
the Country Reports and or discussions with the Country Experts – the two remedies seem to have at 
least similar effects on the behaviour expectations towards of directors in pre-insolvency situations.  
Differences exist, however. In practice, courts mainly tend to enforce the wrongful trading prohibition 
in relation to companies that are already insolvent.
262
 This may suggests that, in practice, the wrongful 
trading prohibition tends to be triggered at a later stage than duties to immediately file for insolvency 
once the relevant triggering event has occurred.
263
 At the same time, however, empirical research 
suggests that recovery rates in the United Kingdom – a jurisdiction relying on the wrongful trading 
prohibition – are higher than in France and Germany – two jurisdictions adopting the “duty to file”-
strategy.
264
  
It is also worth noting in this context that most jurisdictions adopting the “duty to file”-strategy do allow 
the continuation of trading beyond the point where the company is balance-sheet insolvent. In 
addition, the rules in the examined countries also differ significantly regarding the “triggering event” 
that defines insolvency, which further complicates the analysis. The differences are further highlighted 
by the responses we received to our Hypotheticals.
265
 
 
4.2 Change of directors’ duties 
Summary of the country reports in tabulated form 
Table 4.2.a: Change of directors’ duties  
Country Do the core duties of directors 
change as the company 
approaches insolvency? 
Austria no 
Belgium no 
Bulgaria no 
Croatia no 
Cyprus yes 
                                                     
261
 See e.g. PL Davies, “Directors' Creditor-Regarding Duties in Respect of Trading Decisions Taken in the Vicinity of 
Insolvency” (2006) 7 European Business Organization Law Review (EBOR) 301, 311. 
262
 See e.g. the analysis by T Bachner, “Wrongful Trading – A New European Model for Creditor Protection?” (2004) 5 
European Business Organization Law Review (EBOR) 293-319. 
263
 T Bachner (ibid) exemplifies this by comparing German and English law in this respect. 
264
 See SA Davydenko and JR Franks, “Do Bankruptcy Codes Matter? A Study of Defaults in France, Germany, and the U.K.” 
(2008) 63 The Journal of Finance 565-608, who examine over 2000 SME-insolvencies. See also H Eidenmüller, “Trading in 
Times of Crisis: Formal Insolvency: Proceedings, Workouts and the Incentives for Shareholders/Managers” (2006) 7 European 
Business Organization Law Review (EBOR) 239, 248. 
265
 See Section 4.4 below. 
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Country Do the core duties of directors 
change as the company 
approaches insolvency? 
Czech Republic no 
Denmark yes 
Estonia yes 
Finland no 
France no 
Germany no 
Greece no 
Hungary yes 
Ireland yes 
Italy no 
Latvia yes 
Lithuania no 
Luxembourg no 
Malta yes 
Netherlands no 
Poland no 
Portugal no 
Romania no 
Slovakia no 
Slovenia no 
Spain no 
Sweden no 
United Kingdom yes 
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Discussion 
Map 4.2.a: Change of directors’ duties  
 
Legend Countries 
No change 
AT, BE, BG, CY, CZ, DE, EL, ES, FR, FI, 
HR, IT, LT, LU, NL, PL, PT, RO, SE, SI, SK 
Some changes in 
core duties 
DK, EE, HU, IE, LV, MT, UK 
 
In some Member States, the definition or the scope of the main duties changes as the company 
approaches insolvency. This is true for Denmark,
266
 Estonia, Hungary,
267
 Ireland,
268
 Latvia, Malta, and 
the United Kingdom.
269
 In general, this implies a change from a more shareholder-centric towards a 
more creditor regarding set of objectives, or a change in the application of the general standard of 
care.
270
  
The change in the duties should thus be seen, at least in part, as a consequence of our findings 
regarding the corporate objective (including the definition of the interests of the company) and the 
general scope of directors’ duties.
271
 
 
                                                     
266
 The standard of care appears to be heightened in case of decisions taken in the vicinity of insolvency. 
267
 See the description of the factors mentioned below, section 4.4. 
268
 Duty to consider creditors’ interests can be triggered before company is insolvent. 
269
 Where the company is approaching (cash-flow) insolvency, the duties owed to the company (s172 Companies Act 2006) 
become duties to promote the success of the company for the benefit of both creditors and shareholders. 
270
 As seems to be the case in relation to Denmark. 
271
 See also the analysis by PL Davies, “Directors' Creditor-Regarding Duties in Respect of Trading Decisions Taken in the 
Vicinity of Insolvency” (2006) 7 European Business Organization Law Review (EBOR) 301. 
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4.3 Re-capitalise or liquidate 
Summary of the country reports in tabulated form 
Table 4.2.a: Change of directors’ duties 
Country Re-capitalisiation rule or mere 
duty to convene meeting? 
Austria Convene GM 
Belgium Convene GM 
Bulgaria Duty to re-capitalise 
Croatia Convene GM 
Cyprus Convene GM 
Czech Republic Duty to re-capitalise 
Denmark Convene GM 
Estonia Duty to re-capitalise 
Finland Convene GM 
France Duty to re-capitalise 
Germany Convene GM 
Greece Convene GM 
Hungary Convene GM 
Ireland Convene GM 
Italy Duty to re-capitalise 
Latvia Duty to re-capitalise 
Lithuania Duty to re-capitalise 
Luxembourg Duty to re-capitalise 
Malta Convene GM 
Netherlands Convene GM 
Poland Convene GM 
Portugal Duty to re-capitalise 
Romania Convene GM 
Slovakia Convene GM 
Slovenia Convene GM 
Spain Duty to re-capitalise 
Sweden Duty to re-capitalise 
United Kingdom Convene GM 
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Discussion 
 
 
Legend Countries 
Duty to convene only 
AT, BE, HR, CY, DK, FI, DE, EL, HU, IE, 
MT, NL, PL, RO, SK, SI, UK, BG, CZ 
Recapitalise or 
liquidate 
EE , FR , IT , LV , LT, LU , PT, ES , SE 
 
An additional regulatory strategy at least indirectly affects the duties in the vicinity of insolvency is the 
so-called “re-capitalise or liquidate” rule. Throughout the European Union, the Second Company Law 
Directive
272
 provides for a duty to call a general meeting in case of a “serious loss”, which is defined 
as a loss of half
273
 of the subscribed share capital (i.e. the reduction of the company’s net assets to 
less than half the share capital).
274
 
                                                     
272
 See now Directive 2012/30/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on coordination of 
safeguards which, for the protection of the interests of members and others, are required by Member States of companies 
within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 54 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, in respect of 
the formation of public limited liability companies and the maintenance and alteration of their capital, with a view to making such 
safeguards equivalent, OJ 2012 L 315/74. 
273
 See ibid, Art. 19; Member States can also set the threshold for serious losses at a lower level, ibid Art. 19(2). 
274
 This is assessed on a cumulated basis; see Jonathan Rickford, Reforming Capital: Report of the Interdisciplinary Group on 
Capital Maintenance, 15 European Business Law Review 919, 940 (2004). 
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But while the Second Directive requires the calling of a general meeting in these circumstances, it 
does not require companies to take any specific action. In so far as Art 19 of the Second Directive only 
requires a meeting of the shareholders, the rule does not seem to follow a clear economic rationale.  
First, the reference to the subscribed capital is, in itself, not a meaningful triggering event. The 
subscribed share capital will not be a particularly useful reference point, as this figure says virtually 
nothing about the assets or capital needs of a company.
275
 Second, even (or particular) where the 
event of losses amounting to more than 50% of the subscribed share capital is a significant point in 
time in the company’s life, it is at least questionable to rely on shareholders intervening at this point in 
time. In fact, to the extent that this event coincides with the company becoming significantly 
undercapitalised, shareholders’ incentives are distorted, since limited liability will often mean that an 
increase in the company’s risk profile also leads to an increase in the value of their shares. 
A majority of the Member States have implemented Art 17 of the Second Directive as a mere duty to 
call a meeting. The interviews with the practitioners in these jurisdictions suggested that shareholders 
do not usually resolve on any significant matters in the general meeting called under the implementing 
national company law provisions. It seems, therefore, that – at least in these Member States – the rule 
produces costs without offering any significant benefits to companies, shareholders or creditors. 
A third of the Member States, however, goes beyond this minimum requirement. These Member 
States require companies to choose, upon loss of half of their subscribed share capital, between 
either re-capitalising the company or winding down its operations and liquidating the company. This 
position is taken by the Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal, Spain, and 
Sweden. The effect of the “re-capitalise or liquidate” rule on near-insolvency trading is twofold. First, it 
aims at making it less likely for companies with significant nominal share capital to trade in a state of 
capital depletion. Second, duty-related enforcement mechanisms are directly linked to this strategy, as 
failure to ensure that appropriate capital measures are taken at this very early stage lead to the liability 
of board members. Our findings suggest that enforcement of duties related to the “re-capitalise or 
liquidate” rule mainly happens once insolvency proceedings have been opened, but the existence of 
the rule may have a significant impact on directors’ incentives as the company approaches insolvency. 
 
4.4 Other strategies 
In the preceding sections, we have identified the four main legal strategies used by Member States to 
address the problem of inefficient risk-shifting in the vicinity of insolvency: the duty of company 
directors to file for the opening of insolvency proceedings; liability attached to a “wrongful trading” 
prohibition; changes to the content of directors’ duties as a company approaches insolvency; and the 
“recapitalise or liquidate” rule. These strategies are of course complemented, in all jurisdictions, by a 
number of additional elements.
276
  
As “general” duties of directors continue to apply in the vicinity of insolvency, the effectiveness of a 
regulatory framework will also depend on the effectiveness with which these general duties can be 
enforced. Since most analysed jurisdictions additionally subject managerial decisions that may have 
led to insolvency to scrutiny based on their general directors’ duties-framework, business decisions in 
near-insolvency situations are also influenced by the standards of review as well as the enforcement 
mechanisms applicable under the general framework. For example, to the extent that the liability of 
directors can be limited through the articles, and provided that such limitation remains valid in 
insolvency,
277
 the liability risk of directors may also be reduced for actions taken as the company 
                                                     
275
 See e.g. J Rickford et al., ‘Reforming Capital: Report of the Interdisciplinary Group on Capital Maintenance’ (2004) 15 
European Business Law Review 919; J Armour, ‘Legal Capital: an Outdated Concept?’ (2006) 7 European Business 
Organization Law Review 5. 
276
 This complementarity may potentially create frictions in cross-border situations, which will also be addressed in more detail 
in section 5. 
277
 See section 2.7. above. Lithuania and Romania, for instance, permit a limitation of liability for certain types of conduct (but 
not in cases of gross negligence or intent). 
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approaches insolvency. Likewise, the possible liability-reducing effects of the business judgement 
rule
278
 also affect the liability risks in near-insolvent firms. 
A number of Member States use general civil law (especially tort law) remedies cumulatively with the 
directors’ duties-centred strategies mentioned above. For example Art 1382 French Civil Code 
provides that “[a]ny act whatever of man, which causes damage to another, obliges the one by whose 
fault it occurred, to compensate it.” The same is true for other jurisdictions of French legal origin such 
as in Belgium
279
 and Luxembourg.
280
 Countries of other legal origin also often use open-ended tort law 
provisions that allow for flexible interpretation and may also be applied to establish liability of directors 
of insolvent or near-insolvent companies. For instance the Dutch,
281
; German
282
 and Austrian Civil 
Codes
283
 contain open-ended provisions that may and have been
284
 used to hold directors liable in 
such circumstances. Moreover, such general tort law concepts also inform the interpretation of the 
relevant company law remedies. 
These alternative remedies are typically not linked to the incorporation of the company, but follow 
different classifications for private international law purposes. This potentially subjects corporate 
directors to claims in multiple jurisdictions; this will be addressed in Section 5 below.  
Apart from tort law-based remedies, Member States differ significantly in their use of criminal law 
sanctions in relation to conduct resulting in damages for corporate creditors. Rigid criminal law 
enforcement of insolvency-related misconduct by company directors often also plays a role in 
producing the evidence that may then be used in civil actions. From the creditors’ perspective, the 
advantages are, first, that the investigations producing the evidence are the publicly funded, and 
second that prosecutors have more powers to conduct the investigation. This is particularly relevant 
where criminal law mirrors, or is linked to, the relevant company and insolvency law provisions. In 
relation to the duty to file this is true, for instance, in Poland, where the failure to file for insolvency 
itself is a criminal offence.
285
 Based on the interviews conducted with practitioners in France, for 
example, the combination of criminal investigation and subsequent private enforcement of directors’ 
duties is of high practical relevance in small and mid-sized companies.
286
  
Moreover, some jurisdictions require the competent insolvency administrators or liquidators to bring or 
examine potential claims the insolvent company may have against its directors.
287
 This can help 
overcome the problem that in most small and mid-sized companies, directors are typically also major 
shareholders, and will often have invested a significant portion of their available assets in the (now 
insolvent) firm. Thus, from a creditors’ perspective the enforcement of duties against insolvent 
companies’ directors will often not be economically viable, given the limited assets the defendants 
possess. Likewise, the evidence provided by the practitioners suggests that incentives of 
administrators or liquidators often play an important role: where administrators do not sufficiently 
benefit from bringing legal actions against company directors, even where these actions are 
successful, this may contribute to perceived low levels of enforcement. 
Finally, the director disqualification and eligibility provisions also affect the incentives of directors in 
near-insolvent firms. However, the effectiveness of these remedies is to some extent inhibited by the 
mobility of companies across the EU, and the resulting choice of applicable company law. This 
problem will be addressed in section 5.2.3 below. 
 
                                                     
278
 See Section 2.4.3 above. 
279
 Belgian Civil Code, arts 1382, 1383. 
280
 Luxembourg Civil Code, arts 1382, 1383. 
281
 See s 6:162(1): “A person who commits a tortious act (unlawful act) against another person that can be attributed to him, 
must repair the damage that this other person has suffered as a result thereof”. 
282
 See s 823(2): “a person who commits a breach of a statute that is intended to protect another person” is liable for damages. 
283
 See s 1311 of the Austrian Civil Code. 
284
 See for example the German Federal Court of Justice (BGH), judgment of 06 June 1994, II ZR 292/91, BGHZ 126, 181. 
285
 See s 586 of the Polish Criminal Code; see also M Zurek in M Siems and D Cabrelli (eds) Comparative Company Law – A 
Case-Based Approach (Oxford: Hart 2013) 45. 
286
 See also P-H Conac in: M Siems and D Cabrelli (eds) Comparative Company Law – A Case-Based Approach (Oxford: Hart 
2013) 35. 
287
 This is true, for instance, in Spain, where claims against directors are brought in more than 80% of the cases. 
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4.5 How and at what point in time do the remedies operate 
Our findings suggest that significant differences exist in relation to the existence of special vicinity of 
insolvency duties as well as, where applicable, the relevant “triggering event” for such duties in the 
vicinity of insolvency to apply.  
First, the divergence in Member States’ laws can be attributed to general differences in the applicable 
insolvency laws. Although all examined jurisdictions attach importance to both, balance-sheet and 
cash-flow insolvency, differences exist in the relative emphasis any given jurisdictions puts on these 
two criteria. While the general insolvency law framework lies outside the main scope of our Report, 
questions relating to the duties in the vicinity of insolvency cannot fully be separated from the general 
insolvency law framework.  
Moreover, a closer examination is necessary, including in relation to those jurisdictions that do not 
provide for a formal change to the core duties of directors as the company approaches insolvency.
288
 
Although most Member States do not adapt the formal definition of the behavioural standards against 
which to assess directors’ actions in “near-insolvent” companies, the application of the general duties 
may have similar effects in practice, depending on the interpretation of the legal rules by local courts. 
To capture this effect and in order to gain a better understanding of the application of duties in the 
vicinity of insolvency, we designed a hypothetical case
289
 and asked our Country Experts to give us 
feedback on the likely outcome of a case of this nature under their national law. In addition, we used 
the context created through our cases to ask related questions about the rules applicable to near-
insolvent companies. The answers we have received are summarised in the table below. 
As can be seen from the summary, the Member States differ in their approaches to resolving the case 
described, as do the likely outcomes.  
The case
290
 involves a thinly capitalised
291
 company whose directors enter into a derivative contract. 
Under that contract, the company faces the risk of losses that would wipe out the company’s 
remaining equity, although the directors consider the risk to be low. Overall, the situation described 
involves the directors taking a business decision favourable to the company’s shareholders and 
potentially detrimental to creditors. Under the laws of most Member States, the actions of the directors 
would not result in the liability of directors.
292
 
 
 
Table 4.4.a Answers to questions  
covered by Hypothetical II  
Country Do fiduciary duties 
prevent directors 
from entering into 
particularly risky 
transactions as 
the one described 
in H-II?  
What is the relevant 
“triggering event”? 
Likely outcome in cases 
covered by H-II 
Austria Yes, if there is a 
substantial risk of 
wiping out 
remaining equity. 
Based, inter alia, on 
criminal law liability 
for harming 
No particular 
“triggering event” 
referring to equity 
ratios or the like 
Generally recognized 
that fewer risks may 
be taken once the 
Given that the company is not 
insolvent, although weakly 
capitalised, at the time the  
decision to trade is made, and 
taking into account that the 
company’s business model is 
not per se unsustainable, 
liability under “duty to file” rules 
                                                     
288
 See Section 4.2 above. 
289
 See Hypothetical II, Annex. 
290
 The full text made available to our Country Experts can be found in the Annex. 
291
 We used equity ratios of 1%, 5%, or 10%, and stated that on average comparable companies in the same line of business 
operate with an equity ratio of about 25%. 
292
 Liability would, however, be likely under the laws of the Czech Republic, France, Greece, and Hungary. 
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Country Do fiduciary duties 
prevent directors 
from entering into 
particularly risky 
transactions as 
the one described 
in H-II?  
What is the relevant 
“triggering event”? 
Likely outcome in cases 
covered by H-II 
creditors. company’s financial 
situation becomes 
“critical”.
293
 
Directors should be 
discouraged from 
“gambling way out of 
insolvency” 
would not apply. 
Directors may be liable 
depending on ex ante 
assessment of riskiness of the 
transaction. Even though they 
still had some equity cushion, 
they would not have been 
allowed to take a “substantial 
risk” of wiping out the 
company’s remaining equity. 
Belgium Relevant question is 
whether 
“reasonable 
director” would have 
entered into the 
transaction 
Where business is 
“unreasonably” 
continued after 
company is 
insolvent, liability 
attaches based on 
Art. 527 CC 
(enforceable by the 
company/liquidator) 
and Art. 1382 Civil 
Code (enforceable 
directly by any 
injured party) 
Unclear whether 
duties change at all.  
In any case, no clear 
triggering event 
Duty to convene 
would, however, apply 
Disputed whether (and if, when) 
duty of loyalty (to act in good 
faith and have regard to the 
company’s interest) changes in 
the vicinity of insolvency. 
Relevant question here is 
whether “reasonable director” 
would have entered into the 
transaction. If so, business 
judgement falls within the 
acceptable margin of discretion. 
Company will have lost half of 
its capital before entering into 
transaction. In case the relevant 
formalities have not been 
complied with, presumption that 
this caused damage to 
company and creditors. 
Bulgaria No duty that 
prevents directors 
from entering into 
particularly risky 
transactions per se, 
even if thinly 
capitalised 
No specific vicinity of 
insolvency duties apart 
from duty to convene 
meeting of 
shareholders when 
equity falls below 
registered capital or 
where losses exceed 
25% of the registered 
capital, but no change 
of duties at that point 
Probably no liability if directors 
complied with duty to convene 
the general meeting, as 
company was neither cash-flow 
insolvent nor over-indebted at 
the time of entering into the 
transaction. 
Croatia No specific rules 
that would prevent 
risky transactions in 
companies with thin 
equity cushion 
Only general duty of 
care and business 
judgement apply 
No specific vicinity of 
insolvency duties apart 
from duty to convene 
meeting of 
shareholders when 
half of the company’s 
share capital is lost, 
but no change of 
duties at that point 
Duties of directors remain 
unchanged despite the thin 
equity cushion. Thus, the 
relevant question is whether the 
business decision to enter into 
transaction was taken with due 
care and in good faith for the 
benefit of the company 
Cyprus Possible that 
English case law 
regarding the 
intrusion of creditor 
interests apply in 
Duty to convene 
meeting of 
shareholders when 
half of the company’s 
share capital is lost, 
Unlikely that director would be 
held liable absent fraudulent 
preference vis-à-vis certain 
creditors  
                                                     
293
 See generally C Nowotny in: P Doralt, C Nowotny, and S Kalss (eds.), Commentary to the Stock Corporation Act (2
nd
 ed; 
Vienna: Manz 2012) § 84 No 9. 
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Country Do fiduciary duties 
prevent directors 
from entering into 
particularly risky 
transactions as 
the one described 
in H-II?  
What is the relevant 
“triggering event”? 
Likely outcome in cases 
covered by H-II 
specific 
circumstances, but 
uncertain due to 
lack of case law 
but no change of 
duties at that point 
Czech Republic Application of 
general duty of 
care, but fact-
specific 
assessment, taking 
into account the 
company’s financial 
position 
No clearly defined, 
separate concept of 
vicinity of insolvency 
(but duty to convene 
applies) 
Directors would most likely be 
liable because the application of 
the duty of care suggests that 
company’s equity cushion is too 
thin for the transaction in 
question. 
Denmark No specific 
prohibition of, or 
restriction in relation 
to risky transaction. 
However, a 
generally 
heightened 
standard of care 
applies in thinly 
capitalised 
companies 
No clear definition of 
triggering event 
Case law suggests 
that the relevant point 
in time is defined by 
there not being a 
reasonable prospect 
for saving company 
Most likely no liability provided 
that decision was taken bona 
fide and with sufficient 
information. 
Danish version of the business 
judgement rule would likely 
apply 
Finland Application of 
general duty of 
care, but situation-
specific 
assessment, taking 
into account the 
company’s financial 
position 
Duty to convene 
meeting of 
shareholders when 
half of the company’s 
share capital is lost, 
but no change of 
duties at that point 
Absent criminal conduct 
(dishonesty, fraudulent 
conveyance, etc.), directors 
would probably not be liable 
based on their entering into the 
transaction before company is 
insolvent 
France Application of 
general duty of 
care, but situation-
specific 
assessment, taking 
into account the risk 
involved in 
transaction 
No specific pre-
insolvency duty 
Given the circumstances, 
directors would likely be held 
liable for causing insolvency of 
the company in breach of their 
(heightened) duty of care 
Germany Companies must 
not enter into 
particularly risky 
transactions if they 
pose an existential 
risk to the company 
Directors may not 
enter into 
transactions that 
entail a substantial 
risk of the company 
not surviving 
No specific definition 
of a triggering event 
Duty of directors to 
keep company 
appropriately 
capitalised for activity 
pursued 
Directors are not likely to be 
held liable in the described 
situation, since company is not 
yet insolvent (albeit weakly 
capitalised) 
Directors may be liable, if 
assessment of riskiness of the 
transaction means that 
company is not appropriately 
capitalised for the activity 
pursued.  
However, it is accepted that 
directors, even directors of 
thinly capitalised companies, 
are not under an obligation to 
act in the primary interest of 
creditors instead of the interest 
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Country Do fiduciary duties 
prevent directors 
from entering into 
particularly risky 
transactions as 
the one described 
in H-II?  
What is the relevant 
“triggering event”? 
Likely outcome in cases 
covered by H-II 
of the company. 
Greece Yes. “Prudent 
businessman” 
standard continues 
to apply in adapted 
form. Prevailing 
view is that, as the 
company 
approaches 
insolvency, 
directors must take 
care of creditors’ 
interests in priority 
to those of the 
company and the 
shareholders 
No clear definition of 
triggering event 
Prevailing view is that 
the relevant point in 
time is defined by 
there not being a 
reasonable prospect 
for saving company 
with “prudent 
management” (i.e. 
without taking 
excessive risk) 
In the case at hand. directors 
will probably face liability 
towards creditors under Article 
98 of the Bankruptcy Code, i.e. 
for causing  insolvency. 
In addition, internal liability 
towards the company will also 
apply. 
Hungary No specific rule on 
risk-taking. 
Relevant question is 
compliance with 
business judgement 
standards, and here 
the determining 
factor is whether 
risks taken were 
unreasonable 
No clear triggering 
event 
Relevant test is threat 
of insolvency, to be 
assessed on the basis 
of a liquidity forecast. 
Factors, like the status 
of the company’s 
markets, business 
trends, and various 
economic factors play 
a role, too. 
The directors prepared the 
transaction with the reasonable 
care, but left the company 
unprotected against a risk. 
Although risk was judged to be 
low company was threatened 
with insolvency. Risk could 
have been mitigated/insured 
against 
The decision involving such a 
risk would presumably be held 
as exceeding “normal business 
risks”. Thus, directors are to be 
held failing to act in compliance 
with the required duty of care 
and their liability may be 
established vis-á-vis the 
company. If the company 
entered liquidation , direct 
liability vis-á-vis the creditors. 
Ireland Yes - duty to 
consider the 
interests of creditors 
will displace the 
duty to act in the 
interests of the 
company 
No clear definition of 
the vicinity of 
insolvency.  
Case law suggests 
that a formal 
declaration of 
insolvency or initiation 
of insolvency 
processes need not 
have occurred for duty 
to consider creditors’ 
interests to be 
triggered. 
Courts are, however, 
pragmatic and 
recognise that the 
directors should not be 
under a duty to cease 
trading immediately 
provided that there is a 
chance that the 
It is likely that a sympathetic 
approach would be taken 
considering the exceptional 
nature of the fall in oil prices. 
Judges are careful not to 
second-guess business 
decisions with hindsight. 
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Country Do fiduciary duties 
prevent directors 
from entering into 
particularly risky 
transactions as 
the one described 
in H-II?  
What is the relevant 
“triggering event”? 
Likely outcome in cases 
covered by H-II 
company could trade 
its way out of its 
difficulties. 
Italy With the exception 
of gross negligence 
(eg. Cass.8 May 
1991 n. 5123 in 
Foro it, 1992, I, 
817), Italian courts 
will not second-
guess managerial 
decisions. However, 
duty of care 
standard applies. 
There is no definition 
of ‘vicinity of 
insolvency’ under 
Italian law and it is 
unlikely that a director 
can be considered to 
have a duty to protect 
the interests of 
creditors before (some 
or all of) the 
requirements for an 
insolvency declaration 
are present. 
Based on the facts of the case, 
the conditions for a duty to 
apply for insolvency 
proceedings had not been met.  
The directors’ decision was 
difficult and risky, but would 
probably be acceptable on the 
basis of the market conditions 
at the time when it was made. 
Netherlands There is no specific 
regulation in Dutch 
law preventing 
directors from 
entering into 
particularly risky 
transactions. 
No formal change of 
duty of company 
directors from 
shareholder interests 
to creditors’ interests, 
in the vicinity of 
insolvency. 
Case law suggests, 
however, that at a 
moment where 
directors should have 
realised that the 
company will not be 
able to meet its future 
obligations, the 
directors are liable 
under tort law 
principles 
In this case the risk seems to be 
rather calculated and it is 
unlikely that directors would be 
held liability for the 
consequences of the sudden 
sovereign debt crisis and the 
worldwide economic crisis 
following from that.  
This, however, depends on the 
level of predictability of the 
crisis, as assessed by a careful 
company director at the time the 
transaction was entered into. 
Poland This is being 
discussed in legal 
literature. The 
current consensus 
seems to be that 
even very risky 
transactions 
entered into by a 
still-solvent 
company do not 
lead to liability of 
directors 
No specific new duties 
or rules that apply in 
the vicinity of 
insolvency (apart from 
duty to convene the 
general meeting) 
Most likely no liability based on 
facts described in Hypothetical 
II 
Portugal Duties of directors 
only prevent them 
from entering into 
transactions or 
taking decisions 
involving 
disproportionate or 
unreasonable risks  
No express 
acknowledgement of 
vicinity of insolvency 
duties 
No specific legal 
provision directly 
providing for a shift of 
directors’ duties 
towards creditors 
Most likely no liability, if 
decision was taken in an 
informed way, free of any 
personal interest and according 
to the standard of 
“entrepreneurial rationality” 
Romania No Romanian law does No liability. Provided the other 
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Country Do fiduciary duties 
prevent directors 
from entering into 
particularly risky 
transactions as 
the one described 
in H-II?  
What is the relevant 
“triggering event”? 
Likely outcome in cases 
covered by H-II 
Business judgement 
rule continues to 
apply. As long as 
risk-taking is not 
unreasonable, no 
prima facie 
restrictions in 
relation to risk-
taking, even in 
near-insolvent 
companies 
not modify directors’ 
duties in the vicinity of 
insolvency. Remedies 
operate only upon 
company is insolvent. 
Law does not require 
directors to act in the 
interest of creditors 
before company 
enters into insolvency 
conditions are met, directors will 
be protected by business 
judgement rule as long as risk-
taking was not “unreasonable”.  
Liability will not arise unless and 
until the company is insolvent. 
Directors may, but are not 
obliged to file for insolvency 
proceedings where insolvency 
is “imminent” 
Slovenia No specific rule on 
risk-taking. 
Relevant question is 
compliance with 
duty of care, and 
liability arises where 
insolvency has 
been caused in 
breach of this duty 
Slovenian company 
law does not define a 
point in time after 
which duties are 
applied differently 
Unclear whether liability would 
exist – this depends on the 
assessment of the directors’ 
action against the general care 
standard. 
Spain No specific rule on 
risk-taking 
general duty of care 
continues to apply 
Spanish law does not 
provide additional 
duties in situations of 
financial distress. 
Duties continue to 
apply in the vicinity of 
insolvency without 
significant adjustments  
A so-called 
“suspicious period”, is, 
however, recognised, 
covering the two years 
preceding the opening 
of the insolvency. A 
special liability applies 
for certain actions 
during that time, but 
no liability is created 
for actions that would 
not also have been 
illegal in solvent 
company. 
Liability would most likely not 
arise, unless “recapitalise or 
liquidate” rule has not been 
complied with. 
United 
Kingdom 
Yes - when a 
company is 
operating in the 
zone of / 
approaching cash-
flow insolvency the 
duties owed to the 
company (s172 
Companies Act 
2006) become 
duties to promote 
the success of the 
The law remains 
somewhat unclear on 
what is the “verge” of 
insolvency and in what 
ways creditors 
interests are taken into 
account in this zone 
(priority versus 
plurality). 
On these facts the risk of failure 
that is apparent would mean 
that the interests of creditors 
would intrude. However, the 
business judgment taken to buy 
the futures would be judged 
according to the section 172 
standard which is a subjective 
standard (in practice a 
rationality standard). There 
appeared at the time to be a 
sound basis for this decision, 
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Country Do fiduciary duties 
prevent directors 
from entering into 
particularly risky 
transactions as 
the one described 
in H-II?  
What is the relevant 
“triggering event”? 
Likely outcome in cases 
covered by H-II 
company for the 
benefit of both 
creditors and 
shareholders and to 
take due care in so 
doing.  
Once company is 
insolvent those 
duties are then to 
promote the 
interests of the 
creditors alone and 
to take care in so 
doing 
accordingly there would be no 
breach. In relation to the duty of 
care the facts suggest that due 
care was taken which would 
comply with the UK’s dual 
subjective / objective care 
standard. 
Wrongful trading: although 
wrongful trading could provide a 
remedy when taking risky 
decisions in the zone of 
insolvency, the facts suggest 
(low probability of price drop) 
that this would not provide a 
remedy in this context. The 
remedy imposes creditor 
regarding obligations when a 
director should have realised 
there was no way of avoiding 
insolvent liquidation. The law 
has not attempted to define the 
probability of avoidance 
required by this provision. The 
low probability suggested in the 
facts would not be sufficient. 
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5. Cross-border issues 
 
The findings in Sections 1 through Section 4 of this Part highlight the significant differences in the 
substantive law as well as in the enforcement of directors’ duties and liabilities throughout the 
European Union. This section aims at highlighting the areas where these differences may create 
particular challenges as a consequence of cross-border operation or administration of companies. 
 
5.1 Real seat and incorporation theories 
Summary of the country reports in tabulated form 
 
Table 5.1.a: Private international law rules and “connecting factors” in Europe 
Country Primary 
connecting 
factor? 
Did the 
position 
change as a 
consequence 
of the 
jurisprudence 
of the Court 
of Justice of 
the European 
Union? 
Rule dependent 
on company 
falling under Art 
54 TFEU? 
Remarks 
Austria 
real seat 
(headquarter, 
jurisdiction in 
which central 
business 
decisions are 
made and 
implemented) 
no explicit 
change, but 
direct 
applicability of 
Treaty leads to 
changed result 
effectively yes, 
since courts cannot 
apply statutory 
rules to Art 54-
companies 
statutory rule; not applied by 
courts to companies falling under 
Art 54 TFEU since Centros 
decision of the ECJ 
Belgium 
real seat 
("principal 
establishment") 
no explicit 
change, but 
direct 
applicability of 
Treaty leads to 
changed result 
effectively yes, 
since courts cannot 
apply statutory 
rules to Art 54-
companies 
statutory rule; renvoi possible; 
courts will not normally apply the 
statutory rule to companies falling 
under Art 54 TFEU (disputed) 
The transfer of a company’s “real 
seat” in combination of a re-
registration without dissolution (as 
required by the Treaty) is 
recognised. 
Bulgaria 
incorporation / 
registration no no 
incorporation doctrine had already 
applied before Bulgaria joined the 
EU 
Croatia 
incorporation / 
registration no no 
Croatia applies the incorporation 
doctrine to all foreign entities 
Cyprus 
incorporation / 
registration no no 
Follows the common law tradition 
in referring to the country of 
incorporation; 
National companies are not 
restricted in moving their 
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administrative seat out of Cyprus. 
Czech 
Republic 
incorporation / 
registration no no 
While the applicable law is 
determined based on the place of 
incorporation, certain substantive 
law rules apply to foreign 
incorporated entities. 
National companies are not 
restricted in moving their 
administrative seat out of the 
Czech Republic. 
Denmark 
incorporation / 
registration 
not in relation 
to the private 
international 
law rule no 
“Scandinavian version” of 
incorporation theory, but Danish 
companies are required to have 
and maintain a "real link" with 
Denmark for Danish company law 
to apply; Centros, which 
concerned a UK company 
established by Danes, rendered 
inapplicable an "outreach"-type
294
 
statute 
Estonia real seat yes Yes 
Traditionally applied real seat 
doctrine 
Finland 
incorporation / 
registration no no 
“Scandinavian version” of 
incorporation theory. 
France mixed 
unclear; no 
change of the 
statutory rule, 
and 
depending on 
interpretation 
of the rule by 
the courts, the 
application of 
French law to 
foreign 
companies 
may be 
compatible 
with the Treaty 
no, although this 
may ultimately 
depend on the 
courts' 
interpretation of 
the "no escape" 
doctrine 
The primary connecting factor is 
the statutory seat. Specific 
provisions of French law can 
apply to companies having their 
real seat in France (based on 
residence of directors and place 
of decision-making), however. 
This is decided on a case by case 
basis. The few cases so far dealt 
with criminal law liability. The 
main reasoning behind the 
application of French law to 
foreign entities seems to be an 
attempted "escape" from French 
law; as such, this may also apply 
to directors' duties. 
In any event, moving the real seat 
into France does not lead to 
automatic dissolution, but may 
trigger requirement to re-register 
Germany 
real seat 
(headquarter, 
jurisdiction in 
which central 
business 
decisions are 
made and yes 
yes, but some 
lower courts have 
applied this to non-
EU companies, too 
No explicit codified rule, but 
prevailing view in both court 
opinions and scholarly writing. 
Not applied by courts to 
companies falling under Art 54 
TFEU since Centros decision of 
the ECJ 
                                                     
294
 I.e. a statute that lays down specific additional substantive law rules applicable to companies incorporated abroad, but 
maintaining a close connection with another jurisdiction. 
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implemented) German private limited 
companies may locate their real 
seats outside Germany while 
remaining subject to German 
law.
295
 
Greece real seat yes 
yes, but also 
applies to 
companies formed 
under the laws of 
certain other 
countries (including 
the US) and to 
companies in 
certain business 
sectors - in 
particular to 
shipping 
companies 
shipping companies and 
companies formed in certain 
countries with which special 
treaties have been concluded are 
exempted from the application 
from the real seat doctrine. This 
also applies to Art 54-companies 
due to the direct applicability of 
the Treaty; no change of statutory 
law. 
National companies can still move 
their real seat out of Greece 
Hungary 
incorporation / 
registration no no 
Hungary applies the incorporation 
doctrine to all foreign-
incorporated companies 
Hungary previously required that 
companies established under 
Hungarian law maintain their real 
seat in Hungary.
296
 This 
requirement has since been 
abolished.
297
 
Ireland 
incorporation / 
registration no no 
Generally follows the common 
law tradition in referring to the 
country of incorporation.  
In relation to some matters, 
position is somewhat unclear: The 
duty of care in tort (but not the 
equitable duty of care) will be 
governed based on the proper 
law of the tort based on the place 
where the substance of the tort 
arose, and may thus apply to 
companies incorporated abroad. 
National companies are not 
limited in moving their 
administrative seat out of Ireland. 
Italy mixed yes yes 
The primary connecting factor is 
the statutory seat. However, 
Italian company law applies to 
companies having their real seat 
("principal activity) in Italy, 
irrespective of the state of 
incorporation. This does no longer 
apply to Art 54-companies, 
although certain mandatory Italian 
                                                     
295
 See s.4a German Private Limited Company Act; s.5a German AktG. 
296
 See the Cartesio judgment of the Court of Justice, Case C-210/06 [2008] ECR I-09641. 
297
 See V Korom and P Metzinger, “Freedom of Establishment for Companies: the European Court of Justice confirms and 
refines its Daily Mail Decision in the Cartesio Case C-210/06” (2009) 6 European Company and Financial Law Review 125. 
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law rules may continue to apply to 
such entities (where compatible 
with the Treaty), including criminal 
law rules. No change of statutory 
rules as a consequence of 
Centros, but courts will not apply 
Italian company law to foreign EU 
companies 
Latvia real seat yes yes   
Lithuania real seat yes yes   
Luxembourg real seat yes yes 
National companies can move 
their administrative seat out of 
Luxembourg despite real seat 
approach. 
Malta 
Incorporation 
theory 
no no Follows the common law tradition 
in referring to the country of 
incorporation. National companies 
are not limited in moving their 
administrative seat out of Malta. 
Netherlands 
incorporation / 
registration 
not in relation 
to the private 
international 
law rule no 
Adopted incorporation theory in 
1959.
298
 
The Foreign Companies Act 
continues to apply, but since 
Inspire Art no longer applicable to 
Art 54-companies. The conflict of 
law rule has not been affected by 
the jurisprudence of the ECJ 
Poland unclear yes unclear 
Polish private international law 
has recently been changed 
(2011). The new provisions define 
the seat of the company as the 
connecting factor, but do not 
define the concept of the "seat". 
The emerging consensus among 
legal scholars seems to interpret 
the "seat" as a reference to the 
place of incorporation, which 
would mark a deviation from the 
traditional real seat doctrine 
applied in Poland. However, this 
has not yet been tested in the 
courts. In relation to Art 54-
companies, the consensus 
among legal scholars is that only 
the place of incorporation should 
be taken into account in 
determining the applicable law 
Portugal real seat yes yes 
No change of statutory law, but 
accepted by courts that real seat 
doctrine cannot be used to 
impose Portuguese company law 
on Art 54-companies. Third 
parties may rely on the 
                                                     
298
 See S Lombardo, “Conflict of Law Rules in Company Law after Überseering” (2004) 4 European Business Organization Law 
Review (EBOR) 301, 311. 
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application of the law of 
incorporation irrespective of the 
real seat. 
Companies have to accept being 
subjected to incorporation law in 
dealings with third parties. In 
addition, companies with their real 
seat in Portugal are under an 
obligation to incorporate under 
Portuguese law.
299
 
Romania 
incorporation / 
registration no no   
Slovakia 
incorporation / 
registration no no   
Slovenia real seat probably yes yes not applied to Art 54-companies 
Spain mixed form probably yes yes 
The position of Spain is not 
entirely clear. The majority 
opinion seems to be that the 
domicilio of a company – the 
determining factor for the 
applicable law – is equivalent to 
the country of incorporation. 
Some scholars take the view, 
however, that the domicilio is to 
be interpreted as the location of 
its central administration.  
Companies incorporated in Spain 
are subject to Spanish law 
irrespective of the location of their 
central administration. 
Sweden 
incorporation / 
registration no no 
“Scandinavian version” of 
incorporation theory. 
United 
Kingdom 
incorporation / 
registration no no 
Incorporation doctrine tradition 
based on common law 
                                                     
299
 See in more detail Section 5 of the Portuguese Report, Annex I. 
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Discussion 
Map 5.1.a: Private international law approaches to  
foreign incorporated entities across Europe 
 
Legend Country 
Real seat doctrine  AT, BE, BG, HR, EE, EL, DE, LV, 
LT, LU, MT, SI 
Incorporation doctrine 
CZ, DK, FI, HU, IE, NL, RO, SE, 
SK, UK 
Mixed approach FR, ES, IT, PT 
Unclear  PL 
 
 
The Court of Justice of the European Union, with its decisions in Centros
300
 and subsequent cases,
301
 
has in effect significantly increased the availability of foreign company law forms to incorporators 
across Europe. As a result, a growing number of companies headquartered – and sometimes 
                                                     
300
 Case C-212/97 Centros Ltd. v Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen, [1999] ECR I-1459. 
301
 See, in particular, Case C-208/00, [2002] ECR I-9919 Überseering BV v Nordic Construction Company Baumanagement 
GmbH (NCC) (“Überseering”); Case C-167/01, [2003] ECR I-10195 Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v 
Inspire Art Ltd (“Inspire Art”); Case C-210/06, [2008] ECR I-9641 Cartesio Oktató és Szolgáltató bt.(“Cartesio”). 
 
 
 
 
231 Directors’ Duties and Liability in the EU  
 
exclusively operating – in a particular jurisdiction will be subject to the company laws of another 
Member State.
302
  
At its core, the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice ensures that companies formed in 
accordance with the law of one Member State (i.e. the “home state”) will not be subjected to the 
substantive company law provisions of another Member State (the “host state”) merely because the 
company’s headquarters, central management, principal establishment or the directors’ residence is 
located in the host state. 
As can be derived from the Court of Justice’s decision in Segers
303
 and in line with the relevant 
European legal literature, the exclusive application of the home Member States’ company law 
mandated by the Centros line of cases also applies, in principle, to the regulation of both duties and 
liability of board members.
304
 This primarily means that incorporators, when choosing between the 
available company laws, also choose the legal framework for directors’ duties and liabilities.
305
 Host 
Member States cannot “impose” on companies incorporated in another Member State their domestic 
legal rules about directors’ liability; a core area of company law, the main duties of directors are 
subject to the law of the Member State of incorporation only. The alternative approach would 
potentially subject directors to claims under multiple substantive laws and, as such, be ‘liable to hinder 
or make less attractive’ the exercise of freedom of establishment. At least when applied generally to 
all companies, the imposition of domestic rules on directors’ duties and liability will typically not be 
justifiable, and thus be incompatible with the Treaty. 
The table above outlines the main connecting factors used by the private international law of the 
jurisdictions assessed in this report. As the Court of Justice has held in Cartesio,
306
 Member States 
are effectively free to restrict the availability of their company laws to businesses that mainly, or at 
least exclusively, operate outside their territory. Accordingly, Member States are free to restrict the 
transfer of the central management of a company formed in accordance with its laws. This Member 
State right is in so far qualified as all Member States, irrespective of their private international law 
rules, are obliged to permit a transfer of the “incorporation seat” to another jurisdiction. Accordingly, a 
company may decide to subject itself to another Member State’s company law, and the (original) 
home Member State must not prevent or restrict such a transfer resulting in a change of the applicable 
law.
307
 
Traditionally, the ability of a company to have its centre of operations outside the jurisdiction it is 
incorporated in was closely correlated to the private international law framework adopted by the 
relevant jurisdiction. Countries following the incorporation doctrine generally allowed companies to 
incorporate in their jurisdictions, irrespective of whether a substantial link existed between the 
operations of the company and this jurisdiction. Countries following the real seat doctrine, on the other 
hand, traditionally required from their own companies that they maintain their central administration 
within their jurisdiction. As can be seen from the table above, this situation has somewhat changed, as 
a number of countries traditionally applying the real seat doctrine now permit a transfer of “their” 
                                                     
302
 For a discussion of the effects, see e.g. J Armour and WG Ringe, ‘European Corporate Law 1999-2010: Renaissance and 
Crisis’ (2011) 48 Common Market Law Review 125; J Rickford , 'Current Developments in European Law on the Restructuring 
of Companies: An Introduction' (2004) 6 European Business Law Review1225; WG Ringe, ‘Company Law and Free Movement 
of Capital’ (2010) 69 Cambridge Law Journal 378; C Gerner-Beuerle and M Schillig, ‘The Mysteries of Right of Establishment 
after Cartesio' (2010) 59 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 303; V Korom and P Metzinger, “Freedom of Establishment 
for Companies: the European Court of Justice confirms and refines its Daily Mail Decision in the Cartesio Case C-210/06” 
(2009) 6 European Company and Financial Law Review 125; F Mucciarelli, ‘Company ‘Emigration’ and EC Freedom of 
Establishment: Daily Mail Revisited’ (2008) 9 European Business Organization Law Review 267; WF Ebke, ‘The European 
Conflict-of-Corporate-Laws Revolution: Uberseering, Inspire Art and Beyond’ (2004) 38 International Lawyer 813; G Eckert, 
Internationales Gesellschaftsrecht (Vienna: Manz 2010); P Paschalidis, Freedom of Establishment and Private International 
Law for Corporations (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2012). 
303
 Case 79/85 [1986] ECR 2375 D. H. M. Segers v Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging voor Bank- en Verzekeringswezen, 
Groothandel en Vrije Beroepen. 
304
 See also the discussion in P Paschalidis, Freedom of Establishment and Private International Law for Corporations (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 2012). 
305
 See the extensive discussion in G Eckert, Internationales Gesellschaftsrecht (Vienna: Manz 2010) particularly pp 356 et 
seqq. 
306
 Case C-210/06, [2008] ECR I-9641. 
307
 See, to that effect, Case C-210/06, Cartesio [2008] ECR I-9641, especially para. 110-112. 
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companies’ central management to another jurisdiction. The historical link between the two questions 
(i.e. private international law in relation to foreign-incorporated companies and company law 
requirement to maintain the “real seat” of a domestic company within a jurisdiction) has thus been 
significantly weakened.  
The consequence of the above is twofold. First, the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice effectively 
requires all Member States, irrespective of their private international law approach, to accept foreign-
incorporated companies to establish their central administration within their territory. Second, a large 
variety of different company laws, including company laws of Member States still applying a real seat-
approach to foreign companies,
308
 are available to businesses across Europe. As mentioned above, 
this also includes the legal frameworks dealing with directors’ duties and liabilities. 
 
5.2 Potential conflicts 
We identify a number of potential conflicts that can arise between different national rules in the area of 
directors’ duties and liability. 
 
5.2.1 Employment law and directors’ duties 
National Member State law in some cases applies special employment law rules to directors, 
sometimes aimed at mitigating liability of such employees. While the liability of the director has to be 
determined, in effect, based on the law of the Member State of incorporation, the applicable labour law 
has to be determined applying Art 8 of the Rome I Regulation.  
Art 1 (2) (f) of the Rome I Regulation generally excludes from its scope matters relating to directors’ 
liability, but some Member States’ company laws seem to permit, under certain circumstances, the 
application of less stringent employment legislation mitigating the liability of directors. 
Our interviews with corporate law practitioners as well as the additional input we received from our 
Country Researchers and Country Experts suggest that no major problems arise in relation to this 
point. This is mainly due to the fact that, where mitigation of liability is accepted, such mitigation 
mainly seems to apply in relation to claims based on the relevant employment or service contracts 
with the relevant directors. 
 
5.2.2 Directors’ duties and general civil liability 
As discussed in Sections 2 through 4, we find a significant degree of variation among Member States 
regarding the legal mechanisms for subjecting directors to liability. Not all Member States exclusively 
rely on company law mechanisms in this regard. Thus, rules which in a national context merely 
operate as functional substitutes for company law-based liability provisions can have the effect of 
subjecting directors to multiple and conflicting obligations. Where a Member State, for example, 
contains provisions regarding the liability for harming creditors’ interests in its general civil law, such 
rules may expose the director to liability under both the applicable company law and the “foreign” 
general civil law. 
The problem is similar to that described in Section 5.2.3 below, as it mainly plays a role in 
circumstances where the company operates outside the jurisdiction of its incorporation. This problem 
may thus potentially affect all companies with cross-border operations. 
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 These Member States are, of course, restricted in applying this approach to EU companies, as discussed immediately 
above. See also G Eckert, Internationales Gesellschaftsrecht (Vienna: Manz 2010). 
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5.2.3 Directors’ duties in the vicinity of insolvency 
Summary of the country reports in tabulated form 
 
Table 5.2.3.a: Classification of d irectors’ duties in the vicinity  
of insolvency for purposes of private international law 
Country Classification 
Austria 
partly company law, but disputed for duty to file for insolvency as 
well as duty to reorganise/recapitalise 
Belgium 
insolvency law regulates managerial conduct that aggravates or 
contributes to insolvency; unclear as to late filing duty, but majority 
view seems to classify this duty as part of insolvency law and thus 
following the COMI-approach; in addition, general duty of care in tort 
law may apply in certain circumstances (also to foreign companies) 
Bulgaria 
main duty is "re-capitalise or liquidate", which clearly only applies to 
companies incorporated in Bulgaria; the duty to file for insolvency, 
which does not seem to play an important role in practice, is 
probably to be classified as insolvency law and thus will apply to 
companies having their COMI in Bulgaria 
Croatia mainly company law 
Cyprus 
mainly company law, including criminal sanctions contained in 
Cyprus Companies Act 
Czech Republic 
currently classified as insolvency law, but recent changes appear to 
re-enact equivalent rules as part of company law; once the 
amended legislation comes into force, it appears that foreign-
incorporated companies and their directors will not be subject to the 
main Czech pre-insolvency duties 
Denmark company law 
Estonia 
classification not entirely clear, but probably a combination of 
company, insolvency and tort law 
Finland 
core duties are part of company law, but important parts are 
contained in criminal law which could also apply to foreign-
registered companies 
France insolvency law 
Germany disputed; probably insolvency law for the duty to file for insolvency 
Greece mainly insolvency law 
Hungary 
This point is not entirely clear; the position seems to be that the 
main liability rules form part of company law and are thus only 
applicable to Hungarian companies. Hungarian law does, however, 
contain a special duty of loyalty towards creditors for directors of 
near-insolvent companies, and attaches liability to the breach of this 
duty. The latter liability may also apply to foreign-registered 
companies having their COMI in Hungary 
Ireland 
mainly company law, but not entirely clear for specific liability heads 
such as reckless trading under s297 of the Companies Act 1963. 
Italy mainly company law 
Latvia 
classification not entirely clear, but probably a combination of 
company, insolvency and tort law 
Lithuania 
classification not entirely clear, but probably a combination of 
company, insolvency and tort law 
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Country Classification 
Luxembourg mainly insolvency law 
Malta mainly insolvency law, but situation not entirely clear 
Netherlands 
mainly company law, but nevertheless specific liability rules apply to 
companies domiciled in the Netherlands 
Poland combination of company law and insolvency law rules 
Portugal 
unclear; both company law rules and insolvency rules govern the 
duties in the vicinity of insolvency, but classification is unclear in 
relation to specific rules such as, in particular, Article 84 of the 
Portuguese Code of Commercial Companies, which provides for the 
unlimited liability of the sole shareholder of a limited company that 
has become insolvent. 
Romania mainly company law 
Slovakia combination of insolvency and company law 
Slovenia 
mainly company law, but insolvency law also plays important role in 
this area 
Spain mainly company  
Sweden combination of company law and insolvency law 
United Kingdom 
core duties, including intrusion of creditors’ interests, are classified 
as company law, but wrongful trading applies on COMI-basis 
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Discussion 
Map 5.2.3.a: Classification of rules aimed at restricting  
or regulating near-insolvency trading for private international law purposes  
 
Legend Country 
 Mainly insolvency law FR, BE, CZ, EL, LU, MT 
 Mainly company law IT, IE, BG, RO, CY, ES, DK, NL, 
HR 
 Mixed approach or 
unclear/disputed 
UK, PT, AT, DE, FI, SE, LT, LV, 
EE, SK, SI, HU, PL 
 
As Table 5.2.3.a shows, virtually all Member States employ one or more of the following legal 
instruments to address problems in relation to managerial conduct where the company is in the vicinity 
of, or once it reaches, insolvency:  
- traditional company law duties: i.e. in particular the duty of care and the duty of loyalty; 
- additional duties that apply in the vicinity or upon reaching insolvency: e.g. a duty to file 
for the opening of insolvency proceedings, wrongful trading prohibitions; and 
- general or special tort law rules that are used to hold directors liable in case they cause or 
contribute to the company’s insolvency; 
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- rules of criminal liability, sometimes linked with tort law liability towards creditors where 
the director is found guilty. 
The exact “classification” of such rules is of little concern in purely domestic settings, and often 
legislators will thus not have paid much attention to the location of the rules within the national legal 
order as long as the rules are effective when applied in cumulatively.  
For companies exercising their freedom of establishment under the Treaty, however, such 
classification may play a significant role. 
A number of Member States use a combination of two or more of the strategies mentioned above.
309
 
In addition, there often is no coherent view in the legal literature and in case law whether to classify a 
particular legal instrument as part of company law, insolvency law, or tort law. It is also possible that 
functionally related instruments are classified differently under private international law and, 
accordingly, are subject to different connecting factors.
310
 
Map 5.2.a above highlights the private international law classification for the most important legal 
strategies employed by Member States in relation to the managerial behaviour in near-insolvent firms. 
Not all Member States have rules explicitly dealing with this issue, but in the vast majority of Member 
States at least a subset of the problematic cases is dealt with by company law, insolvency law, and/or 
tort law rules.
311
  
In countries highlighted in blue, the exact private international law classification of the rules we 
consider to be particularly important cannot be determined, is disputed, or differs across a range of 
inter-connected legal remedies relating to near-insolvency situations. In addition, all countries 
highlighted in yellow rely mainly or exclusively on company law mechanisms. 
The consequence of this is that a coherent set of interconnected rules on the national law level may 
be dissected by virtue of the private international law. As outlined above, company law is now 
essentially determined according to the state of incorporation across the EU, while insolvency law 
applies on the basis of the COMI.  
In combination with the “scattering” of legal strategies across multiple private international law 
categories across the EU, this may result in the partial application of different legal systems whenever 
a company has its COMI in a location that differs from its jurisdiction of incorporation. If companies 
and directors are subject to other regulatory regimes in addition to the state of incorporation, which of 
course determines liability of the directors under the general rules on directors’ duties, they may be 
dissuaded from exercising their free movement rights under the Treaty. 
Consequently, the likely disadvantages of the current legal situation in many Member States are as 
follows: 
(1) The uncertain scope of the private international law rules and the criteria for classification 
of the substantive provisions on directors’ duties in the vicinity of insolvency creates legal 
uncertainty. 
(2) Where two or more legal instruments function as legal complements in a jurisdiction, but 
these instruments are subject to different connecting factors and these connecting factors 
lead to the application of different national laws, the lack of coordination in the conflict of 
law rules may result in regulatory gaps. 
                                                     
309
 See e.g. the wrongful trading prohibition under English law, s.214 Insolvency Act 1986 and the “intrusion” of creditor interests 
in the definition of the core duties under s172 Companies Act 2006. See also the answers to the Hypotheticals in Section 4.5. 
310
 An example are the duty of directors under German law to file for the opening of insolvency proceedings (s. 15a Insolvency 
Act) and liability for the failure to file (liability to the company is based on s. 93(2) Stock Corporation Act and to creditors on s. 
15a Insolvency Act in conjunction with s. 823(2) Civil Code (protective law)), which are classified as insolvency law for purposes 
of private international law (disputed); liability for fraud pursuant to s. 263 Criminal Code in conjunction with s. 823(2) Civil 
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(3) It is unclear whether, and under what conditions, the application of additional duties and 
liability provisions, for example pursuant to the lex loci delicti commissi
312
 to directors of 
companies incorporated under a different jurisdiction is compatible with Arts. 49, 54 
TFEU. 
The second point may be illustrated by an example. In most jurisdictions, directors’ duties under 
company law and insolvency law or in the vicinity of insolvency are functional complements. The level 
of shareholder and creditor protection can only be appreciated if mechanism derived from company 
law, insolvency law, and possibly also tort and contract law, are taken into consideration and 
considered as complementing each other. In this way, deficiencies in one area of the law may be 
compensated for by more comprehensive and stringent regulation in another. However, if we assume 
that general duties such as the duty of care and the duty of loyalty are commonly classified as 
company law and duties in the vicinity of insolvency as insolvency law, which may be a simplifying, but 
for most purposes accurate description,
313
 the two connecting factors of the registered seat and the 
COMI apply cumulatively to the case. As discussed above,
314
 these connecting factors will not always 
lead to the same applicable law. It is possible that this division of the applicable law will result in a 
weak selection, i.e. the selection of the two sets of substantive rules that are the weak components of 
the investor protection regimes of their respective jurisdictions. 
For example, we have observed clear differences in the scope and deterrent effect of the rules on 
liability for wrongdoing in the vicinity of insolvency. In some Member States, if the insolvency is 
declared wrongful, which is the case if intentional or grossly negligently acts of the director have 
caused or aggravated the state of insolvency, the bankruptcy court may order the director to cover all 
or parts of the deficiency in the company’s assets.
315
 Thus, a causal connection between the wrongful 
act of the director and the depletion of the company’s assets does not need to be shown. In addition, 
the director may be disqualified for a period ranging from 2 to 15 years.
316
 In other Member States, the 
liability of the director in a comparable case, the failure to file, may be restricted to the difference 
between the insolvency dividend that the creditor could have obtained if insolvency proceedings had 
been opened in time, and the actual dividend.
317
 If at the same time the enforcement of directors’ 
duties under company law is weaker in the first jurisdiction and stronger in the second jurisdiction (or if 
other company law or tort law mechanisms function as functional complement in the second 
jurisdiction), the weak selection of the company law of the first jurisdiction on the basis of the 
company’s registered seat there and the insolvency law of the second jurisdiction on the basis of the 
company’s COMI in that Member State may lead to regulatory gaps. Such gaps may invite regulatory 
arbitrage.
318
 While we have not found any evidence in practice that regulatory arbitrage takes place, 
the theoretical possibility exists and may warrant a modification of the applicable rules on private 
international law so that the weak selection of multiple regimes is avoided.
319
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 Likewise, it can be argued that the strong selection of multiple regimes, i.e. the cumulative application of the most stringent 
components of more than one regulatory regime, should be avoided, since the cumulation of directors’ duties in cross-border 
situations may exert a deterrent effect on the free movement of companies. 
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6. Summary and conclusion 
 
6.1 Lack of enforcement of directors’ duties in solvent companies 
Based on our research, and combining the information gathered from our Country Experts, Country 
Researchers, the interviewed practitioners, and our review of the relevant literature, we conclude that 
gaps and deficiencies exist less with regard to the substantive rules on directors’ duties, and more in 
relation to enforcement. In the vast majority of Member States, breaches of directors’ duties do not 
normally lead to judicial enforcement of claims against directors as long as the company continues to 
operate as a going concern. 
There are several factors that contribute to what may be seen as under-enforcement of directors’ 
duties. We find that the most important of these factors cannot easily be addressed by changes to the 
national law rules concerning directors’ duties; rather, the relevant obstacles are of a structural nature. 
First, in most jurisdictions covered by this report, share ownership, including share ownership in listed 
public companies is highly concentrated. This typically leads to a situation where the most important 
business decisions are taken by, or with the formal or informal approval of, the controlling 
shareholders or group of shareholders. Consequently, it may be said that the issue in need of 
regulatory intervention is not so much wrongdoing by the directors that affects the shareholders as a 
class, but rather the minority/majority shareholder conflict. Where the law allows for ex ante 
authorisation or ex post ratification of the directors’ conduct by the shareholders in general meeting, a 
breach of duty may be healed from the point of view of the substantive rules. Where authorisation or 
ratification is not permissible, for example because interested parties must abstain from voting, the 
company’s claim may be frustrated because the independence of the authorised organ is implicated, 
with the consequence that the organ refrains from bringing a lawsuit on behalf of the company. For 
this reason, it is important that the law provides for the possibility of minority shareholders to instigate 
legal proceedings. However, the derivative action comes with its own problems, which call into 
question its usefulness.
320
 
Second, irrespective of the problems in connection with the prevalent ownership structures, the rules 
on standing do not seem to be working well. If the board of directors in companies with a one-tier 
board structure has authority to instigate proceedings on behalf of the company, the conflict of interest 
is apparent, in particular where incumbents are sued. Data on enforcement activity, as far as 
available, indicate that the problem is not alleviated by allocating the power to enforce the company’s 
claims to another organ, for example the general meeting or, in companies following the two-tier board 
model, the supervisory board. As regards the general meeting, the reason may be a collective action 
problem. Until recently, the supervisory board also does not seem to have been vigilant in enforcing 
breaches of directors’ duties. It was suggested by legal practitioners that the personal connections 
between the two boards, with retiring members of the management board often receiving a position on 
the supervisory board, may have implicated the supervisory board’s enthusiasm to bring an action. 
This may be in the process of changing in the wake of the financial crisis and a number of high-profile 
corporate scandals in some Member States, but it is too early to tell whether we are witnessing a 
sustained change in the enforcement climate or the increase in enforcement activity will abate. 
Third, the institutional preconditions may not always be conducive to enforcement. Even where the 
law on the books seems to be, in principle, satisfactory, enforcement is perceived in some Member 
States as being lengthy, expensive, and fraught with uncertainties. In addition, the perception of the 
competence and efficacy of the judicial system does not seem to be unreservedly positive in all 
Member States. Shareholders may prefer to remove the incumbent directors and appoint new ones, 
rather than applying to the courts. In this context, it is worth noting that the degree of legal certainty 
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and in general the sophistication of the legal system, which in turn influence the preparedness of the 
corporate actors to engage the judiciary, may be a function of the availability of published legal 
opinion. It is our impression that the development of the legal rules depends to a significant extent on 
the availability of such material. In the Member States where court decisions are not published as a 
matter of course, unresolved legal issues are more numerous and uncertainty regarding the scope 
and extent of directors’ duties greater than in jurisdictions where judgements, also those of lower 
courts, are easily accessible. 
As a consequence of these factors, enforcement in most jurisdictions is confined to cases of 
fraudulent conduct and particularly grave breaches of directors’ duties. In some cases, claims against 
directors are also brought following a change of control, although such claims are often excluded in 
the relevant agreements leading to the change of control. Enforcement activity occurs where the duty 
of loyalty is implicated and directors have engaged in self-dealing or misappropriated corporate 
assets. Often, enforcement starts with a criminal investigation. In some jurisdictions, notably France, 
minority shareholders can file a criminal complaint,
321
 thus triggering an investigation by the public 
prosecutor, and attach their claim to the criminal proceedings. This allows the minority shareholders to 
overcome the informational asymmetry between them and the controllers of the company. Liability for 
mismanagement, on the other hand, is virtually non-existent. However, even in cases of self-dealing 
or misappropriation of corporate assets bordering criminal liability enforcement is more likely once the 
company becomes insolvent, rather than at the going concern stage. 
It should be noted, however, that our findings do not, in itself, call into question the effectiveness of 
the relevant legal rules. The level of compliance with directors’ duties, particularly in larger companies, 
is perceived to be very high in some of the Member States that do not exhibit high levels of litigation 
activity. 
 
6.2 Incentive problems in relation to enforcement by (minority) 
shareholders 
Derivative actions are rare in Europe. An explanation may be that virtually all Member States exhibit 
deficiencies with respect to one or more of the three dimensions along which we test the effectiveness 
of the shareholder suit, as the ease of enforcement index presented above shows (see Tables 3.2.b 
and 3.2.c). A particularly important issue are cost rules. A rule that requires the shareholders to 
advance the costs of the proceedings and imposes the litigation risk on them aggravates the collective 
action problem mentioned above.
322
 In many countries where the claimant bears the costs of the 
proceedings, the relevance of the derivative action is minimal.
323
 Minority shareholder friendly cost 
rules are an advantage of the English derivative action mechanism.
324
 They may have alleviated to 
some extent the very restrictive admission requirements under the rule in Foss v Harbottle, which was 
applicable before the reform of the shareholder suit in the Companies Act 2006.
325
 Nevertheless, even 
in the UK enforcement through minority shareholders suits is not widespread and many judgments 
interpreting directors’ duties were rendered in disqualification proceedings, which accordingly perform 
the function of an important substitute mechanism under UK law. We find similar effects in other 
Member States,
326
 where public enforcement – in the form of criminal investigations – alleviates the 
incentive problems as well as informational disadvantages of shareholders.  
We submit that for an effective regulation of derivative actions all three elements analysed in Table 
3.2.a, standing, admission conditions and cost rules, should be conducive to minority shareholder 
enforcement. Absent that, private enforcement is unlikely to act as a meaningful deterrent against 
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breaches of directors’ duties. This may be seen as particularly relevant in jurisdictions with 
concentrated share ownership, where related party transactions and “tunnelling”, more generally, are 
of concern. 
 
6.3 Incentive problems with enforcement of claims against directors of 
insolvent companies 
In most Member States, judicial enforcement of directors’ duties mainly or almost exclusively takes 
place after the company has filed for insolvency. Nevertheless, the feedback we received from both 
the interviewed practitioners and our Country Experts suggests that in most Member States only a 
small fraction of claims against an insolvent company’s directors are enforced in practice. 
Member states differ significantly in their procedural rules applicable in the insolvency stage of the 
company, but in most cases a court-appointed liquidator or administrator is responsible for the 
enforcement of claims against directors for breaches of their duties. 
We identify the following three problems in relation to enforcement of directors’ duties after the 
company has entered insolvency proceedings. 
First, depending on the national law provisions, liquidators may often not be properly incentivised to 
bring claims against directors, even where clear evidence of wrongdoing exists and where the claims 
could also be enforced against the director in question. This may be a consequence of the liquidators’ 
remuneration structures, in particular where liquidators do not personally benefit from the 
augmentation of the insolvent company’s assets, or only do so to an insignificant degree. 
Consequently, an agency-related conflict between the liquidator and the company’s creditors may 
arise. 
Secondly, most companies that enter insolvent liquidation are small or medium-sized businesses. In 
most of these companies, the directors are at the same time major shareholders of the company. This 
typically means that a significant part of the director’s personal assets will have been tied up in the 
company, and hence lost in its insolvency. Consequently, the enforcement of claims against director-
shareholders, even claims for clear breaches of directors’ duties, will often not be enforced in the 
courts due to a lack of assets on the part of the director. Rather than further depleting the assets of 
the insolvent company by litigating against a director with limited personal assets, liquidators and 
creditors often prefer to distribute the remaining assets. In the Netherlands, the ministry of justice may 
finance the proceedings of the liquidator, which has been commended by practitioners from other 
countries as an effective strategy to address this problem. 
Third, practitioners from a number of Member States emphasised the problems relating to the costs 
and duration of court proceedings. In addition, and more relevant to this report, practitioners 
highlighted the legal uncertainties resulting from the scarce case law on directors’ duties in most 
jurisdictions. This situation may well be a self-perpetuating and inefficient equilibrium that may be 
attributed to the public good-nature of litigation of that sort. 
 
6.4 Gaps relating to companies with cross-border operations 
As Table 5.2.3.a shows, in all Member States directors’ duties consist of a mix of traditional company 
law duties, i.e. in particular the duty of care and the duty of loyalty, and additional duties that apply in 
the vicinity of insolvency, notably the duty to file for the opening of insolvency proceedings. As far as 
the latter are concerned, in most Member States some uncertainty exists as to their classification for 
purposes of private international law. Often there is no coherent view in the legal literature and in case 
law whether to classify an instrument as company law, insolvency law, or tort law. It is also possible 
that functionally related instruments are classified differently under private international law and, 
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accordingly, are subject to different connecting factors.
327
 The consequence is that a coherent set of 
interconnected rules of substantive national company law may be dissected by virtue of the private 
international law and allocated to different legal systems. If foreign law is applicable to some aspects 
of the case and no substitute legal mechanism is available under that country’s substantive company 
law, parts of the case may be left unregulated. Finally, if companies and directors are subject to other 
regulatory regimes in addition to the state of incorporation, which of course determines liability of the 
directors under the general rules on directors’ duties, they may be dissuaded from exercising their free 
movement rights under the Treaty. 
To summarise, the likely disadvantages of the current legal situation in many Member States are as 
follows: 
(1) The uncertain scope of the private international law rules and the criteria for classification 
of the substantive provisions on directors’ duties in the vicinity of insolvency creates legal 
uncertainty. 
(2) Where two or more legal instruments function as legal complements in a jurisdiction, but 
these instruments are subject to different connecting factors and these connecting factors 
lead to the application of different national laws, the lack of coordination in the conflict of 
law rules may result in regulatory gaps. 
(3) It is unclear whether, and under what conditions, the application of additional duties and 
liability provisions, for example pursuant to the lex loci delicti commissi
328
 to directors of 
companies incorporated under a different jurisdiction is compatible with Arts. 49, 54 
TFEU. 
The second point may be illustrated by an example. In most jurisdictions, directors’ duties under 
company law and insolvency law or in the vicinity of insolvency are functional complements. The level 
of shareholder and creditor protection can only be appreciated if mechanism derived from company 
law, insolvency law, and possibly also tort and contract law, are taken into consideration and 
considered as complementing each other. In this way, deficiencies in one area of the law may be 
compensated for by more comprehensive and stringent regulation in another. However, if we assume 
that general duties such as the duty of care and the duty of loyalty are commonly classified as 
company law and duties in the vicinity of insolvency as insolvency law, which may be a simplifying, but 
for most purposes accurate description,
329
 the two connecting factors of the registered seat and the 
COMI apply cumulatively to the case. As discussed above,
330
 these connecting factors will not always 
lead to the same applicable law. It is possible that this division of the applicable law will result in a 
weak selection, i.e. the selection of the two sets of substantive rules that are the weak components of 
the investor protection regimes of their respective jurisdictions. 
For example, we have observed clear differences in the scope and deterrent effect of the rules on 
liability for wrongdoing in the vicinity of insolvency. In some Member States, if the insolvency is 
declared wrongful, which is the case if intentional or grossly negligently acts of the director have 
caused or aggravated the state of insolvency, the bankruptcy court may order the director to cover all 
or parts of the deficiency in the company’s assets.
331
 Thus, a causal connection between the wrongful 
act of the director and the depletion of the company’s assets does not need to be shown. In addition, 
the director may be disqualified for a period ranging from 2 to 15 years.
332
 In other Member States, the 
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liability of the director in a comparable case, the failure to file, may be restricted to the difference 
between the insolvency dividend that the creditor could have obtained if insolvency proceedings had 
been opened in time, and the actual dividend.
333
 If at the same time the enforcement of directors’ 
duties under company law is weaker in the first jurisdiction and stronger in the second jurisdiction (or if 
other company law or tort law mechanisms function as functional complement in the second 
jurisdiction), the weak selection of the company law of the first jurisdiction on the basis of the 
company’s registered seat there and the insolvency law of the second jurisdiction on the basis of the 
company’s COMI in that Member State may lead to regulatory gaps. Such gaps may invite regulatory 
arbitrage. While we have not found any evidence in practice that regulatory arbitrage takes place, the 
theoretical possibility exists and may warrant a modification of the applicable rules on private 
international law so that the weak selection of multiple regimes is avoided.
334
 
 
6.5 Gaps relating to director disqualification 
Director disqualification as an administrative law substitute for private enforcement of directors’ 
duties
335
 creates similar cross-border frictions due to the unaligned nature of the respective private 
international law rules as those discussed in the previous section. Director disqualification requires 
some connection of the director’s company with the territory where the disqualification order is issued. 
The UK rules, for example, apply to directors of companies that are either registered under the 
Companies Act 2006 or that may be wound up under the UK Insolvency Act 1986 without being 
registered in the UK, i.e. that have their COMI in the UK.
336
 The disqualification order prevents the 
director from acting as director of any company falling within that definition, also companies registered 
in other Member States, provided that they may be wound up in the UK. 
Such rules give rise to two concerns. First, in case of foreign companies they may lead to strong 
selection as outlined above,
337
 since they apply in addition to any sanctions that may be applicable 
under the law of the company’s home Member State. In general, they are foreign elements that may 
disturb the balance of the domestic system of sanctions and liability. 
Second, and maybe more importantly, disqualification orders do not apply on an EU wide basis, but 
only capture companies that have the necessary connection to the territory where the disqualification 
order is issued. Even where a Member State extends the applicability of its disqualification statute, this 
extension will not prevent the valid appointment of a director in another jurisdiction. Partly due to the 
case law of the European Court of Justice,
338
 Member States may find it difficult to enforce their 
national law rules against disqualified directors who are then appointed by foreign-incorporated 
companies, even where the relevant foreign-incorporated company operates within its territory. 
Thus, directors may attempt to either avoid a disqualification (or more severe sanctions, for example 
under criminal law) in the Member State where their main activities are located by attempting to satisfy 
the necessary connecting factor in another country before the opening of insolvency procedures. 
Anecdotal evidence indicates that such forum shopping takes place. They may also hamper the 
effectiveness of a disqualification order issued by one state by operating ‘through’ a company 
incorporated abroad. 
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HYPOTHETICALS 
 
Austria 
 
Hypothetical I: Liability of the parent and directors of the parent for breaches of duty at the 
level of the subsidiary 
 
A pharmaceutical company is currently developing two new drugs. After assessing the potential 
liability risks associated with the future products, the directors of the pharmaceutical company decide 
to incorporate two separate private limited companies, each taking over the development, research 
and future marketing of one of the two drugs. 
 
The directors of the pharmaceutical company appoint the two project managers as directors of the two 
subsidiary companies. The two subsidiary companies enter into an agreement allowing them access 
to the parent company's research facilities. According to the subsidiary's articles of association, all 
major strategic decisions regarding the research, development and marketing of the drugs are subject 
to approval by their sole shareholder, the pharmaceutical company. The employees working for the 
subsidiaries are formally still employed with the parent company, but are posted with the subsidiaries 
under an agreement entered into by the parent company and the two subsidiaries upon formation of 
the two companies. 
 
When the directors of the parent company learn about competitors working on similar projects, they try 
to accelerate the development process of the two drugs. They award substantial bonuses to the 
subsidiary’s directors, contingent on the drugs receiving regulatory approval within the next 6 months. 
The original schedule provided for further tests, which would take at least 12 months. 
 
Primarily because of the contingent bonus payment, the directors of the subsidiaries skip some of the 
planned tests and studies, and cover up this decision in their filings for regulatory approval. 
 
The two drugs gain regulatory approval within the 6 month time span, and are successfully marketed 
shortly after that.  
 
Two years after the initial marketing, independent studies reveal that one of the drugs causes a rare 
form of lethal cancer, exposing the relevant subsidiary to enormous product liability claims that far 
exceed its net assets. The drug developed by the other subsidiary proves to be safe and leads to 
substantial profits. 
 
 Is it possible that the parent company would be liable in circumstances comparable to the stylised 
facts above? 
 
In order to answer the question one would probably have to distinguish between liability according to 
company or civil law.  
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Under company law the answer depends on the provision in the articles which would be possible for a 
private limited company (albeit not for a public one, for which one would use a so-called “domination 
agreement” for these purposes). Generally, such directions would not by itself lead to liability. 
However, in one stray decision the Supreme Court has held that the parent company may become 
liable as a de facto director if it continually influences the decisions of its subsidiary (6 Ob 313/03b); 
the decision provoked vociferous criticism and may not be upheld. 
 
Additionally, members may become liable for directions, which cause damage, if such damage could 
have been foreseen beforehand; this is generally understood to be an application of the fiduciary 
duties of the members against the company. The simple fact that the parent company induced the 
directors to speed up the process for regulatory approval by awarding bonuses will by itself will most 
probably not be sufficient to establish liability. 
 
In order to establish liability under civil law rules the parent company would have to be an accessory 
to the acts of its subsidiary. As long as there is no proof that the parent company wilfully induced its 
subsidiary to circumvent the necessary tests such a liability would again be hard to establish. 
 
 Under which circumstances would the directors of the parent company face a liability risk in those 
circumstances? 
 
If there is a liability of the parent company due to negligent actions by its directors, they in turn may 
face liability. This would be the case if the parent violated its fiduciary duties towards its subsidiary or if 
it were accessory to the acts of its subsidiary. 
 
Hypothetical II: Duties in the vicinity of insolvency 
 
After making losses for three consecutive years, an oil trading company’s equity ratio (equity divided 
by total assets) has fallen below [1% - 5% - 10%]. On average, comparable companies in the same 
line of business have an equity ratio of about 25%.  
 
The company still has substantial assets, but the thin equity cushion makes it hard for the company to 
pursue its core business, as trading partners demand higher prices to compensate them for the 
perceived higher risk of the company's operations.   
 
The company's directors evaluate different possibilities to improve the business prospects of the 
company. They attribute past trading losses to the substantially higher volatility of oil prices following 
the financial crisis, and maintain the view that the company's business model is sustainable in the long 
run. After exploring the possibility to raise new equity to recapitalize the business, they conclude that 
current market conditions would force them to issue new shares at prohibitively low prices, which 
would lead to a substantial dilution of their current shareholders. 
 
After analysing the market conditions, the directors come to the conclusion that the market price for 
crude oil is bound to rise significantly over the next year, particularly due to high anticipated demand 
from emerging market economies. In an attempt to recapitalize the company the directors decide to 
invest heavily in crude oil futures. They expect that the anticipated increase in oil prices will lead to 
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substantial gains from this transaction, bringing the equity ratio back in line with the industry average, 
and thus allowing the company to resume their trading operations at more sustainable conditions.  
The directors are aware that a sudden substantial fall in oil prices could potentially wipe out the 
remaining equity of the firm, but they consider the likelihood of this happening to be very low.  
 
Shortly after entering into the forward sale agreement, worries about a sovereign debt crisis lead to a 
revision of worldwide economic growth forecasts. The price of crude oil falls more than 10% on a 
single day, the worst one day performance in many years. As the company cannot fulfil the margin 
calls on its forward sales contracts, the positions are closed by the counterparty. The closed positions 
have a negative value exceeding the company’s equity, leading to the company’s over-indebtedness. 
Trading partners refuse to enter into transactions with the company due to its financial position, and 
banks close all existing credit lines of the company. 
 
 Do fiduciary duties prevent directors from entering into particularly risky transactions? 
 
Generally speaking, under Austrian law this would be an issue of the duty of care. Although it is 
generally recognised that managers should not become liable if they exercise their business 
judgement even though the outcome is detrimental to the company (cf. Austrian Supreme Court 1 Ob 
144/01k), excessive risk taking with a substantial risk of wiping out the company’s assets would not be 
protected by applying some sort of business judgement. This may be deduced inter alia from Sec. 159 
Penal Code (cf. below the answer to question 3). 
 
 At which point in time does the law provide for additional duties of directors or the change of 
existing duties in situations of financial distress? (i.e. how is ‘vicinity of insolvency’ defined?) 
 
There is no particular point in time which provides for additional duties in the vicinity of insolvency (cf. 
the different equity-to-assets ratios above). However, it is generally recognized that less risks may be 
taken once the company’s financial situation becomes critical (cf. Nowotny in Doralt/Nowotny/Kalss, 
Commentary to the Stock Corporation Act, 2
nd
 Edition, 2012, § 84 No. 9). Directors should be 
discouraged from gambling the company out of insolvency to the detriment of the creditors. 
 
 What is the legal response to above situation? For example, the law may provide that the 
directors have to take primarily the creditors’ interests into account, rather than those of the 
shareholders or the company must cease to trade and the directors file for the opening of 
insolvency proceedings. 
 
As there does not seem to be any immediate risk of insolvency before the transactions mentioned 
above (equity cushion is still available, although thin, plus sustainability of business model), the 
directors would be under no obligation to open insolvency proceedings. Therefore, they would not 
become liable under insolvency law for belatedly opening insolvency proceedings. 
Apart from that the critical issue in my view is whether the directors were taking a substantial risk of 
wiping out the company’s equity during a critical time for the company; however, according to their 
judgment this risk, although present, was “very low”. Should that judgement have been correct, I do 
not think that the directors would face liability. 
If, however, in fact as opposed to their judgement there was a substantial risk of the company 
becoming insolvent due to the transactions in derivatives, they would face liability on the basis of 
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Sec. 84 para 2 Stock Corporation Act, which would be enforced by the insolvency receiver on behalf 
of the company. 
An additional liability may result from criminal law, in particular from the protective rule on grossly 
negligent encroachment on creditors’ interests (Sec. 159 Penal Code), which will be applicable if the 
directors have caused the inability to meet mature debts in a grossly negligent way, especially by 
depleting the company’s assets through extremely risky transactions. This penal law provision may 
lead to a direct civil liability towards the creditors as it aims at protecting their interests. 
 
Hypothetical III: Duty of care 
 
A large banking institution is engaged in retail as well as investment banking. In 2000, a new CEO 
was appointed, who also sits on the board of directors. The CEO made the decision to invest heavily 
in collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) backed by residential mortgage backed securities, including 
lower rated securities that pooled subprime mortgages to borrowers with weak credit history. The 
investments were initially successful, generating high profits for the company. However, beginning in 
2005, house prices, particularly in the United States, began to decrease. Defaults and foreclosures 
increased and the income from residential mortgages fell rapidly.  
 
As early as May 2005, economist Paul Krugman had warned of signs that the US housing market was 
approaching the final stages of a speculative bubble. Early in 2007, a large US subprime lender filed 
for bankruptcy protection and a number of investors announced write downs of several billion dollars 
on their structured finance commitments. In July, 2007, Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s 
downgraded bonds backed by subprime mortgages. At the end of 2007, two hedge funds that had 
invested heavily in subprime mortgages declared bankruptcy. In spite of these warning signs, the CEO 
had continued to invest in CDOs until shortly before the Lehman bankruptcy in September 2008, 
accumulating a total exposure of more than 20 billion Euro/Pounds/… . The subprime mortgage crisis 
necessitated massive write downs, leading to an annual loss of eight billion in 2008, which can be 
attributed in equal measure to the CDO transactions undertaken in 2005-2008. 
 
The CEO resigned in October 2008. As part of the resignation, the CEO entered into an agreement 
with the company providing that he would receive 50 million Euro/Pounds/… upon his departure, 
including bonus and stock options, and in addition an office, administrative assistant, car and driver 
until he would commence full time employment with another employer. In exchange, the CEO signed 
a non-compete agreement and a release of claims against the company. The agreement with the 
CEO was approved by all directors (the CEO abstaining from voting), acting on behalf of the company. 
 
After the CEO’s departure and with a new management team in place, it transpires that the old CEO 
had used a number of ostensibly arms-length transactions with investment firms that were, however, 
controlled by the CEO’s nominees, to transfer assets at an undervalue to a company owned by the 
CEO on the Cayman Islands. When the true nature of these transactions becomes known, the assets 
are no longer recoverable. 
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Questions: 
 
 Is the CEO liable for annual loss suffered by the company in 2008? 
 
I assume that this question only refers to the decision to continue investing in CDOs, not to the issue 
of self-dealing, for which the liability under Sec. 84 Joint Stock Corporation Act is clear. 
As to the CDOs I do not believe that the facts as given above would lead to a liability. On the one 
hand, Austrian courts are aware of the danger of hindsight bias when deciding on the negligence of 
managers’ behaviour when making business decisions. Although the BJR is not part of Austrian law, 
judges generally defer to business decisions which have been taken with due preparation of the facts 
as long as there is no conflict with the duty of loyalty. However, according to the majority of 
commentators and along the lines of the German BGH’s ARAG/Garmenbeck decision this does not 
apply if the decision is ”absolutely untenable”. I do not think that this would be the case with CDOs, at 
least not until the first half of 2007. Even for 2007 judges probably would analyse the behaviour of 
comparable banking institutions and will conceivably base their decision on whether the 
misconceptions as to the CDOs were shared by other market participants. 
 
 Have the directors (other than the CEO) breached their fiduciary duties by approving the 
agreement in conjunction with the resignation of the outgoing CEO? 
 
The decision by the board (in Austria: the board of supervisors) on the agreement with the outgoing 
CEO most probably would not have constituted a violation of duties. The Austrian Supreme Court in a 
seminal judgement has set a remarkably low standard for this type of decisions (7 Ob 58/08t). The 
judgement argues that it lies within the discretion of the board to enter into such agreements even in 
cases where the directors may have given cause for dismissal as it is in the best interest of the 
company to avoid negative publicity. In the case decided the payment on departure was a substantial 
part of the company’s yearly profits. Although this judgement does not exclude such decisions from 
liability in principle, applying its standards liability of the board members is very unlikely. 
 
 Have the members of the company’s internal audit committee (of which the CEO was not a 
member) breached their fiduciary duties by not identifying the true nature of the ostensibly arms-
length transactions and are they, accordingly, liable for the loss suffered by the company as a 
consequence of the transactions? Have the other directors (except the CEO) breached their 
duties? 
 
Members of the audit committee are subject to the general liability rules for members of the board of 
supervisors. Thus, they may become liable if they do not fulfil their duty to the full. Their duty under 
Austrian law, however, is not the preparation of the accounts (which is the duty of the CEO and the 
other members of the managing board), but controlling them. The requisite standard of diligence 
therefore refers to the standards of care for controlling the books. If the members have violated this 
duty (which cannot be ascertained on the basis of the facts given above), they can become liable. This 
would not necessarily lead to the liability of other members of the board of supervisors not members of 
the audit committee. 
 
Additionally one would have to ask whether other members of the managing board apart from the 
CEO (if any) have violated the duty of diligently preparing the accounts and thus may become liable. 
Again, the facts given above do not indicate such a liability. 
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 Assuming that the company has a claim against the CEO or another director pursuant to one or 
more of the above questions, can a minority shareholder enforce the claim? 
 
A minority shareholder by itself cannot enforce the claim, as long as he does not hold 10 percent of 
the share capital (for details cf. Sec. 134 et seq. Joint Stock Corporation Act). 
 
Hypothetical IV: Duty of loyalty 
 
A mining company (‘Bidder’) considers expanding business operations. The board identifies assets 
held by another company (‘Target’) as a possible acquisition. The following scenarios ask you to 
consider the liability of a director (‘A’) on the board of Bidder. 
 
 Director A is also majority shareholder in Target, holding 60 percent of the outstanding share 
capital of the company. As majority shareholder of Target, he is interested in an acquisition that is 
beneficial to Target. He proposes that Bidder purchase the assets for 10 million Euro/Pounds/…, 
knowing that the value ranges between 7 and 8 million. Director A does not disclose his interest in 
Target to the board of Bidder. A majority of the directors approves the acquisition. A’s vote was 
not decisive for the positive vote. 
 
Director A has violated his duty of loyalty towards Bidder by promoting the acquisition of Target. 
According to legal literature A would have had to disclose his interest in the transaction to the board. 
The fact that he promoted the transaction provides sufficient causality for liability; it is not relevant that 
his vote was not decisive. 
 
 As in scenario 1, but Director A discloses his interest in Target to the board of Bidder, and a 
majority of the uninterested directors approves the acquisition. 
 
As A only discloses his interest, but apparently not the fact that the true value of Target lies below the 
purchase price, A’s actions still to violate his duty of loyalty. Therefore, he will be liable. 
 
 As in scenario 1, but when the shareholders of Bidder learn of A’s interest in Target, they ratify the 
transaction, believing that it is in the company’s interests. 
 
The ratification by the general meeting will remove liability against the company if the approval is 
given before the transaction has been closed. However, this removal is only valid against the 
company, not against individual creditors who may try to enforce Bidder’s liability claim against A if 
Bidder does not fulfil its obligations (sec. 84 para 1 Joint Stock Corporation Act). Consequently, 
approval should not remove the liability in the case of A’s insolvency either as the receiver acts in the 
creditors’ interests; the issue has not been addressed to my knowledge. 
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 Director A is majority shareholder and managing director in a competitor of bidder (‘Rival’), which 
is also active in the mining business. The assets held by Target that Bidder seeks to acquire 
consist in claims near Rival’s own mining territories. Director A is of the opinion that the assets are 
more valuable for Rival than for Bidder. He therefore arranges for Rival to make a competing and 
higher offer than Bidder, and Target accordingly decides to sell the assets to the former company. 
 
I assume that A is member of the management board. As such he is under a prohibition to compete 
without approval by the supervisory board. The mere fact that he is a managing director of Rival would 
lead to liability and to a duty to disgorge any profits to the company (sec. 79 Joint Stock Corporation 
Act). If the board of supervisors approved A’s boar position he will probably escape liability, but he 
may, in my opinion, still be removed from office for cause. 
 
If A were a member of Bidder’s supervisory board the situation is even less clear as members on that 
board serve typically part time and there is no prohibition to compete. He most certainly would not be 
allowed to vote on the issue; if Rival is actually a rival in Bidder’s core business A would have to 
renounce his board position in Bidder (cf. also No. 45 Austrian Code of Corporate Governance). Apart 
from that he would probably not be subject to liability. 
 
 As in scenario 4, but A resigns from his position as director of Bidder before Rival makes the 
competing offer. 
 
Cf. above. 
 
 As in scenario 4, but after an initial expression of interest by Bidder in acquiring the assets and 
before Rival has taken any steps to make a competing offer, the Bidder board determines that an 
investment of that size is not advisable at the present time in light of Bidder’s weak financial 
position. 
 
I do not see a case for liability under Austrian law. 
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Belgium 
 
Hypothetical I: Liability of the parent and directors of the parent for breaches of duty at the 
level of the subsidiary 
 
A pharmaceutical company is currently developing two new drugs. After assessing the potential 
liability risks associated with the future products, the directors of the pharmaceutical company decide 
to incorporate two separate private limited companies, each taking over the development, research 
and future marketing of one of the two drugs. 
 
The directors of the pharmaceutical company appoint the two project managers as directors of the two 
subsidiary companies. The two subsidiary companies enter into an agreement allowing them access 
to the parent company's research facilities. According to the subsidiary's articles of association, all 
major strategic decisions regarding the research, development and marketing of the drugs are subject 
to approval by their sole shareholder, the pharmaceutical company. The employees working for the 
subsidiaries are formally still employed with the parent company, but are posted with the subsidiaries 
under an agreement entered into by the parent company and the two subsidiaries upon formation of 
the two companies. 
 
When the directors of the parent company learn about competitors working on similar projects, they try 
to accelerate the development process of the two drugs. They award substantial bonuses to the 
subsidiary’s directors, contingent on the drugs receiving regulatory approval within the next 6 months. 
The original schedule provided for further tests, which would take at least 12 months. 
 
Primarily because of the contingent bonus payment, the directors of the subsidiaries skip some of the 
planned tests and studies, and cover up this decision in their filings for regulatory approval. 
 
The two drugs gain regulatory approval within the 6 month time span, and are successfully marketed 
shortly after that.  
 
Two years after the initial marketing, independent studies reveal that one of the drugs causes a rare 
form of lethal cancer, exposing the relevant subsidiary to enormous product liability claims that far 
exceed its net assets. The drug developed by the other subsidiary proves to be safe and leads to 
substantial profits. 
 
 Is it possible that the parent company would be liable in circumstances comparable to the stylised 
facts above? 
 
In principle, the parent company is a shareholder of the relevant subsidiary so that it benefits 
from limited liability. There is no group liability under Belgian company law. 
 
However, since the subsidiary is a private limited company, its shares may not be held solely by 
a legal person (parent company; art. 213 § 2 CC: within the year, another shareholder needs to 
be found or the subsidiary needs to be dissolved). This is enforced by considering the 100% 
parent company a guarantor for all liabilities of the subsidiary of which it holds all shares. 
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If the parent company is not the sole shareholder of the relevant subsidiary (anymore) (this 
situation is often remedied by transferring one share to an affiliated company), it can only be held 
liable if i) use is made of the technique to consider its legal personality to be abused (so that it 
loses the benefit of limited liability, or ii) considering the parent company itself a de facto director 
of the subsidiary. Both options are not likely. As regards ii), one must also note that the 
application of directors’ liability to de facto directors is contested as regards art. 527-529 CC. 
 
 Under which circumstances would the directors of the parent company face a liability risk in those 
circumstances? 
 
It will not be easy to classify the parent company’s director as a de facto director of the relevant 
subsidiary since application of directors’ liability to de facto directors is contested as regards art. 
527-529 CC, and, were such application to be accepted, this would require the director to actually 
manage the relevant subsidiary. It is currently unclear whether mere influence would lead to 
liability as a de facto director. 
 
In case the parent company’s director breaches the general duty of care (art. 1382 Civil Code), 
injured parties will be able to claim compensation after they prove fault, damage and causation. 
 
ADDENDUM: It is not clear from the assignment whether the two project managers are 
employees of the parent company. If they are, two more issues potentially arise: 
 
- The employment relationship may conflict with their directorship, as the parent company, 
as an employer, will be entitled to instruct how they perform their directorial mandate. The 
latter is, however, to be exercised independently and free from external instructions. 
- The parent company may be held liable as an employer if errors committed by its 
employees are not to be considered as serious errors or repetitive light errors. 
 
Hypothetical II: Duties in the vicinity of insolvency 
 
After making losses for three consecutive years, an oil trading company’s equity ratio (equity divided 
by total assets) has fallen below [1% - 5% - 10%]. On average, comparable companies in the same 
line of business have an equity ratio of about 25%.  
 
The company still has substantial assets, but the thin equity cushion makes it hard for the company to 
pursue its core business, as trading partners demand higher prices to compensate them for the 
perceived higher risk of the company's operations.   
 
The company’s directors evaluate different possibilities to improve the business prospects of the 
company. They attribute past trading losses to the substantially higher volatility of oil prices following 
the financial crisis, and maintain the view that the company's business model is sustainable in the long  
run. After exploring the possibility to raise new equity to recapitalise the business, they conclude that 
current market conditions would force them to issue new shares at prohibitively low prices, which 
would lead to a substantial dilution of their current shareholders. 
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After analysing the market conditions, the directors come to the conclusion that the market price for 
crude oil is bound to rise significantly over the next year, particularly due to high anticipated demand 
from emerging market economies. In an attempt to recapitalise the company the directors decide to 
invest heavily in crude oil futures. They expect that the anticipated increase in oil prices will lead to 
substantial gains from this transaction, bringing the equity ratio back in line with the industry average, 
and thus allowing the company to resume their trading operations at more sustainable conditions.  
 
The directors are aware that a sudden substantial fall in oil prices could potentially wipe out the 
remaining equity of the firm, but they consider the likelihood of this happening to be very low.  
 
Shortly after entering into the forward sale agreement, worries about a sovereign debt crisis lead to a 
revision of worldwide economic growth forecasts. The price of crude oil falls more than 10% on a 
single day, the worst one day performance in many years. As the company cannot fulfil the margin 
calls on its forward sales contracts, the positions are closed by the counterparty. The closed positions 
have a negative value exceeding the company’s equity, leading to the company’s over-indebtedness. 
Trading partners refuse to enter into transactions with the company due to its financial position, and 
banks close all existing credit lines of the company. 
 
1. Do fiduciary duties prevent directors from entering into particularly risky transactions? 
2. At which point in time does the law provide for additional duties of directors or the change of 
existing duties in situations of financial distress? (i.e. how is ‘vicinity of insolvency’ defined?) 
3. What is the legal response to above situation? For example, the law may provide that the 
directors have to take primarily the creditors’ interests into account, rather than those of the 
shareholders, or the company must cease to trade and the directors file for the opening of 
insolvency proceedings. 
 
Entering into risky transactions is not specifically prohibited, but regard must be had to whether 
any other reasonable director, placed in similar circumstances, would have entered into the 
respective transaction; if so, the business judgement falls within the permitted margin of 
discretion. Given the low equity ratio and on-going financial crisis, it could be argued that the 
decision to invest in oil derivatives was not opportune, and thus constituted a managerial error 
(art. 527 CC), although this is a matter of judicial interpretation. 
 
It is disputed whether the duty of loyalty (to act in good faith and have regard to the company’s 
interest) changes in the vicinity of insolvency. The unreasonable continuation of an obviously 
insolvent company can be considered, however, to be both a managerial error (art. 527 CC, 
enforceable by the company/liquidator) and/or a breach of the general duty of care (art. 1382 Civil 
Code, enforceable by any injured party). 
 
It must also be noted that, when the company’s net assets have fallen below half of the 
company’s registered capital, directors face certain formalities (art. 633 CC). The law also 
rebuttably presumes that any loss incurred by third parties will be due to having failed to comply 
with these formalities. Moreover, when not complying with these sections, directors face liability 
for breaching the Companies Code (art. 528 CC, enforceable by both the company and third 
parties, including shareholders that claim personal harm). 
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Hypothetical III: Duty of care 
 
A large banking institution is engaged in retail as well as investment banking. In 2000, a new CEO 
was appointed, who also sits on the board of directors. The CEO made the decision to invest heavily 
in collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) backed by residential mortgage-backed securities, including 
lower-rated securities that pooled subprime mortgages to borrowers with weak credit history. The 
investments were initially successful, generating high profits for the company. However, beginning in 
2005, house prices, particularly in the United States, began to decrease. Defaults and foreclosures 
increased and the income from residential mortgages fell rapidly.  
 
As early as May 2005, economist Paul Krugman had warned of signs that the US housing market was 
approaching the final stages of a speculative bubble. Early in 2007, a large US subprime lender filed 
for bankruptcy protection and a number of investors announced write downs of several billion dollars 
on their structured finance commitments. In July, 2007, Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s 
downgraded bonds backed by subprime mortgages. At the end of 2007, two hedge funds that had 
invested heavily in subprime mortgages declared bankruptcy. In spite of these warning signs, the CEO 
had continued to invest in CDOs until shortly before the Lehman bankruptcy in September 2008, 
accumulating a total exposure of more than 20 billion Euro/Pounds/… . The subprime mortgage crisis 
necessitated massive write downs, leading to an annual loss of eight billion in 2008, which can be 
attributed in equal measure to the CDO transactions undertaken in 2005-2008. 
 
The CEO resigned in October 2008. As part of the resignation, the CEO entered into an agreement 
with the company providing that he would receive 50 million Euro/Pounds/… upon his departure, 
including bonus and stock options, and in addition an office, administrative assistant, car and driver 
until he would commence full time employment with another employer. In exchange, the CEO signed 
a non-compete agreement and a release of claims against the company. The agreement with the 
CEO was approved by all directors (the CEO abstaining from voting), acting on behalf of the company. 
 
After the CEO’s departure and with a new management team in place, it transpires that the old CEO 
had used a number of ostensibly arms-length transactions with investment firms that were, however, 
controlled by the CEO’s nominees, to transfer assets at an undervalue to a company owned by the 
CEO on the Cayman Islands. When the true nature of these transactions becomes known, the assets 
are no longer recoverable. 
 
Questions: 
 
 Is the CEO liable for annual loss suffered by the company in 2008? 
 
There are no specific guidelines for judging liability in case of risky transactions and warning 
signs. Regard must only be had to whether any other reasonable director, placed in similar 
circumstances, would have entered into the involved transaction; if so, the business 
judgement falls within a margin of discretion. Of course, considering the ample presence of 
warning signs, the CEO (either as an executive director, day-to-day manager or both) can be 
held liable for overstepping this margin and causing managerial errors in continuing the 
investments (art. 527 CC, enforceable by the company). 
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 Have the directors (other than the CEO) breached their fiduciary duties by approving the 
agreement in conjunction with the resignation of the outgoing CEO? 
 
Transactions inflicted with conflicts of interest are decided upon by the board of directors. 
There is only an abstention requirement (from deliberation and voting) for the interested 
director when the company has issued securities to the public (including when the company is 
listed). Art. 523 CC contains further formalities (annual report, auditor report). 
 
If the formalities of art. 523 CC (conflict of interest) are complied with, all incumbent directors 
can still be held liable (severally and jointly) for any damage done to the company and/or third 
parties to the extent that the transaction has resulted in an unjustified, i.e. excessive, 
advantage to the director to the detriment of the company (art. 529 CC). The possibility of art. 
528 CC to rebut liability, however, still stands. 
 
 Have the members of the company’s internal audit committee (of which the CEO was not a 
member) breached their fiduciary duties by not identifying the true nature of the ostensibly 
arms-length transactions and are they, accordingly, liable for the loss suffered by the 
company as a consequence of the transactions? Have the other directors (except the CEO) 
breached their duties? 
 
As of 2010, listed companies only need to install audit and remuneration committees 
comprised of directors (art. 526bis and quater CC). In general, a director’s competences or 
membership of a committee are not formally elements of the judicial determination of liability, 
although it cannot be ruled out that courts will take the membership of audit or remuneration 
committees into account when determining what ‘similar given circumstances’ are. 
 
Directors are not required to monitor their colleagues, but systematic absenteeism or other 
negligent behaviour is considered to be a managerial error when overstepping the margin of 
appreciation (art. 527 CC). That there is no general legal requirement to supervise other 
directors can be inferred from the possibility for directors to rebut liability for breaching the 
Companies Code and articles of association/conflicts of interest regime (art. 528/529 CC) by 
demonstrating that the director: 
 
(i) did not participate in the contested decision (e.g. by remaining absent from the 
meeting (where this absence was excusable) or by having voted against the 
decision); 
(ii) is not blameworthy; and 
(iii) challenged the decision at the earliest general assembly meeting (or, in case of 
members of the executive committee, the earliest meeting of the board of 
directors). 
 
 Assuming that the company has a claim against the CEO or another director pursuant to one 
or more of the above questions, can a minority shareholder enforce the claim? 
Annulment/suspension claims: any interested party can bring this action, including minority 
shareholders, irrespective of their holdings. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
256 Directors’ Duties and Liability in the EU  
 
Liability claims (art. 527-530 CC): Minority shareholders can only bring derivative claims (for 
company harm on behalf of the company) if the following conditions are satisfied: 
 
(i) the shareholders bringing the action must hold securities that represent at least 
1% of the votes; or 
(ii) hold securities representing a part of the capital of at least EUR 1,250,000.00; 
and 
(iii) the shareholders with voting rights must not have voted for the acquittance of the 
directors. 
 
Minority shareholders will have to mandate a special administrator to continue the claim. 
There is no specific procedure for checking whether claims can be continued, but general 
procedural law must be followed (the claimant must prove a legitimate interest in bringing the 
claim; claimants can abuse their right to bring a claim according to the general abuse of right 
doctrine). 
 
Minority shareholders must advance the costs. In case of a successful claim, judgement is 
given in favour of the company, without direct personal benefit for the claimant, and the 
claimant is reimbursed with respect to litigation costs. When the claim is not successful, 
claimants can be condemned to pay all outstanding litigation costs (and in some events 
complementary damages). 
 
Hypothetical IV: Duty of loyalty 
 
A mining company (‘Bidder’) considers expanding business operations. The board identifies assets 
held by another company (‘Target’) as a possible acquisition. The following scenarios ask you to 
consider the liability of a director (‘A’) on the board of Bidder. 
 
1. Director A is also majority shareholder in Target, holding 60 per cent of the outstanding share 
capital of the company. As majority shareholder of Target, he is interested in an acquisition 
that is beneficial to Target. He proposes that Bidder purchase the assets for 10 million 
Euro/Pounds/…, knowing that the value ranges between 7 and 8 million. Director A does not 
disclose his interest in Target to the board of Bidder. A majority of the directors approves the 
acquisition. A’s vote was not decisive for the positive vote. 
 
Belgian company law contains a specific regime addressing conflict of interest situations for 
board members: when a director has a proprietary conflict of interest as regards a decision 
the board is about to take, certain formal requirements have to be fulfilled. According to art.  
523 CC, the conflicted member has to inform the board beforehand and must inform the 
company’s auditor. The conflicted director has to report in the minutes of the board about the 
transaction and explain its justification. There is only an abstention requirement (from 
deliberation and voting) for the interested director when the company has issued securities to 
the public (including when the company is listed). For other companies, interested directors 
can vote and it does not matter whether the vote was decisive.
1
 
 
                                                     
1
 In addition, a specific conflicts of interest regime exists for intra-group transactions: art. 524 CC (see country report). 
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When these formalities are not complied with, each director
2
 (including A) can be held liable 
for unjustified (excessive) benefits accrued by one/more director(s) to the detriment of the 
company (art. 529 CC), and the involved decision/transaction can be annulled at the request 
of the company (and the company alone, but only if the persons dealing with the company in 
respect of the involved decision or transaction were or ought to be aware of the breach). In 
the case at hand, Target will most likely be aware of the conflict of interest (although this 
depends on whether director A’s knowledge can be attributed to Target). 
 
2. As in scenario 1, but Director A discloses his interest in Target to the board of Bidder, and a 
majority of the uninterested directors approves the acquisition. 
 
See answer sub 1. However, compliance with art. 523 CC formalities does not affect the 
potential liability under art. 529 CC. Therefore, directors can still be held liable to both the 
company and/or third parties for unjustified benefits. 
 
3. As in scenario 1, but when the shareholders of Bidder learn of A’s interest in Target, they 
ratify the transaction, believing that it is in the company’s interests. 
 
Ex post ratification in this respect can be interpreted to constitute a waiver of the company’s 
(general meeting’s) right to bring a claim against the directors, request annulment of the 
decision/transaction or liability on the grounds of art. 529 CC. Directors can vote as 
shareholders for such ratification, as there are no conflict of interest rules for shareholders. 
 
However, such ratification will not affect third parties, who can still bring a claim based on art. 
529 CC for any damage they have suffered as a result of the unjustified benefits accrued by 
the interested director. Moreover, minority shareholders that do not approve the ratification 
can still bring a derivative claim (that is: they can only bring a derivative claim if they have not 
approved the ratification). 
 
4. Director A is majority shareholder and managing director in a competitor of bidder (‘Rival’), 
which is also active in the mining business. The assets held by Target that Bidder seeks to 
acquire consist in claims near Rival’s own mining territories. Director A is of the opinion that 
the assets are more valuable for Rival than for Bidder. He therefore arranges for Rival to 
make a competing and higher offer than Bidder, and Target accordingly decides to sell the 
assets to the former company. 
 
We refer to the country report on directors’ duties in Belgian corporate law, and stress the 
following points: 
 
- There is no specific corporate opportunities regulation in the Companies Code. 
- The literature has worked out a corporate opportunities doctrine based on the 
general duty to act in good faith (which comprises, for directors, a duty of loyalty) 
and inspired by Anglo-Saxon tests (business line, etc.). Opinions, however, still 
differ, and there is certainly not clearly established case law. 
                                                     
2
 Art. 529 CC leaves untouched the possibility given by art. 528 CC (for the remaining directors) to state that they have not 
participated in the contested decision to transact with Target. They will have to show the elements required by art. 528 CC and 
listed in the answer to question III.3 in fine. 
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- This means that recourse has to be made to the general enforcement 
mechanism of the duty of loyalty (art. 527 CC, enforceable by the company or 
derivative action), and, if applicable, the conflicts of interest regime (art. 523 CC). 
- A duty not to compete is also derived from the duty to act in good faith, and is 
similarly vague with respect to its exact scope and borders. 
 
5. As in scenario 4 but A resigns from his position as director of Bidder before Rival makes the 
competing offer. 
 
As directors’ duties are based on contract (the contractual norm to act in good faith, art. 1134, 
3 Civil Code), the duty of loyalty ends when the service contract ends. Towards the company, 
this is so as from resignation. After resignation, non-compete contracts can, of course, be 
constructed. 
 
Resignation can in itself be a basis for liability only if it is given in an untimely and harmful 
way. Even though we are not aware of any case law on this point, we think one could 
probably argue that, before resigning, the director should have notified the company of the 
corporate opportunity on the basis of his duty to act in good faith (see the doctrine indicating 
such duty referred to in the country report). 
 
6. As in scenario 4 but after an initial expression of interest by Bidder in acquiring the assets and 
before Rival has taken any steps to make a competing offer, the Bidder board determines that 
an investment of that size is not advisable at the present time in light of Bidder’s weak 
financial position. 
 
If the board of directors decides not to usurp the corporate opportunity, the director can 
principally not be held liable anymore for giving the opportunity to another company. However, 
he must still act loyally to all companies he serves, and must thus equally distribute his time 
and effort among these companies. 
 
The interested director can vote, unless it involves a company that has issued securities to the 
public (which includes listed companies). In the latter case, there is an abstention obligation 
(supra). 
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Bulgaria 
 
Hypothetical I: Liability of the parent and directors of the parent for breaches of duty at the 
level of the subsidiary 
 
1. Is it possible that the parent company would be liable in circumstances comparable to the 
stylised facts above? 
 
Under Bulgarian law companies are delictually liable (art. 45 of the Obligations and Contracts Act). 
Hence, the subsidiary company shall be held delictually liable for the health damages, caused to the 
injured persons. 
 
The parent company, though, cannot be held responsible. The doctrine of “piercing the corporate veil” 
is not applicable under Bulgarian law. A parent company, under Bulgarian law, is allowed to register a 
subsidiary company and to become its single owner, but the responsibility of the two companies 
remains completely separate.  
 
If from the facts of the case can be concluded that there has been an assignment of the work from the 
parent company to the subsidiary, only then the parent company shall be considered responsible (art. 
49 of the Obligations and Contracts Act). But there has to be proven the existence of the following 
additional legal requirements: the assignee (the subsidiary company in the discussed case) has to act 
in the interest of the assignor and for the benefit of the assignor. “For the benefit” means that the profit 
from the distribution of the medicine shall be received only by the assignor (the parent company in the 
discussed case), while the subsidiary company has to receive only a payment for the fulfillment of the 
assigned task.  
 
The discussed case, though, does not reveal any facts from which can be concluded that the parent 
company has assigned work to the subsidiary company. Hence, the parent company shall not be 
considered liable for the damages, caused to the injured persons. 
 
2. Under which circumstances would the directors of the parent company face a liability risk in 
those circumstances? 
 
The directors are not delictually liable for the damages, caused to the injured persons, because there 
is no proximate causation between their act of establishment the subsidiary company and the caused 
damages. 
 
In addition it shall be underlined, that there are no provisions, concerning joint stock companies and 
limited liability companies in the Commerce Act, arranging responsibility of the directors for the 
establishment of subsidiary companies, that turn out to be ineffective in future. 
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Hypothetical II: Duties in the vicinity of insolvency 
 
1. Do fiduciary duties prevent directors from entering into particularly risky transactions? 
 
Neither the Commerce Act, nor any other special act in Bulgaria arranges a fiduciary duty that 
prevents the directors from entering into particularly risky transactions. Bulgarian court practice also 
does not draw a conclusion for the existence of such a duty by interpreting the legislation. 
 
There are, though, some legal provisions, that indirectly prevent the directors from entering into risky 
transactions (e.g. art. 236 of the Commerce Act – for the “closed” joint-stock companies and art. 114 
of the Securities Public Offering Act – for the “public” joint-stock companies). The term “risky” is not 
used in these provisions, but it actually is defined by ratios that can be calculated on the basis of the 
data, disclosed in the annual financial report of each specific company. For example – undertaking of 
an obligation which value for the current year exceeds half of the value of the company’s assets 
according to the last certified annual financial report (art. 236, par. 2, p. 3 of the Commerce Act) or 
transfer of assets, which value exceeds 1/3 of the lower value of the assets according to the last 
certified annual financial report (art. 114, par. 1, p. 1 (a) of the Securities Public Offering Act). For such 
transactions as the ones under art. 236 of the Commerce act and art. 114 of the Securities Public 
Offering Act the preliminary consent of the general meeting, resp. the supervisory board or the 
unanimous consent of the BoD is required. 
 
In case of violation of such provisions, the results can be different, depending on the specific 
provision: 
 the violation of art. 236 of the Commerce Act makes the member of the board, who 
has signed the contract legally responsible, but the transaction itself remains valid; 
 the violation of art. 114 of the Securities Public Offering Act makes the transaction 
void and the members of the board, who have signed the contract - legally responsible; 
 
2. At which point in time does the law provide for additional duties of directors or the change 
of existing duties in situations of financial distress? (i.e. how is ‘vicinity of insolvency’ 
defined?) 
 
The term “vicinity of insolvency” is used neither in the Bulgarian legal acts, nor in the specialized 
Bulgarian legal literature because of two reasons: 
 the rules, arranging vicinity of insolvency are described in the company law, not the 
insolvency law; and 
 Bulgarian legal literature concentrates on the studying of other two terms “over-
indebtedness” (art. 742, par. 1 of the Commerce Act) („свръхзадълженост”) and cash flow insolvency 
(art. 608 of the Commerce Act) („неплатежоспособност”). 
Regardless of the above-said, as vicinity of insolvency can be considered two points in time: 
 when the shareholders’ equity (total assets minus total obligations) falls below the 
registered capital. This rule is applicable to the joint-stock companies and the limited liability 
companies (art. 138, par. 3 and art. 252, par. 1, p. 5 of the Commerce Act); 
 when the loss exceeds ¼ of the company’s registered capital. This rule is applicable 
as an alternative to the above-mentioned rule to the limited liability companies. 
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3. What is the legal response to above situation? For example, the law may provide that the 
directors have to take primarily the creditors’ interests into account, rather than those of the 
shareholders or the company must cease to trade and the directors file for the opening of 
insolvency proceedings. 
 
The legal response to the vicinity of insolvency is the occurrence of a new obligation for the 
management – the obligation to summon the general meeting of the company and to inform its 
members about the new situation.  
 
The Commerce Act does not specify the term, within which the general meeting of the limited liability 
company shall be summoned. Hence, it shall be summoned immediately. 
 
The summoning of the general meeting of the joint-stock company shall take place within a term of 
one year and there shall be taken a decision for the application of any of the following three 
measures: decision for the decrease of the capital, decision for the transformation of the company or 
decision for the termination of the company. If, though, none of the enumerated in the previous 
sentence measures are taken, the company shall be terminated by court’s decision under a 
prosecutor’s claim (art. 252, par. 1, p. 5 of the Commerce Act).  
 
If the company becomes insolvent or over-indebted, the management is obliged to ask for opening of 
an insolvency court procedure within a term of 15 days (art. 626 of the Commerce Act). In case this is 
not done within the above-mentioned term, the management shall be jointly responsible in front of the 
creditors for the damages, caused because of the delay for opening the insolvency procedure (art. 
627 of the Commerce Act). 
 
It can be concluded from the above-said that both – the interests of the creditors and the interests of 
the company’s members, are purposed to be protected. 
 
Hypothetical III: Duty of care 
 
1. Is the CEO liable for annual loss suffered by the company in 2008? 
 
The answer is positive, because the CEO has wilfully caused damages to the company by transferring 
the assets at an undervalue (art. 240, par. 2 of the Commerce Act). 
 
2. Have the directors (other than the CEO) breached their fiduciary duties by approving the 
agreement in conjunction with the resignation of the outgoing CEO? 
 
According to the Bulgarian law it is the board of directors (“BoD”) that appoints the executive director 
and determines his remuneration (and bonuses) (art. 244, par. 4 of the Commerce Act – in case of a 
one-tier system) and it is the supervisory board that appoints the members of the management board 
and determines their remuneration (and bonuses) (art. 241, par. 2 of the Commerce Act - in case of a 
two-tier system). The contract between the executive director and the company shall be concluded by 
the chairman of the BoD (art. 244, par. 7 of the Commerce Act) and the contract between the 
members of the management board and the company shall be concluded by the chairman of the 
supervisory board (art. 241, par. 6 of the Commerce Act). Hence, the general meeting of the joint-
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stock company does not take part neither in the conclusion of the contract with the executive director, 
nor in the determination of his remuneration. 
Concerning the specific case, the answer is as follows:  
 if the members of the BoD have acted negligently by not discovering the CEO’s 
misconduct, then they shall be responsible for the payments, made to the CEO; 
 if the members of the BoD have not been aware of the CEO’s misconduct and this 
unawareness has not been due to the negligence of theirs, then the board has to pay to the CEO the 
agreed under the management contract remuneration. In this specific situation, though, the company 
can sue the former CEO on the grounds of an unjust enrichment. 
 
3.1. Have the members of the company’s internal audit committee (of which the CEO was not a 
member) breached their fiduciary duties by not identifying the true nature of the ostensibly 
arms-length transactions and are they, accordingly, liable for the loss suffered by the company 
as a consequence of the transactions?  
 
Under Bulgarian Commerce Act the companies are not obliged to establish committees for internal 
audit. Some institutions, though, as banks and insurance companies, are obliged to arrange bodies for 
internal control (art. 62 of the Insurance Code and art. 74 of the Credit Institutions Act). 
 
Since the considered hypothetical discusses a bank institution, there shall be applied the provisions of 
Ordinance № 10 for the Internal Control in Banks of the Bulgarian National Bank. According to art. 18, 
par. 2, p. 2 the internal audit committee has to have an unlimited access to the assets and the 
information of the bank and according to art. 14, par. 1, p. 7 it has to check and estimate the defence 
of the assets from misuse. Hence, the members of the internal audit committee have breached their 
duties by not identifying the true nature of the ostensibly arms-length transactions and are accordingly 
liable. 
 
3.2. Have the other directors (except the CEO) breached their duties? 
 
Art. 237, par. 1 of the Commerce Act prescribes that the members of the board have equal rights and 
obligations, regardless of the internal distribution of the functions between them (management and 
representation of the company by some of them included). No explicit obligation for supervision by 
each director over the others is provided. Therefore, the rest of the members of the BoD are not 
obliged to supervise the transactions, which the CEO concludes with third parties. This is why, if the 
transactions are carried out without the knowledge, participation, decision of the rest of the members 
of the BoD, the latter will not be considered liable. 
 
If the BoD has put under vote the conclusion of the ostensibly arms-length transactions, the members 
of the BoD who have voted “pro” conclusion of these transactions, shall be held liable; the rest of the 
members shall be considered free from liability (art. 240, par. 3 of the Commerce Act). 
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4. Assuming that the company has a claim against the CEO or another director pursuant to one 
or more of the above questions, can a minority shareholder enforce the claim? 
 
The answer is positive. Shareholders, possessing 10% of the capital of the joint-stock company, have 
right to enforce a claim for the responsibility of the members of the BoD, the management board and 
the supervision board for damages, caused to the company (art. 240a of the Commerce Act). 
 
Hypothetical IV: Duty of loyalty 
 
Director A is also majority shareholder in Target, holding 60 percent of the outstanding share 
capital of the company. As majority shareholder of Target, he is interested in an acquisition 
that is beneficial to Target. He proposes that Bidder purchase the assets for 10 million 
Euro/Pounds/…, knowing that the value ranges between 7 and 8 million. Director A does not 
disclose his interest in Target to the board of Bidder. A majority of the directors approves the 
acquisition. A’s vote was not decisive for the positive vote. 
 
All members of the BoD shall be considered responsible, because they have not checked the 
parameters of the transaction and they have been aware of the conclusion of this transaction (art. 
240b in connection with art. 240, par. 2 of the Commerce Act). 
 
2. As in scenario 1, but Director A discloses his interest in Target to the board of Bidder, and a 
majority of the uninterested directors approves the acquisition. 
 
In this case the directors, who have votes “pro” conclusion of the transaction, can be held responsible. 
 
3. As in scenario 1, but when the shareholders of Bidder learn of A’s interest in Target, they 
ratify the transaction, believing that it is in the company’s interests. 
 
In this case none of the directors can be considered liable, because of the approval by the general 
meeting (art. 240, par. 3 of the Commerce Act).  
 
4. Director A is majority shareholder and managing director in a competitor of bidder (‘Rival’), 
which is also active in the mining business. The assets held by Target that Bidder seeks to 
acquire consist in claims near Rival’s own mining territories. Director A is of the opinion that 
the assets are more valuable for Rival than for Bidder. He therefore arranges for Rival to make 
a competing and higher offer than Bidder, and Target accordingly decides to sell the assets to 
the former company. 
 
Director “A” shall be considered responsible, because he violates his obligation not to announce any 
information, of which he became aware in his capacity of a director, if this announcement can 
influence the company’s activity and its development (art. 237, par. 5 of the Commerce Act). 
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5. As in scenario 4, but A resigns from his position as director of Bidder before Rival makes 
the competing offer. 
 
Director “A” shall be considered responsible because of the announcement of the information, 
regardless of the fact that he has resigned before making the announcement (art. 237, par. 5 of the 
Commerce Act). 
 
4. As in scenario 4, but after an initial expression of interest by Bidder in acquiring the assets 
and before Rival has taken any steps to make a competing offer, the Bidder board determines 
that an investment of that size is not advisable at the present time in light of Bidder’s weak 
financial position. 
 
Director “A” shall not be considered responsible, since no damages have been caused to “Bidder” (art. 
240, par. 2 of the Commerce Act).  
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Croatia 
 
Hypothetical I: Liability of the parent and directors of the parent for breaches of duty at the 
level of the subsidiary 
 
A pharmaceutical company is currently developing two new drugs. After assessing the potential 
liability risks associated with the future products, the directors of the pharmaceutical company decide 
to incorporate two separate private limited companies, each taking over the development, research 
and future marketing of one of the two drugs. 
 
The directors of the pharmaceutical company appoint the two project managers as directors of the two 
subsidiary companies. The two subsidiary companies enter into an agreement allowing them access 
to the parent company's research facilities. According to the subsidiary's articles of association, all 
major strategic decisions regarding the research, development and marketing of the drugs are subject 
to approval by their sole shareholder, the pharmaceutical company. The employees working for the 
subsidiaries are formally still employed with the parent company, but are posted with the subsidiaries 
under an agreement entered into by the parent company and the two subsidiaries upon formation of 
the two companies. 
 
When the directors of the parent company learn about competitors working on similar projects, they try 
to accelerate the development process of the two drugs. They award substantial bonuses to the 
subsidiary’s directors, contingent on the drugs receiving regulatory approval within the next 6 months. 
The original schedule provided for further tests, which would take at least 12 months. 
 
Primarily because of the contingent bonus payment, the directors of the subsidiaries skip some of the 
planned tests and studies, and cover up this decision in their filings for regulatory approval. 
 
The two drugs gain regulatory approval within the 6 month time span, and are successfully marketed 
shortly after that.  
 
Two years after the initial marketing, independent studies reveal that one of the drugs causes a rare 
form of lethal cancer, exposing the relevant subsidiary to enormous product liability claims that far 
exceed its net assets. The drug developed by the other subsidiary proves to be safe and leads to 
substantial profits. 
 
 Is it possible that the parent company would be liable in circumstances comparable to the stylised 
facts above? 
 
Provided that the directors of the parent company have not breached their duties by way of e.g. 
forcing the directors of the subsidiaries not to follow certain procedures prescribed by law, they would 
not be held liable. If correctly understood by the facts of the case, the actions of the directors of the 
subsidiaries were made on their own motion, since the directors of the parent company did not require 
or suggest skipping some of the planned tests and studies, they merely promised the bonuses. Under 
the circumstances, it seems that promise of the bonuses would not suffice to conclude that the 
directors of the parent company actually and practically requested to skip those tests and studies. 
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 Under which circumstances would the directors of the parent company face a liability risk in those 
circumstances? 
 
If the directors of the parent company by their actions cause the damage to the subsidiary, the parent 
company would have to compensate that damage by the end of the business year. If it does not do 
so, the parent company is jointly and severally liable together with its directors, if they have given the 
instructions to the subsidiary. Standard of care is that of a prudent businessman. 
 
Hypothetical II: Duties in the vicinity of insolvency 
 
After making losses for three consecutive years, an oil trading company’s equity ratio (equity divided 
by total assets) has fallen below [1% - 5% - 10%]. On average, comparable companies in the same 
line of business have an equity ratio of about 25%.  
 
The company still has substantial assets, but the thin equity cushion makes it hard for the company to 
pursue its core business, as trading partners demand higher prices to compensate them for the 
perceived higher risk of the company's operations.   
 
The company's directors evaluate different possibilities to improve the business prospects of the 
company. They attribute past trading losses to the substantially higher volatility of oil prices following 
the financial crisis, and maintain the view that the company's business model is sustainable in the long 
run. After exploring the possibility to raise new equity to recapitalize the business, they conclude that 
current market conditions would force them to issue new shares at prohibitively low prices, which 
would lead to a substantial dilution of their current shareholders. 
 
After analysing the market conditions, the directors come to the conclusion that the market price for 
crude oil is bound to rise significantly over the next year, particularly due to high anticipated demand 
from emerging market economies. In an attempt to recapitalize the company the directors decide to 
invest heavily in crude oil futures. They expect that the anticipated increase in oil prices will lead to 
substantial gains from this transaction, bringing the equity ratio back in line with the industry average, 
and thus allowing the company to resume their trading operations at more sustainable conditions.  
 
The directors are aware that a sudden substantial fall in oil prices could potentially wipe out the 
remaining equity of the firm, but they consider the likelihood of this happening to be very low.  
 
Shortly after entering into the forward sale agreement, worries about a sovereign debt crisis lead to a 
revision of worldwide economic growth forecasts. The price of crude oil falls more than 10% on a 
single day, the worst one day performance in many years. As the company cannot fulfil the margin 
calls on its forward sales contracts, the positions are closed by the counterparty. The closed positions 
have a negative value exceeding the company’s equity, leading to the company’s over-indebtedness. 
Trading partners refuse to enter into transactions with the company due to its financial position, and 
banks close all existing credit lines of the company. 
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 Do fiduciary duties prevent directors from entering into particularly risky transactions? 
 
No, the general provisions on duty of care and business judgment rule apply to all transactions.  
 
 At which point in time does the law provide for additional duties of directors or the change of 
existing duties in situations of financial distress? (i.e. how is ‘vicinity of insolvency’ defined?) 
 
As soon as the directors find out that there is a loss amounting to a half of the share capital, they are 
obliged to convene the general meeting. This does not necessarily lead to insolvency, but if that duty 
is considered as a special duty in case of vicinity of insolvency, it may be considered as that particular 
point in time.  
 
 What is the legal response to above situation? For example, the law may provide that the 
directors have to take primarily the creditors’ interests into account, rather than those of the 
shareholders or the company must cease to trade and the directors file for the opening of 
insolvency proceedings. 
 
Legally, the duties of the directors do not change.  
 
Hypothetical III: Duty of care 
 
A large banking institution is engaged in retail as well as investment banking. In 2000, a new CEO 
was appointed, who also sits on the board of directors. The CEO made the decision to invest heavily 
in collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) backed by residential mortgage backed securities, including 
lower rated securities that pooled subprime mortgages to borrowers with weak credit history. The 
investments were initially successful, generating high profits for the company. However, beginning in 
2005, house prices, particularly in the United States, began to decrease. Defaults and foreclosures 
increased and the income from residential mortgages fell rapidly.  
 
As early as May 2005, economist Paul Krugman had warned of signs that the US housing market was 
approaching the final stages of a speculative bubble. Early in 2007, a large US subprime lender filed 
for bankruptcy protection and a number of investors announced write downs of several billion dollars 
on their structured finance commitments. In July, 2007, Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s 
downgraded bonds backed by subprime mortgages. At the end of 2007, two hedge funds that had 
invested heavily in subprime mortgages declared bankruptcy. In spite of these warning signs, the CEO 
had continued to invest in CDOs until shortly before the Lehman bankruptcy in September 2008, 
accumulating a total exposure of more than 20 billion Euro/Pounds/… . The subprime mortgage crisis 
necessitated massive write downs, leading to an annual loss of eight billion in 2008, which can be 
attributed in equal measure to the CDO transactions undertaken in 2005-2008. 
 
The CEO resigned in October 2008. As part of the resignation, the CEO entered into an agreement 
with the company providing that he would receive 50 million Euro/Pounds/… upon his departure, 
including bonus and stock options, and in addition an office, administrative assistant, car and driver 
until he would commence full time employment with another employer. In exchange, the CEO signed 
a non-compete agreement and a release of claims against the company. The agreement with the 
CEO was approved by all directors (the CEO abstaining from voting), acting on behalf of the company. 
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After the CEO’s departure and with a new management team in place, it transpires that the old CEO 
had used a number of ostensibly arms-length transactions with investment firms that were, however, 
controlled by the CEO’s nominees, to transfer assets at an undervalue to a company owned by the 
CEO on the Cayman Islands. When the true nature of these transactions becomes known, the assets 
are no longer recoverable. 
 
Questions: 
 
 Is the CEO liable for annual loss suffered by the company in 2008? 
 
Only if it is considered that he has breached the business judgment rule, which depends on all 
circumstances of the case. It would be up to the court to establish whether the signs of crisis have be 
sufficient to require a prudent businessman to take or not to take some actions.  
 
 Have the directors (other than the CEO) breached their fiduciary duties by approving the 
agreement in conjunction with the resignation of the outgoing CEO? 
 
In principle yes, since their actions would not be considered as actions in the best interest of the 
company.  
 
 Have the members of the company’s internal audit committee (of which the CEO was not a 
member) breached their fiduciary duties by not identifying the true nature of the ostensibly arms-
length transactions and are they, accordingly, liable for the loss suffered by the company as a 
consequence of the transactions? Have the other directors (except the CEO) breached their 
duties? 
 
Members of the audit committee who are board members are subject to the same general rules as 
any board member. External members of the committee are logically subject to less stringent rules, 
since they are not board members and may not be expected the same level of involvement. However, 
to them applies the principle of a prudent external audit member, as a legal standard, assessed on a 
case by case basis.  
 
Board members are required to be acquainted with company transactions, since that follows from the 
rule that, unless otherwise provided for by the articles of association, the management board makes 
decisions unanimously. However, even the articles of association provide that each director manages 
the company individually within his/her scope of duties, other directors should take appropriate 
actions, including e.g. informing the supervisory board, if they consider that a particular decision is not 
in the best interest of the company.  
 
Duty of care in principle includes the duty to do everything reasonably possible to be informed on all 
management actions of other board members. 
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 Assuming that the company has a claim against the CEO or another director pursuant to one or 
more of the above questions, can a minority shareholder enforce the claim? 
 
Only if the shareholders have suffered the damage independently form the damage caused to the 
company and if it can be proven that the actions of the CEO have been influenced by a third person 
(that includes also e.g. CEO who is a shareholder and thus as shareholder ‘influencing’ his actions as 
CEO or him acting as a director of another company etc.). Any shareholder is under those 
circumstances entitled to a claim. 
 
Hypothetical IV: Duty of loyalty 
 
A mining company (‘Bidder’) considers expanding business operations. The board identifies assets 
held by another company (‘Target’) as a possible acquisition. The following scenarios ask you to 
consider the liability of a director (‘A’) on the board of Bidder. 
 
 Director A is also majority shareholder in Target, holding 60 percent of the outstanding share 
capital of the company. As majority shareholder of Target, he is interested in an acquisition that is 
beneficial to Target. He proposes that Bidder purchase the assets for 10 million Euro/Pounds/…, 
knowing that the value ranges between 7 and 8 million. Director A does not disclose his interest in 
Target to the board of Bidder. A majority of the directors approves the acquisition. A’s vote was 
not decisive for the positive vote. 
 
Director A should have disclosed his interest. He is liable to the Bidder since his actions were not in 
the best interest of the Bidder. The acquisition is valid unless it may be proven that the sellers of the 
shares knew or ought to have known the circumstances of the transaction. Obviously, the director 
knew them.  
 
 As in scenario 1, but Director A discloses his interest in Target to the board of Bidder, and a 
majority of the uninterested directors approves the acquisition. 
 
A is liable, since acting as director of the Bidder he knowingly acted against the best interest of the 
Bidder by not revealing his knowledge of the true value of the shares. 
Other directors would, however, probably also be liable since they have not taken all appropriate 
actions to get proper information on the true value of the shares. 
 
 As in scenario 1, but when the shareholders of Bidder learn of A’s interest in Target, they ratify the 
transaction, believing that it is in the company’s interests. 
 
Same as answer to question 2. 
 
 Director A is majority shareholder and managing director in a competitor of bidder (‘Rival’), which 
is also active in the mining business. The assets held by Target that Bidder seeks to acquire 
consist in claims near Rival’s own mining territories. Director A is of the opinion that the assets are 
more valuable for Rival than for Bidder. He therefore arranges for Rival to make a competing and 
higher offer than Bidder, and Target accordingly decides to sell the assets to the former company. 
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A may not be managing director of the Rival (as competitor of Bidder) without the consent of the 
supervisory board. Otherwise he is liable for any damage caused to Bidder. 
 As in scenario 4, but A resigns from his position as director of Bidder before Rival makes the 
competing offer. 
 
A is then not any more subject to the duty of care and loyalty to Bidder, but arguably he may be found 
liable for not having acted in the best interest of Bidder at the time when he was the director.  
 
 As in scenario 4, but after an initial expression of interest by Bidder in acquiring the assets and 
before Rival has taken any steps to make a competing offer, the Bidder board determines that an 
investment of that size is not advisable at the present time in light of Bidder’s weak financial 
position. 
 
If the weak financial situation is established as the true reason for not pursuing the transaction, there 
would be no liability.  
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Cyprus 
 
Hypothetical I: Liability of the parent and directors of the parent for breaches of duty at the 
level of the subsidiary 
 
A pharmaceutical company is currently developing two new drugs. After assessing the potential 
liability risks associated with the future products, the directors of the pharmaceutical company decide 
to incorporate two separate private limited companies, each taking over the development, research 
and future marketing of one of the two drugs. 
 
The directors of the pharmaceutical company appoint the two project managers as directors of the two 
subsidiary companies. The two subsidiary companies enter into an agreement allowing them access 
to the parent company's research facilities. According to the subsidiary's articles of association, all 
major strategic decisions regarding the research, development and marketing of the drugs are subject 
to approval by their sole shareholder, the pharmaceutical company. The employees working for the 
subsidiaries are formally still employed with the parent company, but are posted with the subsidiaries 
under an agreement entered into by the parent company and the two subsidiaries upon formation of 
the two companies. 
 
When the directors of the parent company learn about competitors working on similar projects, they try 
to accelerate the development process of the two drugs. They award substantial bonuses to the 
subsidiary’s directors, contingent on the drugs receiving regulatory approval within the next 6 months. 
The original schedule provided for further tests, which would take at least 12 months. 
 
Primarily because of the contingent bonus payment, the directors of the subsidiaries skip some of the 
planned tests and studies, and cover up this decision in their filings for regulatory approval. 
 
The two drugs gain regulatory approval within the 6 month time span, and are successfully marketed 
shortly after that.  
 
Two years after the initial marketing, independent studies reveal that one of the drugs causes a rare 
form of lethal cancer, exposing the relevant subsidiary to enormous product liability claims that far 
exceed its net assets. The drug developed by the other subsidiary proves to be safe and leads to 
substantial profits. 
 
1. Is it possible that the parent company would be liable in circumstances comparable to the stylised 
facts above? 
2. Under which circumstances would the directors of the parent company face a liability risk in those 
circumstances? 
 
Unclear – No case-law on the subject. Parent Company and/or directors could face criminal 
proceedings for offences under Criminal Code Cap.154, and civil proceedings under the Civil 
Wrongs Law Cap.154 for torts such as Negligence (section 51).  
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Hypothetical II: Duties in the vicinity of insolvency 
 
After making losses for three consecutive years, an oil trading company’s equity ratio (equity divided 
by total assets) has fallen below [1% - 5% - 10%]. On average, comparable companies in the same 
line of business have an equity ratio of about 25%.  
 
The company still has substantial assets, but the thin equity cushion makes it hard for the company to 
pursue its core business, as trading partners demand higher prices to compensate them for the 
perceived higher risk of the company's operations.   
 
The company's directors evaluate different possibilities to improve the business prospects of the 
company. They attribute past trading losses to the substantially higher volatility of oil prices following 
the financial crisis, and maintain the view that the company's business model is sustainable in the long 
run. After exploring the possibility to raise new equity to recapitalise the business, they conclude that 
current market conditions would force them to issue new shares at prohibitively low prices, which 
would lead to a substantial dilution of their current shareholders. 
 
After analysing the market conditions, the directors come to the conclusion that the market price for 
crude oil is bound to rise significantly over the next year, particularly due to high anticipated demand 
from emerging market economies. In an attempt to recapitalise the company the directors decide to 
invest heavily in crude oil futures. They expect that the anticipated increase in oil prices will lead to 
substantial gains from this transaction, bringing the equity ratio back in line with the industry average, 
and thus allowing the company to resume their trading operations at more sustainable conditions.  
 
The directors are aware that a sudden substantial fall in oil prices could potentially wipe out the 
remaining equity of the firm, but they consider the likelihood of this happening to be very low.  
 
Shortly after entering into the forward sale agreement, worries about a sovereign debt crisis lead to a 
revision of worldwide economic growth forecasts. The price of crude oil falls more than 10% on a 
single day, the worst one day performance in many years. As the company cannot fulfil the margin 
calls on its forward sales contracts, the positions are closed by the counterparty. The closed positions 
have a negative value exceeding the company’s equity, leading to the company’s over-indebtedness. 
Trading partners refuse to enter into transactions with the company due to its financial position, and 
banks close all existing credit lines of the company. 
 
 Do fiduciary duties prevent directors from entering into particularly risky transactions? 
 At which point in time does the law provide for additional duties of directors or the change of 
existing duties in situations of financial distress? (i.e. how is ‘vicinity of insolvency’ defined?) 
 What is the legal response to above situation? For example, the law may provide that the 
directors have to take primarily the creditors’ interests into account, rather than those of the 
shareholders, or the company must cease to trade and the directors file for the opening of 
insolvency proceedings. 
 
Uncertain – No case-law on the subject: 
1) Regarding the first question, possible infringement of the duty of care and skill. In the 
Judgment of the Supreme Court in Giannakis Pelekanos and others v Andreas Pelekanos 
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Civil Appeal No. 10953 (2006) 1A S.C.J. 390, it was stated that the defendant director had 
acted in such way as to exclude his fellow director from the decision-making process, 
promoting his own interests over the interests of the company, which constituted a breach of 
his duty of care and skill. To that effect reference was made to the English judgement in Re 
City Equitable Fire Assurance Co. [1925] Ch 407. It is noted that the Court did not conduct a 
detailed analysis of the said judgment and upheld the abovementioned reference of the first 
instance District Court. Accordingly, the Cyprus Court may follow the English Common Law 
and jurisprudence associated with the Companies Act 1948 on this issue. This is so also on 
the basis of section 29(1)(b) of the Courts of Justice Law (14/1960). 
2) Regarding the second question, in the event section 169F of the Cyprus Companies Law may 
be applicable. Regarding the so-called ‘vicinity of insolvency’, the relevant provision of the 
Cyprus Companies Law is section 169F, which provides (section 169F(1)) that in the event 
that losses of past financial years, or other reasons, lead to the reduction of the share capital 
of a public company by 50% or to a level which, as per the opinion of the directors, puts the 
accomplishment of the company’s goal under dispute, the directors have to call not later than 
28 days from when the reduction became known to them an extraordinary general meeting at 
a date not exceeding 56 days from the date when the decision for calling the meeting was 
made, in order to assess whether the company must be dissolved or any other measure must 
be taken. Under section 169F(2), an omission by the directors of the company to act as above 
constitutes a tort and renders them responsible for damages. The said responsibility is 
personal, unlimited, joint and severable. 
3) Regarding the third question, uncertain – section 301 of the Cyprus Companies Law may be 
applicable, as to fraudulent preference vis-a-vis the company’s creditors. 
 
Hypothetical III: Duty of care 
 
A large banking institution is engaged in retail as well as investment banking. In 2000, a new CEO 
was appointed, who also sits on the board of directors. The CEO made the decision to invest heavily 
in collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) backed by residential mortgage-backed securities, including 
lower-rated securities that pooled subprime mortgages to borrowers with weak credit history. The 
investments were initially successful, generating high profits for the company. However, beginning in 
2005, house prices, particularly in the United States, began to decrease. Defaults and foreclosures 
increased and the income from residential mortgages fell rapidly.  
 
As early as May 2005, economist Paul Krugman had warned of signs that the US housing market was 
approaching the final stages of a speculative bubble. Early in 2007, a large US subprime lender filed 
for bankruptcy protection and a number of investors announced write downs of several billion dollars 
on their structured finance commitments. In July, 2007, Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s 
downgraded bonds backed by subprime mortgages. At the end of 2007, two hedge funds that had 
invested heavily in subprime mortgages declared bankruptcy. In spite of these warning signs, the CEO 
had continued to invest in CDOs until shortly before the Lehman bankruptcy in September 2008, 
accumulating a total exposure of more than 20 billion Euro/Pounds/… . The subprime mortgage crisis 
necessitated massive write downs, leading to an annual loss of eight billion in 2008, which can be 
attributed in equal measure to the CDO transactions undertaken in 2005-2008. 
 
The CEO resigned in October 2008. As part of the resignation, the CEO entered into an agreement 
with the company providing that he would receive 50 million Euro/Pounds/… upon his departure, 
including bonus and stock options, and in addition an office, administrative assistant, car and driver 
until he would commence full time employment with another employer. In exchange, the CEO signed 
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a non-compete agreement and a release of claims against the company. The agreement with the 
CEO was approved by all directors (the CEO abstaining from voting), acting on behalf of the company. 
  
After the CEO’s departure and with a new management team in place, it transpires that the old CEO 
had used a number of ostensibly arms-length transactions with investment firms that were, however, 
controlled by the CEO’s nominees, to transfer assets at an undervalue to a company owned by the 
CEO on the Cayman Islands. When the true nature of these transactions becomes known, the assets 
are no longer recoverable. 
 
Questions: 
 
 Is the CEO liable for annual loss suffered by the company in 2008? 
 
Uncertain – No case-law on the issue.  
 
In the Judgment of the Supreme Court in Giannakis Pelekanos and others v Andreas 
Pelekanos Civil Appeal No. 10953 (2006) 1A S.C.J. 390, it was stated that the defendant 
director had acted in such way as to exclude his fellow director from the decision-making 
process, promoting his own interests over the interests of the company, which constituted a 
breach of his duty of care and skill. To that effect reference was made to the English 
judgement in In Re City Equitable Fire Assurance Co. [1925] Ch 407. It is noted that the Court 
did not conduct a detailed analysis of the said judgment and upheld the abovementioned 
reference of the first instance District Court.  
 
Accordingly, the Cyprus Court may follow the English Common Law and jurisprudence 
associated with the Companies Act 1948 on this issue. 
 
 Have the directors (other than the CEO) breached their fiduciary duties by approving the 
agreement in conjunction with the resignation of the outgoing CEO? 
 
Issues: 
 
- Who decides on transactions of one of the directors with the company 
(related party transactions)? 
 
1.1 Section 191 of the Cyprus Companies Law imposes a duty on directors, 
who are directly or indirectly interested in a contract or proposed contract 
with the company, to declare the nature of their interest at the board 
meeting considering the transaction. If the director becomes interested in 
the contract after the contract is entered into, he or she must declare the 
interest at the first meeting of the board of directors after he/she became 
interested. Failure to do so constitutes a criminal offence. 
1.2 Further, there could be a related provision in the Article of Association of 
the company. 
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- Is the duty of care used to constrain excessive executive remuneration? 
 
a. Uncertain – no case-law on the subject. On the basis of (a) the Judgment 
of the Supreme Court in Giannakis Pelekanos and others v Andreas 
Pelekanos Civil Appeal No. 10953 (2006) 1A S.C.J. 390, which approved 
the citation of the first instance District Court of the English judgement in 
In Re City Equitable Fire Assurance Co. [1925] Ch 407, and (b) section 
29(1)(b) of the Courts of Justice Law (14/1960), the Cyprus Court may 
follow the English Common Law and jurisprudence associated with the 
Companies Act 1948 on this issue. 
 
b. The above matter of the CEO is regulated by section 183 of the Cyprus 
Companies Law, which provides that it shall not be lawful for a company 
to make to any director of the company any payment by way of 
compensation for loss of office, or as consideration for or in connection 
with his retirement from office, without particulars with respect to the 
proposed payment, including the amount thereof, being disclosed to 
members of the company and the proposal being approved by the 
company.  
 
 Have the members of the company’s internal audit committee (of which the CEO was not a 
member) breached their fiduciary duties by not identifying the true nature of the ostensibly 
arms-length transactions and are they, accordingly, liable for the loss suffered by the 
company as a consequence of the transactions? Have the other directors (except the CEO) 
breached their duties? 
 
Uncertain – no case-law on the subject. On the basis of (a) the Judgment of the Supreme 
Court in Giannakis Pelekanos and others v Andreas Pelekanos Civil Appeal No. 10953 (2006) 
1A S.C.J. 390, which approved the citation of the first instance District Court of the English 
judgement in In Re City Equitable Fire Assurance Co. [1925] Ch 407, and (b) section 29(1)(b) 
of the Courts of Justice Law (14/1960), the Cyprus Court may follow the English Common 
Law and jurisprudence associated with the Companies Act 1948 on this issue. 
 
 Assuming that the company has a claim against the CEO or another director pursuant to one 
or more of the above questions, can a minority shareholder enforce the claim? 
 
Issues: 
 
- Who can bring a claim on behalf of the company? 
- Does the derivative action exist? If not, how does the law ensure that minority 
shareholders are protected against collusive behaviour by the majority and 
the directors? 
- What is the threshold to bring a derivative action? 
- Do conditions exist that must be satisfied before a court will allow a derivative 
action to proceed (for example, will the court review whether the action is in 
the interest of the company or frivolous)? 
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- Who bears the costs for a derivative action? 
 
1) A shareholder of the company can bring a derivative action on behalf of the company (to 
that effect see Theodoros Pirillis and another v. Eleftherios Kouis Civil Appeal No. 11387 
(2004) 1A S.C.J. 136). 
2) The derivative action is employed in Cyprus under certain circumstances (to that effect 
see inter alia the Supreme Court of Cyprus Judgements in Theodoros Pirillis and another 
v. Eleftherios Kouis Civil Appeal No. 11387 (2004) 1A S.C.J. 136 and Aimilios Thoma and 
others v. Iakovos Eliades Civil Appeal 11784 (2006) 1B S.C.J. 1263).  
 
3) In the cases where a derivative action was successfully brought, fraudulent behaviour of 
the wrongdoers was evident. 
 
4) The first instance court may be faced with an argument of no case to answer by the 
defendant.  
 
5) The award of costs lies in the discretion of the Court.  
 
Hypothetical IV: Duty of loyalty 
 
A mining company (‘Bidder’) considers expanding business operations. The board identifies assets 
held by another company (‘Target’) as a possible acquisition. The following scenarios ask you to 
consider the liability of a director (‘A’) on the board of Bidder. 
 
 Director A is also majority shareholder in Target, holding 60 percent of the outstanding share 
capital of the company. As majority shareholder of Target, he is interested in an acquisition 
that is beneficial to Target. He proposes that Bidder purchase the assets for 10 million 
Euro/Pounds/…, knowing that the value ranges between 7 and 8 million. Director A does not 
disclose his interest in Target to the board of Bidder. A majority of the directors approves the 
acquisition. A’s vote was not decisive for the positive vote. 
 
Section 191 of the Cyprus Companies Law codifies an aspect of the fiduciary duty of directors 
to avoid conflicts of interest. 
 
Section 191 imposes a duty on directors who are directly or indirectly interested in a contract 
or proposed contract with the company to declare the nature of their interest at the board 
meeting considering the transaction. If the director becomes interested in the contract after 
the contract is entered into, he or she must declare the interest at the first meeting of the 
board of directors after he/she became interested. Failure to do so constitutes a criminal 
offence and the director is liable to a fine of 855 EUR. 
 
Of relevance to section 191 is the judgment of the Supreme Court in Giannakis Pelekanos 
and others v Andreas Pelekanos Civil Appeal No. 10953 (2006) 1A S.C.J. 390, where the 
Supreme Court upheld the first instance judgment of the District Court to the effect that the 
failure of the company directors to declare the nature of their interests prior to entering into the 
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transaction, by using the machinery and personnel of the company pursuing projects in which 
they had indirect interests and by purchasing property, constituted an infringement of both the 
articles of association of the company and of section 191.  
 
In addition, the provision of this section is repeated in Regulation 84(1) of Part I Table A of the 
Cyprus Companies Law, which can be adopted in the articles of association of the company. 
Further Regulation 84(2) provides that a director shall not vote in respect of any contract or 
arrangement in which he is interested, and if he shall do so his vote shall not be counted, nor 
shall he be counted in the quorum present at the meeting of the board of directors, with 
certain exceptions. Only the general meeting of shareholders can release the director of this 
prohibition, either generally or in relation to a particular contract or transaction (Regulation 
84(2)). Although Part I of Table A relates to public companies, Part II of Table A, which deals 
with private companies, clearly states, via Regulation 1, that the Regulation of Part I Table A 
is applicable to private companies as well, with the exception of Regulations 24 and 53 Part I. 
 
Whether the transaction is void or voidable may be ascertained by the Cyprus courts 
according to common law judgments and any judgments associated with the English 
Companies Act 1948. 
 
 As in scenario 1 but Director A discloses his interest in Target to the board of Bidder, and a 
majority of the uninterested directors approves the acquisition. 
 
Issue: Does the interested director have to abstain from voting when the board decides on the 
conflicted interest transaction? If he/she fully informs the board and abstains from voting and 
the board approves the transaction, is it valid? 
 
Yes, the interested director has to abstain and fully inform the board. If the board then 
approves the transaction, it is valid. 
 
 As in scenario 1 but when the shareholders of Bidder learn of A’s interest in Target, they ratify 
the transaction, believing that it is in the company’s interests. 
 
Issue: Can the shareholders authorise or ratify a related-party transaction? Can the conflicted 
director vote on such a resolution if he/she is also shareholder? How is minority shareholder 
protection ensured? For example, can the minority shareholder appeal to the courts and claim 
that the transaction was not in the company’s interest? 
 
The Cyprus courts will draw guidance regarding the first two issues from the common law 
judgments and any judgments associated with the English Companies Act 1948. 
 
Regarding the third issue, it may be possible by bringing a derivative action if fraud is present.  
 
 Director A is majority shareholder and managing director in a competitor of bidder (‘Rival’), 
which is also active in the mining business. The assets held by Target that Bidder seeks to 
acquire consist in claims near Rival’s own mining territories. Director A is of the opinion that 
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the assets are more valuable for Rival than for Bidder. He therefore arranges for Rival to 
make a competing and higher offer than Bidder, and Target accordingly decides to sell the 
assets to the former company. 
 
The Cyprus courts will draw guidance from the common law judgments and any judgments 
associated with the English Companies Act 1948. 
 
 As in scenario 4 but A resigns from his position as director of Bidder before Rival makes the 
competing offer. 
 
There is no provision under Cyprus law on the continuation of the duty of a director not to 
make use of corporate opportunities even after his resignation as director, or indeed for the 
continuation of any other director’s duty after such resignation. 
 
 As in scenario 4 but after an initial expression of interest by Bidder in acquiring the assets and 
before Rival has taken any steps to make a competing offer, the Bidder board determines that 
an investment of that size is not advisable at the present time in light of Bidder’s weak 
financial position. 
 
The interested director has to abstain and fully inform the board of his interest. If the board 
then approves the transaction, it is valid. 
 
Regarding the application of the corporate opportunities doctrine, the Cyprus courts will draw 
guidance from the common law judgments and any judgments associated with the English 
Companies Act 1948.  
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Czech Republic 
 
Hypothetical I: Liability of the parent and directors of the parent for breaches of duty at the 
level of the subsidiary 
 
A pharmaceutical company is currently developing two new drugs. After assessing the potential 
liability risks associated with the future products, the directors of the pharmaceutical company decide 
to incorporate two separate private limited companies, each taking over the development, research 
and future marketing of one of the two drugs. 
 
The directors of the pharmaceutical company appoint the two project managers as directors of the two 
subsidiary companies. The two subsidiary companies enter into an agreement allowing them access 
to the parent company's research facilities. According to the subsidiary's articles of association, all 
major strategic decisions regarding the research, development and marketing of the drugs are subject 
to approval by their sole shareholder, the pharmaceutical company. The employees working for the 
subsidiaries are formally still employed with the parent company, but are posted with the subsidiaries 
under an agreement entered into by the parent company and the two subsidiaries upon formation of 
the two companies. 
 
When the directors of the parent company learn about competitors working on similar projects, they try 
to accelerate the development process of the two drugs. They award substantial bonuses to the 
subsidiary’s directors, contingent on the drugs receiving regulatory approval within the next 6 months. 
The original schedule provided for further tests, which would take at least 12 months. 
 
Primarily because of the contingent bonus payment, the directors of the subsidiaries skip some of the 
planned tests and studies, and cover up this decision in their filings for regulatory approval. 
 
The two drugs gain regulatory approval within the 6 month time span, and are successfully marketed 
shortly after that.  
 
Two years after the initial marketing, independent studies reveal that one of the drugs causes a rare 
form of lethal cancer, exposing the relevant subsidiary to enormous product liability claims that far 
exceed its net assets. The drug developed by the other subsidiary proves to be safe and leads to 
substantial profits. 
 
Is it possible that the parent company would be liable in circumstances comparable to the stylised 
facts above? 
 
According to currently valid and effective legislation in the CC, the subsidiary would be liable towards 
customers. Within the framework of the group, relationships between the parent company and 
subsidiary companies were contractually anchored. It would depend on the nature of the given 
contract. If it would have the character of a controlling contact, the parent company would then be 
entitled to give instructions to the controlling and executive bodies of the subsidiary, if it were in the 
interest of the entire group. Persons giving instructions on behalf of the parent company are obliged to 
proceed with due diligence. If they violate this obligation, they are obliged to compensate for damage 
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that arises from it to the controlled person (subsidiary). If creditors of the controlled person also incur 
damage, the persons breaching due diligence are liable jointly and indivisibly for such damage, if the 
claim of the creditor cannot be satisfied from the assets of the controlled person. In this case however, 
the parent company did not violate the obligation to proceed with due diligence, and it would incur no 
obligations for compensation for damage.  
 
If the contract does not have the character of a controlling contract, the parent company could not 
implement such measures from which the controlled person could incur financial damage, unless it 
pays this damage by the end of the accounting period in which such damage occurred. In this case, it 
is disputable whether the measures of the parent company were of such a nature. It would probably 
not be judged as such because it concerned motivational measures that themselves did not lead to 
the origin of damage.  
 
Under which circumstances would the directors of the parent company face a liability risk in those 
circumstances? 
 
In part see previous answer: if the concluded contract is a controlling contract, the directors of the 
parent company would be liable if their order meant a breach of due diligence. That did not occur in 
this instance. 
 
If the contract concluded between a parent company and subsidiary companies does not have the 
character of a controlling contract, the controlling person cannot implement measures that could 
cause the controlled person damage.  Directors of the parent company provide a guarantee that the 
controlling person will compensate for damage caused by its measures implemented towards the 
controlled person. Here to, measures of the parent company themselves did not lead to the origin of 
damage, liability of the directors of the parent company thus apparently would not occur.   
 
Hypothetical II: Duties in the vicinity of insolvency 
 
After making losses for three consecutive years, an oil trading company’s equity ratio (equity divided 
by total assets) has fallen below [1% - 5% - 10%]. On average, comparable companies in the same 
line of business have an equity ratio of about 25%.  
 
The company still has substantial assets, but the thin equity cushion makes it hard for the company to 
pursue its core business, as trading partners demand higher prices to compensate them for the 
perceived higher risk of the company's operations.   
 
The company's directors evaluate different possibilities to improve the business prospects of the 
company. They attribute past trading losses to the substantially higher volatility of oil prices following 
the financial crisis, and maintain the view that the company's business model is sustainable in the long 
run. After exploring the possibility to raise new equity to recapitalize the business, they conclude that 
current market conditions would force them to issue new shares at prohibitively low prices, which 
would lead to a substantial dilution of their current shareholders. 
 
After analysing the market conditions, the directors come to the conclusion that the market price for 
crude oil is bound to rise significantly over the next year, particularly due to high anticipated demand 
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from emerging market economies. In an attempt to recapitalize the company the directors decide to 
invest heavily in crude oil futures. They expect that the anticipated increase in oil prices will lead to 
substantial gains from this transaction, bringing the equity ratio back in line with the industry average, 
and thus allowing the company to resume their trading operations at more sustainable conditions.  
 
The directors are aware that a sudden substantial fall in oil prices could potentially wipe out the 
remaining equity of the firm, but they consider the likelihood of this happening to be very low.  
 
Shortly after entering into the forward sale agreement, worries about a sovereign debt crisis lead to a 
revision of worldwide economic growth forecasts. The price of crude oil falls more than 10% on a 
single day, the worst one day performance in many years. As the company cannot fulfil the margin 
calls on its forward sales contracts, the positions are closed by the counterparty. The closed positions 
have a negative value exceeding the company’s equity, leading to the company’s over-indebtedness. 
Trading partners refuse to enter into transactions with the company due to its financial position, and 
banks close all existing credit lines of the company. 
 
Do fiduciary duties prevent directors from entering into particularly risky transactions? 
 
The requirement for due diligence enables a wide interpretation and does not prevent directors from 
making decisions relating to financial risk. In the given case however, the situation of the company 
was not good enough, and the external economic environment was not stable enough to allow them to 
bet everything on actions of one kind. Their procedure would probably be assessed as a breach of 
due diligence, and lead to their liability. 
 
At which point in time does the law provide for additional duties of directors or the change of existing 
duties in situations of financial distress? (i.e. how is ‘vicinity of insolvency’ defined?) 
 
The vicinity of insolvency itself is not explicitly defined in the CC. For members of the boards of 
directors of joint-stock companies, the obligation to adopt necessary measures would arise from the 
general requirement for due diligence. The CC gives supervisory boards the right to call a general 
meeting, if the interests of the company require so, and to propose necessary measures at the 
general meeting. The reason for calling a general meeting is formulated in utterly general terms, as a 
rule it would occur this way if the supervisory board were to ascertain serious breaches of the 
obligations of members of the board of directors, serious deficiencies in managing the company, etc. 
 
What is the legal response to above situation? For example, the law may provide that the directors 
have to take primarily the creditors’ interests into account, rather than those of the shareholders or the 
company must cease to trade and the directors file for the opening of insolvency proceedings. 
 
See the answer at question no. 1 - directors would be held liable for violation of due diligence.  
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Hypothetical III: Duty of care 
 
A large banking institution is engaged in retail as well as investment banking. In 2000, a new CEO 
was appointed, who also sits on the board of directors. The CEO made the decision to invest heavily 
in collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) backed by residential mortgage backed securities, including 
lower rated securities that pooled subprime mortgages to borrowers with weak credit history. The 
investments were initially successful, generating high profits for the company. However, beginning in 
2005, house prices, particularly in the United States, began to decrease. Defaults and foreclosures 
increased and the income from residential mortgages fell rapidly.  
 
As early as May 2005, economist Paul Krugman had warned of signs that the US housing market was 
approaching the final stages of a speculative bubble. Early in 2007, a large US subprime lender filed 
for bankruptcy protection and a number of investors announced write downs of several billion dollars 
on their structured finance commitments. In July, 2007, Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s 
downgraded bonds backed by subprime mortgages. At the end of 2007, two hedge funds that had 
invested heavily in subprime mortgages declared bankruptcy. In spite of these warning signs, the CEO 
had continued to invest in CDOs until shortly before the Lehman bankruptcy in September 2008, 
accumulating a total exposure of more than 20 billion Euro/Pounds/… . The subprime mortgage crisis 
necessitated massive write downs, leading to an annual loss of eight billion in 2008, which can be 
attributed in equal measure to the CDO transactions undertaken in 2005-2008. 
 
The CEO resigned in October 2008. As part of the resignation, the CEO entered into an agreement 
with the company providing that he would receive 50 million Euro/Pounds/… upon his departure, 
including bonus and stock options, and in addition an office, administrative assistant, car and driver 
until he would commence full time employment with another employer. In exchange, the CEO signed 
a non-compete agreement and a release of claims against the company. The agreement with the 
CEO was approved by all directors (the CEO abstaining from voting), acting on behalf of the company. 
 
After the CEO’s departure and with a new management team in place, it transpires that the old CEO 
had used a number of ostensibly arms-length transactions with investment firms that were, however, 
controlled by the CEO’s nominees, to transfer assets at an undervalue to a company owned by the 
CEO on the Cayman Islands. When the true nature of these transactions becomes known, the assets 
are no longer recoverable. 
 
Questions: 
 
Is the CEO liable for annual loss suffered by the company in 2008? 
 
The rules of business judgment care are a part of the new legislation in the law on business 
corporations.  However, even according to the current wording, it should be examined whether the 
CEO acted with due professional care, which forms part of the interpretation of due diligence. In this 
case, it would be possible to accept a conclusion that it was not like this. The CEO would thus be 
obliged to compensate for damage he caused the company. It is not possible to say however that 
such damage would equate directly to an incurred loss. 
 
In the Czech reality, such a case would most likely be dealt with as a crime, and compensation for 
damage would be a secondary question. 
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Have the directors (other than the CEO) breached their fiduciary duties by approving the agreement in 
conjunction with the resignation of the outgoing CEO? 
 
Similar agreements are usually indicated as "golden parachutes". To prevent similar cases the CC 
was amended in 2000 (Act no. 370/2000 Coll.): Any supply (benefits, emoluments) by a company in 
favour of a person who is the organ of the company, or a member of such, which this person is not 
entitled to under the statutory provisions or the company's internal regulations (rules) is subject to 
approval by the general meeting, unless the person was awarded the right to such supply (benefits) in 
a contract on the performance of his office. However, the company shall not provide such supply if this 
person's performance of his office obviously contributed to the company's unfavorable economic 
results, if this person is guilty of (responsible for) breaching a statutory duty in connection with the 
performance of his office. The directors would thus, according to Czech legislation, violate the lawful 
ban on providing any supply under the aforementioned circumstances. 
 
Have the members of the company’s internal audit committee (of which the CEO was not a member) 
breached their fiduciary duties by not identifying the true nature of the ostensibly arms-length 
transactions and are they, accordingly, liable for the loss suffered by the company as a consequence 
of the transactions? Have the other directors (except the CEO) breached their duties? 
 
Committees for auditing in accordance with Act no. 93/2009 Coll. on Auditors are compelled to create 
only persons of public interest, thus mainly companies whose shares were accepted for trading on the 
European regulated market, or entities enterprising on the capital market and economically important 
companies (over 4,000 employees). This concerns one of the controlling bodies of the company which 
must, inter alias, assess the effectiveness of internal auditing and the risk management system. They 
should thus deal with these circumstances. But the wording of their liability is not utterly clear. If the 
committee is comprised of members of the supervisory board, the requirement for due diligence 
applies to these members. If it were comprised of other persons, this requirement would be derived 
from the analogy.  
 
Other directors would breach their obligations only under the stipulation that they did not devote close 
enough attention to transactions, if they could and would know and recognize that the transactions are 
damaging in terms of the economic interests of the company. 
 
Assuming that the company has a claim against the CEO or another director pursuant to one or more 
of the above questions, can a minority shareholder enforce the claim? 
 
A minority shareholder can request the supervisor board to exercise the right to compensation for 
damage, which the company has towards the board of directors member. If the supervisory board 
does not fulfill the request of the shareholder without needless delay, it may exercise this right on 
behalf of the company itself.   
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Hypothetical IV: Duty of loyalty 
 
A mining company (‘Bidder’) considers expanding business operations. The board identifies assets 
held by another company (‘Target’) as a possible acquisition. The following scenarios ask you to 
consider the liability of a director (‘A’) on the board of Bidder. 
 
Director A is also majority shareholder in Target, holding 60 percent of the outstanding share capital of 
the company. As majority shareholder of Target, he is interested in an acquisition that is beneficial to 
Target. He proposes that Bidder purchase the assets for 10 million Euro/Pounds/…, knowing that the 
value ranges between 7 and 8 million. Director A does not disclose his interest in Target to the board 
of Bidder. A majority of the directors approves the acquisition. A’s vote was not decisive for the 
positive vote. 
 
Director A is violating the ban on competition regulated by the CC. For violating the ban on 
competition, the director incurs the obligation to relinquish proceedings from the transaction in which 
he breached the ban on competition, or transfer the rights to it to the company. The CC however lacks 
explicit regulation of the obligation to notify the company that he is in a state of competition with it. But 
this obligation can also be deduced from the requirement of due diligence, because it includes the 
obligation of loyalty to the company. 
 
As in scenario 1, but Director A discloses his interest in Target to the board of Bidder, and a majority 
of the uninterested directors approves the acquisition. 
 
Here the situation would change, if he refrained from voting and the other directors would approve the 
acquisition without his vote. Certain opinions in the doctrine claim that even upon the ban on 
competition it is not possible to enforce sanctions against someone in a competitive position if it does 
not concern damage to the company. 
  
As in scenario 1, but when the shareholders of Bidder learn of A’s interest in Target, they ratify the 
transaction, believing that it is in the company’s interests. 
 
Shareholders will not decide apparently on acquisition because it is a matter for the company's 
business management to decide. The general meeting could approve the transaction if such operation 
would be a part of the articles of association of the company. Approval by the general meeting does 
not mean that director A did not violate the ban on competition and does not release him from liability. 
 
Director A is majority shareholder and managing director in a competitor of bidder (‘Rival’), which is 
also active in the mining business. The assets held by Target that Bidder seeks to acquire consist in 
claims near Rival’s own mining territories. Director A is of the opinion that the assets are more 
valuable for Rival than for Bidder. He therefore arranges for Rival to make a competing and higher 
offer than Bidder, and Target accordingly decides to sell the assets to the former company. 
 
Once again, violation of the ban on competition (ban on mediating or brokering company transactions 
for other persons) with consequences such as in scenario 1). 
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As in scenario 4, but A resigns from his position as director of Bidder before Rival makes the 
competing offer. 
 
It is not certain whether or not in this case that violation on the ban on competition occurred, because 
the law does not regulate whether competition is banned even after termination of the job function. 
The articles of association could contain this regulation. It would depend on the assessment of all 
circumstances of the given case. 
 
As in scenario 4, but after an initial expression of interest by Bidder in acquiring the assets and before 
Rival has taken any steps to make a competing offer, the Bidder board determines that an investment 
of that size is not advisable at the present time in light of Bidder’s weak financial position. 
 
In relation to a transaction not implemented, it could lead to violation of the ban on competition if the 
director already negotiated on behalf of the Rival, but no damage or benefit occurred, so sanction 
consequences for the ban on competition are not applied. 
 
Note to all cases 
 
The solution was performed according to valid and effective legislation in the commercial code and 
other regulations. There are no experiences with the new legislation, there exists no case law or 
opinions of doctrine that have undergone fundamental discussion arising from problems appearing in 
practice. Relating laws, mainly process laws, exist thus far only as unpublicized drafts that undergo 
comments of applicable state authorities. For these reasons, answers did not take into consideration 
the new legislation. 
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Denmark 
 
Hypothetical I: Liability of the parent and directors of the parent for breaches of duty at the 
level of the subsidiary 
 
A pharmaceutical company is currently developing two new drugs. After assessing the potential 
liability risks associated with the future products, the directors of the pharmaceutical company decide 
to incorporate two separate private limited companies, each taking over the development, research 
and future marketing of one of the two drugs. 
 
The directors of the pharmaceutical company appoint the two project managers as directors of the two 
subsidiary companies. The two subsidiary companies enter into an agreement allowing them access 
to the parent company's research facilities. According to the subsidiary's articles of association, all 
major strategic decisions regarding the research, development and marketing of the drugs are subject 
to approval by their sole shareholder, the pharmaceutical company. The employees working for the 
subsidiaries are formally still employed with the parent company, but are posted with the subsidiaries 
under an agreement entered into by the parent company and the two subsidiaries upon formation of 
the two companies. 
 
When the directors of the parent company learn about competitors working on similar projects, they try 
to accelerate the development process of the two drugs. They award substantial bonuses to the 
subsidiary’s directors, contingent on the drugs receiving regulatory approval within the next 6 months. 
The original schedule provided for further tests, which would take at least 12 months. 
 
Primarily because of the contingent bonus payment, the directors of the subsidiaries skip some of the 
planned tests and studies, and cover up this decision in their filings for regulatory approval. 
 
The two drugs gain regulatory approval within the 6 month time span, and are successfully marketed 
shortly after that.  
 
Two years after the initial marketing, independent studies reveal that one of the drugs causes a rare 
form of lethal cancer, exposing the relevant subsidiary to enormous product liability claims that far 
exceed its net assets. The drug developed by the other subsidiary proves to be safe and leads to 
substantial profits. 
 
Is it possible that the parent company would be liable in circumstances comparable to the stylised 
facts above? Under which circumstances would the directors of the parent company face a liability risk 
in those circumstances? 
 
Answer: Yes, if the actions of the directors of the parent company were seen as irresponsible and 
carried out on behalf of the parent company, the parent company may face liability as a shadow 
director. 
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Hypothetical II: Duties in the vicinity of insolvency 
 
After making losses for three consecutive years, an oil trading company’s equity ratio (equity divided 
by total assets) has fallen below [1% - 5% - 10%]. On average, comparable companies in the same 
line of business have an equity ratio of about 25%.  
 
The company still has substantial assets, but the thin equity cushion makes it hard for the company to 
pursue its core business, as trading partners demand higher prices to compensate them for the 
perceived higher risk of the company's operations.   
 
The company's directors evaluate different possibilities to improve the business prospects of the 
company. They attribute past trading losses to the substantially higher volatility of oil prices following 
the financial crisis, and maintain the view that the company's business model is sustainable in the long 
run. After exploring the possibility to raise new equity to recapitalise the business, they conclude that 
current market conditions would force them to issue new shares at prohibitively low prices, which 
would lead to a substantial dilution of their current shareholders. 
 
After analysing the market conditions, the directors come to the conclusion that the market price for 
crude oil is bound to rise significantly over the next year, particularly due to high anticipated demand 
from emerging market economies. In an attempt to recapitalise the company the directors decide to 
invest heavily in crude oil futures. They expect that the anticipated increase in oil prices will lead to 
substantial gains from this transaction, bringing the equity ratio back in line with the industry average, 
and thus allowing the company to resume their trading operations at more sustainable conditions.  
 
The directors are aware that a sudden substantial fall in oil prices could potentially wipe out the 
remaining equity of the firm, but they consider the likelihood of this happening to be very low.  
 
Shortly after entering into the forward sale agreement, worries about a sovereign debt crisis lead to a 
revision of worldwide economic growth forecasts. The price of crude oil falls more than 10% on a 
single day, the worst one day performance in many years. As the company cannot fulfil the margin 
calls on its forward sales contracts, the positions are closed by the counterparty. The closed positions 
have a negative value exceeding the company’s equity, leading to the company’s over-indebtedness. 
Trading partners refuse to enter into transactions with the company due to its financial position, and 
banks close all existing credit lines of the company. 
 
 Do fiduciary duties prevent directors from entering into particularly risky transactions? 
 
No, a director may enter into risky transactions, however, if the company has insufficient funds, 
either generally or because the risk is particularly great, the director is obliged to exercise 
particular care. However, if the director bona fide and adequately informed believes the 
transaction to be beneficial for the company, he may enter into it. 
 
 At which point in time does the law provide for additional duties of directors or the change of 
existing duties in situations of financial distress? (i.e. how is ‘vicinity of insolvency’ defined?) 
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A director is obliged to exercise care to ensure that the company can fulfil its obligations and 
commitments as they fall due. Thus, the director owes a duty to all claimants of the company and 
not just to shareholders. As creditors are paid before shareholders, a director has an obligation to 
consider the interests of creditors before shareholders if the company is close to insolvency, but it 
is acceptable that the director tries to save the company from insolvency and thereby look after 
the interests of the shareholders as long as the actions taken are not unreasonable. 
Consequently, if the company is in financial distress and may not be able to honour its 
commitments, directors must observe particular care. However, there is no definite point in time or 
any set threshold as to liquidity, cash or own funds that may be used as objective cut-off points as 
it would depend on the company and its financial situation. In case law, directors have been held 
liable if they have taken on additional debt (typically by buying on credit) at a point in time where 
there was no reasonable prospect of the company being able to service the debt; known 
colloquially as the ‘hopelessness point.’  
 
 What is the legal response to above situation? For example, the law may provide that the 
directors have to take primarily the creditors’ interests into account, rather than those of the 
shareholders or the company must cease to trade and the directors file for the opening of 
insolvency proceedings. 
 
In the case described here, my view would be that the director may escape liability if he made the 
decision bona fide and well informed. Danish courts may be said to apply a version of the 
Business Judgement Rule to the extent that they are reluctant to censor decisions made by 
directors that later turn out to be bad business decisions unless they were clearly reckless at the 
time. 
 
Hypothetical III: Duty of care 
 
A large banking institution is engaged in retail as well as investment banking. In 2000, a new CEO 
was appointed, who also sits on the board of directors. The CEO made the decision to invest heavily 
in collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) backed by residential mortgage backed securities, including 
lower rated securities that pooled subprime mortgages to borrowers with weak credit history. The 
investments were initially successful, generating high profits for the company. However, beginning in 
2005, house prices, particularly in the United States, began to decrease. Defaults and foreclosures 
increased and the income from residential mortgages fell rapidly.  
 
As early as May 2005, economist Paul Krugman had warned of signs that the US housing market was 
approaching the final stages of a speculative bubble. Early in 2007, a large US subprime lender filed 
for bankruptcy protection and a number of investors announced write downs of several billion dollars 
on their structured finance commitments. In July, 2007, Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s 
downgraded bonds backed by subprime mortgages. At the end of 2007, two hedge funds that had 
invested heavily in subprime mortgages declared bankruptcy. In spite of these warning signs, the CEO 
had continued to invest in CDOs until shortly before the Lehman bankruptcy in September 2008, 
accumulating a total exposure of more than 20 billion Euro/Pounds/… . The subprime mortgage crisis 
necessitated massive write downs, leading to an annual loss of eight billion in 2008, which can be 
attributed in equal measure to the CDO transactions undertaken in 2005-2008. 
 
The CEO resigned in October 2008. As part of the resignation, the CEO entered into an agreement 
with the company providing that he would receive 50 million Euro/Pounds/… upon his departure, 
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including bonus and stock options, and in addition an office, administrative assistant, car and driver 
until he would commence full time employment with another employer. In exchange, the CEO signed 
a non-compete agreement and a release of claims against the company. The agreement with the 
CEO was approved by all directors (the CEO abstaining from voting), acting on behalf of the company. 
 
After the CEO’s departure and with a new management team in place, it transpires that the old CEO 
had used a number of ostensibly arms-length transactions with investment firms that were, however, 
controlled by the CEO’s nominees, to transfer assets at an undervalue to a company owned by the 
CEO on the Cayman Islands. When the true nature of these transactions becomes known, the assets 
are no longer recoverable. 
 
Questions: 
 
 Is the CEO liable for annual loss suffered by the company in 2008? 
 
In this case, the decisions appear to have been reckless to the extent that the CEO may incur 
liability, see reply in hypo II. I’m not sure that Krugman’s warning, despite his eloquence, 
would be sufficient as a warning that makes the decisions look reckless to a court, but the 
other market indicators would probably do. 
 
 Have the directors (other than the CEO) breached their fiduciary duties by approving the 
agreement in conjunction with the resignation of the outgoing CEO? 
 
Only if it is proven that they understood that they were overpaying. Compensation is decided 
by the board of directors itself, i.e. by fellow directors. There is a fiduciary duty not to allow 
excessive compensation, but the boundaries are wide as to the board’s discretion. Note that 
financial companies and publicly traded companies now must have policies on remuneration 
requiring approval by the shareholders in general meeting, however, the application of the 
policy still lies with the directors. 
 
 Have the members of the company’s internal audit committee (of which the CEO was not a 
member) breached their fiduciary duties by not identifying the true nature of the ostensibly 
arms-length transactions and are they, accordingly, liable for the loss suffered by the 
company as a consequence of the transactions? Have the other directors (except the CEO) 
breached their duties? 
 
The liability of the audit committee depends on whether there was information available to 
them that would have showed the problem. Although a board is a collective organ, each 
director is evaluated individually. Thus, although the members of the audit committee may be 
liable for failing to note available alarming information, liability may not extend to the other 
directors, unless the information was also available to them. This may be the case, as many 
audit committees disclose their information to the whole board. A director cannot excuse 
himself by the fact that he supposed the audit committee to discover any wrongdoings. 
 
 Assuming that the company has a claim against the CEO or another director pursuant to one 
or more of the above questions, can a minority shareholder enforce the claim? 
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No, the starting point would be that the claim belongs to the company. However, if the 
company decides not to pursue the claim, shareholders holding 10 per cent of the capital may 
raise a derivative claim on behalf of the company. 
 
Hypothetical IV: Duty of loyalty 
 
A mining company (‘Bidder’) considers expanding business operations. The board identifies assets 
held by another company (‘Target’) as a possible acquisition. The following scenarios ask you to 
consider the liability of a director (‘A’) on the board of Bidder. 
 
 Director A is also majority shareholder in Target, holding 60 percent of the outstanding share 
capital of the company. As majority shareholder of Target, he is interested in an acquisition 
that is beneficial to Target. He proposes that Bidder purchase the assets for 10 million 
Euro/Pounds/…, knowing that the value ranges between 7 and 8 million. Director A does not 
disclose his interest in Target to the board of Bidder. A majority of the directors approves the 
acquisition. A’s vote was not decisive for the positive vote. 
 
Issue: Does the law require directors to disclose direct or indirect interests in transactions with 
the company? Is this duty laid down in the companies act or does it derive from the fiduciary 
position of the director? If the director violates the disclosure obligation, is the transaction void 
or voidable or does the director have to pay damages? 
 
Yes, a director must disclose a conflict of interest and excuse himself (for the time it takes the 
board to decide). However, it may be permissible first to explain his view of the matter before 
leaving the board. A failure can make the decision void, even if the director’s vote was not 
decisive, however, it would depend on whether the failure to make the proper disclosure may 
have affected the decision made by the other directors. 
 
 As in scenario 1, but Director A discloses his interest in Target to the board of Bidder, and a 
majority of the uninterested directors approves the acquisition. 
 
Issue: Does the interested director have to abstain from voting when the board decides on the 
conflicted interest transaction? If he/she fully informs the board and abstains from voting and 
the board approves the transaction, is it valid? 
 
 Yes and yes, see above. 
 
 As in scenario 1, but when the shareholders of Bidder learn of A’s interest in Target, they 
ratify the transaction, believing that it is in the company’s interests. 
 
Ratification is probably possible.  
 Director A is majority shareholder and managing director in a competitor of bidder (‘Rival’), 
which is also active in the mining business. The assets held by Target that Bidder seeks to 
acquire consist in claims near Rival’s own mining territories. Director A is of the opinion that 
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the assets are more valuable for Rival than for Bidder. He therefore arranges for Rival to 
make a competing and higher offer than Bidder, and Target accordingly decides to sell the 
assets to the former company. 
 
There is no specific ‘corporate opportunities doctrine’, but the same result is achieved by 
using the ordinary standards of duty of care and loyalty, and the rules on conflict of interest, 
which prohibits the director from influencing the decision. 
 
 As in scenario 4, but A resigns from his position as director of Bidder before Rival makes the 
competing offer. 
 
A resignation would probably not remedy the breach of the duty of care and loyalty, unless the 
resignation was made before the transaction was contemplated. 
 
 As in scenario 4, but after an initial expression of interest by Bidder in acquiring the assets 
and before Rival has taken any steps to make a competing offer, the Bidder board determines 
that an investment of that size is not advisable at the present time in light of Bidder’s weak 
financial position. 
 
It is not clear, but probably no liability of the director if the board and thereby the company do 
not believe to have any interest that could conflict with the private interest of the director. 
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Finland 
 
Hypothetical I: Liability of the parent and directors of the parent for breaches of duty at the 
level of the subsidiary 
 
A pharmaceutical company is currently developing two new drugs. After assessing the potential 
liability risks associated with the future products, the directors of the pharmaceutical company decide 
to incorporate two separate private limited companies, each taking over the development, research 
and future marketing of one of the two drugs. 
 
The directors of the pharmaceutical company appoint the two project managers as directors of the two 
subsidiary companies. The two subsidiary companies enter into an agreement allowing them access 
to the parent company's research facilities. According to the subsidiary's articles of association, all 
major strategic decisions regarding the research, development and marketing of the drugs are subject 
to approval by their sole shareholder, the pharmaceutical company. The employees working for the 
subsidiaries are formally still employed with the parent company, but are posted with the subsidiaries 
under an agreement entered into by the parent company and the two subsidiaries upon formation of 
the two companies. 
 
When the directors of the parent company learn about competitors working on similar projects, they try 
to accelerate the development process of the two drugs. They award substantial bonuses to the 
subsidiary’s directors, contingent on the drugs receiving regulatory approval within the next 6 months. 
The original schedule provided for further tests, which would take at least 12 months. 
 
Primarily because of the contingent bonus payment, the directors of the subsidiaries skip some of the 
planned tests and studies, and cover up this decision in their filings for regulatory approval. 
 
The two drugs gain regulatory approval within the 6 month time span, and are successfully marketed 
shortly after that.  
 
Two years after the initial marketing, independent studies reveal that one of the drugs causes a rare 
form of lethal cancer, exposing the relevant subsidiary to enormous product liability claims that far 
exceed its net assets. The drug developed by the other subsidiary proves to be safe and leads to 
substantial profits. 
 
 Is it possible that the parent company would be liable in circumstances comparable to the stylised 
facts above? 
 
The answer does not include any considerations on product liability law. 
 
The Companies Act does not include provisions on lifting the corporate veil (disregarding the legal 
entity). The issue has been discussed in the Finnish legal literature for decades. Some Supreme Court 
cases may be interpreted to contain wording that does not deny the possibility of lifting the corporate 
veil. However, there are no published court cases applying Companies Act whre  the corporate veil 
would have been lifted. Clearly such a decision would require exceptional circumstances. Considering 
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the circumstances of the case, especially that the directors of the subsidiaries skip test and studies 
and cover up this decision, it is most unlikely that Finnish courts would decide the parent company 
to be liable. 
 
 Under which circumstances would the directors of the parent company face a liability risk in those 
circumstances? 
 
The answer does not include any considerations on product liability law. 
 
If the directors of the parent company knew or should have known that necessary test and studies 
were skipped, this might cause liability if the parent company suffers a loss because of the directors’ 
passivity or neglect. The parent company might have a claim against its directors based on the losses 
suffered by the parent company due to one subsidiary’s exposure to product liability claims. 
 
According to Chapter 1, Section 8 of Companies Act, The management of the company shall act with 
due care and promote the interests of the company. (It should be noted that the law includes the 
board of directors under the definition of management). 
 
According to Chapter 22, Section 1, Sub-section 1, A Member of the Board of Directors, a Member of 
the Supervisory Board and the Managing Director shall be liable in damages for the loss that he or 
she, in violation of the duty of care referred to in chapter 1, section 8, has in office deliberately or 
negligently caused to the company. 
 
Hypothetical II: Duties in the vicinity of insolvency 
 
After making losses for three consecutive years, an oil trading company’s equity ratio (equity divided 
by total assets) has fallen below [1% - 5% - 10%]. On average, comparable companies in the same 
line of business have an equity ratio of about 25%.  
 
The company still has substantial assets, but the thin equity cushion makes it hard for the company to 
pursue its core business, as trading partners demand higher prices to compensate them for the 
perceived higher risk of the company's operations.   
 
The company's directors evaluate different possibilities to improve the business prospects of the 
company. They attribute past trading losses to the substantially higher volatility of oil prices following 
the financial crisis, and maintain the view that the company's business model is sustainable in the long 
run. After exploring the possibility to raise new equity to recapitalize the business, they conclude that 
current market conditions would force them to issue new shares at prohibitively low prices, which 
would lead to a substantial dilution of their current shareholders. 
 
After analysing the market conditions, the directors come to the conclusion that the market price for 
crude oil is bound to rise significantly over the next year, particularly due to high anticipated demand 
from emerging market economies. In an attempt to recapitalize the company the directors decide to 
invest heavily in crude oil futures. They expect that the anticipated increase in oil prices will lead to 
substantial gains from this transaction, bringing the equity ratio back in line with the industry average, 
and thus allowing the company to resume their trading operations at more sustainable conditions.  
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The directors are aware that a sudden substantial fall in oil prices could potentially wipe out the 
remaining equity of the firm, but they consider the likelihood of this happening to be very low.  
 
Shortly after entering into the forward sale agreement, worries about a sovereign debt crisis lead to a 
revision of worldwide economic growth forecasts. The price of crude oil falls more than 10% on a 
single day, the worst one day performance in many years. As the company cannot fulfil the margin 
calls on its forward sales contracts, the positions are closed by the counterparty. The closed positions 
have a negative value exceeding the company’s equity, leading to the company’s over-indebtedness. 
Trading partners refuse to enter into transactions with the company due to its financial position, and 
banks close all existing credit lines of the company. 
 
 Do fiduciary duties prevent directors from entering into particularly risky transactions? 
 
Risk-taking is a normal part of business. It is the directors’ duty to assess the situation with duty of 
care. Business Judgement Rule is recognized under Finnish Companies Act (the preparatory text of 
the Government Bill acknowledges the Business Judgement Rule). The risk and required care are 
correlated between each other: the duty of care is emphasized when the risk increases (Government 
Bill HE 109/2005 page 40). This means that particularly risky transactions require particular care. 
 
 At which point in time does the law provide for additional duties of directors or the change of 
existing duties in situations of financial distress? (i.e. how is ‘vicinity of insolvency’ defined?) 
 
Chapter 20, Section 23, Sub-section 1 of Companies Act stipulates the following. 
If the Board of Directors of the company notices that the equity of the company is negative, it shall 
without delay notify the loss of the share capital for registration.  
 
Sub-section 3 stipulates the following. 
If the Board of Directors of a public company notices that the equity of the company is less than one 
half of the share capital, the Board of Directors shall without delay draw up financial statements and 
annual report in order to ascertain the financial position of the company. If according to the balance 
sheet the equity of the company is less than one half of the share capital, the Board of Directors shall 
without delay convene a General Meeting to consider measures to remedy the financial position of the 
company. The General Meeting shall be held within three months of the date of the financial 
statements.  
 
 What is the legal response to above situation? For example, the law may provide that the 
directors have to take primarily the creditors’ interests into account, rather than those of the 
shareholders or the company must cease to trade and the directors file for the opening of 
insolvency proceedings. 
The law does not include a duty to the directors or CEO to apply for bankruptcy. However, continuing 
the business operations may cause liability to the directors or CEO under Criminal Code. It is not very 
rare that criminal proceedings are initiated after bankruptcy. 
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Chapter 39 of the Criminal Code includes the provisions on offences by a debtor. E.g. according to 
Section 1, a debtor who increases his or her liabilities without basis and thus causes his or her 
insolvency or essentially worsens his or her state of insolvency, shall be sentenced for dishonesty by 
a debtor to a fine or to imprisonment for at most two years. Section 1a includes the provisions of 
aggravated dishonesty by a debtor when e.g. considerable or particularly substantial damage is 
caused to the creditors and the dishonesty by a debtor is aggravated also when assessed as a whole, 
the offender shall be sentenced for aggravated dishonesty by a debtor to imprisonment for at least 
four months and at most four years. 
 
Favouring a creditor (Section 6) is also a crime. 
 
Hypothetical III: Duty of care 
 
A large banking institution is engaged in retail as well as investment banking. In 2000, a new CEO 
was appointed, who also sits on the board of directors. The CEO made the decision to invest heavily 
in collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) backed by residential mortgage backed securities, including 
lower rated securities that pooled subprime mortgages to borrowers with weak credit history. The 
investments were initially successful, generating high profits for the company. However, beginning in 
2005, house prices, particularly in the United States, began to decrease. Defaults and foreclosures 
increased and the income from residential mortgages fell rapidly.  
 
As early as May 2005, economist Paul Krugman had warned of signs that the US housing market was 
approaching the final stages of a speculative bubble. Early in 2007, a large US subprime lender filed 
for bankruptcy protection and a number of investors announced write downs of several billion dollars 
on their structured finance commitments. In July, 2007, Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s 
downgraded bonds backed by subprime mortgages. At the end of 2007, two hedge funds that had 
invested heavily in subprime mortgages declared bankruptcy. In spite of these warning signs, the CEO 
had continued to invest in CDOs until shortly before the Lehman bankruptcy in September 2008, 
accumulating a total exposure of more than 20 billion Euro/Pounds/… . The subprime mortgage crisis 
necessitated massive write downs, leading to an annual loss of eight billion in 2008, which can be 
attributed in equal measure to the CDO transactions undertaken in 2005-2008. 
 
The CEO resigned in October 2008. As part of the resignation, the CEO entered into an agreement 
with the company providing that he would receive 50 million Euro/Pounds/… upon his departure, 
including bonus and stock options, and in addition an office, administrative assistant, car and driver 
until he would commence full time employment with another employer. In exchange, the CEO signed 
a non-compete agreement and a release of claims against the company. The agreement with the 
CEO was approved by all directors (the CEO abstaining from voting), acting on behalf of the company. 
 
After the CEO’s departure and with a new management team in place, it transpires that the old CEO 
had used a number of ostensibly arms-length transactions with investment firms that were, however, 
controlled by the CEO’s nominees, to transfer assets at an undervalue to a company owned by the 
CEO on the Cayman Islands. When the true nature of these transactions becomes known, the assets 
are no longer recoverable. 
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Questions: 
 
 Is the CEO liable for annual loss suffered by the company in 2008? 
 
The CEO is liable under Companies Act at least for the damage caused by the transaction taken to 
transfer assets at an undervalue to a company owned by the CEO him/herself. According to Chapter 
6, Section 19 of Companies Act, section 4 on disqualification applies also to the Managing Director. 
According to Chapter 6, Section 4 of the Companies Act A Member [of the Board of Directors] shall 
likewise be disqualified from the consideration of a matter pertaining to a contract between the 
company and a third party, if the Member is to derive an essential benefit in the matter and that benefit 
may be contrary to the interests of the company. The provisions in this section on a contract apply 
correspondingly to other transactions and court proceedings. 
 
For damages unrelated to the damages caused by the above-mentioned self-interest transactions, the 
answer is unclear. For losses caused by transactions taken in 2005, 2006 and early 2007 the CEO is 
not liable as the business was common market practice and had generated high profits for the 
company. Towards the end of 2007 and in 2008 signs of losses became clearer and it is possible that 
he or she is liable for neglecting the fiduciary duty. According to Companies Act, Chapter 1, Section 8, 
The management of the company shall act with due care and promote the interests of the company.  
 
According to Chapter 22, Section 1, Sub-section 1, A Member of the Board of Directors, a Member of 
the Supervisory Board and the Managing Director shall be liable in damages for the loss that he or 
she, in violation of the duty of care referred to in chapter 1, section 8, has in office deliberately or 
negligently caused to the company. 
 
According to Supreme Court case KKO 1997:110 risk-taking is a part of credit functions of commercial 
banking. According to the Supreme Court, duty of care requires, however, that credit decisions are 
prepared carefully and that they can be justified by commercial grounds. When assessing the duty of 
care, the decisive point of time is the state of affairs at the time when the decisions were made. 
Already when the first credit decision was taken 22 November 1990, the appellants had to be aware 
even based on the information given in the media of the weakening economic trends and the 
decreasing housing prices prevailing at that time. Nothing referred to an essential and rapid 
amelioration of the situation.  
 
 Have the directors (other than the CEO) breached their fiduciary duties by approving the 
agreement in conjunction with the resignation of the outgoing CEO? 
 
The answer is written under the presumption that there was no previous agreement on the severance 
benefits. 
 
The directors are liable. The described resignation agreement would be highly unusual in Finland for 
any company. In fact I don’t think such a package has ever been given to any CEO even in a highly 
successful company. Under the circumstances, when the resignation takes places in a situation of a 
loss of eight billion EUR, following the CEO’s investment decisions, the board has not acted with due 
care considering the exceptionally expensive resignation agreement. 
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According to Chapter 1, Section 8, The management of the company shall act with due care and 
promote the interests of the company. (It should be noted that the law includes the board of directors 
under the definition of management). 
 
According to Chapter 22, Section 1, Sub-section 1, A Member of the Board of Directors, a Member of 
the Supervisory Board and the Managing Director shall be liable in damages for the loss that he or 
she, in violation of the duty of care referred to in chapter 1, section 8, has in office deliberately or 
negligently caused to the company. 
 
 Have the members of the company’s internal audit committee (of which the CEO was not a 
member) breached their fiduciary duties by not identifying the true nature of the ostensibly arms-
length transactions and are they, accordingly, liable for the loss suffered by the company as a 
consequence of the transactions? Have the other directors (except the CEO) breached their 
duties? 
 
Under Companies Act, the answer is unclear. The members of the audit committee are liable, if the 
real nature of the transactions taken by the CEO was evident in the material or other information 
received by the audit committee. Even if the issue was not evident but there was anyway reason to 
doubt the true nature of those transactions. the committee members may be liable for neglecting the 
duty of care of Companies Act Chapter 1, Section 8. The same applies to the other directors. They are 
liable if they had reason to doubt the true nature of the transactions from the materials and other 
information that they had. The other directors may have had less possibility to notice the suspicious 
transactions and it is possible that only the audit committee members are liable. The law is not 
different for members and non-members but the circumstances in question determine who is liable. 
 
 Assuming that the company has a claim against the CEO or another director pursuant to one or 
more of the above questions, can a minority shareholder enforce the claim? 
 
Yes, at least if the plaintiff hold at least 10 % of all the shares. An owner of just one share has the 
same right if non-enforcement of the claim would be contrary to the principle of equal treatment but 
this is not evident in the case description. 
 
The Companies Act includes the following Chapter 22, Section 7: 
 
Right of the shareholders to bring an action on the behalf of the company 
(1) One or several shareholders shall have the right to bring an action in their own name for the 
collection of damages to the company under sections 1—3 or under section 44 of the Auditing Act, if it 
is probable at the time of filing of the action that the company will not make a claim for damages and: 
(1) the plaintiffs hold at least one tenth (1/10) of all shares at that moment; or 
(2) it is proven that the non-enforcement of the claim for damages would be contrary to the principle of 
equal treatment, as referred to in chapter 1, section 7. 
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Hypothetical IV: Duty of loyalty 
 
A mining company (‘Bidder’) considers expanding business operations. The board identifies assets 
held by another company (‘Target’) as a possible acquisition. The following scenarios ask you to 
consider the liability of a director (‘A’) on the board of Bidder. 
 
 Director A is also majority shareholder in Target, holding 60 percent of the outstanding share 
capital of the company. As majority shareholder of Target, he is interested in an acquisition that is 
beneficial to Target. He proposes that Bidder purchase the assets for 10 million Euro/Pounds/…, 
knowing that the value ranges between 7 and 8 million. Director A does not disclose his interest in 
Target to the board of Bidder. A majority of the directors approves the acquisition. A’s vote was 
not decisive for the positive vote. 
 
Director A is liable under Companies Act. 
 
According to legal literature, competing action is forbidden due to duty of loyalty. Although the 
Companies Act contains no explicit provision on the duty of loyalty, legal literature agrees that it is part 
of duty or care (Chapter 1, Section 8). This is also stated in the Government Bill for the Act (HE 
109/2005 page 79). 
 
Furthermore, according to Chapter 6, Section 4 of the Limited Liability Companies Act, A Member [of 
the Board of Directors] shall likewise be disqualified from the consideration of a matter pertaining to a 
contract between the company and a third party, if the Member is to derive an essential benefit in the 
matter and that benefit may be contrary to the interests of the company. The provisions in this section 
on a contract apply correspondingly to other transactions and court proceedings. 
 
According to Chapter 1, Section 8, The management of the company shall act with due care and 
promote the interests of the company. (It should be noted that the law includes the board of directors 
under the definition of management). 
 
According to Chapter 22, Section 1, Sub-section 1, A Member of the Board of Directors, a Member of 
the Supervisory Board and the Managing Director shall be liable in damages for the loss that he or 
she, in violation of the duty of care referred to in chapter 1, section 8, has in office deliberately or 
negligently caused to the company. 
 
According to Chapter 22, Section 1, Sub-section 2, A Member of the Board of Directors, a Member of 
the Supervisory Board and the Managing Director shall likewise be liable in damages for the loss that 
he or she, in violation of other provisions of this Act or the Articles of Association, has in office 
deliberately or negligently caused to the company, a shareholder or a third party. 
 
According to the Supreme Court case KKO 1997:110, even a deputy director may be liable for 
damages even when the deputy director did not participate in the decision-making, if he or she 
neglected the fiduciary duty e.g. by not disclosing to the board the essential factors related to the 
decision that he or she was aware of. 
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 As in scenario 1, but Director A discloses his interest in Target to the board of Bidder, and a 
majority of the uninterested directors approves the acquisition. 
 
Director A is liable under Companies Act (Chapter 1, Section 8 as described in point 1). Also the 
above-mentioned Supreme Court case KKO 1997:110 shows that non-disclosure of essential factors 
may cause liability even when the director does not participate in the decision-making. 
 
 As in scenario 1, but when the shareholders of Bidder learn of A’s interest in Target, they ratify the 
transaction, believing that it is in the company’s interests. 
 
Director A is liable under Companies Act (Chapter 1, Section 8 as described in point 1). Also the 
above-mentioned Supreme Court case KKO 1997:110 shows that non-disclosure of essential factors 
may cause liability even when the director does not participate in the decision-making. The ratification 
of the shareholders does not remove Director A’s duty to disclose his or her knowledge of the 
discrepancy between the purchase price and the value of the assets.  
 
 Director A is majority shareholder and managing director in a competitor of bidder ( ‘Rival’), which 
is also active in the mining business. The assets held by Target that Bidder seeks to acquire 
consist in claims near Rival’s own mining territories. Director A is of the opinion that the assets are 
more valuable for Rival than for Bidder. He therefore arranges for Rival to make a competing and 
higher offer than Bidder, and Target accordingly decides to sell the assets to the former company. 
 
Director A is liable under Companies Act. 
 
According to legal literature, competing action is forbidden due to duty of loyalty. Although the 
Companies Act contains no explicit provision on the duty of loyalty, legal literature agrees that it is part 
of duty or care (Chapter 1, Section 8). This is also stated in the Government Bill for the Act (HE 
109/2005 page 79). 
 
According to Chapter 6, Section 4 of the Companies Act A Member [of the Board of Directors] shall 
likewise be disqualified from the consideration of a matter pertaining to a contract between the 
company and a third party, if the Member is to derive an essential benefit in the matter and that benefit 
may be contrary to the interests of the company. The provisions in this section on a contract apply 
correspondingly to other transactions and court proceedings. 
 
According to Chapter 1, Section 8 The management of the company shall act with due care and 
promote the interests of the company. (It should be noted that the law includes the board of directors 
under the definition of management). 
 
According to Chapter 22, Section 1, Sub-section 1, A Member of the Board of Directors, a Member of 
the Supervisory Board and the Managing Director shall be liable in damages for the loss that he or 
she, in violation of the duty of care referred to in chapter 1, section 8, has in office deliberately or 
negligently caused to the company. 
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According to Chapter 22, Section 1, Sub-section 2, A Member of the Board of Directors, a Member of 
the Supervisory Board and the Managing Director shall likewise be liable in damages for the loss that 
he or she, in violation of other provisions of this Act or the Articles of Association, has in office 
deliberately or negligently caused to the company, a shareholder or a third party. 
 
 As in scenario 4, but A resigns from his position as director of Bidder before Rival makes the 
competing offer. 
 
Under Companies Act, the answer is unclear. After the resignation Director A has no fiduciary duty 
towards the Bidder. It is unclear, however, if non-disclosure of the facts before the resignation could 
be deemed to be such a neglect that it has causality with any damage suffered by the Bidder. Under 
the circumstances, especially if the resigning director has mentioned the conflict of interest as the 
cause of resignation, the remaining board members should take all reasonable efforts to base their 
decision on all relevant facts. 
 
 As in scenario 4, but after an initial expression of interest by Bidder in acquiring the assets and 
before Rival has taken any steps to make a competing offer, the Bidder board determines that an 
investment of that size is not advisable at the present time in light of Bidder’s weak financial 
position. 
 
Under Companies Act, the answer is unclear. If the Bidder’s financial position is weak, the transaction 
might be too risky as it is not certain if the Bidder could sell the assets to the Rival with a profit. Thus it 
is not clear if the Bidder has been caused damage by Director A. 
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France 
 
Hypothetical I: Liability of the parent and directors of the parent for breaches of duty at the 
level of the subsidiary 
 
A pharmaceutical company is currently developing two new drugs. After assessing the potential 
liability risks associated with the future products, the directors of the pharmaceutical company decide 
to incorporate two separate private limited companies, each taking over the development, research 
and future marketing of one of the two drugs. 
 
The directors of the pharmaceutical company appoint the two project managers as directors of the two 
subsidiary companies. The two subsidiary companies enter into an agreement allowing them access 
to the parent company's research facilities. According to the subsidiary's articles of association, all 
major strategic decisions regarding the research, development and marketing of the drugs are subject 
to approval by their sole shareholder, the pharmaceutical company. The employees working for the 
subsidiaries are formally still employed with the parent company, but are posted with the subsidiaries 
under an agreement entered into by the parent company and the two subsidiaries upon formation of 
the two companies. 
 
When the directors of the parent company learn about competitors working on similar projects, they try 
to accelerate the development process of the two drugs. They award substantial bonuses to the 
subsidiary’s directors, contingent on the drugs receiving regulatory approval within the next 6 months. 
The original schedule provided for further tests, which would take at least 12 months. 
 
Primarily because of the contingent bonus payment, the directors of the subsidiaries skip some of the 
planned tests and studies, and cover up this decision in their filings for regulatory approval. 
 
The two drugs gain regulatory approval within the 6 month time span, and are successfully marketed 
shortly after that.  
 
Two years after the initial marketing, independent studies reveal that one of the drugs causes a rare 
form of lethal cancer, exposing the relevant subsidiary to enormous product liability claims that far 
exceed its net assets. The drug developed by the other subsidiary proves to be safe and leads to 
substantial profits. 
 
 Is it possible that the parent company would be liable in circumstances comparable to the 
stylised facts above? 
 
French case law is very restrictive to admit the possibility to hold the parent liable for instructions 
given to the subsidiary, such as in the current case. 
 
The employees working for the subsidiaries are formally still employed with the parent company 
but are posted with the subsidiaries under an agreement entered into by the parent company, and 
the two subsidiaries is something common in groups. It would not lead the courts, as such, to 
consider that the subsidiary was not an independent entity. 
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 Under which circumstances would the directors of the parent company face a liability risk in 
those circumstances? 
 
The parent company would have to be considered a shadow director or it would have to create a 
misleading appearance towards thirds parties that the parent was actually contracting (selling the 
drugs) with clients. Case law is becoming currently more restrictive as the latest decisions since 
2004 require a misleading appearance and not just involvement in the business of the subsidiary. 
 
Hypothetical II: Duties in the vicinity of insolvency 
 
After making losses for three consecutive years, an oil trading company’s equity ratio (equity divided 
by total assets) has fallen below [1% - 5% - 10%]. On average, comparable companies in the same 
line of business have an equity ratio of about 25%.  
 
The company still has substantial assets, but the thin equity cushion makes it hard for the company to 
pursue its core business, as trading partners demand higher prices to compensate them for the 
perceived higher risk of the company's operations.   
 
The company's directors evaluate different possibilities to improve the business prospects of the 
company. They attribute past trading losses to the substantially higher volatility of oil prices following 
the financial crisis, and maintain the view that the company's business model is sustainable in the long 
run. After exploring the possibility to raise new equity to recapitalise the business, they conclude that 
current market conditions would force them to issue new shares at prohibitively low prices, which 
would lead to a substantial dilution of their current shareholders. 
 
After analysing the market conditions, the directors come to the conclusion that the market price for 
crude oil is bound to rise significantly over the next year, particularly due to high anticipated demand 
from emerging market economies. In an attempt to recapitalise the company the directors decide to 
invest heavily in crude oil futures. They expect that the anticipated increase in oil prices will lead to 
substantial gains from this transaction, bringing the equity ratio back in line with the industry average, 
and thus allowing the company to resume their trading operations at more sustainable conditions.  
 
The directors are aware that a sudden substantial fall in oil prices could potentially wipe out the 
remaining equity of the firm, but they consider the likelihood of this happening to be very low.  
 
Shortly after entering into the forward sale agreement, worries about a sovereign debt crisis lead to a 
revision of worldwide economic growth forecasts. The price of crude oil falls more than 10% on a 
single day, the worst one day performance in many years. As the company cannot fulfil the margin 
calls on its forward sales contracts, the positions are closed by the counterparty. The closed positions 
have a negative value exceeding the company’s equity, leading to the company’s over-indebtedness. 
Trading partners refuse to enter into transactions with the company due to its financial position, and 
banks close all existing credit lines of the company. 
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 Do fiduciary duties prevent directors from entering into particularly risky transactions? 
 
Under French law, directors and managers are not prohibited from entering into risky transactions. 
However, in the case at hand, since the company will have to file for bankruptcy because of the 
transaction, it is almost certain that it will be held liable for breach of its duty of care. 
 
 At which point in time does the law provide for additional duties of directors or the change of 
existing duties in situations of financial distress? (i.e. how is ‘vicinity of insolvency’ defined?) 
 
Once the company has filed for bankruptcy, any management mistake that was committed before 
the bankruptcy may lead to liability. 
 
 What is the legal response to below situation? 
 
The directors would almost certainly be held liable for management mistakes. 
 
Hypothetical III: Duty of care 
 
A large banking institution is engaged in retail as well as investment banking. In 2000, a new CEO 
was appointed, who also sits on the board of directors. The CEO made the decision to invest heavily 
in collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) backed by residential mortgage-backed securities, including 
lower-rated securities that pooled subprime mortgages to borrowers with weak credit history. The 
investments were initially successful, generating high profits for the company. However, beginning in 
2005, house prices, particularly in the United States, began to decrease. Defaults and foreclosures 
increased and the income from residential mortgages fell rapidly.  
 
As early as May 2005, economist Paul Krugman had warned of signs that the US housing market was 
approaching the final stages of a speculative bubble. Early in 2007, a large US subprime lender filed 
for bankruptcy protection and a number of investors announced write downs of several billion dollars 
on their structured finance commitments. In July, 2007, Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s 
downgraded bonds backed by subprime mortgages. At the end of 2007, two hedge funds that had 
invested heavily in subprime mortgages declared bankruptcy. In spite of these warning signs, the CEO 
had continued to invest in CDOs until shortly before the Lehman bankruptcy in September 2008, 
accumulating a total exposure of more than 20 billion Euro/Pounds/… . The subprime mortgage crisis 
necessitated massive write downs, leading to an annual loss of eight billion in 2008, which can be 
attributed in equal measure to the CDO transactions undertaken in 2005-2008. 
 
The CEO resigned in October 2008. As part of the resignation, the CEO entered into an agreement 
with the company providing that he would receive 50 million Euro/Pounds/… upon his departure, 
including bonus and stock options, and in addition an office, administrative assistant, car and driver 
until he would commence full time employment with another employer. In exchange, the CEO signed 
a non-compete agreement and a release of claims against the company. The agreement with the 
CEO was approved by all directors (the CEO abstaining from voting), acting on behalf of the company. 
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After the CEO’s departure and with a new management team in place, it transpires that the old CEO 
had used a number of ostensibly arms-length transactions with investment firms that were, however, 
controlled by the CEO’s nominees, to transfer assets at an undervalue to a company owned by the 
CEO on the Cayman Islands. When the true nature of these transactions becomes known, the assets 
are no longer recoverable. 
 
Questions: 
 
 Is the CEO liable for annual loss suffered by the company in 2008? 
 
The BJR, as known in the US, does not apply in France, but French courts do not tend to second-
guess business decisions as long as the company does not become insolvent. If it does, they 
easily find a management mistake. In the current case, the company has not become insolvent. 
This situation is similar to a few situations of French banks. No suit has been filed and I doubt that 
a judge would find a management mistake. Suits are more likely to be filed (but not necessary to 
be successful) on the ground that the company, when listed, did not disclose with accuracy the 
relevant facts. 
 
It cannot be said generally when warning signs (‘red flags’) become so obvious that initially 
permissible risk-taking constitutes a violation of the duty of care. This is decided by courts on a 
case-by-case basis. They will usually hold that the situation must have been so desperate that 
there would have been no hope to save the company. 
 
 Have the directors (other than the CEO) breached their fiduciary duties by approving the 
agreement in conjunction with the resignation of the outgoing CEO? 
 
The decision belongs to the board of directors (or supervisory board), but if the transaction is 
signed before and without authorisation, it is simply voidable in case of prejudice to the company. 
 
 Have the members of the company’s internal audit committee (of which the CEO was not a 
member) breached their fiduciary duties by not identifying the true nature of the ostensibly arms-
length transactions and are they, accordingly, liable for the loss suffered by the company as a 
consequence of the transactions? Have the other directors (except the CEO) breached their 
duties? 
 
Theoretically, members of the audit committee are not subject to specific liability rules or a 
separate standard of care in light of their position and/or expertise, especially in suits by 
shareholders. However, if the board of directors is held liable for having approved the transaction, 
members of the audit committee will face a secondary action by other members of the board in 
order to share a larger portion of the damages by arguing that they are more liable. 
 
Directors are generally not required to monitor their colleagues. If a director lies to them, they will 
probably not be held liable for not having identified the problem, unless it was obvious. 
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 Assuming that the company has a claim against the CEO or another director pursuant to one or 
more of the above questions, can a minority shareholder enforce the claim? 
 
- Who can bring a claim on behalf of the company? 
 
Any shareholder. 
 
- What is the threshold to bring a derivative action? 
 
One share. 
 
- Do conditions exist that must be satisfied before a court will allow a derivative action to 
proceed (for example, will the court review whether the action is in the interest of the 
company or frivolous)? 
 
No. 
 
Hypothetical IV: Duty of loyalty 
 
A mining company (‘Bidder’) considers expanding business operations. The board identifies assets 
held by another company (‘Target’) as a possible acquisition. The following scenarios ask you to 
consider the liability of a director (‘A’) on the board of Bidder. 
 
 Director A is also majority shareholder in Target, holding 60 percent of the outstanding share 
capital of the company. As majority shareholder of Target, he is interested in an acquisition 
that is beneficial to Target. He proposes that Bidder purchase the assets for 10 million 
Euro/Pounds/…, knowing that the value ranges between 7 and 8 million. Director A does not 
disclose his interest in Target to the board of Bidder. A majority of the directors approves the 
acquisition. A’s vote was not decisive for the positive vote. 
 
The law requires directors to disclose their interest. This duty is laid down in the Code de 
Commerce. The transaction is void because the director took part in the vote, regardless of 
the fact that his vote was not essential, and even if the operation would have been beneficial 
to the company. However, the nullity is not opposable to good faith third parties. 
 
 As in scenario 1, but Director A discloses his interest in Target to the board of Bidder, and a 
majority of the uninterested directors approves the acquisition. 
 
The conflicted director must abstain from voting. As long as he abstains and the board 
approves the transaction, it is valid. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
308 Directors’ Duties and Liability in the EU  
 
 As in scenario 1, but when the shareholders of Bidder learn of A’s interest in Target, they 
ratify the transaction, believing that it is in the company’s interests. 
 
Shareholders cannot authorise the transaction. They can only approve it, with no legal effect. 
Under French law, the rule is that each organ of the company receives its powers from the 
Companies Act and modifications are limited. 
 
A minority shareholder can appeal to the court and claim that the transaction was not in the 
company’s interest even if the transaction was approved by the majority of the shareholders. 
 
 Director A is majority shareholder and managing director in a competitor of bidder (‘Rival’), 
which is also active in the mining business. The assets held by Target that Bidder seeks to 
acquire consist in claims near Rival’s own mining territories. Director A is of the opinion that 
the assets are more valuable for Rival than for Bidder. He therefore arranges for Rival to 
make a competing and higher offer than Bidder, and Target accordingly decides to sell the 
assets to the former company. 
 
The body of case law on the corporate opportunities doctrine is not very developed. Directors 
(but not managers of Limited - SARL) are allowed to run competing businesses. However, this 
case law is evolving. It cannot be ruled out that a French court would hold that there was a 
breach of the duty of loyalty, since the exact extent of this duty is still not fully clear. 
 
 As in scenario 4, but A resigns from his position as director of Bidder before Rival makes the 
competing offer. 
 
There could be a case for liability, but again this is not certain. 
 
 As in scenario 4, but after an initial expression of interest by Bidder in acquiring the assets 
and before Rival has taken any steps to make a competing offer, the Bidder board determines 
that an investment of that size is not advisable at the present time in light of Bidder’s weak 
financial position. 
 
There is no prejudice, so that there would be no liability. 
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Germany 
 
 
Hypothetical I: Liability of the parent and directors of the parent for breaches of duty at the 
level of the subsidiary
3
 
 
A pharmaceutical company is currently developing two new drugs. After assessing the potential 
liability risks associated with the future products, the directors of the pharmaceutical company decide 
to incorporate two separate private limited companies, each taking over the development, research 
and future marketing of one of the two drugs. 
 
The directors of the pharmaceutical company appoint the two project managers as directors of the two 
subsidiary companies. The two subsidiary companies enter into an agreement allowing them access 
to the parent company's research facilities. According to the subsidiary's articles of association, all 
major strategic decisions regarding the research, development and marketing of the drugs are subject 
to approval by their sole shareholder, the pharmaceutical company. The employees working for the 
subsidiaries are formally still employed with the parent company, but are posted with the subsidiaries 
under an agreement entered into by the parent company and the two subsidiaries upon formation of 
the two companies. 
 
When the directors of the parent company learn about competitors working on similar projects, they try 
to accelerate the development process of the two drugs. They award substantial bonuses to the 
subsidiary’s directors, contingent on the drugs receiving regulatory approval within the next 6 months. 
The original schedule provided for further tests, which would take at least 12 months. 
 
Primarily because of the contingent bonus payment, the directors of the subsidiaries skip some of the 
planned tests and studies, and cover up this decision in their filings for regulatory approval. 
 
The two drugs gain regulatory approval within the 6 month time span, and are successfully marketed 
shortly after that.  
 
Two years after the initial marketing, independent studies reveal that one of the drugs causes a rare 
form of lethal cancer, exposing the relevant subsidiary to enormous product liability claims that far 
exceed its net assets. The drug developed by the other subsidiary proves to be safe and leads to 
substantial profits. 
 
1. Is it possible that the parent company would be liable in circumstances comparable to the stylised 
facts above? Under which circumstances would the directors of the parent company face a liability 
risk in those circumstances? 
 
Under German law the liability of a parent company could in these circumstances arise out of the 
principle of liability for an intervention destroying the economical existence of the company 
(existenzvernichtender Eingriff), general stock corporation law, as well as group law regulations. 
 
                                                     
3
 Answers on German law kindly provided by Niklas Bielefeld. 
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a) Intervention destroying the economic existence of the company (existenzvernichtender 
Eingriff) 
 
The limited liability of shareholders and the separation of liabilities and assets between 
shareholders and company – as laid down in s. 1(1), sent. 2 of the German Stock Corporation Act 
(Aktiengesetz, AktG) for the German stock corporation (Aktiengesellschaft, AG) and in s. 13(2) of 
the German Limited Liability Company Act (Gesetz betreffend die Gesellschaften mit beschränkter 
Haftung, GmbHG) for limited liability companies (Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung, GmbH), 
respectively – have always been emphasised and enforced by German courts as two of the core 
principles of company law. The German Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof, BGH) has 
over the years established a rule that the shareholders in a limited liability company may be 
subject to personal liability towards the company in case of a conscious intervention or 
interference destroying the economic existence of the company. This case group is not quite 
clear-cut, however, from a dogmatic point of view and has undergone several changes and 
alterations over the years. According to recent decisions by the BGH the personal liability of the 
shareholders for this particular form of misuse and abuse of the corporate form is derived from s. 
826 of the German Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, BGB), a rule of tort law. It applies only in 
very narrow circumstances, where the shareholders consciously and abusively diminish the assets 
of the company, causing the company to become insolvent in the process. The actions of the 
shareholders leading to the insolvency must be of an unethical and immoral nature. In an 
authoritative decision from 2008 the BGH stated:
4
 
 
“The liability for intervention destroying the economic existence of the company (remark: as a 
case group of s. 826 BGB) shall have the effect of an enforced prohibition of the withdrawal of 
company assets which endorses – but also goes noticeably beyond – the general statutory 
rules on capital maintenance by compensating for the unethical self-serving behaviour of 
shareholders to the detriment of the creditors of the company and thereby causing or 
deepening the company’s insolvency through the establishment of a rigid liability for damages 
to the impaired assets of the company.” 
 
According to the BGH, the actions of the shareholders have to aim at giving preference to their 
financial interests over the legally protected interests of the creditors through a conscious 
impairment of the assets of the company. Since the courts have always been reluctant to interpret 
this case group broadly, the personal liability of shareholders is limited to this type of behaviour.  
 
While not being undisputed, it is argued by most legal authors that this concept of liability, which 
was developed for private limited companies (GmbH’s), shall also apply to public companies 
(AG’s).
5
  
 
In the above case, German courts would almost with certainty conclude that the parent company 
was not liable according to s. 826 BGB for causing the insolvency of one of its subsidiaries, 
because the relevant actions, i.e. the setting-up of the bonus scheme – although probably 
unethical and reckless towards the general public – were not aimed at impairing the subsidiary’s 
assets in favour of the parent company’s self-interest and to the detriment of the creditors’ 
interests. 
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 BGH, Judgement of 28 April 2008 - II ZR 264/06 (“Gamma”, NJW 2008, 2437, 2438); see also BGH, Judgement of 9 February 
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b) Liability according to s. 117 AktG 
 
If the two subsidiary companies developing the drugs in the above case were AG’s instead of 
GmbH’s, the liability of the parent company could also result from s. 117 AktG, which stipulates in 
subsection 1: 
 
“Any person who, by exerting his influence over the company, intentionally induces a member 
of the management board or the supervisory board, a registered authorised officer (Prokurist) 
or an authorised signatory to act to the disadvantage of the company or its shareholders shall 
be liable to the company for any resulting damage. Such person shall also be liable to the 
shareholders for any resulting damage insofar as they have suffered damage in addition to 
any loss incurred as a result of the damage to the company.” 
 
This regulation not only provides for a liability towards the company, but also towards its 
shareholders. The required influence over the company’s management or officers will in most 
cases result from a position as shareholder of the AG. Thus, the parent company could in principle 
be subject to such liability. In addition, the influence must be aimed at inducing an action by the 
management that is in contravention of the company’s interests (see s. 76 AktG) and its specific 
social responsibility resulting from art. 14(2) of the German Federal Constitution (Grundgesetz, 
GG). It is generally acknowledged that this criterion has to be evaluated in the light of the general 
duty of care of the directors as laid down in s. 93 AktG.
6
 Whether an action can be regarded as a 
violation of the director’s duty has to be determined by the rules set out in s. 93 AktG. Section 
93(1) sent. 1 AktG states that in conducting the company’s business, the members of the 
management board shall employ the care of a diligent and conscientious manager. Sent. 2 
clarifies that it shall not be deemed a violation of the aforementioned duty if, at the time of the 
entrepreneurial decision, the members of the board had good reason to assume that they were 
acting on the basis of adequate information and for the benefit of the company. This provision 
effectively establishes a business judgment rule in German corporate law. Although the directors 
are hereby generally granted a rather broad range of discretion for decision-making, the 
assumption of unforeseeable risks would have to be regarded as a violation of the duties of the 
directors.  
 
Putting drugs on the market which have not been sufficiently tested constitutes an unforeseeable 
risk. The directors of both parent and subsidiary company knew that the testing schedule initially 
was 12 months and consciously wanted to short-cut the process by setting up the bonus scheme 
to reach the aim of regulatory approval within six months, hereby accepting enormous product 
liability risks for the subsidiary company. It is a matter of value judgement whether the 
considerable advantages of a much faster testing process – which eventually materialised in 
substantial profits with one of the drugs – make up for the danger of enormous liability risks. This 
seems rather questionable, though, in light of other risks for the welfare of the involved 
companies, such as for example the considerable reputational damage caused by “scandals” in 
the pharmaceutical industry. Generally, the directors may not take actions which pose a potentially 
                                                     
6
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existential risk to the company, even if from an ex ante perspective the decision has a positive net 
present value.
7
 In addition, it conflicts with the social responsibilities of the company to put 
potentially dangerous drugs on the market without proper testing in order to be the first supplier in 
the relevant market. Furthermore, giving false information to the authorities during the approval 
process may also be unlawful under the relevant statutory rules. In any case, the encouragement 
of such illegal behaviour by the subsidiary companies’ directors falls outside of the directors’ 
discretion granted by the business judgement rule.  
 
Therefore, it can be reasonably concluded that the parent company and its directors would be 
liable under s. 117 AktG for unlawfully using their influence over the subsidiary company. 
 
c) Group Law – liability in the case of an domination agreement (Beherrschungsvertrag) 
 
As regards German group law, the liability of the parent company and its directors towards the 
subsidiary company could also arise out of the application of s. 309(2) AktG if a domination 
agreement existed between the two companies. According to subsection 1 of this provision, the 
legal representatives of the controlling parent company shall, in issuing instructions to the 
controlled company, employ the care of a diligent and conscientious manager. If such legal 
representatives violate their duties, they are jointly and severally liable to the company for any 
resulting damage pursuant to subsection 2. Although the wording of the provision only concerns 
the liability of the directors of the controlling company, it is undisputed that the controlling 
company itself is also liable for the damage. The liability of the controlling company further 
requires an “instruction” by the management of the controlling company. An instruction in this 
sense is every measure by means of which the management of the controlling company tries to 
influence the conduct of the controlled company. Thus, no express order or directive by the 
management of the controlling company is necessary. 
 
In the above case, the awarding of the bonuses to the directors of the subsidiaries was only put in 
place by the management of the controlling company in order to induce them to speed up the 
development and testing of the drugs. It is highly likely that German courts would deem this to be 
an instruction in the sense of s. 309 AktG. Again, whether an action constitutes a violation of the 
director’s duties has to be determined in light of the definition of directors’ duties under s. 93 AktG. 
As elaborated above, the instruction by the management of the parent company would very likely 
have to be qualified as a violation of the directors’ duties for various reasons.  
 
For the sake of completeness, it shall be noted that the burden of proof regarding the violation of 
the duties of the directors is borne by the directors according to s. 93(2) sent. 2 and s. 309(2) 
sent. 2 AktG. Furthermore, each shareholder of the subsidiary company as well as the creditors of 
the subsidiary are entitled to bring the claim either against the parent company or against its 
directors according to s. 309(4) AktG. For the creditors this is only the case if their claims cannot 
be satisfied by the subsidiary company itself. 
 
Irrespective of a possible violation of duties, the parent company would be liable for any annual 
loss that the subsidiary company may suffer pursuant to s. 302 AktG.  
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d) Group law – liability in a factual group (faktischer Konzern) 
 
If no control or domination agreement is in force between the parent and the subsidiary company 
the liability of the parent company and its directors would result from s. 317 AktG, the 
requirements of which are rather similar to those of s. 309 AktG. The parent company must have 
caused the subsidiary company to take a disadvantageous measure without compensating the 
subsidiary for the damage incurring therefrom. 
 
It shall be added for the sake of completeness that the liability of the parent company and the 
directors could, of course, also result from regulations of German tort and product liability law. 
 
e) Substantive consolidation 
 
The above constellation also gives reason to mention the equitable concept of substantive 
consolidation. However, group insolvency law in general is hardly regulated and comparatively 
underdeveloped in Germany. While the concept has been discussed recently in the legal literature 
(with a rejecting tenor),
8
 it has to be concluded that it is still unknown to German law.  
 
Hypothetical II: Duties in the vicinity of insolvency 
 
 
After making losses for three consecutive years, an oil trading company’s equity ratio (equity divided 
by total assets) has fallen below [1% - 5% - 10%]. On average, comparable companies in the same 
line of business have an equity ratio of about 25%.  
 
The company still has substantial assets, but the thin equity cushion makes it hard for the company to 
pursue its core business, as trading partners demand higher prices to compensate them for the 
perceived higher risk of the company's operations.   
 
The company's directors evaluate different possibilities to improve the business prospects of the 
company. They attribute past trading losses to the substantially higher volatility of oil prices following 
the financial crisis, and maintain the view that the company’s business model is sustainable in the long 
run. After exploring the possibility to raise new equity to recapitalize the business, they conclude that 
current market conditions would force them to issue new shares at prohibitively low prices, which 
would lead to a substantial dilution of their current shareholders. 
 
After analysing the market conditions, the directors come to the conclusion that the market price for 
crude oil is bound to rise significantly over the next year, particularly due to high anticipated demand 
from emerging market economies. In an attempt to recapitalize the company the directors decide to 
invest heavily in crude oil futures. They expect that the anticipated increase in oil prices will lead to 
substantial gains from this transaction, bringing the equity ratio back in lime with the industry average, 
and thus allowing the company to resume their trading operations at more sustainable conditions.  
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The directors are aware that a sudden substantial fall in oil prices could potentially wipe out the 
remaining equity of the firm, but they consider the likelihood of this happening to be very low.  
 
Shortly after entering into the forward sale agreement, worries about a sovereign debt crisis lead to a 
revision of worldwide economic growth forecasts. The price of crude oil falls more than 10% on a 
single day, the worst one day performance in many years. As the company cannot fulfil the margin 
calls on its forward sales contracts, the positions are closed by the counterparty. The closed positions 
have a negative value exceeding the company’s equity, leading to the company’s over-indebtedness. 
Trading partners refuse to enter into transactions with the company due to its financial position, and 
banks close all existing credit lines of the company. 
 
1. Do fiduciary duties prevent directors from entering into particularly risky transactions? 
 
The taking of certain risks is, of course, inherent in any kind of business activity. However, in 
general directors may enter into particularly risky transactions only under certain circumstances. 
According to s. 93(1) sent. 1 and 2 AktG, the directors have to evaluate all risks and chances that 
are related to the specific transaction, make their decision on an appropriately informed basis, and 
act solely for the purpose of the welfare of the company. There is no outright prohibition of 
speculative finance transactions or other transactions carrying unforeseeable risks, as the ones 
described above, but such transactions may generally only be entered into if they are part of the 
ordinary business operations of the company as laid down in the articles of association, or if they 
are ancillary to transactions that fall within the company’s regular business activities. This is the 
case for banks and other financial institutions, but not for other kinds of companies.
9
  
 
Furthermore, the directors may not enter into particularly risky transactions if they pose a 
potentially existential risk to the company, i.e. if the company will very likely become insolvent if 
the transaction fails.
10
 This principle applies even if from an ex ante perspective there is a 
predominant likelihood of the realisation of a profit.
11
 The higher the threat of insolvency, the more 
stringent is the duty of the directors to abstain from such transactions. Although some authors 
have proposed that speculative derivatives transactions and the like should only be permissible up 
to an amount in reasonable proportion to the company’s equity capital, no specific ratios have 
been suggested to specify this criterion yet.
12
 
 
As regards a possible personal liability of the directors according to s. 93 AktG in the above 
situation, the equity ratio would have to be taken into consideration. Although there is no specific 
prohibition of under-capitalisation, the directors are obliged to ensure that the company has an 
appropriate equity cushion that permits it to engage in its relevant area of business. The equity 
ratios of competitors and comparable companies are a point of orientation. In addition, the fact 
that the company encounters increasingly financing problems and a rise of negotiated prices 
resulting from its very low equity ratio should have been “red flags” for the directors. It should be 
noted in this context that a non-authoritative corporation tax directive defines an equity ratio of 30 
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per cent as appropriate.
13
 Nevertheless, in the case under consideration insolvency was not 
immediately impending since there was still a certain, albeit low level of equity cushion. 
 
2. At which point in time does the law provide for additional duties of directors or the change of 
existing duties in situations of financial distress? (i.e. how is ‘vicinity of insolvency’ defined?) 
 
Apart from s. 92(2) sent. 3 AktG, German company and insolvency law do not provide for specific 
statutory duties of the directors prior to the existence of statutorily defined so-called reasons or 
events of insolvency (Insolvenzgründe).  
 
There are three different reasons for insolvency, which trigger the duty of the directors to file for 
insolvency proceedings in the above case: cash-flow insolvency (illiquidity), impending cash-flow 
insolvency, and over-indebtedness. Section 17(2) of the German Insolvency Code 
(Insolvenzordnung, InsO) defines illiquidity as the inability of the company to pay its debts when 
they fall due. Impending cash-flow insolvency in the sense of s. 18(2) InsO occurs when the 
company will presumably become unable to pay its existing debts when they fall due in the near 
future (usually a three-months perspective is applied). The company is insolvent because of over-
indebtedness according to s. 19(2), sent. 1 InsO when the value of its assets is insufficient to 
cover its liabilities unless, considering all specific circumstances, the continuation of the enterprise 
is more likely than its termination. 
 
There is no specific point in time that defines the “vicinity of insolvency” and that would change the 
duties of the directors with regard to the conduct of the business other than the occurrence of 
these reasons of insolvency. Rather, the discretion of the directors granted by s. 93 AktG 
becomes narrower when the company faces a crisis and certain payments or risk-taking could 
potentially entail insolvency. But this is a question for each single action or payment and cannot 
be assessed by way of a general “yardstick” method. This approach is exemplified by s. 92(2), 
sent. 3 AktG. Section 92(2) AktG states: 
 
“After the non-solvency of the company has occurred or its over-indebtedness has emerged, 
the management board may not make any payments. The foregoing shall not apply to 
payments made after this time that are nonetheless compatible with the care of a diligent and 
conscientious manager. The same obligation shall apply to the managing board for payments 
to shareholders as far as such payments were bound to lead to the company’s insolvency, 
unless this was not foreseeable even when employing the care set out s. 93(1), sent. 1.” 
 
The prohibition of payments by the directors in s. 92(2), sent. 1 AktG only applies after one of the 
following two reasons for insolvency, illiquidity or over-indebtedness, have occurred. The 
prohibition is made more flexible by the exception that such payments are permissible if they are 
“compatible with the care of a diligent and conscientious manager”, a reference to the BJR of 
s. 93(1) AktG. It is made clear by sent. 3 that prior to the occurrence of one of these reasons for 
insolvency only payments to shareholders are prohibited. Further, such payments are only 
prohibited if it was foreseeable that they would lead to the insolvency of the company. The fact 
that foreseeability is judged from the ex ante perspective of a diligent and conscientious director 
shows the importance that the idealised discretion of the directors laid down in s. 93 AktG plays 
under German law. The rigidity of German law in this respect is further underlined by the fact that 
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the prohibition of payments pursuant to s. 92(2), sent. 1 does not apply in the case of impending 
insolvency in the sense of s. 18(2) InsO. Thus, the danger of insolvency alone does not trigger 
any specific duties. 
 
3. What is the legal response to above situation? For example, the law may provide that the 
directors have to take primarily the creditors’ interests into account, rather than those of the 
shareholders or the company must cease to trade and the directors file for the opening of 
insolvency proceedings. 
 
As the BGH has emphasised on many occasions, the directors are obliged to monitor constantly 
the company’s financial and solvency position as well as the ratio of assets and liabilities.
14
 If the 
directors have no reason to regard the company as illiquid or over-indebted after consultation of 
all necessary resources and thereby applying the care of a diligent and contentious director, there 
is no reason under German law to consider the interests of creditors. The directors only have to 
act in the interest of the company and not its creditors.
15
 
 
As already mentioned above, this approach only changes with the occurrence of one of the 
reasons of insolvency. The duties of the directors change insofar as they are from this point on 
required by s. 92 AktG and s. 15a InsO to protect the company’s assets for an orderly lawful 
distribution among its creditors and to file for the opening of insolvency proceedings. Hereby, 
unlawful advantages to shareholders or certain creditors shall be prevented.
16
 
 
The duty to file for the opening of insolvency proceedings is enforced by criminal law (s. 15a(4) 
InsO), which penalises the belated filing, as well as by s. 283 of the German Criminal Code 
(Strafgesetzbuch, StGB) if the directors consciously or recklessly caused the company to become 
insolvent. 
 
Hypothetical III: Duty of care 
 
A large banking institution is engaged in retail as well as investment banking. In 2000, a new CEO 
was appointed, who also sits on the board of directors. The CEO made the decision to invest heavily 
in collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) backed by residential mortgage backed securities, including 
lower rated securities that pooled subprime mortgages to borrowers with weak credit history. The 
investments were initially successful, generating high profits for the company. However, beginning in 
2005, house prices, particularly in the United States, began to decrease. Defaults and foreclosures 
increased and the income from residential mortgages fell rapidly.  
 
As early as May 2005, economist Paul Krugman had warned of signs that the US housing market was 
approaching the final stages of a speculative bubble. Early in 2007, a large US subprime lender filed 
for bankruptcy protection and a number of investors announced write downs of several billion dollars 
on their structured finance commitments. In July, 2007, Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s 
downgraded bonds backed by subprime mortgages. At the end of 2007, two hedge funds that had 
invested heavily in subprime mortgages declared bankruptcy. In spite of these warning signs, the CEO 
had continued to invest in CDOs until shortly before the Lehman bankruptcy in September 2008, 
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accumulating a total exposure of more than 20 billion Euro/Pounds/… . The subprime mortgage crisis 
necessitated massive write downs, leading to an annual loss of eight billion in 2008, which can be 
attributed in equal measure to the CDO transactions undertaken in 2005-2008. 
 
The CEO resigned in October 2008. As part of the resignation, the CEO entered into an agreement 
with the company providing that he would receive 50 million Euro/Pounds/… upon his departure, 
including bonus and stock options, and in addition an office, administrative assistant, car and driver 
until he would commence full time employment with another employer. In exchange, the CEO signed 
a non-compete agreement and a release of claims against the company. The agreement with the 
CEO was approved by all directors (the CEO abstaining from voting), acting on behalf of the company. 
 
After the CEO’s departure and with a new management team in place, it transpires that the old CEO 
had used a number of ostensibly arms-length transactions with investment firms that were, however, 
controlled by the CEO’s nominees, to transfer assets at an undervalue to a company owned by the 
CEO on the Cayman Islands. When the true nature of these transactions becomes known, the assets 
are no longer recoverable. 
 
Questions: 
 
 Is the CEO liable for annual loss suffered by the company in 2008? 
 
Since the introduction of s. 93(1) sent. 2 AktG directors are to a certain degree protected from 
personal liability by a business judgement rule which allows them to act and decide under 
conditions of uncertainty if their actions and decisions are taken on an appropriately informed 
basis and for the purpose of the welfare of the company. 
 
Thus, directors have to collect comprehensive information on the envisaged transaction. Where 
necessary, they are required to consult experts. They are then expected to decide whether to 
proceed with the transaction on the basis of a universal valuation of all related risks and benefits 
for the company.
 17
 Thus, as elaborated above, taking risky measures is generally permissible if 
and to the extent that such risks are balanced by the expected advantages for the company. 
 
It will always be considered a violation of the duty of care if the envisaged action is outright 
unjustifiable. This is the case if the action would be considered wrong from the perspective of an 
uninterested third person from outside of the company.
18
 While it is difficult to describe what 
constitutes a violation of the duty of care on an abstract basis, it is highly likely that courts will 
consider the duty of care to be violated if the likelihood of a loss to the company is higher than the 
likelihood of any profits, irrespective of the potential size of such profits.
19
 
When applying these criteria to the above case, the CEO would presumably be held liable for at 
least parts of the losses of the company in 2008. The general reluctance of German courts to 
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interfere with pure business decisions notwithstanding, courts have in recent years become more 
prepared to evaluate such decisions in the light of the directors’ discretion and the boundaries of 
the business judgement rule. Although it might initially have been a sound decision for a large and 
experienced bank to invest in CDOs – given the healthy profits that these investments generated 
initially – it soon became apparent that such transactions were likely to cause tremendous losses 
at least on a short to mid-term perspective. Against the background not only of the particular 
structure of such products (“sub-prime”), but also of the warning that – among other signs of 
potential for losses – defaults and foreclosures increased in the USA and income from the 
mortgages fell rapidly from 2005 on as well as the statements of economist Krugman, the first 
bankruptcy of a large US subprime lender, and the huge write downs of other investors in 2007, it 
was reasonably to conclude that the investments in CDOs carried a very high risk of losses for the 
company. In addition, one must also take into consideration the behaviour of “peer” banks or 
enterprises that were similarly exposed to the risks carried by CDOs and compare their reactions 
to the warning signs. For example, if they acted differently than the CEO in our case and divested 
their holdings, this would be a strong sign that further investments in the securities until 2008 
constituted a violation of the duty of care. All in all, it therefore seems justifiable to hold the CEO 
liable under the German business judgment rule for all or the largest part of the losses incurred 
from early 2007 to 2008. 
 
 Have the directors (other than the CEO) breached their fiduciary duties by approving the 
agreement in conjunction with the resignation of the outgoing CEO? 
 
German stock corporation law provides for a two-tier system where a mandatory supervisory 
board (Aufsichtsrat, s. 94 seq. AktG) controls the actions and decisions of the board of directors 
(Vorstand, s. 76 seq. AktG), see s. 111(1) AktG. The general principle of s. 78(1) AktG is that the 
board of directors is the legal representative of the company. In deviation from this principle, the 
supervisory board decides on and represents the company in all transactions with members of the 
management board (s. 112 AktG). The supervisory board is also competent to determine the 
remuneration of the members of the board of directors according to the rules set forth in s. 87 
AktG. This is now regarded as one of the foremost duties of the supervisory board by the German 
legislator. Section 87(1) sent. 1 AktG provides: 
 
“In determining the remuneration of the overall earnings (salary, profit participation, 
allowances, insurance rewards, premiums, incentive-oriented remuneration promises such as 
stock option rights and additional remunerations of any kind) of each single member of the 
board of directors, the supervisory board is obliged to ensure that these shall be of an 
appropriate proportion with regard to the duties and services of the member of the board of 
directors as well as the situation of the company and that they shall not exceed the usual 
remuneration without any particular reason.” 
 
The liability of the members of the supervisory board for damage to the company due to excessive 
remuneration of the members of the board of directors has been made an express statutory rule in 
s. 116 sent. 3 AktG with the coming into force of the Board of Directors Remuneration Act 
(Vorstandsvergütungsgesetz). 
The liability of the members of the supervisory board who decide on such transaction in a German 
stock corporation depends on one crucial question: of which nature is the payment to the CEO 
upon his leaving the company?  
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The BGH held in a famous and very controversial decision regarding the question of criminal 
liability of the supervisory board members for granting excessive payments to members of the 
board of directors in 2005 (“Mannesmann”)
20
 that the payment to a leaving CEO violated the 
fiduciary duties of the members of the supervisory board if: (1) it is not provided for in the service 
contract of the relevant director; (2) it constitutes an award in order to increase retroactively the 
remuneration of the director; and (3) it does not bring about any (future) benefits for the company. 
The BGH regards so-called “compensation-less” appreciation awards (“kompensationslose 
Anerkennungsprämie”) as a violation of the duty of care under German law.  
 
Large parts of the company law literature assess the case differently insofar as they are prepared 
to regard even exorbitant payments to directors who leave the company as possibly legitimate if 
they constitute an award or reward for extraordinary services that the directors has performed for 
the company. Such payments might also have a beneficial effect on the company as they may 
create a strong incentive for potential future directors to work for the company; thus, such 
payments would not be without a certain element of compensation. 
 
Even if this more generous view is applied, the payment and other benefits to the CEO in the 
above case would likely constitute a breach of the duty of care of the members of the supervisory 
board, unless the director had performed particularly outstanding services for the benefit of the 
company during his time as CEO. But the tremendous losses suffered by the company, which 
were a consequence of his decision to invest in CDOs, would make it unlikely that such a view 
would be justified in court proceedings under German law. 
 
 Have the members of the company’s internal audit committee (of which the CEO was not a 
member) breached their fiduciary duties by not identifying the true nature of the ostensibly arms-
length transactions and are they, accordingly, liable for the loss suffered by the company as a 
consequence of the transactions? Have the other directors (except the CEO) breached their 
duties? 
 
In a German stock company the supervisory board is competent to monitor such transactions 
according to s. 111 AktG. Although members of German supervisory boards often have specific 
expertise in various areas, this is not expressly required by statutory law, so that no particular 
rules regarding a higher level of care exist.
21
 Hence, the situation would not be entirely 
comparable to the monitoring of such transactions for example by specifically qualified members 
of a British internal auditing committee. It has repeatedly been decided by the BGH, however, that 
board members who have specific knowledge or skill in a particular area such as accounting are 
required under German law to live up to a higher standard of care in their area of expertise.
22
 
 
The main duty of the supervisory board is set out in s. 111(1) AktG and consists in controlling the 
management of the company. This encompasses the monitoring of the legality, soundness, 
purposefulness, functionality and usefulness of the directors’ actions.
23
 The supervisory board is 
entitled to a broad range of information and control rights, such as regular reports by the board of 
directors on a variety of important facts concerning the business of the company.
24
 If the 
respective transactions in the above case were of particular importance for the profitability or 
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 BGH, Judgement of 21st December 2005 - 3 StR 470/04, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (NJW) 2005, 522. 
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 The personal requirements for members of the supervisory board are set out in s. 100 AktG. 
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 Recently: BGH, Judgement of 2 September 2011 - II ZR 234/09, Wertpapier-Mitteilungen (WM) 2011, 2092. 
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 Hüffer, Aktiengesetz, 10th edition, 2012, § 111 sec. 6. 
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 See s. 90 AktG. 
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solvency of the company, the board of directors would be required under s. 90(1), no. 4 in 
connection with subsection 2, no. 4 AktG to inform the supervisory board of such transactions 
early enough to give the supervisory the opportunity to comment on the transactions prior to their 
execution.  
 
It might be justified to argue that depending on the structure of the bank’s business in the above 
case and the regularity with which the bank traded with such companies, the supervisory board 
should have duly noticed irregularities – the constant selling of assets at an undervalue to 
companies in the Cayman Islands – when exercising their duty of care and control rights in a 
proper way. Upon noticing these irregularities, the supervisory board would have been required to 
investigate further the nature of the transactions, specifically if such transactions occurred 
frequently or were of a certain value. The non-performance of such investigations would very 
likely lead to liability of the members of the supervisory board towards the company according to 
s. 116 sent. 1 AktG. 
 
To a limited degree, German law recognises a duty of the members of the board of directors to 
control their colleagues’ actions that is structurally different from the control duties of the 
supervisory board. This specific monitoring duty is characterised and shaped both by the 
principles of collegiate bodies and the functional separation of the individual portfolios of each 
member.
25
 Accordingly, under normal circumstances German law limits such duty to the regular 
participation in meetings of the board and the general monitoring of the board’s actions.
26
 The 
relationship among the individual board members should be characterised by mutual trust. The 
duty to investigate further or inform the supervisory board is only triggered if specific 
circumstances give rise to suspicions that another member of the board is acting wrongfully.
27
 
This rather generous system may, of course, change substantially in a crisis of the company and 
in other specific situations.
28
  
 
In the above case liability of the other members of the board of directors is therefore not unlikely 
but would – as the liability of the supervisory board members – depend largely on the other 
circumstances of the case, such as the regularity with which business with other offshore 
jurisdiction was done by the company and the frequency as well as the specific terms of the 
transactions. 
 
 Assuming that the company has a claim against the CEO or another director pursuant to one or 
more of the above questions, can a minority shareholder enforce the claim? 
 
According to s. 147 seq. AktG, claims against the members of both the board of directors and the 
supervisory board must be brought if a simple majority in the general meeting so decides. 
Additionally, a minority of shareholders whose aggregate shareholding equals at least 1 per cent 
of the company’s capital or a minimum aggregate amount of 100,000 EUR are entitled to apply at 
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 Hüffer, Aktiengesetz, 10th edition, 2012, § 77 sec. 15, Spindler, Münchener Kommentar zum Aktiengesetz, 3rd edition, 2008, 
§ 77, sec. 59; Spindler/Stilz, Aktiengesetz, 2
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nd
 edition,  
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the competent court for admission to enforce the company’s liability claim in their own name 
according to s. 148 AktG. 
 
According to s. 148(3) sent. 1 AktG, the company is at any time entitled to take over the 
proceedings and pursue the claim. A judgement according to s. 148(5) sent. 1 AktG has binding 
effect for and against the company and all shareholders of the company regardless of them being 
parties to the proceedings. 
 
It should also be noted that according to s. 93(5) sent. 1 and 2 in connection with s. 116 sent. 1 
AktG creditors of the company are entitled to enforce the company’s claims under certain 
circumstances. 
 
Hypothetical IV: Duty of loyalty 
 
A mining company (‘Bidder’) considers expanding business operations. The board identifies assets 
held by another company (‘Target’) as a possible acquisition. The following scenarios ask you to 
consider the liability of a director (‘A’) on the board of Bidder. 
 
 Director A is also majority shareholder in Target, holding 60 percent of the outstanding share 
capital of the company. As majority shareholder of Target, he is interested in an acquisition 
that is beneficial to Target. He proposes that Bidder purchase the assets for 10 million 
Euro/Pounds/…, knowing that the value ranges between 7 and 8 million. Director A does not 
disclose his interest in Target to the board of Bidder. A majority of the directors approves the 
acquisition. A’s vote was not decisive for the positive vote. 
 
Currently, there are no statutory rules which require directors to disclose potential conflicts of 
interest. But it is widely acknowledged in the legal literature that a general duty of loyalty 
exists, which requires directors not only to avoid any kind of conflict of interest but also to 
disclose such information to the board of directors as well as to the supervisory board.
29 
Accordingly, no. 4.3.4 of the German Corporate Governance Code
30
 – a non-binding set of 
recommendations of an independent government committee of experts that is increasingly 
perceived as a major point of orientation in questions of corporate governance – requires the 
directors to do so. 
 
However, the transaction would neither be void under German general civil law nor would its 
validity be dependent on the consent of the company, i.e. the consent of the supervisory 
board. The fact alone that A is also the majority shareholder of Target does not trigger a shift 
in competences for the conclusion of the transaction.
31
 The transaction would not constitute a 
form of self-dealing within the meaning of s. 181 alt. 1 BGB either. Thus, it would be legally 
valid. 
 
The CEO would likely be liable for damages according to s. 93(2) AktG for violation of the duty 
of loyalty under stock corporation law. The fact that his vote was not decisive for the positive 
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 Spindler/Stilz, Aktiengesetz, 2
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 edition,  2010, § 93, 124. 
30
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 High Court of Justice of Saarbruecken, Judgement of 30 November 2000 - 8 U 71/00-15, Neue Zeitschrift für 
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vote is generally not accepted as justifying an exclusion from liability. This is especially true in 
a case where the member of the board withheld essential information from his colleagues.  
 
In addition, the CEO would possibly be liable under tort law for fraud according to s. 823(2) 
BGB in connection with s. 263 StGB. 
 
 As in scenario 1, but Director A discloses his interest in Target to the board of Bidder, and a 
majority of the uninterested directors approves the acquisition. 
 
The director may be liable for the damages if he did not reveal the disadvantageous 
conditions of the transaction in violation of his duty of loyalty. In situations like this most legal 
authors apply an arms’ length approach in order to assess whether the transaction is 
detrimental to the company.
32
 Where the transaction does not stand such a test, all directors 
will be held liable.  
 
Statutory law does not provide for rules on the exclusion of board member from the decision-
making through resolutions of the board. Nevertheless, it is universally acknowledged that 
s. 34 BGB, which regulates the exclusion of interested members of the board of directors of 
an association from the respective decision-making process, shall be applicable mutatis 
mutandis to the board of directors of an AG.
33
 Director A would therefore be excluded from 
voting. 
 
 As in scenario 1, but when the shareholders of Bidder learn of A’s interest in Target, they 
ratify the transaction, believing that it is in the company’s interests. 
 
According to s. 93(4) sent. 1 AktG, the liability of the members of the board is not triggered if 
their actions are based on a prior lawful resolution of the shareholders. However, liability is not 
excluded if the board member withheld essential information from the shareholders.
34 
According to s. 93(4) sent. 3 AktG the ratification of the transaction with the effect of relieving 
the board members of liability is only permissible in the form of a waiver of the claim three 
years after the claim has come into existence. Such waiver also requires the full knowledge of 
all relevant facts by the shareholders, i.e. the violation of a duty by the director and the nature 
as well as the volume of the damages.
35
 If the shareholders in the given case did not have the 
necessary information to evaluate the transaction correctly and were instead of the opinion 
that the transaction was in the best interest of the company, ratification would not exempt the 
CEO from liability. In addition, s. 93(4) sent. 2 AktG grants a minority of shareholders holding 
at least 10 per cent of the share capital the right to object to the resolution and hereby prevent  
the waiver from becoming valid. 
 
Furthermore, the CEO would be excluded from voting in the general meeting resolving on 
such waiver according to s. 136(1) sent. 1 alt. 1 AktG as the resolution would concern his own 
liability towards the company.  
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Section 142(2) sent. 1 AktG also provides for the possibility of minority of shareholders 
holding at least 1 per cent of the registered share capital or 100,000 EUR to have certain 
transactions reviewed by an independent expert (“Sonderprüfung”). This requires an 
application to the competent court and the demonstration that reasonable suspicions exist that 
a violation of directors’ duties, the law, or the articles of association took place in connection 
with the relevant transaction. These safeguards guarantee a minimum of minority shareholder 
protection from collusion by the board of directors and majority shareholders. 
 
 Director A is majority shareholder and managing director in a competitor of bidder (‘Rival’), 
which is also active in the mining business. The assets held by Target that Bidder seeks to 
acquire consist in claims near Rival’s own mining territories. Director A is of the opinion that 
the assets are more valuable for Rival than for Bidder. He therefore arranges for Rival to 
make a competing and higher offer than Bidder, and Target accordingly decides to sell the 
assets to the former company. 
 
The so-called business opportunity doctrine (“Geschäftschancen-Theorie”), developed by the 
BGH, is modelled after the US corporate opportunities doctrine but is in many ways more rigid 
in its application. Accordingly, no. 4.3.3 of the German Corporate Governance Code states 
that no director may take advantage of business opportunities which belong to the corporate 
business. When being confronted with such a corporate opportunity, the director shall not act 
in his own interest or in the interest of third parties, but only in the interest of the company. 
Unfortunately, the question when an opportunity belongs to the company’s business has not 
yet been answered satisfactorily. 
 
Some criteria have nonetheless been established by the courts. An opportunity is a corporate 
opportunity if the company has already taken certain steps to make use of the opportunity or if 
it has expressed its interest in doing so, for example through a relevant decision of the board 
of directors or other managers of the company.
36
 In such cases the director is required to 
accept the company’s prior right to take advantage of the opportunity.
37
 The corporate 
opportunities doctrine is dogmatically rooted in the duty of loyalty of directors. It resembles 
structurally the duty not to compete with the company, which is regulated in s. 88 AktG. The 
relation between these two duties is largely unclear. According to most authors, the duty not to 
compete helps to shape the corporate opportunities doctrine. However, it is in some respects 
broader, for example because a violation does not require a loss or damage to the company. 
In other respects it is narrower than the corporate opportunities doctrine. This is for example 
true for the acquisition of property by the director for private purposes or with regard to the 
duration of the duty, since the duty not to compete usually ends with the termination of the 
position as a director.
38
 Although the two duties are apparently perceived to be congruent to 
some extent, these differences show that they are not perfect substitutes. Rather, under 
German corporate law they complement each other.  
 
In light of these criteria director A would be prevented by his duty of loyalty to purchase the 
relevant assets since Bidder had already placed a bid for them, thereby manifesting its 
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interest in taking advantage of the opportunity. As a result, the acquisition would have to be 
regarded as a corporate opportunity. Hence, A acted in violation of his duty of loyalty when 
acquiring the assets. 
 
As regards restrictions to the general prohibition as known in US law (for example financial 
incapacity of the company), German courts have been very reluctant to accept them in 
practice. This is especially true for the question of insufficient liquidity of the company, which 
could easily be used as pretence by the directors.
39
 Here the BGH stated clearly that the 
directors would be required to consider raising new capital for the company rather than 
pursuing the business opportunity for their own account.
40
 The court also follows a strict 
approach with regard to privately gained knowledge of the business opportunity. In such a 
case, the duty of loyalty would still prevent the directors from taking advantage of the 
opportunity.
41
 As discussed above, consent or waiver by the company is only valid if the 
competent corporate body is fully informed of the details, chances and risks of the envisaged 
transaction.
42
 
 
 As in scenario 4, but A resigns from his position as director of Bidder before Rival makes the 
competing offer. 
 
Under German law, the duty to abstain from taking advantage of corporate opportunities does 
not end with the termination of the position as director.
43
 In this respect, the corporate 
opportunities doctrine differs markedly from the duty not to compete. According to the BGH, 
the dogmatic reasons for this are the general civil law principles of post-contractual loyalty and 
consideration.
44
 Although the legal literature generally acknowledges the advantages of the 
continuity of the duties, it also mentions its unsatisfying dogmatic derivation. In addition, there 
should be a specific time period after which the duties end in order to ensure coherence with 
the duty not to compete, which usually ends with the termination of the position as director.  
 
 As in scenario 4, but after an initial expression of interest by Bidder in acquiring the assets 
and before Rival has taken any steps to make a competing offer, the Bidder board determines 
that an investment of that size is not advisable at the present time in light of Bidder’s weak 
financial position. 
 
The BGH is of the opinion that such a decision is only valid if the other members of the board 
are fully informed of the details, terms and arrangements as well as the chances and risks of 
the envisaged transaction.
45
 If these conditions were met and the board did consider and 
decide on possible methods of raising capital for such a transaction in order to exploit the 
opportunity on behalf of the company, director A would probably not act in violation of his duty 
of loyalty. But here again, the general rule of German association law of s. 34 BGB applies, so 
that A – as an interested member of the board – would be excluded from voting on the board 
resolution. 
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Hungary 
 
Hypothetical I: Liability of the parent and directors of the parent for breaches of duty at the 
level of the subsidiary 
 
A pharmaceutical company is currently developing two new drugs. After assessing the potential 
liability risks associated with the future products, the directors of the pharmaceutical company decide 
to incorporate two separate private limited companies, each taking over the development, research 
and future marketing of one of the two drugs. 
 
The directors of the pharmaceutical company appoint the two project managers as directors of the two 
subsidiary companies. The two subsidiary companies enter into an agreement allowing them access 
to the parent company's research facilities. According to the subsidiary's articles of association, all 
major strategic decisions regarding the research, development and marketing of the drugs are subject 
to approval by their sole shareholder, the pharmaceutical company. The employees working for the 
subsidiaries are formally still employed with the parent company, but are posted with the subsidiaries 
under an agreement entered into by the parent company and the two subsidiaries upon formation of 
the two companies. 
 
When the directors of the parent company learn about competitors working on similar projects, they try 
to accelerate the development process of the two drugs. They award substantial bonuses to the 
subsidiary’s directors, contingent on the drugs receiving regulatory approval within the next 6 months. 
The original schedule provided for further tests, which would take at least 12 months. 
 
Primarily because of the contingent bonus payment, the directors of the subsidiaries skip some of the 
planned tests and studies, and cover up this decision in their filings for regulatory approval. 
 
The two drugs gain regulatory approval within the 6 month time span, and are successfully marketed 
shortly after that.  
 
Two years after the initial marketing, independent studies reveal that one of the drugs causes a rare 
form of lethal cancer, exposing the relevant subsidiary to enormous product liability claims that far 
exceed its net assets. The drug developed by the other subsidiary proves to be safe and leads to 
substantial profits. 
 
 Is it possible that the parent company would be liable in circumstances comparable to the stylised 
facts above? 
 
As a general rule, the parent company shall not be liable for the debts of the subsidiary. If, however, 
the subsidiary became insolvent and went under liquidation, the parent company shall be liable for the 
debts which were not covered by the assets of the subsidiary if the parent company and the subsidiary 
worked as a registered group of companies; if the bankruptcy was the result of permanently 
detrimental business policy implemented by the parent company; if absence of coverage was the 
result of abuse of limited liability; or if, as a shadow director, the parent company failed to act in 
compliance with the priority of creditors’ interests on the verge of insolvency. The same answer is to 
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be given under the regime of the Bill of the New Hungarian Civil Code. The fact, that employees 
working for the subsidiaries are formally still employed with the parent company does not establish 
liability per se.  
 
As none of these specific preconditions seem to be met in the described case, the parent company 
shall not be liable for the debts of the subsidiary.  
 
 Under which circumstances would the directors of the parent company face a liability risk in those 
circumstances? 
 
Influence of the decision of the subsidiary as such does not establish liability of the directors of the 
parent company, even if such an influence may result in wrongful conduct of the subsidiary’s directors. 
Although the directors of the parent company may be held as shadow directors, the liability of shadow 
directors is triggered only if the company (here the subsidiary) came to the verge of insolvency and 
the directors failed to act in compliance with the priority of interests of the subsidiary’s creditors. 
 
Hypothetical II: Duties in the vicinity of insolvency 
 
After making losses for three consecutive years, an oil trading company’s equity ratio (equity divided 
by total assets) has fallen below [1% - 5% - 10%]. On average, comparable companies in the same 
line of business have an equity ratio of about 25%.  
 
The company still has substantial assets, but the thin equity cushion makes it hard for the company to 
pursue its core business, as trading partners demand higher prices to compensate them for the 
perceived higher risk of the company's operations.   
 
The company's directors evaluate different possibilities to improve the business prospects of the 
company. They attribute past trading losses to the substantially higher volatility of oil prices following 
the financial crisis, and maintain the view that the company's business model is sustainable in the long 
run. After exploring the possibility to raise new equity to recapitalise the business, they conclude that 
current market conditions would force them to issue new shares at prohibitively low prices, which 
would lead to a substantial dilution of their current shareholders. 
 
After analysing the market conditions, the directors come to the conclusion that the market price for 
crude oil is bound to rise significantly over the next year, particularly due to high anticipated demand 
from emerging market economies. In an attempt to recapitalise the company the directors decide to 
invest heavily in crude oil futures. They expect that the anticipated increase in oil prices will lead to 
substantial gains from this transaction, bringing the equity ratio back in line with the industry average, 
and thus allowing the company to resume their trading operations at more sustainable conditions.  
 
The directors are aware that a sudden substantial fall in oil prices could potentially wipe out the 
remaining equity of the firm, but they consider the likelihood of this happening to be very low.  
 
Shortly after entering into the forward sale agreement, worries about a sovereign debt crisis lead to a 
revision of worldwide economic growth forecasts. The price of crude oil falls more than 10% on a 
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single day, the worst one day performance in many years. As the company cannot fulfil the margin 
calls on its forward sales contracts, the positions are closed by the counterparty. The closed positions 
have a negative value exceeding the company’s equity, leading to the company’s over-indebtedness. 
Trading partners refuse to enter into transactions with the company due to its financial position, and 
banks close all existing credit lines of the company. 
 
 Do fiduciary duties prevent directors from entering into particularly risky transactions? 
 
Fiduciary duties do not prevent directors from entering into risky transactions but such transactions 
may be in incompliance with the business judgement standards if they are unreasonable. The 
directors prepared the transaction with the reasonable care (market analysis) but left the company 
unprotected against a risk which was of a low probability but threatened with bankruptcy. This risk 
might have been avoided e.g. by buying options, derivatives or other positions insuring the company 
against such risks. The decision involving such a risk would presumably be held as falling behind the 
normal business risks. Thus, directors are to be held failing to act in compliance with the required duty 
of care and their liability may be established vis-á-vis the company. If the company went under 
liquidation and its assets did not provide coverage for its debts, the liability may be established vis-á-
vis the creditors. 
     
 At which point in time does the law provide for additional duties of directors or the change of 
existing duties in situations of financial distress? (i.e. how is ‘vicinity of insolvency’ defined?) 
 
It is the time when the company came to the verge of insolvency (a situation “threatening insolvency”) 
which is to be assessed on the basis of a liquidity forecast rather than a balance sheet test. Factors, 
like the status of the company’s markets, business trends affecting the financial status of the 
company, as well as potential changes thereto and how various economic problems can be handled 
by the directors, if at all, and in what timeframe, etc. are to be taken into consideration. It is also has to 
be assessed if there is a risk of breach of loan agreements, the potential of financial support of 
shareholders in the form of a capital increase or by other means, and whether there are any other 
alternative financial resources available for the Company or not.  
 
Thus, in the case at hand, when a sudden substantial fall in oil prices could potentially wipe out the 
remaining equity of the firm – having regard to the other described circumstances of the case like 
trends of falling of equity ratio as well -, the threatening insolvency (verge of insolvency) might be 
established even if the likelihood of this happening was very low. 
 
 What is the legal response to above situation? For example, the law may provide that the 
directors have to take primarily the creditors’ interests into account, rather than those of the 
shareholders or the company must cease to trade and the directors file for the opening of 
insolvency proceedings. 
 
In the case of coming to the verge of insolvency the general obligation of directors to focus on the 
interests of the company shifts to an obligation to prioritise the interests of creditors. Failing this may 
establish “wrongful trading.” Non-compliance with this priority requirement may result in personal 
liability of the directors vis-á-vis the creditors of the comapny. Directors will only incur liability if the 
company was declared insolvent by court and the wrongful trading resulted in a loss of the creditors 
(i.e. decrease of the company's assets available for distribution to the creditors in a liquidation 
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procedure). Directors may be exonerated by proving that they acted in line with the required duty of 
care that was to be expected of a person in their position 
 
Hypothetical III: Duty of care 
 
A large banking institution is engaged in retail as well as investment banking. In 2000, a new CEO 
was appointed, who also sits on the board of directors. The CEO made the decision to invest heavily 
in collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) backed by residential mortgage backed securities, including 
lower rated securities that pooled subprime mortgages to borrowers with weak credit history. The 
investments were initially successful, generating high profits for the company. However, beginning in 
2005, house prices, particularly in the United States, began to decrease. Defaults and foreclosures 
increased and the income from residential mortgages fell rapidly.  
 
As early as May 2005, economist Paul Krugman had warned of signs that the US housing market was 
approaching the final stages of a speculative bubble. Early in 2007, a large US subprime lender filed 
for bankruptcy protection and a number of investors announced write downs of several billion dollars 
on their structured finance commitments. In July, 2007, Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s 
downgraded bonds backed by subprime mortgages. At the end of 2007, two hedge funds that had 
invested heavily in subprime mortgages declared bankruptcy. In spite of these warning signs, the CEO 
had continued to invest in CDOs until shortly before the Lehman bankruptcy in September 2008, 
accumulating a total exposure of more than 20 billion Euro/Pounds/… . The subprime mortgage crisis 
necessitated massive write downs, leading to an annual loss of eight billion in 2008, which can be 
attributed in equal measure to the CDO transactions undertaken in 2005-2008. 
 
The CEO resigned in October 2008. As part of the resignation, the CEO entered into an agreement 
with the company providing that he would receive 50 million Euro/Pounds/… upon his departure, 
including bonus and stock options, and in addition an office, administrative assistant, car and driver 
until he would commence full time employment with another employer. In exchange, the CEO signed 
a non-compete agreement and a release of claims against the company. The agreement with the 
CEO was approved by all directors (the CEO abstaining from voting), acting on behalf of the company. 
 
After the CEO’s departure and with a new management team in place, it transpires that the old CEO 
had used a number of ostensibly arms-length transactions with investment firms that were, however, 
controlled by the CEO’s nominees, to transfer assets at an undervalue to a company owned by the 
CEO on the Cayman Islands. When the true nature of these transactions becomes known, the assets 
are no longer recoverable. 
 
Questions: 
 
 Is the CEO liable for annual loss suffered by the company in 2008? 
 
It is difficult to assess that, in the chain of events described here, which element should have lead to 
withdrawing from the business according to the required duty of care. One can assume - which 
probably would be the conclusion of a Hungarian court - that the CEO breached its fiduciary duties by 
continuing the investments in CDOs which, taking into account the volume of the company’s 
investment as well, became an extremely risky market by the end of 2007. If that is the case, the CEO 
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can be liable for loss suffered by the company in 2008 except a discharge was provided to him by the 
shareholders of the company. 
 
 Have the directors (other than the CEO) breached their fiduciary duties by approving the 
agreement in conjunction with the resignation of the outgoing CEO? 
 
The answer to this question depends mainly on the general practice and customs in business. 
Directors did not necessarily breached their fiduciary duties by approving the agreement, if such 
agreements provided the customary services to the resigning CEO. There is, however, no clear 
starting point in Hungarian court practice or legislation to assess this aspect of the case. 
 
 Have the members of the company’s internal audit committee (of which the CEO was not a 
member) breached their fiduciary duties by not identifying the true nature of the ostensibly arms-
length transactions and are they, accordingly, liable for the loss suffered by the company as a 
consequence of the transactions? Have the other directors (except the CEO) breached their 
duties? 
 
Omission of duty to control may be a basis for liability according to the general rules and doctrines of 
liability. Allocating risks to supervisory bodies in this context is also would fit to the frameworks of 
Hungarian company law, although there is not any court practice or legislation which could indicate 
clearly how such a case would be decided under Hungarian law. 
 
 Assuming that the company has a claim against the CEO or another director pursuant to one or 
more of the above questions, can a minority shareholder enforce the claim? 
 
It is the general meeting that has to decide if the company enforces a claim against the executive 
officer. If the general meeting of the company has refused the request to enforce a claim against the 
members, executive officers, supervisory board members or against the auditor of the business 
association, or, if the business association's supreme body failed to adopt a decision regarding a 
proposal that has been properly presented, a group of members (shareholders) controlling at least five 
per cent of the votes may enforce the claim themselves on behalf of the company within a period of 
thirty days after the general meeting.
46
 The rights of the minority shareholders are original rather than 
derivative ones, so they may enforce such rights even if the discharge was provided by the majority of 
votes to the director. 
 
Hypothetical IV: Duty of loyalty 
 
A mining company (‘Bidder’) considers expanding business operations. The board identifies assets 
held by another company (‘Target’) as a possible acquisition. The following scenarios ask you to 
consider the liability of a director (‘A’) on the board of Bidder. 
 
 
 Director A is also majority shareholder in Target, holding 60 percent of the outstanding share 
capital of the company. As majority shareholder of Target, he is interested in an acquisition that is 
                                                     
46
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beneficial to Target. He proposes that Bidder purchase the assets for 10 million Euro/Pounds/…, 
knowing that the value ranges between 7 and 8 million. Director A does not disclose his interest in 
Target to the board of Bidder. A majority of the directors approves the acquisition. A’s vote was 
not decisive for the positive vote. 
 
Director A has certainly failed to comply with the statutory duties imposed on him as concerning the 
duty of loyalty. The decision caused a loss to Bidder. Members of the board are to be held joint and 
severally liable for damages resulting from their wrongful decision. Directors may be exonerated from 
liability by proving that in the course of passing the decision they acted according to the required 
standard of conduct. Other members of the board – who neither were nor ought to have been aware 
of the fact that Bidder will pay a price high above the value of Target – may be exempted from liability 
but Director A certainly not. The fact that his vote was not decisive is irrelevant.   
 
 As in scenario 1, but Director A discloses his interest in Target to the board of Bidder, and a 
majority of the uninterested directors approves the acquisition. 
 
That does not change the position of Director A. His act was wrongful not only because he failed to 
reveal his interest in Target but also because, as a member of the board, he supported a decision 
causing damage to the company. As that is still the case, he still will be held liable.  
 
 As in scenario 1, but when the shareholders of Bidder learn of A’s interest in Target, they ratify the 
transaction, believing that it is in the company’s interests. 
 
The ratification of the decision does not relieve the directors of liability. Ratification of such a decision 
of the board of directors does not change the fact that directors (esp. Director A) failed to act 
according to the priority of the interests of the company and caused compensable loss to the company 
by infringing their/his duty of loyalty. A discharge may be given to directors confirming that they acted 
in compliance with the interests of the company which may bar the company from enforcing claims 
against the directors but such a discharge does not prevent minority shareholders from enforcing 
claims in the name of the company and is also ineffective if certain facts (e.g. that the price was much 
higher than the value of Target) were not clear for the shareholders at the time of deciding for it.   
  
 Director A is majority shareholder and managing director in a competitor of bidder (‘Rival’), which 
is also active in the mining business. The assets held by Target that Bidder seeks to acquire 
consist in claims near Rival’s own mining territories. Director A is of the opinion that the assets are 
more valuable for Rival than for Bidder. He therefore arranges for Rival to make a competing and 
higher offer than Bidder, and Target accordingly decides to sell the assets to the former company. 
 
In such a case director A seems to deprive the company of a business opportunity otherwise open for 
the company and exploit the profit making possibility for his own interests. This constitutes an abuse 
of his managing powers and violation of his fiduciary duties which may establish his liability for 
damages. The company also might have a claim for transferring the profit made by company Rival on 
the transaction on the basis of unjust enrichment.
47
 
  
                                                     
47
 § 361 of Civil Code. So far this has never been tested in Hungarian court practice. 
 
 
 
 
 
331 Directors’ Duties and Liability in the EU  
 
 As in scenario 4, but A resigns from his position as director of Bidder before Rival makes the 
competing offer. 
 
Resignation does not relieve director A from liability. Once he launched the chain of events resulting in 
damage (causal link), he is a tortfeasor to be liable for the loss caused by him. There is neither 
statutory norm nor court practice giving any indication for other conclusion. 
 
 As in scenario 4, but after an initial expression of interest by Bidder in acquiring the assets and 
before Rival has taken any steps to make a competing offer, the Bidder board determines that an 
investment of that size is not advisable at the present time in light of Bidder’s weak financial 
position. 
 
There is no basis for liability of director A. In such a case a causal link between the loss of profit 
suffered by the company and violation of duty of loyalty (incompliance with the required standard of 
conduct) is not to be established. Thus, the liability of director A is not to be established. Neither a 
claim for restoration of unjust enrichment would be accepted because the profit earned by Rival could 
not be earned by Bidder even in absence of the transaction made by Rival. Thus, Rival earned the 
profit not to the detriment of Bidder.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
332 Directors’ Duties and Liability in the EU  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
333 Directors’ Duties and Liability in the EU  
 
Ireland 
 
Hypothetical I: Liability of the parent and directors of the parent for breaches of duty at the 
level of the subsidiary 
 
A pharmaceutical company is currently developing two new drugs. After assessing the potential 
liability risks associated with the future products, the directors of the pharmaceutical company decide 
to incorporate two separate private limited companies, each taking over the development, research 
and future marketing of one of the two drugs. 
 
The directors of the pharmaceutical company appoint the two project managers as directors of the two 
subsidiary companies. The two subsidiary companies enter into an agreement allowing them access 
to the parent company's research facilities. According to the subsidiary's articles of association, all 
major strategic decisions regarding the research, development and marketing of the drugs are subject 
to approval by their sole shareholder, the pharmaceutical company. The employees working for the 
subsidiaries are formally still employed with the parent company, but are posted with the subsidiaries 
under an agreement entered into by the parent company and the two subsidiaries upon formation of 
the two companies. 
 
When the directors of the parent company learn about competitors working on similar projects, they try 
to accelerate the development process of the two drugs. They award substantial bonuses to the 
subsidiary’s directors, contingent on the drugs receiving regulatory approval within the next 6 months. 
The original schedule provided for further tests, which would take at least 12 months. 
 
Primarily because of the contingent bonus payment, the directors of the subsidiaries skip some of the 
planned tests and studies, and cover up this decision in their filings for regulatory approval. 
 
The two drugs gain regulatory approval within the 6 month time span, and are successfully marketed 
shortly after that.  
 
Two years after the initial marketing, independent studies reveal that one of the drugs causes a rare 
form of lethal cancer, exposing the relevant subsidiary to enormous product liability claims that far 
exceed its net assets. The drug developed by the other subsidiary proves to be safe and leads to 
substantial profits. 
 
1. Is it possible that the parent company would be liable in circumstances comparable to the stylised 
facts above? 
 
There is a risk of liability if the separate legal personality of the companies was disregarded and 
the directors of the parent company were regarded as having acted without due care, skill and 
diligence. However, this is unlikely given the persuasive force of the decision of the House of 
Lords in Appeal in Adams v Cape Industries Plc [1990] Ch 433, which allows a corporate structure 
to be set up so as to shelter companies within a group from a potential future liability as opposed 
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to an existing liability. This decision was cited with approval by the Irish High Court in Fyffes Plc v 
DCC Plc.
48
  
 
2. Under which circumstances would the directors of the parent company face a liability risk in those 
circumstances? 
 
There is a risk of liability only if the separate legal personality of the companies was disregarded 
and the directors of the parent company were regarded as having acted without due care, skill 
and diligence. 
 
Hypothetical II: Duties in the vicinity of insolvency 
 
After making losses for three consecutive years, an oil trading company’s equity ratio (equity divided 
by total assets) has fallen below [1% - 5% - 10%]. On average, comparable companies in the same 
line of business have an equity ratio of about 25%.  
 
The company still has substantial assets, but the thin equity cushion makes it hard for the company to 
pursue its core business, as trading partners demand higher prices to compensate them for the 
perceived higher risk of the company's operations.   
 
The company's directors evaluate different possibilities to improve the business prospects of the 
company. They attribute past trading losses to the substantially higher volatility of oil prices following 
the financial crisis, and maintain the view that the company's business model is sustainable in the long 
run. After exploring the possibility to raise new equity to recapitalise the business, they conclude that 
current market conditions would force them to issue new shares at prohibitively low prices, which 
would lead to a substantial dilution of their current shareholders. 
 
After analysing the market conditions, the directors come to the conclusion that the market price for 
crude oil is bound to rise significantly over the next year, particularly due to high anticipated demand 
from emerging market economies. In an attempt to recapitalise the company the directors decide to 
invest heavily in crude oil futures. They expect that the anticipated increase in oil prices will lead to 
substantial gains from this transaction, bringing the equity ratio back in lise with the industry average, 
and thus allowing the company to resume their trading operations at more sustainable conditions.  
 
The directors are aware that a sudden substantial fall in oil prices could potentially wipe out the 
remaining equity of the firm, but they consider the likelihood of this happening to be very low.  
 
Shortly after entering into the forward sale agreement, worries about a sovereign debt crisis lead to a 
revision of worldwide economic growth forecasts. The price of crude oil falls more than 10% on a 
single day, the worst one day performance in many years. As the company cannot fulfil the margin 
calls on its forward sales contracts, the positions are closed by the counterparty. The closed positions 
have a negative value exceeding the company’s equity, leading to the company’s over-indebtedness.  
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Trading partners refuse to enter into transactions with the company due to its financial position, and 
banks close all existing credit lines of the company. 
 
Response: 
 
The duty to act with due care, skill and diligence means that risky transactions which are undergone 
without appropriate risk assessment may breach the duty although a business judgment rule operates 
in the directors’ favour. When the company becomes insolvent, the duty to act in the best interests of 
the company moves to a duty to act in the interests of the company’s creditors. A duty to consider the 
interests of creditors will displace the duty to act in the interests of the company and arise under Irish 
law not just where formal insolvency procedures have been activated, but also where there is an 
entitlement to initiate them. This was established in Re Frederick Inns Ltd.
49
 
 
There is no clear definition of the vicinity of insolvency. However, the case law suggests that a formal 
declaration of insolvency or initiation of insolvency processes need not have occurred in order for 
directors to be under a duty to consider creditors’ interests. The Irish courts are pragmatic and 
recognise that the directors should not be under a duty to cease trading immediately provided that 
there is a chance that the company could trade its way out of its difficulties.   
 
In Re USIT World plc
50
 the liquidator expressed concern that the company had traded while it was 
insolvent on a balance sheet basis. Peart J. recognised that a reasonable and limited effort at trading 
out of the company’s difficulties is not irresponsible. He made the following pertinent comments on the 
issue: 
 
“Many companies will experience for many reasons unrelated to the general health of the 
company, a downturn in profitability over a quarter, two quarters or even three quarters. That 
in my view does not mean that even where a risk of insolvency downstream is warranted or 
anticipated, some reasonable effort at rescuing the situation may not be permitted to be 
undertaken. To attempt to trade out of a difficulty is not an irresponsible act. Care of course 
must be taken to ensure that effective and realistic steps are taken and that creditors’ 
interests are kept to the fore, rather than that a careless or reckless gamble is taken without 
proper advice and planning to an achievable end. Some sort of short term emergency fire-
fighting must be permitted to take place without those efforts, provided they are reasonable 
and responsible, from being made. Many companies have survived and prospered after 
temporary setbacks.”
51
 
 
In this case it was acknowledged that the fallout of September 11, 2001 had a very large part to play 
in the company’s difficulties since it led to financing being pulled. Furthermore, the directors had taken 
legal and accountancy advice in relation to its continued trading after September 11. 
 
In the context of an ongoing slump, such generosity of approach is less likely and the period of time 
for continuing to trade is likely to be expected to be short.
52
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It is likely that a sympathetic approach would be taken considering the exceptional nature of the fall in 
oil prices. In Business Communications Ltd v Baxter
53
 Murphy J. stated that “[o]f course one must be 
careful not to be wise after the event. There must be no ‘witch hunt’ because a business failed as 
businesses will.” 
 
Hypothetical III: Duty of care 
 
A large banking institution is engaged in retail as well as investment banking. In 2000, a new CEO 
was appointed, who also sits on the board of directors. The CEO made the decision to invest heavily 
in collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) backed by residential mortgage-backed securities, including 
lower-rated securities that pooled subprime mortgages to borrowers with weak credit history. The 
investments were initially successful, generating high profits for the company. However, beginning in 
2005, house prices, particularly in the United States, began to decrease. Defaults and foreclosures 
increased and the income from residential mortgages fell rapidly.  
 
As early as May 2005, economist Paul Krugman had warned of signs that the US housing market was 
approaching the final stages of a speculative bubble. Early in 2007, a large US subprime lender filed 
for bankruptcy protection and a number of investors announced write downs of several billion dollars 
on their structured finance commitments. In July, 2007, Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s 
downgraded bonds backed by subprime mortgages. At the end of 2007, two hedge funds that had 
invested heavily in subprime mortgages declared bankruptcy. In spite of these warning signs, the CEO 
had continued to invest in CDOs until shortly before the Lehman bankruptcy in September 2008, 
accumulating a total exposure of more than 20 billion Euro/Pounds/… . The subprime mortgage crisis 
necessitated massive write downs, leading to an annual loss of eight billion in 2008, which can be 
attributed in equal measure to the CDO transactions undertaken in 2005-2008. 
 
The CEO resigned in October 2008. As part of the resignation, the CEO entered into an agreement 
with the company providing that he would receive 50 million Euro/Pounds/… upon his departure, 
including bonus and stock options, and in addition an office, administrative assistant, car and driver 
until he would commence full time employment with another employer. In exchange, the CEO signed 
a non-compete agreement and a release of claims against the company. The agreement with the 
CEO was approved by all directors (the CEO abstaining from voting), acting on behalf of the company. 
 
After the CEO’s departure and with a new management team in place, it transpires that the old CEO 
had used a number of ostensibly arms-length transactions with investment firms that were, however, 
controlled by the CEO’s nominees, to transfer assets at an undervalue to a company owned by the 
CEO on the Cayman Islands. When the true nature of these transactions becomes known, the assets 
are no longer recoverable. 
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Questions: 
 
 Is the CEO liable for annual loss suffered by the company in 2008? 
 
At common law the director is protected if he exercises the skill, care and diligence that a person 
in his position would be expected to have: Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co Ltd.
54
 
 
Although the better view is that Re City Equitable cemented a hybrid, part-subjective, part-
objective standard, there are indications that the Irish judiciary has been relatively slow to fully 
embrace this standard. Dicta of Kenny J. in PMPA Insurance Co Ltd v New Ireland Assurance Co 
Ltd
55
 saw the business judgment rule being applied in its most traditional form. Having outlined 
that the management of the company is delegated by the shareholders to the directors, Kenny J. 
went on to state that a decision of the board of directors would not be interfered with unless it was 
in breach of the articles of association or could be classed as dishonest or grossly incompetent. 
 
The most radical shift in judicial thinking in relation to care, skill and diligence came about in the 
aftermath of the Barings Bank scandal. The Barings litigation
56
 involved crossing the Rubicon in 
terms of how the duty to exercise care, skill and diligence was perceived. In the most significant 
judgment since Re City Equitable,
57
 Jonathan Parker J. showed that the tide had turned for inert 
directors and that objective standards had to be weighed in the balance. 
 
The shift from a purely subjective assessment of care, skill and diligence under equitable and 
common law duties to a more complex assessment which accommodates objective standards has 
occurred tangentially within the context of the statutory restriction and disqualification systems 
which are primarily designed to safeguard the public interest, with a particular emphasis on the 
interests of creditors.
58
 
 
The courts have always been reluctant to second guess the business decisions of directors. 
However, in recent times, rather than being unduly deferential there has been a judicial 
willingness to examine the quality or grossness of the error of judgment. It would seem that 
today’s courts are less afraid to evaluate directorial conduct. This can be seen as a response to 
changing societal expectations. A distinction is drawn between calculated risks and rash and 
reckless risks: Re USIT World Plc.
59
 
 
 Have the directors (other than the CEO) breached their fiduciary duties by approving the 
agreement in conjunction with the resignation of the outgoing CEO? 
 
The directors are usually given the power to rule on these matters in the company’s articles of 
association. On the question of whether approval of such an arrangement would breach the duty 
to act in the best interests of the company, this is difficult to assess as a matter of fact. A recent 
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case on similar facts was settled before the Irish High Court gave judgment. If the directors 
subjectively believed that they were acting in the best interests of the company then they will be 
protected.
60
 To date the courts do not objectively review such decisions. The duty of care is not 
used to constrain executive remuneration. However, statutory provisions provide greater 
assistance. Sections 186-189 of the Companies Act 1963 require approval of qualifying cash and 
non-cash payments made in connection with loss of office by a director to be approved by the 
shareholder body. Failure to follow the approval procedure will render the payment unlawful. 
 
 Have the members of the company’s internal audit committee (of which the CEO was not a 
member) breached their fiduciary duties by not identifying the true nature of the ostensibly arms-
length transactions and are they, accordingly, liable for the loss suffered by the company as a 
consequence of the transactions? Have the other directors (except the CEO) breached their 
duties? 
 
It is possible that the directors in question would be considered to have acted in breach of their 
duty to act with due care, skill and diligence by not appropriately identifying the nature of the 
transactions. Potentially the company could recover the loss suffered by way of 
damages/equitable compensation if a breach is found. The lack of modern Irish case law hinders 
a more certain answer. However, case law in the area of disqualification in relation to banks in 
Ireland indicates that directors are under a duty to inform themselves appropriately in relation to 
the company’s affairs. A duty of monitoring is expected in relation to other directors but it is 
difficult to identify the circumstances in which it will be appropriate to say that the other directors 
were in dereliction of their duty in failing to spot a complex transaction as being connected with 
one of the directors. If they have relevant financial expertise, they would be expected to exercise 
it. And if they do not have it, they would be expected to take steps to educate themselves. 
 
 Assuming that the company has a claim against the CEO or another director pursuant to one or 
more of the above questions, can a minority shareholder enforce the claim? 
 
A minority shareholder can generally only bring a derivative action on behalf of the company 
where the company has decided not to sue in respect of a wrong and there is wrongdoer control 
of the company which has influenced the decision not to sue. If a court exercises its discretion to 
grant leave to bring a derivative action, the company will indemnify him against costs on the basis 
that the action was in the interests of the company.
61
 Leave will only be granted if the claim is 
regarded as being in the company’s interests, not vexatious, another appropriate remedy is not 
considered more suitable (e.g., an oppression petition), there is support from other shareholders 
and there has not been undue delay. 
 
Hypothetical IV: Duty of loyalty 
 
A mining company (‘Bidder’) considers expanding business operations. The board identifies assets 
held by another company (‘Target’) as a possible acquisition. The following scenarios ask you to 
consider the liability of a director (‘A’) on the board of Bidder. 
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 Director A is also majority shareholder in Target, holding 60 percent of the outstanding share 
capital of the company. As majority shareholder of Target, he is interested in an acquisition 
that is beneficial to Target. He proposes that Bidder purchase the assets for 10 million 
Euro/Pounds/…, knowing that the value ranges between 7 and 8 million. Director A does not 
disclose his interest in Target to the board of Bidder. A majority of the directors approves the 
acquisition. A’s vote was not decisive for the positive vote. 
 
Part IV of the Companies Act 1990, s.53 requires directors to notify the company in writing of 
any interest in shares or debentures in the company or any related company and of their entry 
into any contract to sell or assign their interest. The company is obliged to keep a register of 
interests recording interests of directors. Where a director fails to make an appropriate 
notification within the required time period, he or she is guilty of an offence.
62
 This is 
punishable on summary conviction by a fine of up to IR£1,500
63
 and/or up to 12 months 
imprisonment and on conviction on indictment, to a fine of up to IR£10,000
64
 and/or 
imprisonment not exceeding five years.
65
 In terms of the civil law, if a director does not make 
the appropriate notification within the required time period, any relevant interest and rights will 
not be legally enforceable by him or her in respect of the shares or debentures.
66
 This means, 
for example, that the right to vote or sell shares cannot be exercised by the affected director. 
 
Section 194(1) of the Companies Act 1963
67
 provides: 
 
“It shall be the duty of a director of a company who is in any way, whether directly or 
indirectly, interested in a contract or proposed contract with the company to declare 
the nature of his interest at a meeting of the directors of the company.”  
 
The mandatory statutory disclosure of directorial interests pursuant to s.194 requires directors 
(including shadow directors) to disclose conflicts of interest in relation to direct or indirect 
interests in a proposed contract with the company by declaring the nature of such interest at a 
directors’ meeting. Such declarations are entered in a register of directors’ interests which can 
be inspected by a director, secretary or member of the company and the company’s auditor. 
Where a proposed contract with a company arises, s.194(2) specifies that the declaration of 
interest be made by a director at the meeting where the question of entering into the contract 
is first considered, or if the director is not present at that meeting, at the next board meeting 
held after he or she has become interested in the contract. 
 
There is persuasive authority to suggest that for the purposes of compliance with s.194 it may 
be irrelevant whether the contract is approved by the board or not so long as the requisite 
disclosure has been made.
68
 There are, however, some consequences for failing to make the 
required disclosure. If a director fails to comply with s.194, he or she is guilty of an offence 
and is liable to a fine not exceeding IR£1,500.
69
 Although no civil consequences of non-
compliance are specified in s.194, there is persuasive authority which suggests that 
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nonetheless under general law principles any contract affected by a breach will be voidable. In 
Craven Textile Engineers Ltd v Batley Football Club Ltd
70
 the Court of Appeal considered the 
position of a director of Batley Football Club who was also a director and the controlling 
shareholder in Craven Textile Engineers Ltd. Craven Textile Engineers carried out 
improvement works on the club’s football grounds including the provision of carpeting and 
turnstile dividers and doors without the director having disclosed his interest to the club’s 
board of directors under the equivalent s.317 of the Companies Act 1985. The Court of 
Appeal held that while s.317 did not set out any civil consequences for breach, under ordinary 
principles of general law, the breach rendered such a contract voidable.
71
 
 
In addition, s.29 of the Companies Act 1990 which is concerned with substantial property 
transactions involving directors and connected persons requires shareholder approval by 
means of an ordinary resolution for the acquisition of substantial non-cash assets from a 
director or a connected person. In this context, a body corporate controlled by a director would 
qualify as a connected person. The threshold value of €63,486.90 or 10 per cent of the 
acquiring company’s relevant assets would be met in this case. In cases of non-compliance, 
the transaction would be voidable at the company’s instance. Personal liability could also be 
imposed on the director in the form of a liability to account for any gains made or to indemnify 
the company for the losses incurred though purchase of the assets at an overvalue. 
 
Separately, a duty of disclosure arises in relation to the fiduciary duty on directors to avoid 
conflicts of interest.
72
 In this regard, directors would be expected to disclose to the company 
their interest in a transaction in which the company is involved. The relevant transaction would 
be treated as being voidable at the company’s election where appropriate disclosure had not 
been made.
73
 
 
 As in scenario 1, but Director A discloses his interest in Target to the board of Bidder, and a 
majority of the uninterested directors approves the acquisition. 
 
In this scenario, the requirement to make disclosure of the material interest to the board would 
be complied with (s.194 of the Companies Act 1963). This would still leave a difficulty in 
relation to the equitable duty to avoid conflicts of interest. The courts in Ireland have not made 
a ruling on whether the duty to avoid conflicts of interest can be satisfied by disclosure at 
board level rather than at shareholder level. It is possible that shareholder approval may be 
required. Legislative proposals are in place which would require an ordinary resolution of the 
shareholder body in relation to both internal and external conflicts of interest. 
 
 As in scenario 1, but when the shareholders of Bidder learn of A’s interest in Target, they 
ratify the transaction, believing that it is in the company’s interests. 
 
Shareholders can ratify a related party transaction by means of a simple majority provided 
that they have been provided with all relevant information before making a decision to ratify. 
Ratification will cure the breach of the equitable duty to avoid conflicts of interest. If ratification 
takes place with the assistance of the vote of a wrongdoing director-shareholder, this may 
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qualify as a wrong which would permit a derivative action by a shareholder on behalf of the 
company where the directors are unwilling to initiate legal proceedings in the company’s 
name.
74
 
 
 Director A is majority shareholder and managing director in a competitor of bidder (‘Rival’), 
which is also active in the mining business. The assets held by Target that Bidder seeks to 
acquire consist in claims near Rival’s own mining territories. Director A is of the opinion that 
the assets are more valuable for Rival than for Bidder. He therefore arranges for Rival to 
make a competing and higher offer than Bidder, and Target accordingly decides to sell the 
assets to the former company. 
 
How competing activity is likely to be treated in Ireland remains to be seen as there have been 
few judgments on the matter. In Spring Grove Services (Ireland) Ltd v O’Callaghan
75
 Herbert 
J. stated: 
 
“A Director of a Company owes strict obligations of good faith, fair dealing and 
honesty to the Company of which he is a Director. Aspects of these obligations, 
commonly referred to as ‘Fiduciary duties’, include a duty not to compete with the 
company ….”
76
 
 
There has not been case law on this in Ireland but the strict approach of the English courts in 
cases such as Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver
77
 and Re Allied Business and Financial 
Consultants Ltd; O’Donnell v Shanahan
78
 would be likely to be applied such that all 
opportunities encountered as a director should be put to the company for its decision on 
whether they would be of value. 
 
 As in scenario 4, but A resigns from his position as director of Bidder before Rival makes the 
competing offer. 
 
The English case law suggests that it is the no profit rule rather than the no conflict rule which 
applies to former directors.
79
 The rationale for this is that under the general policy against 
restraint of trade it would be improper to regard a former director as subject to the same 
duties of loyalty as an existing director.
80
 Thus the courts have viewed the non-application of 
the no conflict rule on termination of directorship as directly linked to the loss of directorial 
powers.
81
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 As in scenario 4, but after an initial expression of interest by Bidder in acquiring the assets 
and before Rival has taken any steps to make a competing offer, the Bidder board determines 
that an investment of that size is not advisable at the present time in light of Bidder’s weak 
financial position. 
 
If the company has chosen not to pursue the opportunity, the director is free to go ahead provided 
appropriate disclosure has been made. Irish case law suggests that the conflicted director should not 
participate in the decision of the board.
82 
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Italy 
 
Hypothetical I: Liability of the parent and directors of the parent for breaches of duty at the 
level of the subsidiary 
 
A pharmaceutical company is currently developing two new drugs. After assessing the potential 
liability risks associated with the future products, the directors of the pharmaceutical company decide 
to incorporate two separate private limited companies, each taking over the development, research 
and future marketing of one of the two drugs. 
 
The directors of the pharmaceutical company appoint the two project managers as directors of the two 
subsidiary companies. The two subsidiary companies enter into an agreement allowing them access 
to the parent company's research facilities. According to the subsidiary's articles of association, all 
major strategic decisions regarding the research, development and marketing of the drugs are subject 
to approval by their sole shareholder, the pharmaceutical company. The employees working for the 
subsidiaries are formally still employed with the parent company, but are posted with the subsidiaries 
under an agreement entered into by the parent company and the two subsidiaries upon formation of 
the two companies. 
 
When the directors of the parent company learn about competitors working on similar projects, they try 
to accelerate the development process of the two drugs. They award substantial bonuses to the 
subsidiary’s directors, contingent on the drugs receiving regulatory approval within the next 6 months. 
The original schedule provided for further tests, which would take at least 12 months. 
 
Primarily because of the contingent bonus payment, the directors of the subsidiaries skip some of the 
planned tests and studies, and cover up this decision in their filings for regulatory approval. 
 
The two drugs gain regulatory approval within the 6 month time span, and are successfully marketed 
shortly after that.  
 
Two years after the initial marketing, independent studies reveal that one of the drugs causes a rare 
form of lethal cancer, exposing the relevant subsidiary to enormous product liability claims that far 
exceed its net assets. The drug developed by the other subsidiary proves to be safe and leads to 
substantial profits. 
 
 Is it possible that the parent company would be liable in circumstances comparable to the stylised 
facts above? 
 
On the basis of the facts described above, the pharmaceutical company (which controls the 
subsidiary under the terms set out by Art. 2359 (1) Civil Code) faces civil liability pursuant to Art. 
2497 (1) Civil Code. According to this provision, when the controlling company (la societa’ che 
esercita attivita’ di direzione e coordinamento di societa’) operates in its own entrepreneurial 
interest in breach of the principles of corporate governance and good management, the same  
company is directly liable towards the members of the controlled companies (le societa’ soggette 
alle attivita’ di direzione e coordinamento) for the damages caused to the value of their 
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shareholding as well as towards their creditors for the diminished value of the company’s 
patrimony. 
 
All the above, of course, would not occur if the members of the controlled company or the 
creditors were able to satisfy their claims directly against the controlled company (Art. 2497 (3) 
Civil Code).  
 
 Under which circumstances would the directors of the parent company face a liability risk in those 
circumstances? 
 
They will be liable for damages pursuant to Art. 2497 (2) Civil Code, as they have largely 
contributed to taking the decisions that brought the insolvency of the subsidiary company (from 
the circumstances described in the hypothetical, there is no need to make recourse to the notion 
of de facto/shadow directors in this specific case). 
 
Hypothetical II: Duties in the vicinity of insolvency 
 
After making losses for three consecutive years, an oil trading company’s equity ratio (equity divided 
by total assets) has fallen below [1% - 5% - 10%]. On average, comparable companies in the same 
line of business have an equity ratio of about 25%.  
 
The company still has substantial assets, but the thin equity cushion makes it hard for the company to 
pursue its core business, as trading partners demand higher prices to compensate them for the 
perceived higher risk of the company's operations.   
 
The company's directors evaluate different possibilities to improve the business prospects of the 
company. They attribute past trading losses to the substantially higher volatility of oil prices following 
the financial crisis, and maintain the view that the company's business model is sustainable in the long 
run. After exploring the possibility to raise new equity to recapitalise the business, they conclude that 
current market conditions would force them to issue new shares at prohibitively low prices, which 
would lead to a substantial dilution of their current shareholders. 
 
After analysing the market conditions, the directors come to the conclusion that the market price for 
crude oil is bound to rise significantly over the next year, particularly due to high anticipated demand 
from emerging market economies. In an attempt to recapitalise the company the directors decide to 
invest heavily in crude oil futures. They expect that the anticipated increase in oil prices will lead to 
substantial gains from this transaction, bringing the equity ratio back in line with the industry average, 
and thus allowing the company to resume their trading operations at more sustainable conditions.  
 
The directors are aware that a sudden substantial fall in oil prices could potentially wipe out the 
remaining equity of the firm, but they consider the likelihood of this happening to be very low.  
 
Shortly after entering into the forward sale agreement, worries about a sovereign debt crisis lead to a 
revision of worldwide economic growth forecasts. The price of crude oil falls more than 10% on a 
single day, the worst one day performance in many years. As the company cannot fulfil the margin 
calls on its forward sales contracts, the positions are closed by the counterparty. The closed positions 
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have a negative value exceeding the company’s equity, leading to the company’s over-indebtedness. 
Trading partners refuse to enter into transactions with the company due to its financial position, and 
banks close all existing credit lines of the company. 
 
 Do fiduciary duties prevent directors from entering into particularly risky transactions? 
 
It depends on the circumstances. With respect to the facts described in the hypothetical, it seems 
that this is not the case. Directors’ duties are obbligazioni di mezzi (broadly, obligations which 
should be fulfilled with competent effort) and not obbligazioni di risultato (broadly, obligations 
which require the obligor to achieve a specific result). With the exception of gross negligence (eg. 
Cass.8 May 1991 n. 5123 in Foro it, 1992, I, 817), Italian courts will not be concerned with the 
opportunity/risk of a managerial decision taken in compliance with Art. 2392 Civil Code (duty of 
care). 
 
 At which point in time does the law provide for additional duties of directors or the change of 
existing duties in situations of financial distress? (i.e. how is ‘vicinity of insolvency’ defined?) 
 
There is no definition of ‘vicinity of insolvency’ under Italian law and it is unlikely that a director can 
be considered to have a duty to protect the interests of creditors before (some or all of) the 
requirements for an insolvency declaration are present. It is only when the company is not able to 
regularly fulfil its financial obligations (Art. 5 Insolvency Act), the amount of the existing unpaid 
debts is greater than 30,000.00 Euros, and certain specific accounting/monetary thresholds are 
met (Art. 1 (2) Insolvency Act), that it is possible to apply to the court by petition for starting 
insolvency proceedings. 
 
 What is the legal response to above situation? For example, the law may provide that the 
directors have to take primarily the creditors’ interests into account, rather than those of the 
shareholders, or the company must cease to trade and the directors file for the opening of 
insolvency proceedings. 
 
From the facts described in the hypothetical the conditions for applying to the court to start 
insolvency proceedings do not seem to be in place. The directors’ decision was difficult/risky, but 
an appropriate one on the basis of the market conditions at the time when it was made. Following 
the unsuccessful implementation of the business strategy, it is likely that an application to the 
court by petition for starting insolvency proceedings will be made by the creditors, the public 
prosecutor (Art. 6 Insolvency Act) or by the company (Art. 217 no. 4 Insolvency Act). 
 
Hypothetical III: Duty of care 
 
A large banking institution is engaged in retail as well as investment banking. In 2000, a new CEO 
was appointed, who also sits on the board of directors. The CEO made the decision to invest heavily  
in collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) backed by residential mortgage-backed securities, including 
lower-rated securities that pooled subprime mortgages to borrowers with weak credit history. The 
investments were initially successful, generating high profits for the company. However, beginning in 
2005, house prices, particularly in the United States, began to decrease. Defaults and foreclosures 
increased and the income from residential mortgages fell rapidly.  
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As early as May 2005, economist Paul Krugman had warned of signs that the US housing market was 
approaching the final stages of a speculative bubble. Early in 2007, a large US subprime lender filed 
for bankruptcy protection and a number of investors announced write downs of several billion dollars 
on their structured finance commitments. In July, 2007, Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s 
downgraded bonds backed by subprime mortgages. At the end of 2007, two hedge funds that had 
invested heavily in subprime mortgages declared bankruptcy. In spite of these warning signs, the CEO 
had continued to invest in CDOs until shortly before the Lehman bankruptcy in September 2008, 
accumulating a total exposure of more than 20 billion Euro/Pounds/… . The subprime mortgage crisis 
necessitated massive write downs, leading to an annual loss of eight billion in 2008, which can be 
attributed in equal measure to the CDO transactions undertaken in 2005-2008. 
 
The CEO resigned in October 2008. As part of the resignation, the CEO entered into an agreement 
with the company providing that he would receive 50 million Euro/Pounds/… upon his departure, 
including bonus and stock options, and in addition an office, administrative assistant, car and driver 
until he would commence full time employment with another employer. In exchange, the CEO signed 
a non-compete agreement and a release of claims against the company. The agreement with the 
CEO was approved by all directors (the CEO abstaining from voting), acting on behalf of the company. 
 
After the CEO’s departure and with a new management team in place, it transpires that the old CEO 
had used a number of ostensibly arms-length transactions with investment firms that were, however, 
controlled by the CEO’s nominees, to transfer assets at an undervalue to a company owned by the 
CEO on the Cayman Islands. When the true nature of these transactions becomes known, the assets 
are no longer recoverable. 
 
Questions: 
 
 Is the CEO liable for annual loss suffered by the company in 2008? 
 
Yes, the CEO is likely to be held liable for the losses suffered by the company in 2008. He 
breached the duty of care set out in Article 2392 (1) Civil Code that requires a director of a 
company to exercise his duties with the knowledge, skill and experience that may reasonably be 
expected of an average director carrying out a similar role (la diligenza richiesta dalla natura 
dell’incarico), and by the specific care and competence that the director has (le specifiche 
competenze). In this case, even if little is known about the CEO’s specific competence, there is 
plenty of evidence that suggests that he has undertaken an excessive level of risk not complying 
with the level of care to be expected by a reasonable director in a similar position (the average 
director) (e.g. the authoritative predictions made by Krugman, the first insolvency cases and the 
general market trends on structured finance commitments). This is so even if it is accepted that 
the standard of review for business decisions in Italy follows a pattern similar to the ‘business 
judgement rule’ adopted by Delaware courts. It seems to be the case that the CEO acted with  
gross negligence and the court review of the decision will be on the fairness of the transaction 
(vaglio della legittimità della decisione). 
 
 Have the directors (other than the CEO) breached their fiduciary duties by approving the 
agreement in conjunction with the resignation of the outgoing CEO? 
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It is difficult to say. It depends on the possible value/importance/relevance of the signing of a non-
competition agreement. With respect to the self-dealing transactions, the CEO should have 
declared the nature and the extent of any interest that he had (directly or indirectly) in the 
proposed transaction with a related party, and it was for the board to decide whether to execute it 
or not (Art. 2391 (1) Civil Code). In that case the board’s resolution should have appropriately 
justified the reasons for entering into the transaction. 
 
When the resolution taken is not in compliance with Art. 2391 (1) Civil Code and it proves to be 
potentially harmful to the company’s interests (danno potenziale), it is voidable if the vote of the 
interested director (the CEO in this case) was essential for passing the resolution (prova di 
resistenza), or if the board did not adequately justify the reasons and the opportunity for entering 
into the transaction.  
 
It is surely possible that the duty of care (placed on the members of the remuneration committee, 
for example) could be used to constrain excessive remuneration.  
 
 Have the members of the company’s internal audit committee (of which the CEO was not a 
member) breached their fiduciary duties by not identifying the true nature of the ostensibly arms-
length transactions and are they, accordingly, liable for the loss suffered by the company as a 
consequence of the transactions? Have the other directors (except the CEO) breached their 
duties? 
 
This is likely to be the case as members of the company’s internal audit committee are supposed 
to be able to identify the true nature of the ostensibly arms-length transactions in carrying out their 
duties in accordance with the knowledge, skill and experience that may reasonably be expected of 
an average director carrying out a similar role (la diligenza richiesta dalla natura dell’incarico). Not 
to mention the specific care and competence that the member of the internal audit committee 
possible had (le specifiche competenze) and of which nothing is known (Art. 2392 (1) Civil Code). 
 
In general terms and outside the present case, where duties are vested in the executive 
committee or individually in the CEO, members of the board are jointly and severally liable for the 
damages caused by a resolution taken in breach of the duty of care (Art. 2392 (1) Civil Code) or 
even for culpa in vigilando (Art. 2392 (2) Civil Code). The only exception is the case where a 
director’s dissenting opinion is recorded in the minutes of the board’s meeting and the director 
notifies in writing the chairman of the statutory board of the issue (Art. 2392 (3) Civil Code). 
 
 Assuming that the company has a claim against the CEO or another director pursuant to one or 
more of the above questions, can a minority shareholder enforce the claim? 
 
A minority shareholder can enforce the claim against the CEO or another director for breach of 
their duties. The Civil Code allows a group of shareholders representing at least one fifth of the 
outstanding corporate capital or a different percentage as set out in the articles (which cannot 
exceed in any case one third of the corporate capital - Art. 2393 (1) bis Civil Code) to enforce the 
company’s rights against the directors. In bringing a derivative action, shareholders act on behalf 
of the company so that the award will compensate only the company for its loss. If the claim is 
successful the company will indemnify the claimants against the costs incurred in bringing the 
proceedings, unless the costs are imposed on the losing party or the losses can be recovered 
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upon direct enforcement against that party (Art. 2393 (5) bis Civil Code). However, if the claim is 
settled or is not successful, the claimants do not have any right to indemnification of any expenses 
occurred. 
 
That said on the power of minority shareholders to bring a claim against the CEO or another 
director for breach of their duties, it must be remembered that the default rule under the Civil Code 
is that, even if a public company is subject to liquidation, shareholders, by way of ordinary 
resolution, can direct the board (Art. 2393 (1) Civil Code) to commence litigation in relation to an 
alleged breach of a director’s duty vis-à-vis the company (Art. 2364 (1) no 4 Civil Code). 
 
Alternatively, following a recent amendment of the Civil Code (pursuant to law no 262 of 2005) the 
board of statutory auditors is entitled to take such decision by a qualified majority of two thirds of 
the board members (Art. 2393 (3) Civil Code). 
 
Hypothetical IV: Duty of loyalty 
 
A mining company (‘Bidder’) considers expanding business operations. The board identifies assets 
held by another company (‘Target’) as a possible acquisition. The following scenarios ask you to 
consider the liability of a director (‘A’) on the board of Bidder. 
 
 Director A is also majority shareholder in Target, holding 60 percent of the outstanding share 
capital of the company. As majority shareholder of Target, he is interested in an acquisition that is 
beneficial to Target. He proposes that Bidder purchase the assets for 10 million Euro/Pounds/…, 
knowing that the value ranges between 7 and 8 million. Director A does not disclose his interest in 
Target to the board of Bidder. A majority of the directors approves the acquisition. A’s vote was 
not decisive for the positive vote. 
 
Director A will be held liable for the breach of his duty of loyalty to the company. Under Italian law, 
directors have to disclose any interest in transactions with the company. The duty is set out under 
Article 2391 of the Civil Code and it imposes on a director a duty to declare the nature and the 
extent of any interest that he has (directly or indirectly) in a proposed transaction with the 
company. In case the resolution taken by the board proves to be potentially harmful to the 
company’s interests (danno potenziale) (as it is the case described in the hypothetical), such 
decision is voidable when the director’s interest was not disclosed and the vote of the interested 
director was essential for passing the resolution (prova di resistenza), or when the board did not 
adequately justify the reasons and the opportunity for entering into the transaction. 
 
 
The director will also have to pay damages caused to the company from his conduct (Art. 2391 (4) 
Civil Code). 
 
 As in scenario 1, but Director A discloses his interest in Target to the board of Bidder, and a 
majority of the uninterested directors approves the acquisition. 
 
If director A discloses his interest in Target to the board of Bidder, he is entitled to vote on the 
conflicted interest transaction. If the resolution taken by the board proves to be potentially harmful 
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to the company’s interests (danno potenziale), such decision is voidable when the board did not 
adequately justify the reasons and the opportunity for entering into the transaction.  
 
 As in scenario 1, but when the shareholders of Bidder learn of A’s interest in Target, they ratify the 
transaction, believing that it is in the company’s interests. 
 
The director will be liable, as pursuant to Art. 2364 (1) no. 5 Civil Code shareholders do not have 
the default power to ratify managerial decisions (even when stated in the articles, the resolution 
does not operate as a liability waiver for the director). Resolutions that do not comply with the 
articles or the law may be challenged by shareholders representing at least 5% of the voting share 
capital (or a lower percentage as stated in the articles - in the case of listed companies the default 
rule is 1/1000 shareholding). If that percentage cannot be reached, minority shareholders are 
entitled to claim compensation for damages (the resolution remains valid in this latter case, see 
Art. 2377 (4) Civil Code).
83
 
 
 Director A is majority shareholder and managing director in a competitor of bidder (‘Rival’), which 
is also active in the mining business. The assets held by Target that Bidder seeks to acquire 
consist in claims near Rival’s own mining territories. Director A is of the opinion that the assets are 
more valuable for Rival than for Bidder. He therefore arranges for Rival to make a competing and 
higher offer than Bidder, and Target accordingly decides to sell the assets to the former company. 
 
From the facts described in the hypothetical, it is possible to conclude that director A knew about 
the business opportunity while acting as director for Bidder and that therefore he exploited the 
opportunity for his own interest (possibly) in breach of his duty of loyalty. 
 
Under Italian law the rule codifying ‘corporate opportunities’ is set out under Article 2391 (5) Civil 
Code: a director is liable when he exploits, for his own benefit or that of third parties, a business 
opportunity obtained in connection with his managerial position.  
 
In the absence of court decisions, it is questionable from the wording of Article 2391 (5) Civil Code 
whether ‘corporate opportunities’ have to be in the company’s line of business, whether it matters 
that the director discovered the opportunity outside his office hours or whether the company must 
be able to take advantage of the information or opportunity (capability fact). The prevailing 
academic view is that the answer to the three uncertainties must be in the negative.
84
 
 
That said on the specific case and on corporate opportunities, Italian law also has a no-
competition rule under Article 2390 Civil Code according to which directors cannot be members of 
a competing unlimited liability company, carry on competitive business activities on their own 
account or for the account of third parties, or be appointed as directors or general managers 
(direttori generali) in competing companies, unless authorised by shareholder resolution. 
Directors’ liability in this case is not based on the material negative economic consequences of 
their actions (i.e. there is no need to give evidence of damage), but on the potential risk that such 
consequences could occur. It is the fiduciary relationship (no-conflict) with the company that 
prevails and that is the basis of liability. 
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 As in scenario 4, but A resigns from his position as director of Bidder before Rival makes the 
competing offer. 
 
Yes, (possibly by way of analogy) as expressly established for employees of the company under 
Art. 2105 and 2598 Civil Code.   
 
 As in scenario 4, but after an initial expression of interest by Bidder in acquiring the assets and 
before Rival has taken any steps to make a competing offer, the Bidder board determines that an 
investment of that size is not advisable at the present time in light of Bidder’s weak financial 
position. 
 
See comments under 2 on self-dealing transactions and 4 with respect to capability facts. 
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The Netherlands 
 
Hypothetical I 
 
1. Solely based on these given data it is not very likely that the parent company will be 
successfully held liable. Piercing the corporate veil in The Netherlands can only be effected on 
the basis of a tort claim (Article 6:162 DCC). Merely the payment of a contingent bonus to the 
subsidiary directors will not be sufficient ground to hold the parent company liable against 
those who suffered damage from the use of the defective drug. Please note that in answering 
this question I have not taken into account the impact of any specific product liability 
regulation that might be applicable. 
2. Again also the possible liability of the directors of the parent company via-à-vis those who 
suffered damage from the use of the drug must be based on tort. Perhaps if the subsidiary 
directors were concretely instructed, on pain of being dismissed, by the parent directors to 
cover up towards the regulating officials, the fact that some tests were not performed, there 
might be ground for a liability claim.   
 
Hypothetical II 
 
1. There is no specific regulation in Dutch law preventing directors from entering into particularly 
risky transactions. Moreover, in this case, the risk seems to be rather calculated and it would 
be difficult in court proceedings, e.g. aimed at personnel liability of the directors towards the 
company, to blame them for the consequences of the sudden sovereign debt crisis and the 
worldwide economical crisis following from that. Of course it all depends on the level of 
predictability of that crisis, for a standard and careful company director that is, at the time the 
transaction was entered into. 
2. Dutch law does not provide for and require a formal change of attitude of company directors, 
i.e. from shareholder interests to creditors’ interests, in the vicinity of insolvency. Neither does 
it contain a “wrongful trading” rule similar to that existing in the UK. However, there is case law 
from the Dutch Supreme Court on the basis of which a company director can be held liable 
towards a third party (creditor) with whom he entered into a contract on the company’s behalf 
at a moment that he realized or should have realized that the company would neither be able 
to fulfill its obligations under that contract nor would there be sufficient assets for the creditor’s 
recourse. Such acting constitutes an act of tort, making the director personally liable towards 
the unpaid creditor. This is the so-called “Beklamel-rule”, named after the said Supreme Court 
decision. This rule is rather often applied in liability cases before the lower courts. 
 
Hypothetical III 
 
1. The Netherlands applies the so-called stakeholder model as the leading concept underlying 
its company law system. As a consequence, a company director should at all times take due 
care of the company’s interest defined in a rather broad sense, so including shareholders’, 
workers’, creditors’ interests and even interests such as the environment, human rights et 
cetera. By accepting the excessive risks as described in the given case, even after being 
severely warned, the CEO obviously seems to have violated this duty of care. In terms of 
Dutch case law: he is likely to be considered “severely culpable” (in Dutch: ernstig verwijt) in 
court proceedings. This could make him personally liable not only towards the company, but  
also in bankruptcy towards the trustee for the deficit of the estate and even towards individual 
creditors for their damage. It is difficult to say in general terms when so-called red flags hang 
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out so obviously that a director crosses the line of legality by continuing such transactions. It 
all depends on the circumstances of the case at hand.   
2. As of 1 January 2013 new legislation on conflicts of interests will become effective in the 
Netherlands, under which no conflicted director may participate in the relevant sensitive 
corporate decision-making. However, his participation will not affect the legality of the decision 
taken by the board, nor of the transaction entered into following the decision. The company is 
still bound by it, provided that it has been validly represented at the time of the transaction. 
Under recent specific legislation the company may, in extreme situations, “claw back” 
excessive payments made to the former director.   
3. Members of the Supervisory Board (or non executive board members) – being a member of 
the Audit Committee or not - could also be held liable for not being cautious enough while 
monitoring the CEO’s actions. The same basic norm applies here; they should also take 
sufficient care when fulfilling their specific supervisory task and the establishment of “severe 
culpability” could make them liable as well. In case law the specific knowledge and expertise a 
member of the supervisory board is deemed to have could be a factor determining the 
outcome in court proceedings. However, no specific legislation applies here. As a rule, board 
members bear a collective responsibility for the performance of the company. In connection 
with this principle they may be jointly and severally liable for the company’s failure. At the 
same time some tasks and responsibilities may be allocated among different board members, 
so indeed board members are incentivised to monitor each other’s performance and do well to 
get adequately and timely informed thereof. 
4. Only company directors can bring a claim on behalf of the company. In bankruptcy the trustee 
represents the company to that end. There is no such thing as a derivative action under Dutch 
company law. However, under the rules of the so-called inquiry proceedings a shareholder – 
or a group of shareholders acting jointly – with a stake of at least 10% in the company, may 
request the Enterprise Chamber of the Amsterdam Court of Appeals “(EC”) to appoint an 
outside expert to investigate the company’s affairs, or a certain aspect thereof during a 
specific timeframe. If the report of the expert shows malperformance (wanbeleid) on the part 
of the company – for which the former directors bear special responsibility – the EC may take 
various measures at the shareholder’s request, such as the dismissal of directors, the 
amendment of the articles of association and the temporary transfer of shares to an 
independent trustee. Only recently has the EC ruled that the mere fact that current 
management refused to hold the former management liable for its actions in itself constituted 
the suspicion of malperformance of the company. So one may conclude that, despite the fact 
a specific law on derivative actions currently lacks in The Netherlands, inquiry proceedings 
more or less fill that gap as they can be used as an alternative instrument to serve the goal of 
protecting the interests of minority shareholders.  
 
 
Hypothetical IV 
 
1. Yes, Dutch corporate law requires directors to disclose their direct or indirect interests in 
transactions with the company, should these constitute a conflict of interests (tegenstrijdig 
belang). A violation of this rule may, under current law, result in the company not being bound 
toward the third party under the relevant transaction. However, under the new law effective as 
of 1 January 2013 there is no longer such external effect. Conflicts of interests are then no 
longer a matter of representation but of corporate decision making. The transaction remains 
valid and binding, but the company may hold the conflicted director liable should the company 
suffer any damage from the said transaction.   
2. Yes and yes. 
3. Only if the Supervisory Board is also conflicted, the shareholders meeting is authorised to 
ratify the decision to perform the transaction. In his role as a shareholder the conflicted 
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director may vote on the issue in the shareholders meeting. For the protection of the interests 
of minority shareholders I refer to what I have stated about the workings of Dutch inquiry 
proceedings mentioned under Question III.4. 
4. Again (I fear that you will find me boring), the issue of corporate opportunities under Dutch law 
is dealt with under the wide normative umbrella of liability actions based on tort. In case law 
by lower courts it has been recognised that the mere fact that a director competes, through his 
stake in another company, with the company he is serving as director in itself does not 
constitute an act of tort and make him liable towards the latter. Additional circumstances must 
be put forward by the claimant. As to the protection of minority shareholders please again be 
referred to what I have stated in answering Question III.4 above. 
5.  Also if a former director exploits corporate opportunities to his own benefit and to the 
detriment of the company he used to serve as a director, he can be held liable by the latter 
because of his violation of unwritten duties of care based on tort. There is no dogmatic 
impediment for such action under Dutch law. 
6. Under Dutch law I would say that the director is still conflicted, since pending a decision of 
Bidder, Rival is contemplating a competing offer, and the director knows it. The fact that 
Bidder forgoes an offer does not change that situation. Director A may not participate in the 
decision-making of the board of Bidder.   
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Portugal 
 
Hypothetical I: Liability of the parent and directors of the parent for breaches of duty at the 
level of the subsidiary 
 
A pharmaceutical company is currently developing two new drugs. After assessing the potential 
liability risks associated with the future products, the directors of the pharmaceutical company decide 
to incorporate two separate private limited companies, each taking over the development, research 
and future marketing of one of the two drugs. 
 
The directors of the pharmaceutical company appoint the two project managers as directors of the two 
subsidiary companies. The two subsidiary companies enter into an agreement allowing them access 
to the parent company's research facilities. According to the subsidiary's articles of association, all 
major strategic decisions regarding the research, development and marketing of the drugs are subject 
to approval by their sole shareholder, the pharmaceutical company. The employees working for the 
subsidiaries are formally still employed with the parent company, but are posted with the subsidiaries 
under an agreement entered into by the parent company and the two subsidiaries upon formation of 
the two companies. 
 
When the directors of the parent company learn about competitors working on similar projects, they try 
to accelerate the development process of the two drugs. They award substantial bonuses to the 
subsidiary’s directors, contingent on the drugs receiving regulatory approval within the next 6 months. 
The original schedule provided for further tests, which would take at least 12 months. 
 
Primarily because of the contingent bonus payment, the directors of the subsidiaries skip some of the 
planned tests and studies, and cover up this decision in their filings for regulatory approval. 
 
The two drugs gain regulatory approval within the 6 month time span, and are successfully marketed 
shortly after that.  
 
Two years after the initial marketing, independent studies reveal that one of the drugs causes a rare 
form of lethal cancer, exposing the relevant subsidiary to enormous product liability claims that far 
exceed its net assets. The drug developed by the other subsidiary proves to be safe and leads to 
substantial profits. 
 
 Is it possible that the parent company would be liable in circumstances comparable to the stylised 
facts above? 
 
As a company law matter, the liability of the parent company would depend primarily on the type 
of inter-corporate linkage between the parent and the subsidiary, that is, on the type of corporate 
group at stake. In the case of a legal group – that is, the parent company holding a 100% 
shareholding or entering into a subordination agreement with each subsidiary (articles 488 and 
493 of the Portuguese Code of Commercial Companies), the parent would bear unlimited liability 
for any unpaid debts of the subsidiaries arising from the product liability claim (art. 501 of the 
same Code). In the case of a pure “de facto group” – where the parent controlled their 
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subsidiaries via a majority shareholding or otherwise –, the liability of the parent would be much 
more difficult to establish, except where the involuntary creditors (affected consumers) prove that 
the parent caused the subsidiary directors to take the managerial decisions in question (art. 83 of 
the same Code) or if the court decided to pierce the corporate veil of the subsidiaries in order to 
impute the liability to the controlling parent. 
 
 Under which circumstances would the directors of the parent company face a liability risk in those 
circumstances? 
 
Again, the answer would depend on the concrete type of group at stake (see above 1). In case of 
a legal group – where the law imposes on directors of the parent company a general duty of 
diligent management concerning the group as a whole (art. 504 of the Code) –, the parent’s 
directors could also be held liable if the affected drug consumers proved that there was a breach 
of the standards of orderly and diligent group management (e.g., instructions issued to the 
subsidiary in order to skip planned pharmaceutical safety protocols). In the case of a factual 
group, an eventual liability of the directors of the parent would be extremely difficult to establish, 
except in egregious cases of disregard of the corporate entity doctrine (as shadow directors). 
 
Hypothetical II: Duties in the vicinity of insolvency 
 
After making losses for three consecutive years, an oil trading company’s equity ratio (equity divided 
by total assets) has fallen below [1% - 5% - 10%]. On average, comparable companies in the same 
line of business have an equity ratio of about 25%.  
 
The company still has substantial assets, but the thin equity cushion makes it hard for the company to 
pursue its core business, as trading partners demand higher prices to compensate them for the 
perceived higher risk of the company's operations.   
 
The company's directors evaluate different possibilities to improve the business prospects of the 
company. They attribute past trading losses to the substantially higher volatility of oil prices following 
the financial crisis, and maintain the view that the company's business model is sustainable in the long 
run. After exploring the possibility to raise new equity to recapitalize the business, they conclude that 
current market conditions would force them to issue new shares at prohibitively low prices, which 
would lead to a substantial dilution of their current shareholders. 
 
After analysing the market conditions, the directors come to the conclusion that the market price for 
crude oil is bound to rise significantly over the next year, particularly due to high anticipated demand 
from emerging market economies. In an attempt to recapitalize the company the directors decide to 
invest heavily in crude oil futures. They expect that the anticipated increase in oil prices will lead to 
substantial gains from this transaction, bringing the equity ratio back in lime with the industry average, 
and thus allowing the company to resume their trading operations at more sustainable conditions.  
 
The directors are aware that a sudden substantial fall in oil prices could potentially wipe out the 
remaining equity of the firm, but they consider the likelihood of this happening to be very low.  
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Shortly after entering into the forward sale agreement, worries about a sovereign debt crisis lead to a 
revision of worldwide economic growth forecasts. The price of crude oil falls more than 10% on a 
single day, the worst one day performance in many years. As the company cannot fulfil the margin 
calls on its forward sales contracts, the positions are closed by the counterparty. The closed positions 
have a negative value exceeding the company’s equity, leading to the company’s over-indebtedness. 
Trading partners refuse to enter into transactions with the company due to its financial position, and 
banks close all existing credit lines of the company. 
 
 Do fiduciary duties prevent directors from entering into particularly risky transactions? 
 
As a matter of principle, the fiduciary duties of directors only prevent them from entering into 
business transactions or to take managerial decisions which involve disproportionate or 
unreasonable financial or economic risks to the company. If the director proves that a concrete 
business transaction has been taken in an informed way, free of any personal interest and 
according to the standard of entrepreneurial rationality, he is presumed to have acted in 
compliance with his fiduciary duties and is thus exempted from any liability (articles 64(1)(a) and 
72(2) of the Portuguese Code of Commercial Companies). 
 
 At which point in time does the law provide for additional duties of directors or the change of 
existing duties in situations of financial distress? (i.e. how is ‘vicinity of insolvency’ defined?) 
 
The concept of “vicinity of insolvency” is not expressly acknowledged by the law or the courts, 
neither is there any specific legal provision directly providing for a shift of directors’ duties in such 
a case. Nevertheless, if the accounts of the company show that half of the share capital is lost or 
there are reasonable grounds to believe that such loss might occur, the directors must 
immediately convene a general shareholders’ meeting (article 35 Portuguese Code of Commercial 
Companies). Moreover, if the company assets are clearly insufficient to cover the liabilities 
according to applicable accounting rules, directors have a duty to start insolvency proceedings 
within 60 days (Code of Insolvency, Article 3(2), 18 and 19). 
 
 What is the legal response to above situation? For example, the law may provide that the 
directors have to take primarily the creditors’ interests into account, rather than those of the 
shareholders or the company must cease to trade and the directors file for the opening of 
insolvency proceedings. 
 
The answer is uncertain as it would depend on the way in which national courts would construct 
and apply the general standard of entrepreneurial rationality in the concrete case, provided for by 
article 72(2) of the said Code, and there is still no case law or jurisprudence on this particular type 
of business decision (investment on derivatives). As a matter of principle, I would submit that a 
decision on massive investments in crude oil futures by the board of directors of an oil trading 
company would be in line with the director’s fiduciary duties only insofar as the investment had a 
hedging purpose (i.e., protection against the volatility of the oil prices) and not a speculation 
purpose (simply gambling on the rise or fall of prices, even when supported by accurate market 
predictions and justified by the need to recapitalize the company). 
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Hypothetical III: Duty of care 
 
A large banking institution is engaged in retail as well as investment banking. In 2000, a new CEO 
was appointed, who also sits on the board of directors. The CEO made the decision to invest heavily 
in collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) backed by residential mortgage backed securities, including 
lower rated securities that pooled subprime mortgages to borrowers with weak credit history. The 
investments were initially successful, generating high profits for the company. However, beginning in 
2005, house prices, particularly in the United States, began to decrease. Defaults and foreclosures 
increased and the income from residential mortgages fell rapidly.  
 
As early as May 2005, economist Paul Krugman had warned of signs that the US housing market was 
approaching the final stages of a speculative bubble. Early in 2007, a large US subprime lender filed 
for bankruptcy protection and a number of investors announced write downs of several billion dollars 
on their structured finance commitments. In July, 2007, Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s 
downgraded bonds backed by subprime mortgages. At the end of 2007, two hedge funds that had 
invested heavily in subprime mortgages declared bankruptcy. In spite of these warning signs, the CEO 
had continued to invest in CDOs until shortly before the Lehman bankruptcy in September 2008, 
accumulating a total exposure of more than 20 billion Euro/Pounds/… . The subprime mortgage crisis 
necessitated massive write downs, leading to an annual loss of eight billion in 2008, which can be 
attributed in equal measure to the CDO transactions undertaken in 2005-2008. 
 
The CEO resigned in October 2008. As part of the resignation, the CEO entered into an agreement 
with the company providing that he would receive 50 million Euro/Pounds/… upon his departure, 
including bonus and stock options, and in addition an office, administrative assistant, car and driver 
until he would commence full time employment with another employer. In exchange, the CEO signed 
a non-compete agreement and a release of claims against the company. The agreement with the 
CEO was approved by all directors (the CEO abstaining from voting), acting on behalf of the company. 
 
After the CEO’s departure and with a new management team in place, it transpires that the old CEO 
had used a number of ostensibly arms-length transactions with investment firms that were, however, 
controlled by the CEO’s nominees, to transfer assets at an undervalue to a company owned by the 
CEO on the Cayman Islands. When the true nature of these transactions becomes known, the assets 
are no longer recoverable. 
 
Questions: 
 
 Is the CEO liable for annual loss suffered by the company in 2008? 
 
Yes, in principle the CEO would be held liable under Portuguese Law. As mentioned above (Case 
II, 1), the directors are protected by a business judgment rule only insofar as risky business 
decisions are in line with the general standard of entrepreneurial rationality (article 72(2) of the 
Portuguese Code of Commercial Companies). In my opinion, it would certainly be difficult for a 
director to prove or to justify the rationality of managerial decisions consisting in massive risky 
investments with collaterals that were consistently regarded as weak or overvalued by the 
economic and financial community long after 2005. Of course, as also mentioned above (Case II, 
3), the answer would ultimately depend on the way in which national courts construct and apply 
the legal standard of entrepreneurial rationality in the case at hand. 
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 Have the directors (other than the CEO) breached their fiduciary duties by approving the 
agreement in conjunction with the resignation of the outgoing CEO? 
 
Yes. According to Portuguese Law, the remuneration of the members of the directors (including 
the CEO and Executive Directors) shall be approved by the general meeting of shareholders or by 
a special remuneration committee nominated by the shareholders (article 399 of the Code of 
Commercial Companies). Moreover, it is up to the shareholders to decide on the existence of any 
pension schemes indemnities (articles 402 of the said Code), and the validity of golden parachute 
schemes is doubtful. In any case, the board of directors has no legal power on its own to fix the 
remuneration of its members or to enter into resignation agreements with any of them. 
 
 Have the members of the company’s internal audit committee (of which the CEO was not a 
member) breached their fiduciary duties by not identifying the true nature of the ostensibly arms-
length transactions and are they, accordingly, liable for the loss suffered by the company as a 
consequence of the transactions? Have the other directors (except the CEO) breached their 
duties? 
 
Yes. The members of the Audit Committee are in charge of carefully monitoring the performance 
of the executive directors in managing the company (Code of Commercial Companies, article 423-
F), being subject to a particularly high standard of professional care (article 64(2)). The non-
executive members would certainly be in breach of their duty of care if they failed to identify the 
wrongdoing of the CEO due to the lack of appropriate monitoring. 
 
 Assuming that the company has a claim against the CEO or another director pursuant to one or 
more of the above questions, can a minority shareholder enforce the claim? 
 
A derivative action (“ut singuli”) may be brought by minority shareholders owning at least 5% of 
the share capital (or, in the case of listed companies, 2%), in order to claim damages in favour of 
the company for the loss suffered (Code of Commercial Companies, article 77(1)). This derivative 
action is only permissible if the company decided not to bring a corporate liability action against 
the director (or failed to bring it within 6 months) and if the plaintiffs were shareholders at the time 
when the derivative action is brought. The plaintiff shareholders shall bear the legal expenses and 
no reimbursement is owed by the company (Code of Commercial Companies, article 77(2)). 
 
Hypothetical IV: Duty of loyalty 
 
A mining company (‘Bidder’) considers expanding business operations. The board identifies assets 
held by another company (‘Target’) as a possible acquisition. The following scenarios ask you to 
consider the liability of a director (‘A’) on the board of Bidder. 
 
 Director A is also majority shareholder in Target, holding 60 percent of the outstanding share 
capital of the company. As majority shareholder of Target, he is interested in an acquisition that is 
beneficial to Target. He proposes that Bidder purchase the assets for 10 million Euro/Pounds/…, 
knowing that the value ranges between 7 and 8 million. Director A does not disclose his interest in 
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Target to the board of Bidder. A majority of the directors approves the acquisition. A’s vote was 
not decisive for the positive vote. 
 
According to Portuguese law, directors are bound by a duty of loyalty towards the company, which 
aims at prohibiting any type of conflict of interest (Code of Commercial Companies, article 
64(1)(b)). Therefore, under this general duty, director A would be required to disclose the majority 
stockholding owned in the Target company to the board of directors of the Bidder. Moreover, 
directors are obliged to inform the chairman of the board of directors of any situation of conflict of 
interest and are prohibited from voting in decisions of the board related to matters in which they 
have, directly or through a third party, a conflict of interest with the company (Code of Commercial 
Companies, article 410(6)). Therefore, director A was required to inform the chairman of the said 
conflict and could not vote on such issue. In case of violation of these provisions, the board 
decision would be voidable (Code of Commercial Companies, article 411 (3)) and the director 
could incur liability for breach of his fiduciary duties in the general terms. 
 
 As in scenario 1, but Director A discloses his interest in Target to the board of Bidder, and a 
majority of the uninterested directors approves the acquisition. 
 
As mentioned above (see 1), director A would be prevented from voting when the board of the 
Bidder decides on the conflicted interest transaction (acquisition of assets of Target). However, 
the board’s approval of the acquisition would be valid if the following conditions were satisfied: a) 
director A complied with his duty to disclose the conflict of interest to the chairman of the board; b) 
director A did not vote in the board decision; c) the decision was approved by the required legal or 
statutory majority of directors. 
 
 As in scenario 1, but when the shareholders of Bidder learn of A’s interest in Target, they ratify the 
transaction, believing that it is in the company’s interests. 
 
The general meeting of shareholders of the Bidder may authorise a related-party transaction 
insofar as such transaction can be considered as being in the best interests of the company itself, 
and the disclosure duties regarding such transactions have been complied with in the annual 
accounts of the company (Code of Commercial Companies, article 66-A (2), IAS 24) and, in the 
case of listed companies, in the information disclosed to the market (Code of Securities, article 
246). If director A was also a shareholder, he/she may not vote in the general meeting resolution 
on the matter in which he/she has a conflict of interest (Code of Commercial Companies, article 
384 (6)). Minority shareholders may dispute the resolution of the general meeting in the courts by 
proving that the conflicted shareholder/director A voted in violation of the legal prohibition, that 
his/her vote was decisive for the resolution, and that the resolution was approved to the detriment 
of the company’s interests or the interests of its minority shareholders (Code of Commercial 
Companies, article 58 (1 (b)). 
 
 Director A is majority shareholder and managing director in a competitor of bidder (‘Rival’), which 
is also active in the mining business. The assets held by Target that Bidder seeks to acquire 
consist in claims near Rival’s own mining territories. Director A is of the opinion that the assets are 
more valuable for Rival than for Bidder. He therefore arranges for Rival to make a competing and 
higher offer than Bidder, and Target accordingly decides to sell the assets to the former company. 
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According to Portuguese law, a director breaches his duty of loyalty if he performs functions in a 
competitor company or if he makes use of a corporate opportunity without the consent of the 
shareholders or the general and supervisory board (Code of Commercial Companies, articles 254, 
398(3) and 428). Even if the conduct of director A would not be considered as amounting to a 
“competing activity”, the fact remains that he/she could be made be liable under the “corporate 
opportunities doctrine”, since the acquisition of assets of Target consists in a business opportunity 
of which the director becomes aware while performing his functions, which falls within the scope 
of activity of the Bidder company, and in which this company has an objectively relevant interest. 
 
 As in scenario 4, but A resigns from his position as director of Bidder before Rival makes the 
competing offer. 
 
In spite of the absence of any legal provision or case law on this matter, according to some 
Portuguese commentators the general prohibition of using corporate opportunities is also 
applicable to directors who have resigned from office in order to exploit a specific existing 
opportunity, thus giving rise to the director’s liability for breach of fiduciary duties.  
 
 As in scenario 4, but after an initial expression of interest by Bidder in acquiring the assets and 
before Rival has taken any steps to make a competing offer, the Bidder board determines that an 
investment of that size is not advisable at the present time in light of Bidder’s weak financial 
position. 
 
As mentioned above (see 1 and 2), directors are prevented from voting in any decision of the 
board related to matters in which they may have, directly or indirectly, a conflict of interest with the 
company (Code of Commercial Companies, article 410(6)). Thus, conflicted director A could not 
vote in such a board decision, since he has an (indirect) interest in it given the position held in the 
competing company (Rival) potentially involved in the same transaction. However, director A 
would be exempted from liability if the general meeting of shareholders permitted him/her to 
exploit the business opportunity or if the board of directors decided that the company should not 
pursue the opportunity. 
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Romania 
 
Hypothetical I: Liability of the parent and directors of the parent for breaches of duty at the 
level of the subsidiary 
 
A pharmaceutical company is currently developing two new drugs. After assessing the potential 
liability risks associated with the future products, the directors of the pharmaceutical company decide 
to incorporate two separate private limited companies, each taking over the development, research 
and future marketing of one of the two drugs. 
 
The directors of the pharmaceutical company appoint the two project managers as directors of the two 
subsidiary companies. The two subsidiary companies enter into an agreement allowing them access 
to the parent company's research facilities. According to the subsidiary's articles of association, all 
major strategic decisions regarding the research, development and marketing of the drugs are subject 
to approval by their sole shareholder, the pharmaceutical company. The employees working for the 
subsidiaries are formally still employed with the parent company, but are posted with the subsidiaries 
under an agreement entered into by the parent company and the two subsidiaries upon formation of 
the two companies. 
 
When the directors of the parent company learn about competitors working on similar projects, they try 
to accelerate the development process of the two drugs. They award substantial bonuses to the 
subsidiary’s directors, contingent on the drugs receiving regulatory approval within the next 6 months. 
The original schedule provided for further tests, which would take at least 12 months. 
 
Primarily because of the contingent bonus payment, the directors of the subsidiaries skip some of the 
planned tests and studies, and cover up this decision in their filings for regulatory approval. 
 
The two drugs gain regulatory approval within the 6 month time span, and are successfully marketed 
shortly after that.  
 
Two years after the initial marketing, independent studies reveal that one of the drugs causes a rare 
form of lethal cancer, exposing the relevant subsidiary to enormous product liability claims that far 
exceed its net assets. The drug developed by the other subsidiary proves to be safe and leads to 
substantial profits. 
 
1. Is it possible that the parent company would be liable in circumstances comparable to 
the stylised facts above? 
 
 First of all, it should be made clear that Romania does not currently have a codified set of rules 
regarding corporate groups. Therefore, the answers that shall be provided here are based solely 
on general provisions, such as the Civil Code, which also applies to companies. 
 
 The parent company can be held liable under the provisions of Article 1.369 of the New Civil 
Code, which state that ‘any person who incited or determined another person to cause damages, 
or knowingly benefited from an illicit act shall be jointly held liable with the originator’. The liability 
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of the parent company depends on the subjective attitude of its directors. If they only wanted to 
boost up the activity of the subsidiary’s directors, the parent company will not be held liable. On 
the other hand, if they knowingly incited the directors of the subsidiary to break the law, the 
parent company might be held liable. The judgments delivered by the ECJ in the ‘Akzo Nobel’ 
and ‘Lombard Club’ cases steer this conclusion in the same direction. 
 
2. Under which circumstances would the directors of the parent company face a liability risk in those 
circumstances? 
 
The rule in the Romanian law is that the acts of the company’s officers are the acts of the 
company itself (Art. 219 of the New Civil Code). Therefore, the person that shall be held liable in 
the first place is the parent company. The directors of the parent company hold only a subsidiary 
liability, meaning that after the parent company has covered the damages, it is entitled to pursue 
a civil action against its directors for the recovery of the amount of money paid. Only in 
exceptional conditions would a director of an ‘in bonis’ company be held liable directly if he acted 
outside of his responsibilities (the French-origin theory of the ‘faute séparable’). 
 
Hypothetical II: Duties in the vicinity of insolvency 
 
After making losses for three consecutive years, an oil trading company’s equity ratio (equity divided 
by total assets) has fallen below [1% - 5% - 10%]. On average, comparable companies in the same 
line of business have an equity ratio of about 25%.  
 
The company still has substantial assets, but the thin equity cushion makes it hard for the company to 
pursue its core business, as trading partners demand higher prices to compensate them for the 
perceived higher risk of the company's operations.   
 
The company’s directors evaluate different possibilities to improve the business prospects of the 
company. They attribute past trading losses to the substantially higher volatility of oil prices following 
the financial crisis, and maintain the view that the company's business model is sustainable in the long 
run. After exploring the possibility to raise new equity to recapitalise the business, they conclude that 
current market conditions would force them to issue new shares at prohibitively low prices, which 
would lead to a substantial dilution of their current shareholders. 
 
After analysing the market conditions, the directors come to the conclusion that the market price for 
crude oil is bound to rise significantly over the next year, particularly due to high anticipated demand 
from emerging market economies. In an attempt to recapitalise the company the directors decide to 
invest heavily in crude oil futures. They expect that the anticipated increase in oil prices will lead to 
substantial gains from this transaction, bringing the equity ratio back in line with the industry average, 
and thus allowing the company to resume their trading operations at more sustainable conditions.  
 
 
The directors are aware that a sudden substantial fall in oil prices could potentially wipe out the 
remaining equity of the firm, but they consider the likelihood of this happening to be very low.  
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Shortly after entering into the forward sale agreement, worries about a sovereign debt crisis lead to a 
revision of worldwide economic growth forecasts. The price of crude oil falls more than 10% on a 
single day, the worst one day performance in many years. As the company cannot fulfil the margin 
calls on its forward sales contracts, the positions are closed by the counterparty. The closed positions 
have a negative value exceeding the company’s equity, leading to the company’s over-indebtedness. 
Trading partners refuse to enter into transactions with the company due to its financial position, and 
banks close all existing credit lines of the company. 
 
1. Do fiduciary duties prevent directors from entering into particularly risky transactions? 
 
Article 1441 (1) of the Companies Law (Law no. 31/1990) contains the fiduciary duty of care and 
skill. Paragraph (2) of the same article is essentially the business judgment rule imported from US 
law. Thus, the directors shall not be held liable if they make business decisions on an informed 
basis and, based on reasonable reasons, they consider that they are acting in the interest of the 
company. 
 
2. At which point in time does the law provide for additional duties of directors or the change of 
existing duties in situations of financial distress? (i.e. how is ‘vicinity of insolvency’ defined?) 
 
Romanian Insolvency Law (Law no. 85/2006) does not deal with the modifications that take place 
in the directors’ duties in the vicinity of insolvency. The law does not even operate with this term, 
but rather with the notion of ‘imminent insolvency’. The most notable change in the directors’ 
duties (especially in the legal regime and conditions of application) is provided for in Article 138 of 
the Insolvency Law, which gives any interested person (especially the creditors of the company) 
the right to claim damages directly from the de jure directors and/or de facto, shadow directors, 
but only after the insolvency proceedings are opened. 
 
3. What is the legal response to above situation? For example, the law may provide that the 
directors have to take primarily the creditors’ interests into account, rather than those of the 
shareholders, or the company must cease to trade and the directors file for the opening of 
insolvency proceedings. 
 
The Insolvency Law (Article 27) stipulates that the company’s directors must file for insolvency 
within 30 days of the date when the insolvency occurred. Also, the directors can (this is not a 
binding obligation) file for insolvency if the company is in the vicinity of insolvency (imminent 
insolvency). There is no provision regarding the directors’ duties to act in the interest of creditors 
during the imminent insolvency period. 
 
 
Hypothetical III: Duty of care 
 
A large banking institution is engaged in retail as well as investment banking. In 2000, a new CEO 
was appointed, who also sits on the board of directors. The CEO made the decision to invest heavily 
in collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) backed by residential mortgage-backed securities, including 
lower-rated securities that pooled subprime mortgages to borrowers with weak credit history. The 
investments were initially successful, generating high profits for the company. However, beginning in 
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2005, house prices, particularly in the United States, began to decrease. Defaults and foreclosures 
increased and the income from residential mortgages fell rapidly.  
 
As early as May 2005, economist Paul Krugman had warned of signs that the US housing market was 
approaching the final stages of a speculative bubble. Early in 2007, a large US subprime lender filed 
for bankruptcy protection and a number of investors announced write downs of several billion dollars 
on their structured finance commitments. In July, 2007, Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s 
downgraded bonds backed by subprime mortgages. At the end of 2007, two hedge funds that had 
invested heavily in subprime mortgages declared bankruptcy. In spite of these warning signs, the CEO 
had continued to invest in CDOs until shortly before the Lehman bankruptcy in September 2008, 
accumulating a total exposure of more than 20 billion Euro/Pounds/… . The subprime mortgage crisis 
necessitated massive write downs, leading to an annual loss of eight billion in 2008, which can be 
attributed in equal measure to the CDO transactions undertaken in 2005-2008. 
 
The CEO resigned in October 2008. As part of the resignation, the CEO entered into an agreement 
with the company providing that he would receive 50 million Euro/Pounds/… upon his departure, 
including bonus and stock options, and in addition an office, administrative assistant, car and driver 
until he would commence full time employment with another employer. In exchange, the CEO signed 
a non-compete agreement and a release of claims against the company. The agreement with the 
CEO was approved by all directors (the CEO abstaining from voting), acting on behalf of the company. 
 
After the CEO’s departure and with a new management team in place, it transpires that the old CEO 
had used a number of ostensibly arms-length transactions with investment firms that were, however, 
controlled by the CEO’s nominees, to transfer assets at an undervalue to a company owned by the 
CEO on the Cayman Islands. When the true nature of these transactions becomes known, the assets 
are no longer recoverable. 
 
Questions: 
 
 Is the CEO liable for annual loss suffered by the company in 2008? 
 
The CEO is liable because he cannot argue that he acted on an informed basis when deciding to 
invest in CDO’s. 
 
- How does the duty of care address excessive risk-taking by the managers? Are managers 
protected by a business judgment rule when they make risky decisions under conditions 
of uncertainty? 
 
There is no legal provision or case-law on the correlation between the duty of care and 
excessive risk-taking besides the business judgment rule enacted in Art. 144
1
 of the 
Companies Law. Under Romanian law, managers are protected as far as they make a 
business decision on an informed basis and, based on reasonable reasons, they consider 
that they are acting in the interest of the company. 
 
- When do warning signs (‘red flags’) become so obvious that initially permissible risk-
taking constitutes a violation of the duty of care?  
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If the information available to the manager indicates that the business decision he is 
about to make will expose the company to losses, or when the manager does not act in 
the interest of the company (by mistake or consciously). 
 
 Have the directors (other than the CEO) breached their fiduciary duties by approving the 
agreement in conjunction with the resignation of the outgoing CEO? 
 
The directors breached their fiduciary duty of care (although there is no case-law in Romania 
regarding this issue), and also the obligation set forth in Art. 153
18
 (4) of the Companies Law 
which states that the board of directors must take into account the economic situation of the 
company and the responsibilities of the CEO when setting the remuneration or other advantages.   
 
- Who decides on transactions of one of the directors with the company (related party 
transactions)? 
 
The board of directors without the participation of the director involved in the transaction. 
The director must immediately inform the auditor. 
 
- Is the duty of care used to constrain excessive executive remuneration? 
 
As far as we know, there is no case-law regarding this issue, although legal grounds for 
bringing such an action do exist. 
 
 Have the members of the company’s internal audit committee (of which the CEO was not a 
member) breached their fiduciary duties by not identifying the true nature of the ostensibly arms-
length transactions and are they, accordingly, liable for the loss suffered by the company as a 
consequence of the transactions? Have the other directors (except the CEO) breached their 
duties? 
 
The internal auditors are liable for negligence because: i) they are agents in a type of agency 
contract (in fact, a mandate contract) and ii) the agent who is remunerated for his services must 
perform his duties according to the standard of the ‘prudent man’, meaning that negligence is a 
ground for liability. 
 
- Does the standard of care depend on the position of the director in the company and 
his/her expertise? Accordingly, would members of the audit committee be held to a higher 
standard of care than other directors? 
 
It is unclear. But, in view of the abstract standard of the ‘prudent man’ differentiations can 
be made with regard to the position held in the company. 
 
- Are directors required to monitor their colleagues on the board? Would they be in breach 
of the duty of care if they could have identified wrongdoing by another board member but 
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failed to do so? To what extent are they entitled to rely on the integrity of and the careful 
discharge of the duties by the other board members? 
 
The directors are not required by law to monitor their colleagues. Despite this, the law 
provides a natural incentive for the directors to abstain and inform the internal auditors 
about any breach of fiduciary or statutory duties, as they are protected from any liability if 
they do so.  
 
 Assuming that the company has a claim against the CEO or another director pursuant to one or 
more of the above questions, can a minority shareholder enforce the claim? 
 
Yes. The shareholder(s) must hold at least 5% of the share capital to enforce the claim. 
 
- Who can bring a claim on behalf of the company? 
 
The general meeting or individual shareholders holding at least 5% of the share capital, 
but only if the GM refuses to bring the claim. 
 
- Does the derivative action exist? If not, how does the law ensure that minority 
shareholders are protected against collusive behaviour by the majority and the directors? 
 
Yes.  
 
- What is the threshold to bring a derivative action? 
 
5% of the share capital. 
 
- Do conditions exist that must be satisfied before a court will allow a derivative action to 
proceed (for example, will the court review whether the action is in the interest of the 
company or frivolous)? 
 
No. 
 
 
- Who bears the costs for a derivative action? 
 
The minority shareholders, but they can be reimbursed by the company if the action is 
successful. 
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Hypothetical IV: Duty of loyalty 
 
A mining company (‘Bidder’) considers expanding business operations. The board identifies assets 
held by another company (‘Target’) as a possible acquisition. The following scenarios ask you to 
consider the liability of a director (‘A’) on the board of Bidder. 
 
 Director A is also majority shareholder in Target, holding 60 percent of the outstanding share 
capital of the company. As majority shareholder of Target, he is interested in an acquisition 
that is beneficial to Target. He proposes that Bidder purchase the assets for 10 million 
Euro/Pounds/…, knowing that the value ranges between 7 and 8 million. Director A does not 
disclose his interest in Target to the board of Bidder. A majority of the directors approves the 
acquisition. A’s vote was not decisive for the positive vote. 
 
Article 144
3 
of the Companies Law stipulates that directors must disclose to the other board 
members their interest or their relative’s interest regarding that transaction, and to refrain from 
participating in the meeting. If the director violates the disclosure and abstention obligations, 
the transaction is valid and the director has to pay damages. On the other hand, if the 
counter-party of the transaction was or should have been aware of the true scope of the 
transaction, then the transaction would be voidable and, if certain conditions are met, even 
void. 
 
 As in scenario 1, but Director A discloses his interest in Target to the board of Bidder, and a 
majority of the uninterested directors approves the acquisition. 
 
The interested director has to abstain from participating in the meeting. If the director fulfils his 
obligations of abstention and non-participation the transaction approved by the other board 
members is valid. 
 
 As in scenario 1, but when the shareholders of Bidder learn of A’s interest in Target, they 
ratify the transaction, believing that it is in the company’s interests. 
 
It is unclear whether the shareholders can authorise or ratify a related-party transaction. If we 
analyse the situation in depth, we will come to the conclusion that the answer can be either 
positive or negative. If we take into consideration the fact that the law states that related-party 
transactions are voidable if the conditions required are met, we will come to the conclusion 
that the transaction can be authorised or ratified by the shareholders, thus making it valid. If 
we look at the problem from a different angle, that of the company’s interest, we come to the 
conclusion that a transaction which is contrary to the company’s interest is void and, 
therefore, not authorised. 
 
In any case, the conflicted director cannot vote on such a resolution pursuant to Article 127 of 
the Companies Law. 
 
Minority shareholders can bring an action for the voidance of the resolution authorising the 
transaction (Article 132 of the Companies Law), or they can directly ask the voidance of the 
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transaction (Art. 215 of the New Civile Code) if the transaction is not in the company’s 
interest. 
 
 Director A is majority shareholder and managing director in a competitor of bidder (‘Rival’), 
which is also active in the mining business. The assets held by Target that Bidder seeks to 
acquire consist in claims near Rival’s own mining territories. Director A is of the opinion that 
the assets are more valuable for Rival than for Bidder. He therefore arranges for Rival to 
make a competing and higher offer than Bidder, and Target accordingly decides to sell the 
assets to the former company. 
 
There is no corporate opportunities doctrine in Romanian Law. The substitute is the non-
compete obligation set forth in Art. 153
15
 of the Companies Law. The rule is not accurate as it 
refers only to managing directors and members of the management board (in the two-tier 
board system). If a managing director wants to pursue competing activities, directly or through 
another company, he must first obtain the approval of the board. 
 
The shareholders can bring an action against the director who breached his duty of loyalty 
under Art. 144
1
 par. (1) of the Companies Law. 
 
In the case above, we think it is rather a question regarding the duty of confidentiality of the 
director.  
 
Under the Romanian law, if the director breaches his non-compete obligation his contract with 
the company shall be terminated and the company may ask for damages in court. Basically, 
the effect of both legal institutions is the same: the company is entitled to be reimbursed for 
the losses.  
 
 As in scenario 4, but A resigns from his position as director of Bidder before Rival makes the 
competing offer. 
 
According to the Romanian law, the fiduciary duty of loyalty (part of which is the non-compete 
duty) ceases to exist when the director resigns (or the contract is terminated by other means). 
Since this is a newly enacted duty (2006), there is no relevant case-law on the matter, but it is 
safe to assume that acts which are in connection with the period of time when the director was 
in office can constitute a breach of the non-compete duty even though the respective acts 
took place after the resignation of the director.   
 
 As in scenario 4, but after an initial expression of interest by Bidder in acquiring the assets 
and before Rival has taken any steps to make a competing offer, the Bidder board determines 
that an investment of that size is not advisable at the present time in light of Bidder’s weak 
financial position. 
 
It is unclear whether duty not to compete applies. The non-compete duty is drafted in more 
general terms than the corporate opportunities doctrine. Therefore, if the board decides to 
approve the director’s request to fill a similar position in a competing company, the 
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authorisation is granted with regard to all future transactions, and not on a case-by-case 
basis. 
 
Theoretically, the company acting through its board of directors can waive the non-compete 
duty of the director. Anyway, the conflicted director is prohibited from participating in the 
decision of the board.  
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Slovenia 
 
Hypothetical I: Liability of the parent and directors of the parent for breaches of duty at the 
level of the subsidiary 
 
A pharmaceutical company is currently developing two new drugs. After assessing the potential 
liability risks associated with the future products, the directors of the pharmaceutical company decide 
to incorporate two separate private limited companies, each taking over the development, research 
and future marketing of one of the two drugs. 
 
The directors of the pharmaceutical company appoint the two project managers as directors of the two 
subsidiary companies. The two subsidiary companies enter into an agreement allowing them access 
to the parent company's research facilities. According to the subsidiary's articles of association, all 
major strategic decisions regarding the research, development and marketing of the drugs are subject 
to approval by their sole shareholder, the pharmaceutical company. The employees working for the 
subsidiaries are formally still employed with the parent company, but are posted with the subsidiaries 
under an agreement entered into by the parent company and the two subsidiaries upon formation of 
the two companies. 
 
When the directors of the parent company learn about competitors working on similar projects, they try 
to accelerate the development process of the two drugs. They award substantial bonuses to the 
subsidiary’s directors, contingent on the drugs receiving regulatory approval within the next 6 months. 
The original schedule provided for further tests, which would take at least 12 months. 
 
Primarily because of the contingent bonus payment, the directors of the subsidiaries skip some of the 
planned tests and studies, and cover up this decision in their filings for regulatory approval. 
 
The two drugs gain regulatory approval within the 6 month time span, and are successfully marketed 
shortly after that.  
 
Two years after the initial marketing, independent studies reveal that one of the drugs causes a rare 
form of lethal cancer, exposing the relevant subsidiary to enormous product liability claims that far 
exceed its net assets. The drug developed by the other subsidiary proves to be safe and leads to 
substantial profits. 
 
1. Is it possible that the parent company would be liable in circumstances comparable to the stylised 
facts above? 
 
The Slovenian Companies Act stipulates that subsidiary companies are legally independent and 
shall be liable for their liabilities with all their assets. The Companies Act does not establish 
automatic liability of the parent company for the liabilities of a subsidiary. In circumstances 
comparable to the facts above (i.e. actual concern) the parent company may not use its influence 
to induce a subsidiary company to carry out harmful transactions for itself, or to do something or 
fail to do something to its own detriment, unless the parent company compensates the subsidiary 
company for the loss. The liability of a parent company would be established if a parent company 
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induces a subsidiary company to carry out a legal transaction which is detrimental to it, or to do 
something or not do something to its own detriment, without actually compensating for the loss by 
the end of the financial year or without providing the right to benefits determined for 
compensation. 
 
2. Under which circumstances would the directors of the parent company face a liability risk in those 
circumstances? 
 
The Slovenian Companies Act stipulates that in addition to the parent company, those statutory 
representatives of the parent company who induced the subsidiary company to carry out the legal 
transaction or measure which is detrimental to it shall also be jointly and severally liable.  
 
The members shall be liable (disregard of the legal personality) for the liabilities of the company in 
the following cases: 
- if they abused the company as a legal person in order to attain an aim which is forbidden to them 
as individuals, 
- if they abused the company as a legal person thereby causing damage to their creditors, 
- if in violation of the law they used the assets of the company as a legal person as their own 
personal assets, or 
- if for their own benefit or for the benefit of some other person they reduced the assets of the 
company even if they knew or should have known that the company would not be capable of 
meeting its liabilities to third persons. 
 
Hypothetical II: Duties in the vicinity of insolvency 
 
After making losses for three consecutive years, an oil trading company’s equity ratio (equity divided 
by total assets) has fallen below [1% - 5% - 10%]. On average, comparable companies in the same 
line of business have an equity ratio of about 25%.  
 
The company still has substantial assets, but the thin equity cushion makes it hard for the company to 
pursue its core business, as trading partners demand higher prices to compensate them for the 
perceived higher risk of the company's operations.   
 
The company's directors evaluate different possibilities to improve the business prospects of the 
company. They attribute past trading losses to the substantially higher volatility of oil prices following 
the financial crisis, and maintain the view that the company's business model is sustainable in the long 
run. After exploring the possibility to raise new equity to recapitalise the business, they conclude that 
current market conditions would force them to issue new shares at prohibitively low prices, which 
would lead to a substantial dilution of their current shareholders. 
 
After analysing the market conditions, the directors come to the conclusion that the market price for 
crude oil is bound to rise significantly over the next year, particularly due to high anticipated demand  
from emerging market economies. In an attempt to recapitalise the company the directors decide to 
invest heavily in crude oil futures. They expect that the anticipated increase in oil prices will lead to 
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substantial gains from this transaction, bringing the equity ratio back in line with the industry average, 
and thus allowing the company to resume their trading operations at more sustainable conditions.  
 
The directors are aware that a sudden substantial fall in oil prices could potentially wipe out the 
remaining equity of the firm, but they consider the likelihood of this happening to be very low.  
 
Shortly after entering into the forward sale agreement, worries about a sovereign debt crisis lead to a 
revision of worldwide economic growth forecasts. The price of crude oil falls more than 10% on a 
single day, the worst one day performance in many years. As the company cannot fulfil the margin 
calls on its forward sales contracts, the positions are closed by the counterparty. The closed positions 
have a negative value exceeding the company’s equity, leading to the company’s over-indebtedness. 
Trading partners refuse to enter into transactions with the company due to its financial position, and 
banks close all existing credit lines of the company. 
 
 Do fiduciary duties prevent directors from entering into particularly risky transactions? 
 At which point in time does the law provide for additional duties of directors or the change of 
existing duties in situations of financial distress? (i.e. how is ‘vicinity of insolvency’ defined?) 
 What is the legal response to above situation? For example, the law may provide that the 
directors have to take primarily the creditors’ interests into account, rather than those of the 
shareholders, or the company must cease to trade and the directors file for the opening of 
insolvency proceedings. 
 
[No answer.] 
 
Hypothetical III: Duty of care 
 
A large banking institution is engaged in retail as well as investment banking. In 2000, a new CEO 
was appointed, who also sits on the board of directors. The CEO made the decision to invest heavily 
in collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) backed by residential mortgage-backed securities, including 
lower-rated securities that pooled subprime mortgages to borrowers with weak credit history. The 
investments were initially successful, generating high profits for the company. However, beginning in 
2005, house prices, particularly in the United States, began to decrease. Defaults and foreclosures 
increased and the income from residential mortgages fell rapidly.  
 
As early as May 2005, economist Paul Krugman had warned of signs that the US housing market was 
approaching the final stages of a speculative bubble. Early in 2007, a large US subprime lender filed 
for bankruptcy protection and a number of investors announced write downs of several billion dollars 
on their structured finance commitments. In July, 2007, Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s 
downgraded bonds backed by subprime mortgages. At the end of 2007, two hedge funds that had 
invested heavily in subprime mortgages declared bankruptcy. In spite of these warning signs, the CEO 
had continued to invest in CDOs until shortly before the Lehman bankruptcy in September 2008, 
accumulating a total exposure of more than 20 billion Euro/Pounds/… . The subprime mortgage crisis  
 
necessitated massive write downs, leading to an annual loss of eight billion in 2008, which can be 
attributed in equal measure to the CDO transactions undertaken in 2005-2008. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
376 Directors’ Duties and Liability in the EU  
 
The CEO resigned in October 2008. As part of the resignation, the CEO entered into an agreement 
with the company providing that he would receive 50 million Euro/Pounds/… upon his departure, 
including bonus and stock options, and in addition an office, administrative assistant, car and driver 
until he would commence full time employment with another employer. In exchange, the CEO signed 
a non-compete agreement and a release of claims against the company. The agreement with the 
CEO was approved by all directors (the CEO abstaining from voting), acting on behalf of the company. 
 
After the CEO’s departure and with a new management team in place, it transpires that the old CEO 
had used a number of ostensibly arms-length transactions with investment firms that were, however, 
controlled by the CEO’s nominees, to transfer assets at an undervalue to a company owned by the 
CEO on the Cayman Islands. When the true nature of these transactions becomes known, the assets 
are no longer recoverable. 
 
Questions: 
 
 Is the CEO liable for annual loss suffered by the company in 2008? 
 
The LCC-1 prescribes for the Management and Supervisory Board members the duty of care, 
using the standard of a conscientious and fair manager. The duty of care and liability of 
supervisory board members and members of the board of directors is subject to the appropriate 
application of the LCC-1 provisions on the duty of care and liability of management board 
members. 
 
It is laid down in the LCC-1 that, in performing their tasks on behalf of the company, the members 
of the management or supervisory body must act with the diligence of a conscientious and fair 
manager and protect the business secrets of the company. 
 
The members of the management or supervisory body are jointly and severally liable to the 
company for damage arising as a consequence of a violation of their tasks, unless they 
demonstrate that they fulfilled their duties fairly and conscientiously. 
 
The members of the Management body, in performing their tasks on behalf of the company must 
act with the diligence of a conscientious and fair manager (duty of care, as legal standard).  
 
The members of the management body are liable to the company for damage arising as a 
consequence of a violation of their tasks, unless they demonstrate that they have fulfilled their 
duties fairly and conscientiously (reversed burden of proof). 
 
The members of the management body are jointly and severally liable to the company (in some 
cases also to the creditors) for damage caused in the course of managing the business. 
 
Members of the management or supervisory body are not obliged to reimburse the company for 
damage if the act that caused damage to the company was based on a lawful resolution passed 
by the general meeting. The liability of the members of the management is not excluded on the 
basis that an act was approved by the management or supervisory body. 
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A compensation claim by the company against members of the management or supervisory body 
may also be pursued by creditors of the company, if the company is unable to repay them. 
 
 Have the directors (other than the CEO) breached their fiduciary duties by approving the 
agreement in conjunction with the resignation of the outgoing CEO? 
 
Issues: 
 
- Who decides on transactions of one of the directors with the company 
(related party transactions)? 
 
Supervisory board in the two tier system and board of directors in the one tier 
system. 
 
- Is the duty of care used to constrain excessive executive remuneration? 
 
Normally yes. 
 
 Have the members of the company’s internal audit committee (of which the CEO was not a 
member) breached their fiduciary duties by not identifying the true nature of the ostensibly arms-
length transactions and are they, accordingly, liable for the loss suffered by the company as a 
consequence of the transactions? Have the other directors (except the CEO) breached their 
duties? 
 
Issues: 
 
- Does the standard of care depend on the position of the director in the 
company and his/her expertise? Accordingly, would members of the audit 
committee be held to a higher standard of care than other directors? 
 
In principle, the same standard of care applies to all directors (members of the 
board). However, members of the audit committee would additionally be held 
to a standard of care taking account of their audit expertise. 
 
- Are directors required to monitor their colleagues on the board?  
 
They are not explicitly obliged to do so. 
 
- Would they be in breach of the duty of care if they could have identified 
wrongdoing by another board member but failed to do so?  
 
If they would, acting so, breach the duty they owe to the company. 
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 Assuming that the company has a claim against the CEO or another director pursuant to one or 
more of the above questions, can a minority shareholder enforce the claim? 
 
Issues: 
 
- Who can bring a claim on behalf of the company? 
 
Directors and the president of the supervisory board; in addition also minority 
shareholders. Where an action is filed against a person still performing the 
duties of a member of the management or controlling organ, the assembly 
shall appoint a special representative who represents the company in the 
proceedings before the court.  
 
- Does the derivative action exist?  
 
Yes. 
 
- What is the threshold to bring a derivative action? 
 
10% of shares or shares of at least 400,000 euro nominal value; where a 
proposal for bringing an action is not accepted or if the assembly does not 
appoint a special representative or if the management or special 
representative does not operate in accordance with the decision of the 
general meeting, a lawsuit may be filed by minority shareholders on their own 
behalf and on behalf of the company.  
- Do conditions exist that must be satisfied before a court will allow a derivative 
action to proceed (for example, will the court review whether the action is in 
the interest of the company or frivolous)? 
 
No particular conditions listed by law. The court will check only if a legal 
ground for the action exists. 
 
- Who bears the costs for a derivative action? 
 
The costs and expenses are covered by the company. 
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Hypothetical IV: Duty of loyalty 
 
A mining company (‘Bidder’) considers expanding business operations. The board identifies assets 
held by another company (‘Target’) as a possible acquisition. The following scenarios ask you to 
consider the liability of a director (‘A’) on the board of Bidder. 
 
 Director A is also majority shareholder in Target, holding 60 percent of the outstanding share 
capital of the company. As majority shareholder of Target, he is interested in an acquisition 
that is beneficial to Target. He proposes that Bidder purchase the assets for 10 million 
Euro/Pounds/…, knowing that the value ranges between 7 and 8 million. Director A does not 
disclose his interest in Target to the board of Bidder. A majority of the directors approves the 
acquisition. A’s vote was not decisive for the positive vote. 
 
If directors have a personal interest in a transaction with the company, they must disclose the 
conflict of interest to the board and to the internal auditors, and refrain from participating in the 
decision on the transaction. 
 
If the director violates the disclosure obligation, is the transaction void or voidable or does the 
director have to pay damages? 
 
If the consent of the supervisory board or general meeting has not been given, it shall be 
deemed that the transaction is null and void. The general meeting may pass a resolution 
approving the transaction. In that case, the transaction is not null and void, but the director 
continues to be liable for violating his disclosure obligations.  
 
 As in scenario 1, but Director A discloses his interest in Target to the board of Bidder, and a 
majority of the uninterested directors approves the acquisition. 
 
Issue: Does the interested director have to abstain from voting when the board decides on the 
conflicted interest transaction? 
 
Yes, there is an explicit legal provision on that. 
 
If he/she fully informs the board and abstains from voting and the board approves the 
transaction, is it valid? 
 
Yes. 
 
 As in scenario 1, but when the shareholders of Bidder learn of A’s interest in Target, they 
ratify the transaction, believing that it is in the company’s interests. 
 
Issue: Can the shareholders authorise or ratify a related-party transaction?  
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No, it is up to the board (supervisory board or board of directors) to decide on consent. The 
general meeting decides only in case there is no board. 
 
Can the conflicted director vote on such a resolution if he/she is also shareholder?  
 
No, but it is not explicitly laid down in the law. 
 
How is minority shareholder protection ensured? For example, can the minority shareholder 
appeal to the courts and claim that the transaction was not in the company’s interest? 
 
It is not regulated in the law in the context of conflicts of interest, but the institute of special 
audit can be used in such cases by minority shareholders. 
 
 Director A is majority shareholder and managing director in a competitor of bidder (‘Rival’), 
which is also active in the mining business. The assets held by Target that Bidder seeks to 
acquire consist in claims near Rival’s own mining territories. Director A is of the opinion that 
the assets are more valuable for Rival than for Bidder. He therefore arranges for Rival to 
make a competing and higher offer than Bidder, and Target accordingly decides to sell the 
assets to the former company. 
 
There are only legal rules referring to a ban of competition. 
 
Members in an unlimited company, general partners in a limited partnership, members and 
managers in a limited liability company, members of the management board and supervisory 
board of a public limited company and procurators may not participate in any of these roles or 
be an employee in any other company, or as an entrepreneur pursue an activity, which is or 
could present competition to the activities of the first company. 
 
The founding act of a company may set conditions under which the persons referred to above 
may participate in a competing company. It may provide that the ban on competition shall 
continue after a person has lost the position, but the ban must not last more than two years. 
 
If a person violates the ban on competition the company may claim compensation. The 
company may also require the offender to cede to the company any operations concluded for 
his own account as operations concluded for the account of the company, or require the 
offender to transfer to it any benefits from operations concluded for his own account, or to 
cede to the company his right to compensation. 
 
A special provision on a ban on competition exists for directors (members of the management 
board). A member of the management board may not pursue an activity with a view to profit in 
the area of the company’s activity without the consent of the supervisory board, nor conclude 
operations for his own account or for the account of another person. 
 
 As in scenario 4, but A resigns from his position as director of Bidder before Rival makes the 
competing offer. 
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Issue: Does the prohibition to exploit corporate opportunities (or the duty not to compete) 
continue to bind the director after resignation?  
 
See the previous answer. 
 
If the duty continues to apply, how is this dogmatically justified? For example, under English 
law the prohibition to exploit corporate opportunities derives from the fiduciary position that a 
director occupies. When a director resigns, fiduciary duties cease to exist. However, the 
English courts argued that the director violated the duty of loyalty by resigning in order to 
exploit an opportunity that was, at the time of resignation, already a so-called maturing 
business opportunity.  
 
It is up to the shareholders to establish such conditions for directors in the founding act 
(articles of incorporation). In such a case the ban on competition shall continue after the 
director has lost the position (but not for more than two years). The ban on competition after 
termination of office can also be contractual (agreed in the contract between the director and 
the company). 
 
 As in scenario 4, but after an initial expression of interest by Bidder in acquiring the assets 
and before Rival has taken any steps to make a competing offer, the Bidder board determines 
that an investment of that size is not advisable at the present time in light of Bidder’s weak 
financial position. 
 
The decision is in the hands of the supervisory board; anyhow, a member of the management 
board may not pursue an activity for profit in the area of the company’s activity without the 
consent of the supervisory board. If such consent is given because the company has no 
interest, the director may pursue such business. 
 
Can the conflicted director participate in the decision of the board?  
 
 No. 
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Spain 
 
Hypothetical I: Liability of the parent and directors of the parent for breaches of duty at the 
level of the subsidiary 
 
A pharmaceutical company is currently developing two new drugs. After assessing the potential 
liability risks associated with the future products, the directors of the pharmaceutical company decide 
to incorporate two separate private limited companies, each taking over the development, research 
and future marketing of one of the two drugs. 
 
The directors of the pharmaceutical company appoint the two project managers as directors of the two 
subsidiary companies. The two subsidiary companies enter into an agreement allowing them access 
to the parent company's research facilities. According to the subsidiary's articles of association, all 
major strategic decisions regarding the research, development and marketing of the drugs are subject 
to approval by their sole shareholder, the pharmaceutical company. The employees working for the 
subsidiaries are formally still employed with the parent company, but are posted with the subsidiaries 
under an agreement entered into by the parent company and the two subsidiaries upon formation of 
the two companies. 
 
When the directors of the parent company learn about competitors working on similar projects, they try 
to accelerate the development process of the two drugs. They award substantial bonuses to the 
subsidiary’s directors, contingent on the drugs receiving regulatory approval within the next 6 months. 
The original schedule provided for further tests, which would take at least 12 months. 
 
Primarily because of the contingent bonus payment, the directors of the subsidiaries skip some of the 
planned tests and studies, and cover up this decision in their filings for regulatory approval. 
 
The two drugs gain regulatory approval within the 6 month time span, and are successfully marketed 
shortly after that.  
 
Two years after the initial marketing, independent studies reveal that one of the drugs causes a rare 
form of lethal cancer, exposing the relevant subsidiary to enormous product liability claims that far 
exceed its net assets. The drug developed by the other subsidiary proves to be safe and leads to 
substantial profits. 
 
1. Is it possible that the parent company would be liable in circumstances comparable to the stylised 
facts above? 
 
Probably not. The facto/shadow director doctrines are used only in “simple and easy” cases, and 
not always successfully. Although these doctrines might work for some purposes, they are not a 
working concept to make the controlling shareholder liable. 
 
2. Under which circumstances would the directors of the parent company face a liability risk in those 
circumstances? 
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In this case, the director could be liable if he speeded up the process and covered it up.   
 
Hypothetical II: Duties in the vicinity of insolvency 
 
After making losses for three consecutive years, an oil trading company’s equity ratio (equity divided 
by total assets) has fallen below [1% - 5% - 10%]. On average, comparable companies in the same 
line of business have an equity ratio of about 25%.  
 
The company still has substantial assets, but the thin equity cushion makes it hard for the company to 
pursue its core business, as trading partners demand higher prices to compensate them for the 
perceived higher risk of the company's operations.   
 
The company's directors evaluate different possibilities to improve the business prospects of the 
company. They attribute past trading losses to the substantially higher volatility of oil prices follo fail to 
convene the mandatory general meeting within two months to adopt a decision on dissolution wing the 
financial crisis, and maintain the view that the company's business model is sustainable in the long 
run. After exploring the possibility to raise new equity to recapitalise the business, they conclude that 
current market conditions would force them to issue new shares at prohibitively low prices, which 
would lead to a substantial dilution of their current shareholders. 
 
After analysing the market conditions, the directors come to the conclusion that the market price for 
crude oil is bound to rise significantly over the next year, particularly due to high anticipated demand 
from emerging market economies. In an attempt to recapitalise the company the directors decide to 
invest heavily in crude oil futures. They expect that the anticipated increase in oil prices will lead to 
substantial gains from this transaction, bringing the equity ratio back in line with the industry average, 
and thus allowing the company to resume their trading operations at more sustainable conditions.  
 
The directors are aware that a sudden substantial fall in oil prices could potentially wipe out the 
remaining equity of the firm, but they consider the likelihood of this happening to be very low.  
 
Shortly after entering into the forward sale agreement, worries about a sovereign debt crisis lead to a 
revision of worldwide economic growth forecasts. The price of crude oil falls more than 10% on a 
single day, the worst one day performance in many years. As the company cannot fulfil the margin 
calls on its forward sales contracts, the positions are closed by the counterparty. The closed positions 
have a negative value exceeding the company’s equity, leading to the company’s over-indebtedness. 
Trading partners refuse to enter into transactions with the company due to its financial position, and 
banks close all existing credit lines of the company. 
 
 Do fiduciary duties prevent directors from entering into particularly risky transactions? 
 At which point in time does the law provide for additional duties of directors or the change of 
existing duties in situations of financial distress? (i.e. how is ‘vicinity of insolvency’ be defined?) 
 What is the legal response to below situation? For example, the law may provide that the directors 
have to take primarily the creditors’ interests into account, rather than those of the shareholders, 
or the company must cease to trade and the directors file for the opening of insolvency 
proceedings. 
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Risky transactions are not per se undesirable. But, of course, depending on the circumstances, 
they may not be recommended: this judgment falls into the standard of the duty of care. The law 
does not provide additional duties in situations of financial distress, nor a concept or a definition of 
‘vicinity of insolvency’. But the two years before the company is declared insolvent by the Court 
are known as the suspicious period, mainly because claw-back actions cover that period of time, 
and directors who have been in office during that period, although they may no longer be, can be 
held liable according to the special liability section of the bankruptcy proceedings. 
 
In the case above the directors may face liability in case they failed to convene the mandatory 
general meeting within two months to adopt a decision on dissolution. Insolvency is defined as the 
situation where the debtor cannot regularly discharge its obligations. This provision applies when 
the dissolution is the consequence of insufficiency of assets. In such a case, directors are liable 
vis-à-vis company creditors holding unpaid claims arising after the insufficiency of assets. 
 
Hypothetical III: Duty of care 
 
A large banking institution is engaged in retail as well as investment banking. In 2000, a new CEO 
was appointed, who also sits on the board of directors. The CEO made the decision to invest heavily 
in collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) backed by residential mortgage-backed securities, including 
lower-rated securities that pooled subprime mortgages to borrowers with weak credit history. The 
investments were initially successful, generating high profits for the company. However, beginning in 
2005, house prices, particularly in the United States, began to decrease. Defaults and foreclosures 
increased and the income from residential mortgages fell rapidly.  
 
As early as May 2005, economist Paul Krugman had warned of signs that the US housing market was 
approaching the final stages of a speculative bubble. Early in 2007, a large US subprime lender filed 
for bankruptcy protection and a number of investors announced write downs of several billion dollars 
on their structured finance commitments. In July, 2007, Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s 
downgraded bonds backed by subprime mortgages. At the end of 2007, two hedge funds that had 
invested heavily in subprime mortgages declared bankruptcy. In spite of these warning signs, the CEO 
had continued to invest in CDOs until shortly before the Lehman bankruptcy in September 2008, 
accumulating a total exposure of more than 20 billion Euro/Pounds/… . The subprime mortgage crisis 
necessitated massive write downs, leading to an annual loss of eight billion in 2008, which can be 
attributed in equal measure to the CDO transactions undertaken in 2005-2008. 
 
The CEO resigned in October 2008. As part of the resignation, the CEO entered into an agreement 
with the company providing that he would receive 50 million Euro/Pounds/… upon his departure, 
including bonus and stock options, and in addition an office, administrative assistant, car and driver 
until he would commence full time employment with another employer. In exchange, the CEO signed 
a non-compete agreement and a release of claims against the company. The agreement with the 
CEO was approved by all directors (the CEO abstaining from voting), acting on behalf of the company. 
 
After the CEO’s departure and with a new management team in place, it transpires that the old CEO 
had used a number of ostensibly arms-length transactions with investment firms that were, however, 
controlled by the CEO’s nominees, to transfer assets at an undervalue to a company owned by the 
CEO on the Cayman Islands. When the true nature of these transactions becomes known, the assets 
are no longer recoverable. 
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Questions: 
 
 Is the CEO liable for annual loss suffered by the company in 2008? 
 
The business judgment rule should be applied if the director is well informed, the decision is not 
illegal, and there is not a conflict of interests. I do not think that the CEO could be liable. It is very 
hard to prove gross negligence, that he made risky decisions at the time (probably, there were 
other companies acting in the same way, and opinions and predictions at the time were not 
unanimous).  
 
 Have the directors (other than the CEO) breached their fiduciary duties by approving the 
agreement in conjunction with the resignation of the outgoing CEO? 
 
Issues: 
 
- Who decides on transactions of one of the directors with the company 
(related party transactions)? 
- Is the duty of care used to constrain excessive executive remuneration? 
 
Related party transactions are decided by the board. The way to prevent excessive 
remuneration in the law’s view is through the approval by the general meeting in case of stock 
options, and the clarification of the remuneration system in the articles of association. 
 
 Have the members of the company’s internal audit committee (of which the CEO was not a 
member) breached their fiduciary duties by not identifying the true nature of the ostensibly arms-
length transactions and are they, accordingly, liable for the loss suffered by the company as a 
consequence of the transactions? Have the other directors (except the CEO) breached their 
duties? 
 
Issues: 
 
- Does the standard of care depend on the position of the director in the 
company and his/her expertise? Accordingly, would members of the audit 
committee be held to a higher standard of care than other directors? 
 
Yes, executive directors could be said to be, in practice, subject to a higher 
standard, but it does not seem to be the case that the members of the audit 
committee would be under a higher standard in practice. There is not even a 
requirement of expertise in order to be a member of the audit committee (it is 
a requirement that independent directors are on the committee). 
 
- Are directors required to monitor their colleagues on the board? Would they 
be in breach of the duty of care if they could have identified wrongdoing by 
another board member but failed to do so? To what extent are they entitled to 
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rely on the integrity of and the careful discharge of the duties by the other 
board members? 
 
Outside directors are not liable for the actions of the executive management 
unless in cases of fault in eligendo, in vigilando or in instruendo. On the other 
hand, they are liable to the company if they negligently perform the tasks that 
are assigned to them as non-executive directors. Monitoring is one of them. If 
the breach is the result of a decision of the board, all board members are 
jointly and severally liable for damages caused to the company, except those 
who voted against the decision and took steps to prevent it or its harmful 
consequences. 
 
 Assuming that the company has a claim against the CEO or another director pursuant to one or 
more of the above questions, can a minority shareholder enforce the claim? 
 
The directors are the ones who can bring a claim on behalf of the company. However, minority 
shareholders have standing to bring a derivative action if they own 5% of the share capital. No 
other special conditions must be satisfied for the derivative action. The costs of the process are 
borne by the losing party (with some restrictions). Notice that derivative actions are rare. 
 
Hypothetical IV: Duty of loyalty 
 
A mining company (‘Bidder’) considers expanding business operations. The board identifies assets 
held by another company (‘Target’) as a possible acquisition. The following scenarios ask you to 
consider the liability of a director (‘A’) on the board of Bidder. 
 
 Director A is also majority shareholder in Target, holding 60 percent of the outstanding share 
capital of the company. As majority shareholder of Target, he is interested in an acquisition 
that is beneficial to Target. He proposes that Bidder purchase the assets for 10 million 
Euro/Pounds/…, knowing that the value ranges between 7 and 8 million. Director A does not 
disclose his interest in Target to the board of Bidder. A majority of the directors approves the 
acquisition. A’s vote was not decisive for the positive vote. 
 
Company Law requires directors to disclose conflicts of interests and abstain from voting (art. 
229 LSC). The decision could be voidable ex. art. 251 LSC, but the mere violation of the 
procedural rules applied to conflicted transactions does not make the resolution per se 
unlawful (doctrine of “resistance”: the resolution should be deemed valid if, even if the rule 
had been observed, the resolution would have been adopted). Nevertheless, the infringing 
director may be liable when the decision has caused damage. 
 
 As in scenario 1, but Director A discloses his interest in Target to the board of Bidder, and a 
majority of the uninterested directors approves the acquisition. 
 
If the interested director observes disclosure and abstention duties, the decision should be 
valid from a procedural perspective. However, besides the procedural dimension, the decision 
may be challenged on substantive grounds (e.g., if it is not in the company’s best interest).  
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 As in scenario 1, but when the shareholders of Bidder learn of A’s interest in Target, they 
ratify the transaction, believing that it is in the company’s interests. 
 
Normally, related party transactions are not ratified by the general meeting. The minority 
shareholders can protect their interests by challenging the board’s decision (but the minority 
can only challenge a board resolution if they represent 5% of the company’s share capital) or 
by suing for damages. If the transaction is also approved by the general meeting – say, a 
capital increase or decrease – the minority is better protected: Any shareholder can bring a 
lawsuit and challenge the decision. However, it may typically be very hard to prove that the 
transaction harms minority shareholders. A high percentage of the successful claims are 
granted based on the violation of procedural rules. It is hard to win a case on substantive 
grounds.  
 
 Director A is majority shareholder and managing director in a competitor of bidder (‘Rival’), 
which is also active in the mining business. The assets held by Target that Bidder seeks to 
acquire consist in claims near Rival’s own mining territories. Director A is of the opinion that 
the assets are more valuable for Rival than for Bidder. He therefore arranges for Rival to 
make a competing and higher offer than Bidder, and Target accordingly decides to sell the 
assets to the former company. 
 
Traditionally, the mechanism to protect the shareholders was the removal of the competing 
director. In this case, the general meeting is entitled to dismiss the director. After the Law 
changed in the aftermath of Enron and related scandals, the traditional prohibition to compete 
has been kept (art. 228 LSC), but the prohibition to exploit corporate opportunities has been 
added (art. 230 LSC). Both rules can be applicable, but it is not clear how the two rules should 
be coordinated.  
 
 As in scenario 4, but A resigns from his position as director of Bidder before Rival makes the 
competing offer. 
 
I am not aware of any judicial ruling on the point, but it seems clear that if the corporate 
opportunity arises while the director is part of the board, he is not allowed to exploit it, even if 
the action of exploitation takes place later. Resignation makes no difference.   
 
 As in scenario 4, but after an initial expression of interest by Bidder in acquiring the assets 
and before Rival has taken any steps to make a competing offer, the Bidder board determines 
that an investment of that size is not advisable at the present time in light of Bidder’s weak 
financial position. 
 
If the company is not interested in the transaction, the corporate opportunities provision does 
not apply. The conflicted director should abstain from participating in the decision of the board 
of directors resolving that the company should not pursue the opportunity. 
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The United Kingdom 
 
Hypothetical I: Liability of the parent and directors of the parent for breaches of duty at the 
level of the subsidiary 
 
A pharmaceutical company is currently developing two new drugs. After assessing the potential 
liability risks associated with the future products, the directors of the pharmaceutical company decide 
to incorporate two separate private limited companies, each taking over the development, research 
and future marketing of one of the two drugs. 
 
The directors of the pharmaceutical company appoint the two project managers as directors of the two 
subsidiary companies. The two subsidiary companies enter into an agreement allowing them access 
to the parent company's research facilities. According to the subsidiary's articles of association, all 
major strategic decisions regarding the research, development and marketing of the drugs are subject 
to approval by their sole shareholder, the pharmaceutical company. The employees working for the 
subsidiaries are formally still employed with the parent company, but are posted with the subsidiaries 
under an agreement entered into by the parent company and the two subsidiaries upon formation of 
the two companies. 
 
When the directors of the parent company learn about competitors working on similar projects, they try 
to accelerate the development process of the two drugs. They award substantial bonuses to the 
subsidiary’s directors, contingent on the drugs receiving regulatory approval within the next 6 months. 
The original schedule provided for further tests, which would take at least 12 months. 
 
Primarily because of the contingent bonus payment, the directors of the subsidiaries skip some of the 
planned tests and studies, and cover up this decision in their filings for regulatory approval. 
 
The two drugs gain regulatory approval within the 6 month time span, and are successfully marketed 
shortly after that.  
 
Two years after the initial marketing, independent studies reveal that one of the drugs causes a rare 
form of lethal cancer, exposing the relevant subsidiary to enormous product liability claims that far 
exceed its net assets. The drug developed by the other subsidiary proves to be safe and leads to 
substantial profits. 
 
 Is it possible that the parent company would be liable in circumstances comparable to the stylised 
facts above? 
 Under which circumstances would the directors of the parent company face a liability risk in those 
circumstances? 
 
 De-facto director: It is unlikely that a court would find that the parent company is a de facto 
director. To become a de-facto director a person must assume responsibility as a de facto 
director, which does not appear to be the case on the basis of the hypothetical. The fact that 
parent company directors are also subsidiary directors does not make the parent company a 
de-facto director. 
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 Shadow director: a person is a shadow director where the directors are accustomed to act in 
accordance with the instructions of that person. What one needs to identify is a pattern of 
behaviour in which the directors do not exercise their own judgment, but rather do as the 
“shadow director” has instructed. On the facts it seems unlikely that the parent is a shadow 
director. The parent uses incentives to mould subsidiary director decision-making. Such 
incentives at this level of the corporate structure would arguably not be required if the parent 
was used to simply telling the actual directors what to do. Furthermore, under UK law it is 
unclear what duties in fact apply to shadow directors.   
 Group liability: it would not be possible to pierce the corporate veil on these facts. There is 
scope to argue that the parent owes directly a duty of care in tort to the subsidiary customers 
on these facts – particularly the control the parent assumes in relation to the drug 
development and approval process. Recent UK tort case law in the context of parent duties 
owed to subsidiary employees supports this, but it is not clear that this authority can be 
extended beyond this setting.  
 Insolvency law would not provide a solution on these facts. 
 
 
Hypothetical II: Duties in the vicinity of insolvency 
 
After making losses for three consecutive years, an oil trading company’s equity ratio (equity divided 
by total assets) has fallen below [1% - 5% - 10%]. On average, comparable companies in the same 
line of business have an equity ratio of about 25%.  
 
The company still has substantial assets, but the thin equity cushion makes it hard for the company to 
pursue its core business, as trading partners demand higher prices to compensate them for the 
perceived higher risk of the company's operations.   
 
The company's directors evaluate different possibilities to improve the business prospects of the 
company. They attribute past trading losses to the substantially higher volatility of oil prices following 
the financial crisis, and maintain the view that the company's business model is sustainable in the long 
run. After exploring the possibility to raise new equity to recapitalise the business, they conclude that 
current market conditions would force them to issue new shares at prohibitively low prices, which 
would lead to a substantial dilution of their current shareholders. 
 
After analysing the market conditions, the directors come to the conclusion that the market price for 
crude oil is bound to rise significantly over the next year, particularly due to high anticipated demand 
from emerging market economies. In an attempt to recapitalise the company the directors decide to 
invest heavily in crude oil futures. They expect that the anticipated increase in oil prices will lead to 
substantial gains from this transaction, bringing the equity ratio back in line with the industry average, 
and thus allowing the company to resume their trading operations at more sustainable conditions.  
 
The directors are aware that a sudden substantial fall in oil prices could potentially wipe out the 
remaining equity of the firm, but they consider the likelihood of this happening to be very low.  
 
Shortly after entering into the forward sale agreement, worries about a sovereign debt crisis lead to a 
revision of worldwide economic growth forecasts. The price of crude oil falls more than 10% on a 
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single day, the worst one day performance in many years. As the company cannot fulfil the margin 
calls on its forward sales contracts, the positions are closed by the counterparty. The closed positions 
have a negative value exceeding the company’s equity, leading to the company’s over-indebtedness. 
Trading partners refuse to enter into transactions with the company due to its financial position, and 
banks close all existing credit lines of the company. 
 
 Fiduciary duties: when a company is operating in the zone of / approaching cash flow  
insolvency the duties owed to the company (section 172 Companies Act 2006) become duties 
to promote the success of the company for the benefit of both creditors and shareholders and 
to take due care in so doing. When insolvent those duties are then to promote the interests of 
the creditors alone and to take care in so doing. The law remains somewhat unclear on what 
is the “verge” of insolvency and in what ways creditor interests are taken into account in this 
zone (priority versus plurality). On these facts the risk of failure that is apparent would mean 
that the interests of creditors would intrude. However, the business judgment taken to buy the 
futures would be judged according to the section 172 standard, which is a subjective standard 
(in practice a rationality standard). There appeared at the time to be a sound basis for this 
decision, accordingly there would be no breach. In relation to the duty of care the facts 
suggest that due care was taken which would comply with the UK’s dual subjective / objective 
care standard.  
 Wrongful trading: although wrongful trading could provide a remedy when taking risky 
decisions in the zone of insolvency, the facts suggest (low probability of price drop) that this 
would not provide a remedy in this context. The remedy imposes creditor-regarding 
obligations when a director should have realised there was no way of avoiding insolvent 
liquidation. The law has not attempted to define the probability of avoidance required by this 
provision. The low probability suggested in the facts would not be sufficient.  
 
Hypothetical III: Duty of care 
 
A large banking institution is engaged in retail as well as investment banking. In 2000, a new CEO 
was appointed, who also sits on the board of directors. The CEO made the decision to invest heavily 
in collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) backed by residential mortgage-backed securities, including 
lower-rated securities that pooled subprime mortgages to borrowers with weak credit history. The 
investments were initially successful, generating high profits for the company. However, beginning in 
2005, house prices, particularly in the United States, began to decrease. Defaults and foreclosures 
increased and the income from residential mortgages fell rapidly.  
 
As early as May 2005, economist Paul Krugman had warned of signs that the US housing market was 
approaching the final stages of a speculative bubble. Early in 2007, a large US subprime lender filed 
for bankruptcy protection and a number of investors announced write downs of several billion dollars 
on their structured finance commitments. In July, 2007, Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s 
downgraded bonds backed by subprime mortgages. At the end of 2007, two hedge funds that had 
invested heavily in subprime mortgages declared bankruptcy. In spite of these warning signs, the CEO 
had continued to invest in CDOs until shortly before the Lehman bankruptcy in September 2008, 
accumulating a total exposure of more than 20 billion Euro/Pounds/… . The subprime mortgage crisis 
necessitated massive write downs, leading to an annual loss of eight billion in 2008, which can be 
attributed in equal measure to the CDO transactions undertaken in 2005-2008. 
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The CEO resigned in October 2008. As part of the resignation, the CEO entered into an agreement 
with the company providing that he would receive 50 million Euro/Pounds/… upon his departure, 
including bonus and stock options, and in addition an office, administrative assistant, car and driver 
until he would commence full time employment with another employer. In exchange, the CEO signed 
a non-compete agreement and a release of claims against the company. The agreement with the 
CEO was approved by all directors (the CEO abstaining from voting), acting on behalf of the company. 
 
After the CEO’s departure and with a new management team in place, it transpires that the old CEO 
had used a number of ostensibly arms-length transactions with investment firms that were, however, 
controlled by the CEO’s nominees, to transfer assets at an undervalue to a company owned by the 
CEO on the Cayman Islands. When the true nature of these transactions becomes known, the assets 
are no longer recoverable. 
 
Questions: 
 
 Is the CEO liable for annual loss suffered by the company in 2008? 
 
The UK does not have a US style business judgment rule, but in effect business decisions are 
similarly regulated. The standard that applies to the business decision - as distinct from the care 
taken in making the decision - is a subjective standard: to do what you consider promotes the 
success of the company for the benefit of the shareholders. Although there is some disagreement 
on this point, UK law does not require “reasonable decisions”. In practice, this results in the 
application of a rationality or plausibility standard: could the decision rationally or plausibly have 
made sense in the shareholders’ interests (assuming no verge of insolvency problem) at the time 
the decision was made. Clearly that is possible in this case even if some market participants 
claimed that the market was heading towards impending doom.  
 
The duty of care as applied to decisions requires a reasonable decision-making process (as 
assessed by a dual subjective / objective reasonable director standard). The facts do not suggest 
that inadequate care was taken in deciding to make the sub-prime investments in a market in 
which everyone else (i.e., the average director) continued to party.  
 
 Have the directors (other than the CEO) breached their fiduciary duties by approving the 
agreement in conjunction with the resignation of the outgoing CEO? 
 
Decision-making: this decision in a company that is UK Corporate Governance Code 
compliant would be made by the remuneration committee that consists only of independent 
non-executive directors. 
 
Duty of care: The decision to make the resignation pay award is more problematic. But again 
a case that this was in the company’s interests can be made depending on the plausible 
assessment of the value of the release and the non-compete – at the time it was entered into. 
At the time major figures in UK banks resigned their posts in the early stages of the crisis it 
was not unreasonable to expect that those figures would work again in the sector. That 
proved to be inaccurate, but duty compliance is determined at the time the decision was 
made.   
 
 
 
 
 
393 Directors’ Duties and Liability in the EU  
 
 Have the members of the company’s internal audit committee (of which the CEO was not a 
member) breached their fiduciary duties by not identifying the true nature of the ostensibly 
arms-length transactions and are they, accordingly, liable for the loss suffered by the 
company as a consequence of the transactions? Have the other directors (except the CEO) 
breached their duties? 
 
The facts are not full enough to give clear direction on this issue. The non-arms-length 
transactions raise questions about the duty of care and monitoring and internal controls, 
particularly for directors who undertake particular responsibility for those controls. The duty of 
care in the UK does not allow directors to delegate power and then absolve themselves of 
responsibility for the exercise of that power. Furthermore, this duty takes account of the role 
and function of the director (e.g., audit committee member). However, the facts of the 
hypothetical do not provide much information to judge duty compliance in this regard. If the 
directors had taken care to ensure that internal controls were in place to provide for the 
reporting of such transactions, then the failure to actually report them to the directors would 
not result in a breach of duty. If on the other hand directors were aware of these red flags but 
had not taken steps to do anything about them then clearly this raises duty of care issues 
directly in relation to these transactions. It would also be relevant information more generally 
about care compliance in relation to these directors and the resignation pay-off.  
 
 
 Assuming that the company has a claim against the CEO or another director pursuant to one 
or more of the above questions, can a minority shareholder enforce the claim? 
 
Issues: 
 
Who can bring a claim on behalf of the company? Any shareholder regardless of when the 
share was purchased if the court gives permission to continue a derivative action.  
 
Does the derivative action exist? If not, how does the law ensure that minority 
shareholders are protected against collusive behaviour by the majority and the 
directors? Yes a derivative action is permissible with the permission of the court. UK law also 
provides an unfair prejudice remedy that in some instances may be used to protect the 
shareholders (depending on the circumstances this remedy may create additional substantive 
protection or be a means to enforce other rights). 
 
What is the threshold to bring a derivative action? Court approval 
 
Do conditions exist that must be satisfied before a court will allow a derivative action to 
proceed (for example, will the court review whether the action is in the interest of the 
company or frivolous)? Yes, multiple conditions focused around good faith, company 
interest, and shareholder views (probable view) of the litigation.  
 
Who bears the costs for a derivative action? Normal cost rules apply unless an 
indemnification order is awarded in favour of the derivative litigant to cover her costs (win or 
lose). 
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Hypothetical IV: Duty of loyalty 
 
A mining company (‘Bidder’) considers expanding business operations. The board identifies assets 
held by another company (‘Target’) as a possible acquisition. The following scenarios ask you to 
consider the liability of a director (‘A’) on the board of Bidder. 
 
 Director A is also majority shareholder in Target, holding 60 percent of the outstanding share 
capital of the company. As majority shareholder of Target, he is interested in an acquisition 
that is beneficial to Target. He proposes that Bidder purchase the assets for 10 million 
Euro/Pounds/…, knowing that the value ranges between 7 and 8 million. Director A does not 
disclose his interest in Target to the board of Bidder. A majority of the directors approves the 
acquisition. A’s vote was not decisive for the positive vote. 
 
Does the law require directors to disclose direct or indirect interests in transactions 
with the company? Yes. 
 
Is this duty laid down in the companies act or does it derive from the fiduciary position 
of the director?  The duty is laid down in the Act, but common law rules will apply if there is 
non-compliance. 
 
If the director violates the disclosure obligation, is the transaction void or voidable or 
does the director have to pay damages? The transaction is voidable. Possible remedies 
include equitable compensation and accounting for profits. 
 
 As in scenario 1, but Director A discloses his interest in Target to the board of Bidder, and a 
majority of the uninterested directors approves the acquisition. 
 
Issue: Does the interested director have to abstain from voting when the board decides 
on the conflicted interest transaction? It depends on the articles of association. Typically 
yes. 
 
If he/she fully informs the board and abstains from voting and the board approves the 
transaction, is it valid? Yes. 
 
 
 As in scenario 1, but when the shareholders of Bidder learn of A’s interest in Target, they 
ratify the transaction, believing that it is in the company’s interests. 
 
Issue: Can the shareholders authorise or ratify a related-party transaction? Yes. 
 
Can the conflicted director vote on such a resolution if he/she is also shareholder? She 
can vote but the votes will not be counted for the purposes of the ratification resolution, so 
effectively no.  
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How is minority shareholder protection ensured? For example, can the minority 
shareholder appeal to the courts and claim that the transaction was not in the 
company’s interest? A non-disclosed or approved transaction is a breach of duty which can 
be enforced derivatively (subject to the conditions outlined above). The claim would not be 
that the transaction is not in the company’s interest, rather a claim for breach of the applicable 
duty requiring disclosure.   
 
 Director A is majority shareholder and managing director in a competitor of bidder (‘Rival’), 
which is also active in the mining business. The assets held by Target that Bidder seeks to 
acquire consist in claims near Rival’s own mining territories. Director A is of the opinion that 
the assets are more valuable for Rival than for Bidder. He therefore arranges for Rival to 
make a competing and higher offer than Bidder, and Target accordingly decides to sell the 
assets to the former company. 
 
Issue: Does a corporate opportunities doctrine exist? Yes. 
 
If yes, when does it apply (for example, only if the opportunity falls within the 
company’s line of business and the company is legally and financially able to pursue 
the opportunity, or are all business opportunities caught that would be theoretically of 
value to the company)? All business opportunities under current case law. Financial 
capacity is irrelevant. No line of business restriction (currently). 
 
If not, what are alternative mechanisms to protect the company and the (minority) 
shareholders? Is the duty not to compete with the company a substitute for the duty-of-
loyalty based corporate opportunities doctrine? Is it equally effective? N/A 
 
 As in scenario 4, but A resigns from his position as director of Bidder before Rival makes the 
competing offer. 
 
Issue: Does the prohibition to exploit corporate opportunities (or the duty not to 
compete) continue to bind the director after resignation? Yes. 
 
If the duty continues to apply, how is this dogmatically justified? In two ways: (1) as the 
continuing application of the fiduciary duty to opportunities identified during the director’s 
tenure or (2) (under pre-Companies Act 2006 case law) on a proprietary type basis – that 
under certain conditions the opportunity belongs to the company (the maturing business 
opportunity approach).  
 
 
 As in scenario 4, but after an initial expression of interest by Bidder in acquiring the assets 
and before Rival has taken any steps to make a competing offer, the Bidder board determines 
that an investment of that size is not advisable at the present time in light of Bidder’s weak 
financial position. 
 
Issue: See the remark regarding scenario 4. Does the corporate opportunities doctrine 
(or the duty not to compete) even apply if the board of directors resolves that the 
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company should not pursue the opportunity? This is not clear. But a strong case can be 
made that it does. 
 
Can the conflicted director participate in the decision of the board? Traditionally the non-
involvement of the director would not be sufficient to allow the opportunity to be taken. The 
codification of this provision in the Companies Act opens some room to argue that this rule no 
longer applies. However, participation (even minority participation) would most likely result in 
the opportunity not being available to the director.  
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